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The U. S. Army’s presence in Germany after the Nazi regime’s capitulation in May 1945, 
required pursuit of two stated missions:  (1) to secure German borders, and (2) to establish an 
occupation government within the U. S. assigned occupation zone.  Both missions required 
logistics support, an often unstated but critical mission.   The security mission, provided largely 
by the combat troops, declined between 1945 and 1948, but grew again, with the Berlin 
Blockade in 1948, and then with the Korean crisis in 1950.  However, the occupation mission 
grew under the military government (1945-1949), and then during the Allied High Commission 
era (1949-1955).  The build-up of U. S. Army infrastructure during the early occupation years 
has stood forward-deployed U. S. military forces in Europe in good stead throughout the ensuing 
years.    
The United States military force, predominantly the U. S. Army, was the only 
U. S. Government agency possessing the ability and resources needed to support the occupation 
mission.  Furthermore, U. S. Army logistics support underpinned not only the U. S. military 
occupation mission between 1945 and 1949, the U. S. presence on the Allied High Commission 
until its official retirement in 1955, but also the U. S. security forces on the ground throughout 
the entire period and for decades later. 
The objectives in this study are threefold.  First, to validate that U. S. Army logistics in 
the U. S. Zone of Occupation in Germany between 1945 and 1949 laid the foundation for the 
long-term presence of the U. S. Army in Germany.  Second, to analyze the rationale for the 
build-up of logistics during this period.  Third, to analyze the impact of U. S. Army soldiers, 






Two months after a successful dissertation defense, pondering how to wrap up the last 
administrative and dissertation submission details, I spoke again with one of the two people who 
really lived almost daily with my project and me, albeit one of the two often from a distance.  
While both people are German to the core, the one remains in Germany, the other here in the 
United States.  Suse Pfeiffer, a Württemberger, is almost eighty-nine now but she was twenty at 
the end of the war, and lived in the U. S. occupation zone.  The other person was only four years 
old, also lived within the U. S. occupation zone, but too young to remember many details.   The 
one with whom I spoke this morning, Suse, not only provided me with her own experiences, but 
introduced me to a number of others from her age group, who rounded out the stories with their 
own experiences.  Moreover, Suse has constantly supported my efforts, and this morning was no 
different.  The other, my husband, Jürgen, not only raised my often-sagging spirits, but also 
provided focus and perspective and more often than not, cleared a path through the sometime 
bureaucratic German archival system.  I cannot over-emphasize the role these two played in my 
completion of this narrative.  As important as their support has been to me personally, however, I 
could not have completed this project without a mountain (a nice logistics term) of assistance 
and support from professional sources. 
First, my dissertation committee deserves the academic equivalent of a military Legion of 
Merit for putting up with the legion of unmeritorious questions I asked.  My chair at the 
University of Kansas, Theodore Wilson, suggested the topic, that at the time I thought to be a 
rather simple subject.  Ha!  Ted Wilson, judiciously or otherwise, gave me full rein until toward 
the end of my journey when he wisely intervened in my somewhat haphazard navigations, to 
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suggest a few timely texts to add some necessary baggage to the load.  I must say, these readings 
are classics and I truly appreciate his suggestions. 
Two committee members, Eve Levin and Leonie Marx, suffered the most from my 
uncertainties and difficulties with focus and preciseness.  Eve Levin was my History Department 
Graduate Advisor, who voted to accept me initially into the PhD program and reminded me 
(often) that I had “what it takes” to push through.  As a professional scholar and editor, Eve 
Levin’s talent and expertise in information management set me straight more than once.  I still 
ask myself, “Why does chronology have to be so important?”  To Leonie Marx, the not-so- 
“outside” committee member and Graduate Advisor in the German Literature and Languages 
Department, fell the task of validating not only my German language capability, as much of my 
research was conducted in German archives using German language material, but she also 
represented the Modern German history expertise lacking in my own department.  Additionally, 
in Leonie Marx’ world, language matters, a skill I still struggle with.  Without these two women, 
I assure you I would not have completed this dissertation.  My other committee members stuck 
with me through muddle and puddle:  Nathan Wood, Adrian Lewis and Jake Kipp, each one 
providing expert knowledge in their specialties throughout my program, culminating in this 
successful project.  Thank you, all!   
Second, no research project succeeds without the assistance and support of dedicated 
archivists and researchers who worked with me to dig up relatively obscure data.  All deserve 
mention, although each one had always demurred with, “I am only doing my job.”  Sabine 
Schrag and the staff at Stadtarchiv Stuttgart in Bad Cannstatt, committed to providing world-
class support to all visitors, extended assistance and hospitality that made us feel at home.  The 
archive possesses an incredible amount of data – it would take months to comb through it all.  
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Especially helpful with occupation history, my thanks to Dr. Ulrich Hussong at the Stadtarchiv 
Marburg.  Tim Renick and John Shields at the U. S. Army Logistics University Library, Fort Lee 
and Luther Hanson, curator at the Ft. Lee Army Quartermaster Museum provided not only their 
time and encouragement but also convinced me, “There is a story out there – you just need to 
find it.”  Randy Sowell at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum took me under 
his wing, as he has so many professional scholars and students, opening folders, documents, and 
in their wake, raising thoughtful questions about the direction of my research and proposing 
counter-ideas.  Likewise, the archivists and staff at the President Dwight D. Eisenhower Library 
were equally supportive.  Of course, I had to return to the CARL at Fort Leavenworth and 
Carlisle Barracks for visits, and the staff at both CARL and the Army Heritage and Education 
Center made it worth my while.  The crews there are so steeped in military history, and typical of 
the military family, both military and civilian, so incredibly knowledgeable of what source has 
which file, document, list or pictures, I shudder to think of the day when any of them retire!  
Thank you all!   
Not connected to any of the official archives, but an archive unto himself, I would truly 
be amiss in not acknowledging the assistance I received from Allen Dale Olson, much of whose 
career tracked with the development of the Dependent School System (DSS), later known at 
Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS), and now Department of Defense 
Education Activity (DODEA).  Allen Dale Olson not only shared his own experiences in 
Germany but also introduced me to many of the educators who also taught in the American 
school system there in the early days.  Thank you!      
I would also like to applaud the University of Kansas Watson and Anschutz library staffs 
and particularly the Interlibrary Loan Department for their diligence and creativity in assisting 
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with this research.  My thanks also to the all-too-often nameless students working at the libraries 
who politely withheld jokes about the two dinosaurs (my husband and me) checking out all the 
material.  One young man actually offered to help me carry the book bags down the stairs of 
Watson Library.     
Fourth, the administrative experts within the History Department, the College of 
Graduate Affairs and Pamela Rooks make what is to this student a nightmare of administrative 
detail, look like pre-school.  The outside supporters – Walter Elkins and the CARE staff at 
CARE Deutschland-Luxemburg contributed graciously to this effort.  Thank you. 
Fifth, my heart-felt thanks go out to that small core of people who trudged with me for 
the last three years, convincing me, “You can do this.”  You know who you are and I am 
grateful! 
Finally, to all the Loggies, past and present, who have served their Army and country 
over the years.  Without your often-unheralded efforts, the missions would have faltered. 



















For Suse and Jürgen,  
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But the Second World War had been a war unlike any other, right from the start – 
when Germany had held the whip hand and had broken all the usual conventions 
of conquest – and now that the Reich was on its knees, the Allies would likewise 





If World War II was unlike any preceding war then the occupation that followed was 
unprecedented and unique.  Four sovereign states occupied another sovereign state, forced it to 
surrender unconditionally and abdicate its sovereignty, set up four zonal military governments 
with the intent to demilitarize, deindustrialize, decartelize and democratize the country, and then 
establish a peace treaty, returning sovereignty to that state – Germany.  Further, never before had 
the U. S. military worked so hard to change a state and a nation of people as the U. S. military 
government did in its occupation zone and Berlin sector within Germany between 1945 and 
1949.  Systemically and often daily U. S. occupation policy permeated the lives of Germans.  
Never before had logistics played such an eminent role in fighting and supporting not 
only the U. S. military forces, but also Allied forces, to win the war.  While combat officially 
ended with capitulation, the logistics mission continued.  Without U. S. military logistics 
resources, the occupation, at least in Western Germany would have ended in a fiasco.  One could 
say that while the fighters and flyers won the war, logisticians won the peace. 
The U. S. Government’s position on Allied occupation policy, not yet scripted at the start 
of the war, faced continued rewrites even after Victory-in-Europe (V-E) Day.  Undoubtedly, 
neither the British, nor the Soviets, and after Potsdam, the French, had prepared executable plans 
on the shelf by May 1945.  In fact, the Big Three (Britain, Soviet Union, United States) only 
                                                   
1 Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler:  the Occupation and Denazification of Germany (New York:  Bloomsbury 
Press, 2011), 67.  
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approved the division of Germany into occupation zones by September 1944, and that would 
change again in February 1945, when the Soviets agreed to France receiving a zone (see 
Appendix III.2.1, Occupation Zones Map).   
The Potsdam Protocol, agreed to by the Big Three went into effect on 1 August 1945, 
three months after Victory in Europe (V-E) Day (8 May 1945).  The Protocol (Section II B, 
paragraph 14)
2
 established the principle of economic unity within occupied Germany.  The levels 
of industry
3
 established under the Potsdam Protocol and subsequent Allied Control Council and 
Foreign Minister Council meetings acknowledged the uneven distribution of resources among 
the occupation zones – hence the necessity for economic unity.  However, the four occupation 
powers -- Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States – through the Allied Control 
Council, never achieved this objective.  The inability or unwillingness to establish economic 
unity left each occupation government to govern, and provide needed resources individually 
within their zone in accordance with national guidance.  President Roosevelt, as early as 
December 1943,
4
 alluded to a short, harsh and total occupation of one or two years in Germany 
following unconditional surrender and victory.  Unlike the armistice, Versailles Peace Treaty and 
partial Rhineland Occupation following World War I, this occupation developed into a decade-
                                                   
2
 The Potsdam Protocol is discussed in detail in Chapter II, following.  
3
 This term  was decided upon by Allied Control Council members and their advising economists to define the 
amount of production Germany would be allowed in order provide basics for the indigenous population as well as to 
cover the costs of necessary imports – primarily food supplies as well as raw resources for small industry 
manufacturing.  
4 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, even by the Tehran Conference in December 1943, commented that a one or two 
years’ occupation would suffice.  As far as the senior military leaders, e.g., General Dwight D. Eisenhower, they had 
hoped the State Department would pick up the occupation government mission from capitulation forward; at worst, 
an initial military government could be turned over to State Department colleagues as early as a few months after 
German capitulation.  See, for example, correspondence between General Eisenhower and General Marshall, 24 Sep 
1945, 13, 23 Oct 1945, or his letter to President Truman, 26 Oct 1945 (copies located at Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Library, Eisenhower Papers, Box 80, file July-December 1945, and President Truman’s response of 2 Nov 1945 at 
the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Official B File). Of course, late in the war, President Roosevelt selected 
the U. S. Army as the occupation government and security force to govern in Germany.  An occupation end date was 
not established during the war. 
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long occupation followed by the decades-long stationing of U.S. military forces and civilian 
personnel on West German soil, and finally a peace treaty forty-five years later.   
How did a year or two turn into more than half a century?  What issues and events lay at 
the roots of the massive build-up of infrastructure in the U. S. occupation zone in Germany by 
the U. S. military forces, and particularly by the U. S. Army? 
The orthodox metanarrative for the build-up of American military forces on German soil 
after World War II suggests that responses to a perceived political-military threat and the 
ideological goal of world domination by the Soviet Union accounted for the extension and build-
up of the U. S. military presence in Germany.  As the Cold War developed, those espousing this 
argument opined that American military forces with their allies controlling the British and 
French zones of occupation would delay, if not counter, the potent Soviet military forces in East 
Germany and the neighboring Eastern European countries in the event of a Soviet attempt to 
move west of the agreed-upon zonal boundaries.   
This perception of a Soviet threat in Europe existed in numerous U. S. Government and 
possibly academic circles even before war’s end.  In fact, according to Mark Stoler, Allies and 
Adversaries,5 American Joint Chiefs of Staff planners had already begun in 1944-1946 to 
develop mid-term strategic plans naming the Soviet Union as a potential adversary.  Moreover, 
according to this neo-orthodox narrative, the American military strategists also considered the 
British as potential adversaries.  No doubt, many in the U. S. military establishment did consider 
Soviet military forces as the latent if not overt threat, regardless; it is the nature of a military 
organization to plan strategically for future operations – such operations based on assumptions in 
most cases.  Furthermore, American planners certainly had reason to see the USSR as a potential 
                                                   
5 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries:  the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U. S. Strategy in World 
War II (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
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competitor, if not adversary.  William Baugh offers a tableau of global trends already by 1945 
pointing in this direction:  a declining British Empire already facing loss of key colonies, a 
defeated France facing a difficult political future at home as well as clashes within its colonial 
empire, and a defeated Germany not likely to challenge its traditional competitors in the near 
future.
6
  Adding to the mix, the only state capable of carrying the economic burden of war, the 
United States, would most likely not retreat again to its northern hemisphere borders.   
While American strategic planners considered the Soviets as future adversaries, I believe 
it unlikely that President Truman or his senior advisors considered a military confrontation with 
the Soviet Union likely within the first five years after World War II.  Rather, it would appear 
that President Truman opted for political stability through economic recovery, as a labyrinth of 
more urgent issues faced the U. S. Government in the aftermath of the war.  Domestically, 
switching industrial production from wartime to peacetime footing, and expanding employment 
opportunities to accommodate returning veterans topped the list.   Internationally,  President 
Truman demonstrated the primacy of political stability through economic recovery by the $400 
million appropriation to Greece and Turkey (March 1947) to stabilize the political situation in 
light of the British inability to continue to support the Greek government against the communist-
led guerrillas, and the discussions over and eventual Congressional approval of the European 
Recovery Plan (April 1948).   
Perhaps these efforts reflect the realization that America could not have conducted 
another war tactically or logistically in this timeframe.  Scholars endorsing this position also 
argue that the Soviet Union was in no better a position to prosecute active conflict.  So argues 
                                                   
6 William H. Baugh, United States Foreign Policy Making:  Process, Problems, and Prospect (Fort Worth:  
Harcourt College Publishers, 2000). 
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Vojtech Mastny in Russia’s Road to the Cold War.7  Mastny contends that Stalin based his 
foreign policy decisions and actions on Russia’s historical and imperial traditions of seeking 
security as well as on Communist ideology – neither point advocating military offensive actions.  
Further, Melvyn P. Leffler supports Mastny’s argument that “ideology did not dictate an 
offensive, expansionist, revolutionary foreign policy.”
8
  Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. 
Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II,9 repeat a quotation from Stalin to Djilas:  
“The war shall soon be over.  We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years and then we’ll have 
another go at it,”
10
 while arguing from the angle of foreign policy and rational actor behavior 
that:   
Evidence suggests that Stalin had reason to expect that his actions in Eastern 
Europe would not be challenged by American arms, if only in Roosevelt’s 
statement at Yalta that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe within 
two years after the war’s end.  .  .  Certainly a leader who expected imminent 
armed conflict would not have taken steps to demobilize the largest portion of his 
own army; by Khrushchev’s calculations the Soviet armed forces were reduced 




For Stalin, a united, neutral, demilitarized Germany under pro-Soviet influence would provide 
the Soviet Union a security blanket in the West.  I contend that the intent of the Soviet blockade 
of Berlin, considerably cheaper than outright military actions, in June 1948, was to chase the 
British, French and American forces out of Berlin, opening the possibility for an eventual 
German vote for neutral unity.    
                                                   
7
 Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War:  Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 1979).   
8
 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War:  What Do We Now Know?”  The American Historical Review 104, no. 2, 
(April 1999):  501-524.  Also, A Preponderance of Power:  National Security, the Truman Administration, and the 
Cold War (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1993). 
9
 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 2nd ed. (New York:  
Pergamon Press, 1986). 
10
 Ibid., 77.  Nogee and Donaldson cite Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York:  Harcourt Brace and 
World, 1962), 115. 
11
 Ibid., 77-78. 
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A stronger argument for continuing the military occupation in Germany suggests that the 
basic needs of the people in war-torn Europe, in accordance with international law and the terms 
of Germany’s unconditional surrender, prompted the beginning of the long-term U. S. military 
presence in Europe, centered in Germany.  The obligations under which the U. S. Army forces 
operated  required the U. S. Army to supply not only the basic needs of the indigenous 
populations in its zone, but also those populations in both the British and French occupation 
zones, given the dire economic straits of the British and French at home.  Moreover, the U. S. 
military force needed its logistics tail not only to support its own requirements in the U. S. 
occupation zone, but also – at least until August 1945 -- to redeploy excess servicemembers and 
equipment to the Pacific Theater to join the fight against the Japanese.  Additionally, thousands 
of war-weary veterans awaited return to the United States to demobilize.  Practical matters often 
interfered with desired shipping schedules – demand for ships outpaced supply, and until August 
1945, the Pacific Theater had shipping priority.  Furthermore, logisticians always have the clean-
up detail, e.g., redeployment, sale or disposal of millions of tons of war material.  
Several other considerations framed the early years of the occupation.  First, no official 
timetable existed for ending the occupation except acceptance of a Peace Treaty by the Four 
Powers.  The Council of Foreign Ministers, established by the Potsdam Protocol as successor to 
the European Advisory Committee failed to approve a Peace Treaty for Germany so the 
occupation dragged on until 1955 when West Germany regained sovereignty and membership in 
NATO.  Second, the U. S. State Department should have been the logical choice to administer 
and manage the U. S. occupation, as it would after 1949 (to this day, the U. S. Ambassador 
remains the senior U. S. representative in country), but President Roosevelt designated the U. S. 
Army for this task.  Regardless, the U. S. military forces represented the only standing 
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organization in the U. S. Government’s arsenal with the resources to support such a mission.  
Third, President Truman’s priorities in 1945 rested on bringing the war in the Pacific to a close 
and retooling American industry for a peacetime economy.  At the same time, he needed to 
balance the economic requirements of retooling with closing out excess wartime production, 
reduced manpower requirements, employment for demobilized veterans, as well as infrastructure 
and housing needs created during the war, if not also dating back to the Depression.  Last, 
perhaps not a critical point in 1945, but German occupation costs funded the housing and other 
costs associated with troops deployed in Germany, lessening the financial burden on the U. S. 
Government.   
The U. S. Army’s presence in Germany after the Nazi regime’s capitulation in May 1945, 
required pursuit of two stated missions:  (1) to secure German borders and (2) to establish an 
occupation government within the U. S. assigned occupation zone.  Both missions required 
logistics support, an often unstated but implicit, ongoing, if not in fact, a third critical mission.   
The security mission, provided largely by the combat troops, declined gradually between 1945 
and 1948, but grew again, first with the Berlin Blockade in 1948, and then with the onset of the 
Korean crisis in 1950.  However, the other mission – the occupation mission, actually grew, first 
under the military government (1945-1949), and then during the Allied High Commission era, a 
civilian operation, which gradually phased out between 1952 and 1955.  German membership in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 replaced occupation with stationing of 
foreign forces under NATO Status of Forces Agreements – a status in effect to this day.  The 
build-up of U. S. Army infrastructure during the early occupation years has stood the U. S. Army 
in good stead throughout the ensuing years.    
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Regardless of the organization in charge during the ten occupation years -- the U. S. 
military government (1945-1949) or the Allied High Commission (1949-1955), U. S. military 
forces, predominantly the U. S. Army, continued to provide logistics support – the only U. S. 
Government agency possessing the ability and resources needed to support the American 
mission.  It was also the only force structure available and capable of critical infrastructure repair 
within its occupation zone (see Chapter IV for the detailed discussion).    Furthermore, U. S. 
Army logistics support underpinned not only the U. S. military occupation mission between 1945 
and 1949, the U. S. presence on the Allied High Commission until its official retirement in 1955, 
but also the U. S. security forces on the ground throughout the entire period.  How inclusive was 
this logistics support? 
Logisticians across the spectrum and over time define logistics differently.  Although 
known in the logistics business by such witticisms as, the tooth-to-tail ratio, or the tail wags the 
dog, in which the tail represents logistics, people outside the logistics field often enough do not 
grasp the broad range of logistics.  As Admiral King stated to a naval staff officer in 1942, “I 
don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that [General] Marshall
12
 is always talking about, but I 
want some of it.”
13
   Today, for example, the U. S. Army Materiel Command (U. S. Army’s most 
senior logistics command) asserts, “If a Soldier shoots it, drives it, flies it, wears it, 
communicates with it, or eats it, AMC [the Army Materiel Command] provides it.”
14
  However, 
looking back at World War II, logisticians organized differently.  Known as the Services of 
Supply, the logistics field included not only today’s traditional loggies – quartermasters, 
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ordnance (maintenance and ammunition), transportation – but also the medical corps, engineers, 
signal, chemical, military police and reinforcement personnel (administration and finance).                
Martin van Creveld defines logistics as, “the practical art of moving armies and keeping 
them supplied.”  He amplifies this definition by stating,  
Before a commander can even start thinking of manoeuvring or giving battle, of 
marching this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating 
or wearing down, in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, 
he has – or ought – to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers with those 
3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease to be of any use as 
soldiers; that roads to carry them to the right place at the right time are available, 





John Lynn, another military historian, suggests that “Mars must be fed; the soldiers and 
sailors who practice his craft need food, clothing and equipment.  All these must be produced, 
transported, and distributed to contending forces if they are to begin or continue the contest.”
16
 
Obviously not just soldiers, but also airmen and sailors participate in these contests.  As Lynn 
notes, governments mobilize societies – populations -- in various ways to support warfare 
through taxation, credit, rationing, and the retooling of certain industries.  More importantly 
perhaps, Lynn’s observation that “the mobilization of resources for war has been a major factor 
in shaping the modern state,”
17
 gets one closer to understanding the enormity of the role logistics 
plays in war.  
Lynn and van Creveld address logistics primarily in its support of the fight.  However, 
wars do not just happen and armies are not outfitted and deployed overnight.  Logistics also 
plays a key role in both the preparation for and the drawdown after the fighting.  In the particular 
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case of the occupation of post-World War II Germany, logistics arguably outweighed both the 
security and military government missions, acquiring a critical role in securing the peace as 
much of the war fighting force left Europe.  Alone, the humanitarian crisis:  the interim care, 
eventual repatriation or resettlement of Displaced Persons, the settlement of Expellees and 
refugees fleeing from the East, and the food and housing shortages of the indigenous German 
population, required support in the first years after the war.  In addition to the often life-or-death 
humanitarian crisis, U. S. Army forces logistically supported execution of the Potsdam Protocol 
process, the redeployment of forces to finish the war in the Pacific, and, of course, the daily 
support of their own forces.   It is worth noting that a significant number of Displaced Persons 
and Germans joined the U. S. Army forces as civilian employees, replacing soldiers either 
deployed to the Pacific Theater or returned to the United States.  Logistics supported the security 
forces tasked to stabilize the war-torn country that lacked its own means to quell looting and 
anarchy.  A major part of the stabilization process involved technical assistance in rebuilding 
critical German infrastructure and retraining German security forces to take over some of the 
peacekeeping aspects of post-war Germany.  One might even argue that the sum of these 
missions provided a vivid, compelling yet provocative argument supporting capitalism and 
democracy rather than communism as the better system in which ordinary citizens can thrive.  To 
defend this argument, a more expansive definition of logistics appears necessary.   
For the purposes of this study, logistics includes: 
the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel; the movement, medical care, 
hospitalization and, as needed, medical evacuation of personnel; the acquisition or 
construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; the acquisition 
of civilian labor; and the acquisition or furnishing of services, such as, baths, 
11 
 
laundry, libraries, and recreation.  Since administration applies to the management 




This study posits that logistics, that often unstated yet tacit third mission, as defined 
earlier, developed not only into the strategy to win the Cold War in Europe, where little or no 
fighting took place, but logistics also stabilized German society immediately after hostilities, and 
over the course of the occupation, underpinned the shaping of post-war Western Germany.  
Logistics matters indeed.   
1.  Objectives of this study. 
The objectives in this study are threefold.  First, demonstrate that U. S. Army logistics in 
the U. S. Zone of Occupation in Germany between 1945 and 1949 laid the foundation for the 
long-term presence of the U. S. Army in Germany.  Second, analyze the rationale for the build-
up of logistics during this period.  Third, analyze the impact of U. S. Army soldiers, aspects of 
their logistics support mission, and family members on the German population.   
A logical starting point for this exploration begins in June 1945 with General Dwight D.  
Eisenhower’s “Proclamation to the German People.”  The period ends when the Office of 
Military Government, United States in Germany (OMGUS) transferred occupation government 
to John J. McCloy, the U. S. High Commissioner, and the combined western zones of Germany 
achieved semi-sovereign status in September 1949.  Rapidly evolving circumstances in 1947 and 
1948 resulted in a reexamination that ultimately changed U. S. foreign policy toward Europe in 
general and occupied Germany in particular.  The rollout of the Marshall Plan in early 1948 and 
the Soviet Union’s blockade of Berlin in June 1948 culminated a period of rising tensions.   
The inability of the Allied Control Council (ACC), the ruling organ of military 
government for post-war Germany, to achieve the hallmark clause of the Potsdam Protocol – 
                                                   
18




establishment of economic and administrative unity within occupied Germany -- led ultimately 
to the currency reform of June 1948.  Carrying out this reform, critical to halting inflation and 
setting Germany on the road to economic recovery, spearheaded by the Americans, violated the 
rule of consensus underlying ACC governance as both the Soviets and French (initially) 
objected.  However, British and American economic strategists argued that the only way out of 
providing continuous financial and relief support to the Germans involved establishing a 
recognized currency within a central bank (a bank of issue) that would enable the Germans to 
export their products on a par with international prices, as well as manage international 
accounting.
19
  The French disagreed in principal with establishment of any centralized German 
governmental agency, but eventually acquiesced to the currency reform.  The Soviet Union 
objected vehemently to a central currency reform, initiated the Berlin Blockade, and followed up 
with their currency reform in the Soviet occupation zone.
20
    
Following the implementation of trizonal currency reform and western responses to the 
Berlin Blockade, the establishment of a semi-sovereign federal German government occurred 
more rapidly than originally planned.  A German Parliamentary Committee under supervision of 
representatives from the Office of Military Government United States in Germany (OMGUS) 
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organized in 1948 to draft a new German constitution (Grundgesetz,  Basic Law), that came into 
effect on 23 May 1949.  The military occupation ended unofficially with acceptance of the Basic 
Law and officially, with the transfer of authority from the Military Governor U. S. Army, to the 
High Commissioner, U. S. Department of State in September 1949 as the newly elected 
Bundestag and Bundeskanzler commenced governing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
Finally, this massive long-term U. S. military footprint on German soil brought about 
lasting cultural exchanges between the U. S. and Germany, in ways not envisioned or anticipated 
at the war’s end.  It is therefore important to examine and analyze this cultural impact.  I examine 
one aspect of the cultural impact through the lens of the Office of Military Government, United 
States (OMGUS), Education and Religious Affairs Division (ERAD) and to a lesser degree, the 
Information Control (ICD) Division.  ERAD became the Education and Cultural Affairs Division 
by 1948.  The Information Control Division replaced the wartime Psychological Warfare 
Division following V-E Day.  Also in the 1947-1948 timeframe, the control aspect of both 
organizations shifted to cultural exchange with the German population, directed more toward 
both anti-communist propaganda, and programs intended to encourage movement toward 
democratic systems and policies in Germany.   
To achieve the stated objectives, this study explores three questions.  How did the U. S. 
War and State departments, and specifically the U. S. Army, as the dominant U. S. military 
service on the ground in Europe in 1945, define, develop and plan the occupation mission and 
plan for and execute the complex logistics support necessary to accommodate the U. S. military 
presence in Germany after World War II?  Next, what events, national interests, alliances and 
policies underlay the deployment and continued stationing of U. S. military forces, and the 
subsequent logistics build-up to support these forces in post-World War II Germany?  Finally, in 
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consideration of the first question and the overwhelming and long-running mission requiring U.S 
military presence in West Germany, did the U. S. military logistics presence have a continuous 
and enduring impact on the German population?           
2.  Definitions.    
Cultural transfer and cultural exchange.  In this study, I employ a simple definition of the two 
terms.  Cultural transfer refers to the movement of American ideas and institutional concepts 
from the American cultural milieu to the German cultural milieu.  Cultural exchange refers to a 
reciprocal giving and receiving of ideas and institutional concepts between the two countries.  
Examination of World War II documents and primary sources from the occupation period 
indicate an official U. S. intent to culturally transfer American democracy – government, 
institutions and even the American way of life – to the Germans.  Cultural transfer in this sense 
meant a one-way movement of ideas and practices, from America to Germany.  Such a practice 
would not have been new as this practice, referred to as cultural exchange by an earlier 
Democratic White House, grew out of a belief in internationalism held, according to Emily S. 
Rosenberg, by a large number of Americans, most notably, President Woodrow Wilson.  Emily 
Rosenberg posited: 
Wilson believed that the progressive force of history, embodied in a League of 
Nations, would usher in a world order safe for the spread of American influence.  
He greatly extended the structure of the promotional state [literally and 
functionally, a state that promotes its beliefs, values and support to other states] 
but never allowed it to take over functions he saw as being proper to the private 
sector.  Tightly bound by the canons of nineteenth-century liberalism, he declined 





In contrast, President Roosevelt’s White House, while favoring a similar ideology 
relative to U. S. economic expansionism and international collective security [the idea of the 
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United Nations], chose a more aggressive governmental role in the postwar world by attempting 
to create international political, economic and cultural institutions directly subject to 
government, and especially to the President.
22
  Additionally, for President Roosevelt and his 
administration, solving the German Problem the second time around took a more total and 
harsher tack, and involved considerably more than political or economic institutional changes -- 
quite different from World War I.  Despite Germany’s historical membership in Western 
civilization, White House officials considered few measures of cultural exchange between the 
U. S. and Germany before mid-1947.     
The Roosevelt administration’s rationale for postwar Germany stemmed from the belief 
that implanting democracy would break the vicious cycle of German militarism and 
authoritarianism responsible ostensibly for three wars between 1870 and 1939.  This intent 
became practice at least for the first two years or so after the war ended.  However, in many 
instances, this experiment in what must be termed cultural transfer, even cultural imperialism, 
failed.  For example, the U. S. occupation government decreed that the German Länder 
governments adopt educational reforms under an American-oriented school structure.
23
  German 
educators had acknowledged a need for reform of the traditional German education system 
during the Weimar Republic;
24
 any such reform measures tossed to the wayside by the Nazi 
movement.  While German educators had long accepted the process of school reform within the 
bounds of German educational tradition and culture, they would not accept the product of a 
uniquely American culture such as its school system.     




 I provide a detailed discussion on American efforts toward, and German efforts against, effecting German school 
reform in Chapter V of this study.   
24
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Over time, the victors’ imperialistic cultural transfer changed into a give-and-take – a 
promotion of mutual understanding, a cultural exchange.  This became most evident early in the 
occupation, by July 1947, when the “you will” of the first, harsher Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067) became “we 
will assist” of the second directive, JCS 1779.           
Little America refers colloquially to the U. S. military installations and communities in 
Germany.  Germans adopted the term, Little America, because these communities offered to 
authorized users many of the services and products available in typical American communities in 
the United States.  Americans living within these installations need not leave the fenced-in 
Kaserne (garrison) for much – schools, shops, entertainment, sport facilities, and more – were 
usually available, invalidating, to some large degree, Donna Alvah’s argument
25
 that military 
families would serve as “unofficial ambassadors,” of the American way of life.  Even in those 
cases where American families could not be housed in Kasernen, as was often the case initially, 
their housing areas consisted of confiscated apartment buildings and homes, wherein integration 
with German families was not encouraged.    
3.  Methodology and Historiography. 
 Scholars espousing the theoretical approach known as the New Historicism argue that 
“History isn’t an orderly parade into a continually improving future . . . It’s more like an 
improvised dance consisting of an infinite variety of steps, following any new route at any given 
moment, and having no particular goal or destination.”
26
  Much of the early historical material 
written about the U. S. occupation in Germany presents a variety of steps, a tangled web, rather 
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than an orderly process marching stoically through time from planning through execution and 
finally to completion.  By accepting the basic percept of New Historicism, that history is not an 
orderly parade into a continually improving future, the oft-vacillating points of view presented 
by researchers depicted the occupation era as confusing.  How does New Historicism inspire this 
study?   
Philosophically, new historicism asserts
27
 that no single “mind of the age,” no master 
narrative, dominates – that history comprises multiple narratives – some more dominant than 
others at given points in history.  These narratives reflect, perpetuate and/or challenge 
ideological, political, economic, cultural and/or social issues of a particular historical period.  
Because history is a story of the past narrated by and from the perspective and the multi-faceted 
discourses of historians, these stories are not totally objective.  Likewise, the readers, researchers 
or viewers bring to the table their own perspectives that might differ substantially from that of a 
particular historian.  Additionally, historians apply priorities, criteria and focus to their research, 
furthering the subjectivity of a given narrative. 
A master narrative refers to events scripted in such a way that the script becomes the 
norm, the truth, the ethic, the moral, the definitive history.  The dominant narrative reflected in 
many primary sources of the U. S. occupation in Germany suggested a campaign on the part of 
the Allies to eliminate finally the destructive seeds of German militarism and thus prevent 
another cataclysmic event like the world wars.  However, could one not otherwise conclude after 
looking from the vantage point of several decades and various cultural negotiations occurring 
since the end of World War II, that the U. S. government after 1945 rode to a 20
th
 century 
version of manifest destiny on the tanks, trains, planes and trucks of “spreading democracy” and 
saving the Germans from themselves?  Conclusions drawn are, of course, subject to 





interpretation based on facts and opinions presented in a dominant narrative.  However, how 
does a reader know what facts or questions researchers did not consider?  This is where several 
and often different narratives play a critical role in understanding events and actions, and taken 
together, offer a better-rounded story.  Put simply, the new historicist looks for a plurality of 
voices, a palette of colors, to paint a fuller picture of historical events.  For instance, in this 
study, several contrasting narratives emerged:   
 A hard or soft peace following unconditional surrender, 
 Contrasting views between the U. S. War and State departments on execution of 
the occupation,  
 Interpretation of the Potsdam Protocol 4Ds28 within U. S. Government agencies as 
well as among the Allied Powers,  
 Differing military strategies on how to conduct the war as well as how to 
prosecute the occupation, and even eventually,  
 Ideologically between democracy and communism.      
This exploration suggests the following narrative.  First, U. S. occupation forces under 
the U. S. military government exercised the political power of the U. S. Government as well as 
the authority of the military hierarchy to influence German reconstruction and reeducation after 
German capitulation on 7 May 1945.  The U. S. military government and its agent, the U. S. 
Army had the authority, the power and perhaps the knowledge to reeducate the Germans and 
reconstruct German infrastructure and society within their zone of occupation.  However, this 
could not have been a one-way street.  Power influences culture but is also influenced by culture.  
Power is not localized within one individual or institution; rather, power moves through a society 
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by means of exchanges.  A new historicist might therefore ask who has the authority (power) to 
create knowledge or change traditions and culture within a society.  Can that knowledge or 
change then be imposed on a society?  How did that society react to such authority, what was the 
reaction, or the exchange?   
Initially, the majority of Germans reacted to Allied demands with acquiescence and 
obedience.  Over time, both the tone of the U. S. military occupation, from harsh to milder, and 
the German exchange to that authority, from acquiescence, to resistance or stalling for time, 
shifted, as in, for example, the U. S. military government’s efforts to force its school reform 
program on the German community.  Further, how might this knowledge in textual (or other) 
medium represent and/or perpetuate the dominant ideology of the imposing culture?  The U. S. 
military government alternately propelled or persuaded acceptance of its ideology – capitalism, 
democracy and the supremacy of the American way of life -- through several mediums, e.g., 
military authority, political dominance, economic advantage and necessity, and a mix of cultural 
arrogance and humanitarian concern.   
Second, the tenor and form of these narratives often collided with existing German 
cultural narratives.  Nearly all Germans rejected the idea that a radically different cultural 
paradigm provided by any of the victors was required.  Despite the wartime physical destruction, 
once Nazism was obliterated, Germany’s dominant cultural precepts, revived and became 
instrumental in rebuilding the country after the war.  After all, Germans had a long cultural 
history to draw on:  common language, prolific world-acclaimed advances in various fields of 
science, philosophy, literature, music, religion and art.  Regional folktales, traditions, and a sense 
of regional pride, as well as a German nationalism, or patriotism as Americans applied the term 
to their own nation, defined German culture.  Additionally, the German education system, 
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heralded by many educators of the period as being one of the best in the world, boasted a 99% 
literacy rate at the end of the 19
th
 century.  What the Germans needed was security, time and 
economic support to rebuild their state and nation.  By 1955, West Germany’s  resurgence, often 
through the resources of its occupier, then protector and (now) ally, the U. S. Government, 
allowed the Federal Republic of Germany to rejoin the civilized world as the front line of 
defense (and offense) in Europe against the Soviet Union and advancing communism.  The 
ability of the U. S. Government to place and logistically support its military contingent in Europe 
and specifically in Germany underlies this achievement.  So, yes, logistics does matter. 
While a plethora of research covers the political and economic paths taken toward this 
achievement, little analysis of the U. S. Army’s logistics effort in achieving this task is available.  
The role of post-World War II U. S. Army logistics in the cultural exchange between Americans 
and Germans has received even less consideration.  Therefore, this study seeks to bring to light 
the role of logistics in not only the U. S. infrastructure build-up in post-war Germany, but the 
impact of that build-up on such discourse between Americans and Germans.  To accomplish this 
objective, two criteria stand out:  first, an analysis of multiple narratives comparing similarities 
and dissimilarities used in discussions and argumentation of the occupation period in question, 
and second, employment of several methodologies that will bring together a broader 
understanding of the subject. 
A variety of resources forms the core of this study, weaving together a fuller tapestry 
while avoiding the reproduction of another master narrative.  An enormous amount of literature 
about the U. S. military occupation exists.  Because much of the early official U. S. documents 
and studies – many written by former employees in the occupation government machinery -- take 
on the specter of a dominant narrative, German media publications, literature and personal 
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accounts, dependent on availability, provide a more balanced and complete narrative.  However, 
few sources examine the events from a perspective of the German political and cultural agendas 
or the potential ideological clashes between the American and German cultures.  Unfortunately, 
because of early U. S. occupation censorship policies, as well as shortage of logistic resources, 
particularly print material and undamaged printing presses, most German critical accounts of the 
occupation period were written after the occupation.  However, singular glimpses occasionally 
shone through, for example, Der Ruf,29 shut down by the U. S. military government in 1947, 
presumably because it carried a generally leftist view that was not uncommon in occupied 
Germany, but nonetheless not tolerated by the military government.   
Oral accounts and interviews detailing how Germans reacted to American attempts to 
democratize and reshape attitudes and values of the collective German public are likewise rare.  
Several oral interviews of a small group of Germans who lived through the Nazi period as 
adolescents and teenagers, preceded by a written questionnaire (see Appendix Introduction.3) 
that informed the basis of these interviews, were conducted for this study.
30
      
Documents critical to a study of post-World War II occupation of Germany include both 
the Yalta and Potsdam protocols, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 (1945), its 
successor, JCS Directive 1779 (1947),  U. S.  Secretary of State Byrne’s 6 September 1946 
speech in Stuttgart, Germany, and the Petersberg Abkommen, 22 November 1949.   Additionally, 
official U. S. Congressional reports, Departments of War (after 1947, Department of Defense) 
                                                   
29
 Siegfried Mandel, Group 47:  the Reflected Intellect (Carbondale:  Southern Illinois University Press, 1973).  Der 
Ruf, edited by Curt Vinz, a German POW, was produced as a medium to reeducate German prisoners of war 
interned in the U. S.  Upon his return to Germany, Vinz received a license to publish Der Ruf in the U. S. occupation 
zone (Munich), and with the efforts of Alfred Andersch, Hans Werner Richter and others, published the first 
German issue in August 1946.  If a political philosophy underlay this publication and its editors, it would have been 
a belief in a united, neutral and socialistic Germany as a bridge between the East and West.  The U. S. Military 
Government Information Control Division objected to this leaning, and cancelled the publication’s license in April 
1947. 
30 The Human Subjects Committee, University of Kansas Lawrence Campus approved this research project.   
22 
 
and State, and U. S. Army documents provide critical, albeit scanty logistics data.  A particularly 
rich vein of materials, although sadly incomplete, the Office of Military Government records 
(OMGUS files), such as the Office of Military Government’s (OMGUS) Monthly Report of the 
Military Governor U. S. Zone, or OMGUS staff files, offer the closest reading of regular contact 
between U. S. Military Government officials and their German counterparts.  Through this 
medium, one obtains a glimpse of logistics support and efforts as well as German reaction to 
U. S. Military Government policy and presence.  Additionally, U. S. Army occupation reports, 
for example, Headquarters U. S. Army Europe historian Oliver J. Fredericksen’s American 
Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953, the U. S. Forces European Theater’s (USFET) 
Weekly Information Bulletin, and the High Commissioner bulletins, represent official U. S. 
occupation policy.  Such reports also provide results of various military government programs 
aimed at supporting and reeducating Germans in the U. S. occupation zone between 1945 and 
1949.  Further, narratives by individuals employed in the U. S. military government, memoirs by 
key leaders, media and literature of the period, oral interviews, and questionnaires answered by 
Germans who were young adults at the end of World War II provide the study with thick 
descriptions adding to the discussion of the impact of U. S. Army logistics on occupied 
Germany.   
Secondary sources played perhaps a greater role than material written during or shortly 
after the occupation for three important reasons.  First, operational military information, often 
classified for a period after a mission closes, restricted access to critical information.  Many of 
the sources available today were not available in the first years of the German occupation when 
the official documents and early source literature were written.  Moreover, secondary source 
material often reflects more than the traditional linear or progressive paths often echoed in the 
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primary source documents.  U. S. Army documents recording statistics on venereal disease in the 
U. S. occupation zone in Germany from the 1945-1946, for example, cite percentages of cases 
affecting  U. S. soldiers.  In contrast, Maria Höhn, writing decades later,
31
 accessed not only the 
official U. S. Government (and German) statistics, but also studied the impact of venereal 
disease on both the U. S. military community and the local communities.  Her sources include 
both material now available in German archives, and oral interviews, both German and 
American, from individuals living in the communities during the occupation period.  Finally, 
both archivists and researchers today often have the advantage of newer technology, such as 
computers, scanners, and internet access.  This technology aids researchers by saving time and 
expense, but also allows archivists to reproduce research material in multiple forms for access to 
researchers.  Further, improved technology provides a broader spread of ongoing and completed 
research for public consumption.   
Therefore, the historiography to fulfill the first criterion, an analysis of multiple 
narratives comparing material used in argumentation, reflects factual early (primary) source 
material, oral interviews, and both factual and interpretive secondary source material that reflects 
cultural negotiations of individuals interacting with several narratives – dominant perspectives -- 
occurring in their culture during the occupation period. 
The second criterion for this study involves examining U. S. Army logistics build-up in 
occupied Germany, 1945 to 1949, diachronically, chronologically, institutionally, geographically 
and culturally.  Diachronically, the tenor of U.S. Government policy on the occupation of 
Germany changed from the planning stages in the middle of the war reflecting a somewhat 
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 to the harsher Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive to the Commander in Chief of 
the U. S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067).  The comparatively milder JCS Directive to the 
Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1779) replaced JCS 1067 in July 
1947.  Moreover, political events after 1945 altered the scenario immensely.  The Nazi regime 
having been defeated, the Allies disengaged from the fight and pursued their own national 
interests increasingly after the war.   
These policy and political developments tremendously affected the logistics program 
undertaken by the U. S. Army in Germany, for example, in 1945, neither the length of the 
occupation nor the end strength of occupation forces had been determined.  How much and what 
kinds of logistics support would U. S. forces require, for how long?  Billeting initially took two 
basic forms:  tents, or requisitioned houses, hotels and other appropriate buildings.  Many of the 
former Wehrmacht kasernes confiscated by occupation forces housed Displaced Persons (DPs) 
and until the DPs were repatriated, these facilities were not available.  Moreover, the decision in 
1945 to allow family members to join their spouses as early as April 1946 complicated logistics 
issues.  Furthermore, the U. S. Congress consistently cut back on War Department budgets, 
reducing funds available for rebuilding, repair and even the necessary building material that, 
already scarce in Germany, had to be imported from the U. S.  Eventually, occupation funds 
would cover some of the repair, but the actual new construction building would not begin in 
earnest for several years, and then a large part of the cost would be borne by the Germans.             
Chronologically, the study embraces the U. S. occupation of Germany from 1945 to 
1949, focusing on the sequential requirements of logistics planning and implementation during 
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the military occupation.  Obviously, decisions made during this period affected the later 
stationing of U. S. Forces in Western Germany.     
Institutionally the primary role in the execution of the United States’ military occupation 
mission in Germany centered on the U. S. Army.  Therefore, U. S. Army policies, organizations, 
military units and agencies figure centrally in this study.  Militarily, the unit mission determines 
the unit’s logistics infrastructure and the logistics resources it requires to perform its mission.  
The U. S. Army had two primary missions and thus two organizational structures in post-war 
Germany:  one for the occupation government and the other for military security.  Additionally, 
resources cost money.  Therefore, the politics of funding among such institutions as the U. S. 
Congress, State and the War/Defense departments, as well as occupation costs levied on the 
Germans also played a key role in occupation policy.   
Geographically, the U. S. occupation zone -- primarily the three Länder of Hessen, 
Württemberg-Baden, and Bayern, and the Enclave at Bremerhaven – and to a lesser degree, the 
U. S. sector in Berlin, represent the focus of this study.  The two primary Lines of 
Communications (LOCs), one from west to east through France and the French occupation zone 
into Germany (the French LOC), and the other from north to south, Bremerhaven, through the 
British occupation zone to the U. S. zone, lie at the heart of U. S. Army logistics support to its 
occupation zone.   
This study analyzes the impact of U. S. occupation policies on the German population 
through the lens of two U. S. occupation agencies:  the Education and Religious Affairs 
Division/Education and Cultural Affairs Division (ERAD/ECAD) and the Information Control 
Division (ICD).  Policies and actions of both organizations provide a lens for understanding how 
the U. S. Military Government’s intent to transfer American culture altered over time into 
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cultural exchange.  Finally, this study scrutinizes several cultural discourses from the period, 
especially the reality of U. S. Army logistics support as a medium of cultural exchange, the 
impact of attempted U.S. school reform on the German school system, and cultural exchange 
through several agencies and activities.  
4.  Organization by chapter. 
 Chapters I, II, and IV address the second question posited:  What events, national 
interests, alliances and policies underlay the deployment and continued stationing of U. S. 
military forces and the subsequent logistics build-up to support these forces in post-World War II 
Germany?   
Chapter I, Historic Roots of Germany’s Post-War Economic and Logistics Challenges,   
briefly analyzes Germany’s economic situation between 1870 and 1945 to determine what about 
this history so surprised the U. S. Government during the summer of 1945 when U. S. Army 
authorities on the ground in Germany realized they had an economic catastrophe on their hands.  
The biggest challenge facing the U. S. Army in Germany – a challenge that lasted at least two 
years – involved providing enough food to prevent starvation and chaos to the indigenous 
population, the Displaced Persons left in Germany at the end of the war, the refugees fleeing 
from the Baltics and the East, and the Expellees from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.  
Further, Germany since joining the circle of industrialized states (mid- to late-19
th
 century) relied 
on trade, exporting products to import raw resources and needed foodstuff shortages.  This 
anomaly, the shortage of foodstuffs in Germany, caught public officials and agencies in 
Washington by surprise – as the inability of Germany to feed her own, based in historical fact, 
should have been known even before the war began. 
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 centuries.  Pierenkemper and Tilly offer a brief and concise narrative on 19
th
 Century 
German economic growth, setting the stage for Germany’s turn towards the autarchic economies 
of both world wars.  The authors argue convincingly that Germany, on the eve of World War I, 
had become one of the world’s leading industrial economies. 
Whereas Pierenkemper and Tilly focus on the 19
th
 century, Gustav Stolper (1888-1947) 
both in his original version and the updated 1967 version by Karl Häuser and Knut Borchart, 
introduces the economic history of Germany from German unification in 1870 to 1940, one year 
after the European war began.  He focuses on economic policy within the milieu of a state 
dominated first by a Prussian ruling class with its bureaucracy and the Junker agricultural elite.  
Stolper discusses several constants, primarily the dovetailed connection between State regulation 
of industry and the vertical integration of industry – cartelization; and secondarily, the necessity 
for Germany to produce industrially and engage in foreign trade to import the raw resources and 
foodstuffs required to feed its population.  Gustav Stolper credibly and importantly argued that  
German industrialization not only provided exportable material to purchase raw resources for 
further production and food for the indigenous population, but also stoked the fires of European 
industrialization.  Indeed, the cornerstone of European recovery after the war must lie with the 
recovery of German industrial production. 
A third book by Alan Kramer, The West German Economy, 1945-1955 (1991), bridges 
the gap between the beginning of World War II, where Gustav Stolper’s text ends (1940), and 
the occupation period.  The value of Kramer’s work lies in its revalidation of Germany’s pre-war 
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economic situation.  In addition, Kramer questions traditional historiography on Germany’s 
economic revival and reconstruction after World War II, which according to Kramer reflects 
continuity with Germany’s past rather than a break brought about by change forced by the Allies 
during the occupation. 
Chapter II, U. S. Strategic Planning for the Occupation Force in Germany, and Chapter 
III, U. S. Army Organization and Missions in Occupied Germany, examine the governmental 
agencies involved in planning and forming occupation policy, the policies produced, the 
organizations established to carry out these policies, and the missions given to these 
organizations.  While Chapter II focuses on the planning processes and subsequent policies for 
the U. S. occupation zone in Germany, Chapter III focuses on the U. S. Army as the agent to 
carry out occupation policy.  Official documents provide the starting point for a thorough 
understanding of the U. S. Army’s role in the occupation. 
The first section of Chapter II examines a possible planning model from the Allied 
Occupation after World War I that framed the development of a U. S Army Military Government 
handbook by Civilian Affairs trainees preparing for the aftermath of the World War II.  The key 
sources for this section are U. S. Army Colonel I. L. Hunt, American Military Government of 
Occupied Germany 1918-1920.  Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs Third Army and 
American Forces in Germany (1920) reprinted 1943 for planning purposes, and Henry T. Allen, 
The Rhineland Occupation (1927).   The first report gets to the heart of the occupation – at the 
operational and unit level.  The second text reports more at the senior command and political 
levels.   
The second part of this section relies on the U. S. Army Military Government Handbook 
itself and the narratives of two Civil Affairs officers:  Marshall Knappen, And Call It Peace 
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(1947), and Stanley Andrews, The Journal of a Retread (1971).  Both Marshall Knappen and 
Stanley Andrews formed part of the initial corps of young academics and professionals trained at 
the University of Virginia and Stanford University respectively for Civil Affairs assignments 
with the U. S. Army.  Knappen counts his service time and the Civil Affairs program as 
somewhat of a failure, while Stanley Andrews, writes an open, detailed account of his 
assignments from journals he kept as early as 7 December 1941.  Both narratives provide 
valuable day-by-day accounts of not only the situation on the ground in the European Theater, 
but also non-military, every-day American accounts of their reactions to the military 
environment they worked in.   
In chronological order and in taking this research back to the documents, Joint Chief of 
Staff Directive 1067 (1944), Potsdam Protocol (1945) and the Joint Staff Directive 1779 (1947) 
spell out the initial rules of engagement for the U. S. military government and occupation forces.  
Additionally, a United States Army Europe historical report by Oliver J. Frederiksen’s American 
Occupation of Germany 1945-1953 (1953), and Earl F. Ziemke’s The U.S. Army in the 
Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (1975) provide critical background narratives for any study 
on the U. S. occupation in Germany.   Oliver Frederiksen, Historian for Headquarters U. S. Army 
Europe, compiled the first official account that focuses on the Army and Army operations during 
the occupation.  Earl Ziemke’s later text, particularly thorough on the establishment of the Civil 
Affairs organization and the occupation planning process in Washington and London during the 
war regrettably stops only two years into the occupation.  Unfortunately, neither Frederiksen nor 
Ziemke delves in any depth into logistics issues facing the U. S. military government.    
Additionally, a number of key players in military government have written extensively 
about their experiences in Germany and with military government – some highly critical, others 
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positive.  Interestingly, several authors, for example, John Gimbel, A German Community under 
American Occupation, Marburg, 1945-52 (1961) and The American Occupation of Germany:  
Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (1968), initially highly critical of U. S. Army efforts in 
Germany during the occupation, praise the policy aspects of the occupation.  Likewise,  
Edward N. Peterson in The American Occupation of Germany, Retreat to Victory (1978) is 
highly critical of Military Government execution, but acknowledges in a later conference that 
perhaps some good came from the occupation.
33
  Authors taking critical positions include W. 
Friedman, The Allied Military Government of Germany (1947), and Franklin M. Davis Come As 
Conqueror (1967).  Carl J. Friedrich, editor, American Experiences in Military Government in 
World War II (1948) and Robert Wolfe, editor, Americans as Proconsuls:  U. S. Military 
Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (1984), give a more balanced approach to the 
problems and effectiveness in military government planning and execution.  Both offer papers, 
and in the case of Wolfe’s text, roundtable presentations and discussions on a variety of military 
government and occupation issues running the gamut from critique to praise.  Equally important 
in achieving a balanced view of planning for, and the follow-on execution of the occupation, 
both Lucius D. Clay and Robert Murphy, the top two leaders in the military government in 
occupied Germany, in their published narratives of the occupation, Decision in Germany (1950) 
and Diplomat Among Warriors (1964) respectively, share their perspectives of being in the 
unique position to execute the results of the planning and policy outcomes.  Lastly, Office of the 
Military Government United States in Germany (OMGUS) monthly and special reports offer a 
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crucial primary source into not only Military Government operations across the spectrum of its 
responsibility, but also its involvement in Allied Control Council affairs. 
Chapters III and IV address the first question:  “How did the U. S. War and State 
departments, and specifically the U. S. Army, as the dominant U. S. military service on the 
ground in Europe in 1945, define, develop and plan the occupation mission, and plan for and 
execute the complex logistics support necessary to accommodate the U. S. military presence in 
Germany after World War II?        
Chapter IV, Support the Military Force, the Displaced Persons and Family concentrates 
on logistics support to the military forces, the support to local populations, and the additional 
logistical support necessary for family members who started arriving in Germany in April 1946.  
The measures taken and detailed in this chapter suggests the foundation of the Little Americas – 
the build-up of the U. S. Army (and Air Force officially, after 1947) infrastructure in Germany.  
Once made, the decision to provide service members an environment resembling home complete 
with families, turned Germany into a second home to millions of Americans for the next forty-
five years or so.   
Data published by the Office of Chief Historian, U. S. Army Headquarters Europe form 
the core of Chapter IV.  The annual and special reports, particularly Domestic Economy (1947), 
and Physical Plant – its Procurement, Construction and Maintenance (1947) offer surprising 
insight into logistics efforts of the U. S. Army in the U. S. occupation zone.  James A. Huston, 
Outposts and Allies:  U. S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953 (1988), the penultimate 
historian of U. S. Army logistics, presents a compelling argument for the connections between 
logistics, military strategy and thereby U. S. diplomacy and foreign policy.  While Huston’s 
critics comment on the lack of current archival evidence from the National Archives system, his 
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voluminous sources from the immediate post-war period complement this research project.  Of 
singular importance, his discussion of Lines of Communications (LOCs) supplies much needed 
clarification on a subject planners too often ignore to their peril.  President Roosevelt certainly 
recognized the importance of LOCs when he argued (and lost) for the northwest corner of 
Germany to be the U. S. occupation zone. 
Finally, the U. S. National Archives system (Presidents Eisenhower and Truman 
libraries) provided access to USFET and OMGUS reports.  The Hauptstaatsarchiv and 
Stadtarchiv in Stuttgart, the Hessisches Staatsarchiv and Stadtarchiv Marburg, and the 
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz contributed valuable detail on U. S. Military Government activities in 
their zonal sectors.  Lastly, the U. S. Army Logistics University Library at Fort Lee provided the 
initial log data and information that set this research on its way. 
Chapter V, Logistics:  the Bridge to Cultural Exchange, or Bratwurst vs. Burger, 
addresses the final question presented earlier in this Introduction:  “What impact did the U. S. 
military logistics presence have on the German population?”  This chapter considers how U. S. 
occupation forces interacted with the German population, in selective venues, during the first 
four years of occupation, 1945 to 1949.  Official German primary source archival documents 
proved especially critical in discussing cultural exchange between the U. S. occupation 
government agencies and their German Länder counterparts.  Specifically, the documents and 
commentary from both the Baden-Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart, and the 
Hessisches Staatsarchiv in Marburg, along with the Office of Military Government United 
States-Germany (OMGUS) files, provide the basis for the specific discussion on German school 
reforms during the occupation period.    Additional avenues of cultural exchange, supported 
initially by U. S Army forces in the U. S. occupation zone come under scrutiny.     
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The final section of this study, Conclusions:  We are In Country for the Long Haul, 
summarizes the impact of logistics and cultural exchange between West Germans and U. S. 







































Chapter I.  Historic Roots of Germany’s Post-War Economic and Logistics Challenges 
 
Introduction.   
The story of the U. S. Army logistics and infrastructure build-up in post-World War II 
Germany begins officially with the U. S. entry into World War II.  Subsequent military 
operations and the effects of those military operations amplified the logistics and infrastructure 
build-up.  However, the economic challenges that Germany faced historically provide insight 
into the problems confronted by Allied forces during the occupation period, 1945-1955.  
International Law, The Hague Convention, Article 43 and U. S. Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules 
of Land Warfare stipulated that a Commander occupying belligerent territory “shall take all 
measures in his power to restore, and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”
34
  Restoring and 
insuring safety, or as it came to be known to World War II planners as the “disease and unrest” 
clause, called on commanders to avert to the best of their abilities, disease epidemics and 
starvation among the populations in occupied territory.  The U. S. Army discovered relatively 
early in the occupation that feeding the population within its occupation zone required longer-
term assistance than initially programmed.  As the food crisis eased, political events presented 
further justification for a longer occupation.  Therefore, briefly reviewing Germany’s economic 
history provides background for the logistics difficulties facing the U. S. Government in 
development of its occupation policy and the U. S. Army in execution of that policy in Germany 
during the occupation period. 
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1.  Challenge:  Exposing the Roots of Germany’s Economic Situation. 
 The principal question the occupying authorities faced was whether the Germans could 
provide enough agricultural products to feed the indigenous population as well as the refugees, 
expellees and Displaced Persons remaining in the U. S. occupation zone (and in reality the 
British and French zones, given their inability or reluctance to provide necessary support after 
capitulation).   
The geographic region known as “Germany” following unification moved rapidly if 
belatedly toward industrialization in the nineteenth century, experiencing the characteristic 
changes of its near neighbors, Britain and France:  the move from rural and agricultural toward 
urban and industrial.  Agriculture survived, it was even protected by the Second German Reich 
(Kaiserreich); however, neither the Kaiserreich nor its successor regimes could feed its 
population from internal sources.  The blockade during and shortly after World War I should 
have taught the Allies this lesson.   
Considering this historical narrative, it would seem surprising that any American official 
could have seriously put forth a concept such as “pastoralization of Germany,” the brainchild of 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., as the solution to tame a militarist Germany 
after World War II.  Yet this plan took center stage at the Second Quebec Conference, September 
1944, between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  Dividing 
Germany and reducing these entities effectively to an agrarian economy would not only deny 
recovery to the European continent that depended on Germany for resources (e.g., coal) and 
industrial products, but also commit the United States and perhaps the Allies to decades-long 
logistics support to prevent mass starvation and to keep a pastoralized Germany afloat. 
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The Quebec conferees soon backed away from the so-called Morgenthau Plan.  Indeed, 
the following July, the authors and signatories of the Potsdam Protocol, officially recognized this 
dilemma.  The key objective in the Protocol aimed at economic unity and resumption of 
industrial production, with restrictions, within Germany, recognizing the significance of German 
resources to the recovery of Europe.  Unfortunately, economic unity was to remain elusive 
throughout the occupation.   
The zones of occupation did not have adequate foodstuffs for the German population, nor 
for the Displaced Persons, refugees or expellees.  The U. S. Government, and its occupation 
agent, the U. S. Army, incorporated the Hague Convention Article 43, as mentioned above, into 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (for which planning began in the summer of 1944), Part 
I, paragraph 5: 
As a member of the Control Council and as zone commander, you will be guided 
by the principle that controls upon the Germany economy may be imposed to the 
extent that such controls may be necessary to achieve the objectives enumerated 
in paragraph 4 above and also as they may be essential to protect the safety and 
meet the needs of the occupying forces and assure the production and 
maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such disease 




A starving population does not bode well for good public order and safety.  International law and 
necessity thus represented the cornerstone for the build-up of U. S. Army logistics and 
infrastructure in Germany after World War II.  International political events, for example, the 
Greek civil war, the establishment of communist governments in several East European 
countries, and the Berlin Blockade, intruded after 1947. 
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1.1  Historic Reliance on Foreign Trade.     
Although Gustav Stolper and other economic historians agree that Germany’s economic 
stage, on the eve of its unification in 1871, reflected a predominantly agricultural character, they 
also point out that rapid industrial expansion took place simultaneously.  Perhaps a key 
difference between Britain and Germany at this point in history, Chancellor Bismarck took steps 
to protect German agriculture from, for example, American inroads in the grain export industry.  
Even though grain and potato production increased rapidly between 1871 and World War I, 
population growth outdistanced the agricultural gains, even considering emigration losses up to 
1890.     
Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, using studies by Knut Borchardt that examined 
numbers of personnel employed in each sector of the economy between 1849 and 1913, suggest 
that one sees a decline in employment in the primary sector of agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
domestic services.  Concurrently, they also note an uptick in employment in commerce, banking, 
insurance, inns and restaurants, communications and transport, mining and salt works – all 
indicators of a rise in industrial activities.   
Despite mechanization of agriculture, an established program under Bismarck, the rural 
sector continued to lose population to the urban areas, a common trend among industrializing 
societies.  This movement of workers away from agriculture into industrial and commercial 
employment occurred steadily between 1882 and 1939.  The employed population grew from 17 
million in 1882 to 35.7 million by 1939.  Those employed in agriculture and forestry declined 
from 42.4% in 1882 to 25% by 1939.  In contrast, those employed in industry and crafts rose 
from 35.6% to 40.8% and in commerce and communications from 22.2% to 34.2% in the same 
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timeframe.36  Such a growth trend tracks with most states undergoing the move from agriculture 
to industry, and movement of populations from rural to urban centers in the nineteenth century.   
Supporting this observation, Pierenkemper and Tilly, citing studies by Walther G. 
Hoffmann, illustrate a similar trend, by tracking the composition of investment, using 1913 
prices.
37
  Investment in the Agriculture Sector (buildings, machinery, livestock and inventory) 
fell from 21.2% in 1851-1855 to 9.8% by 1906-1910.  In contrast, within this timeframe, 
investment in the Industrial Sector (buildings, machinery and inventory) rose from 16.1% to 
41.7%.  Industrialization in the late nineteenth century, and up to World War II, provided the 
exchange mechanism – export products – with which to import the necessary foodstuffs and 
resources to fuel further industrialization and manufacturing.  Analyzing the Pierenkemper and 
Tilly data, between 1872 and 1913, with the exception of 1880, total imports exceeded total 
exports, measured in billions of dollars.
38
                      
 The international economic crisis of 1857 and the crash of 1873-1874, as well as 
aggressive exportation of American products on the international market, particularly grain, steel 
and iron, pushed both German industrialists and agriculturists to clamor for protection.  The 
German government responded with tariffs on imports, although not all players favored moving 
in this direction.  Thus, the German economy and particularly trade moved from its earlier liberal 
tendencies toward protectionism. 
 Cartels, an oligopolistic-type organization in which providers of a service or product 
form an arrangement to coordinate, more often, to control, production, prices and sales venues of 
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their services or  products, burst forth in Germany in the late nineteenth century.  Bank mergers 
accelerated industrial consolidation by concentrating bank business within an industry or 
branches within an industry, leading often to establishment of monopolies – a cartel by another 
name.  Cartel agreements enjoyed a legal status in Germany equal to any other type of private 
contract, surviving through World War II, to become a specific target of the Allied reorientation 
program for German industry after World War II.  Two examples from this period stand out.  
The Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat, RWKS, 
1893-1945), with an initial membership of over ninety members, carried up to 90% share of the 
Ruhr district coal output, and about 50% of the national coal output prior to World War I.
39
  The 
Steelmakers Association (Stahlwerksverband, 1904-1939), initially with thirty-one member 
companies, held an approximate 90% share of total German steel production.
40
  The RWKS 
included in addition to coal mining companies, also iron and steel producers, while the 
Stahlwerksverband included not only steel works, but also coalmines, coke works and blast 
furnaces.  This quasi-nationalization of the coal and steel industries certainly aided the 
Kaiserreich and later the Third Reich in organization for wartime production. 
 Nationalization of certain resources, protectionism in trade, growing cartelization in 
banking and key industries, and finally the threat of a British blockade combined to create an 
economic situation approaching autarchy in Germany on the eve of World War I.  By 1914, the 
Kaiserreich had already nationalized a fair portion of rail transportation resources and public 
utilities, although total nationalization of the rail system, Reichsbahn, did not take place until 
1919.  According to Gustav Stolper, by the eve of World War I, the following services came 
under the aegis of the state:  postal, telegraph, and most railroad systems; while gasworks, 
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waterworks, local transportation systems, power production, and even the forestry industry fell 
under the jurisdiction and regulation of municipal authorities or a few “mixed-ownership” 
companies (combined industrial and municipal authorities) 
 Finally, the threat of a British-initiated sea blockade of Germany became a reality in 
August 1914, essentially closing off most imported resources, particularly metals, rubber, oil, 
nitrate and other raw materials indispensable for armament production, fertilizers, as well as 
foodstuff and fodder required for military and civilian populations.  Even before the war, 
Germany produced only approximately two-thirds of its food and fodder requirements.  While 
Germany could rely for a short period on suppliers from the East, e.g., grain from Ukraine (after 
1915) or oil from Romania, and her own reserves, eventually these supplies dwindled.  
Furthermore, agricultural production declined because the labor source dwindled as the 
Reichswehr called up more men and horses.  The situation in Germany after World War II was 
even bleaker.   
Whereas during World War II, Germany occupied considerable territory outside its 
borders, and could acquire more resources externally to boost production and feed its population 
than during World War I, the post-World War II situation was grimmer.  To begin with, 
Germany suffered massive, countrywide destruction during World War II; little occurred during 
World War I.  Following the war, in accordance with the Potsdam Protocol and earlier 
agreements among the Big Three, Germany’s borders were reduced from that of 1937, but its 
population increased drastically with the influx of refugees requiring food and shelter.  While 
Germany lost some territory after World War I, it did not suffer a mass influx of refugees.  
Further, Germany had a working federal government and governmental administration down to 
the municipal level in place and functioning throughout the non-occupied areas of Germany after 
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World War I and the Allied occupiers relied on local German officials in every-day transactions 
throughout the occupation period.  The German government after capitulation in May 1945 
collapsed.  What German officials remained in positions, primarily at the local community 
levels, reflected a minority that at least the American occupiers drastically reduced even further 
through their denazification process.  The Four Powers recreated and later supervised indigenous 
governments in their assigned zones in Germany after World War II.  The Potsdam Protocol 
championed German deindustrialization resulting in loss of not only war making industry, but 
also industry necessary for basic survival of the Germany population.  To conclude, the two 
world wars are marked with more differences than similarities.  Nonetheless, one common thread 
ran through both wars and their aftermath – the inability of Germany to self-sustain 
economically.         
While the impetus for nationalization, protectionism, and industrial cartelization had not 
rested on establishing a war-ready logistics system, national control over particularly the 
transportation system and cartelizing key industrial assets allowed for some streamlining of 
production, as well as rationalizing and expediting resources key to fighting the war.
41
  
Nonetheless, most critics argue that even with emergency measures in place, for example, Walter 
Rathenau’s Kriegsgesellschaften, or the Hindenburg Programm,42 the Kaiserreich never 
adequately prepared logistically for a long-term war.  Indeed, the Kaiserreich had not anticipated 
a war longer than a few months.  The blockade proved to be the ‘straw that broke the camel’s 
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back.’  Without the ability to export goods from its industrial production, Germany could not 
import shortage foodstuffs to support itself – a pattern repeated again within a few decades.   
World War I and the blockade led to desperate hunger in many urban centers in Central 
European countries and, specifically, Germany’s urban population.  According to Jens 
Flemming, between August 1914, and July 1917, the blockade had contributed close to a 50% 
reduction in general food supplies and over 80% reduction in protein foods for the German 
population.
43
   Further, N. P. Howard provides more specificity from a report compiled by Petr 
Struve:  an annual loss of approximately 4 million tons of imported cattle feed concentrates and a 
reduction from pre-war grain harvests of 21 million tons to 12 million tons by 1918.
44
  The 
reduction in cattle feed concentrates translated into reduced meat and fats, for example:  12% of 
the peacetime diet of meat, 7% of fats, 28% of butter, and 15% of cheese.  Of the reduced 12 
million tons from grain harvests, bread rations reached only 48% of the pre-war level and for the 




The availability of food did not improve much after the Armistice, for the Allies 
continued the blockade until after the Versailles Treaty was signed in July 1919.  Moreover, 
armistice and treaty provisions resulted in the loss of much of 13.1% of Germany’s pre-war 
territory, a large chunk of its merchant marine, 25% of its fishing fleet, 40% of its river and lake 
fleets, and a sizeable amount of transportation assets, e.g., 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 rail cars 
and 5,000 motor trucks.
46
  Losing Alsace-Lorraine and half of Silesia resulted not only in the loss 
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of much of the connecting transportation links running east-west, but also agricultural and 
mineral resources that had previously supported Germany either through food production 
internally or industrial production for export.  Losing much of the merchant marine fleet not only 
limited German exports, but also deprived the nation of foreign exchange received from 
countries using German merchant marine assets.  The Treaty of Versailles provided an initial list 
of reparations; further conferences and resolutions provided specifics as well as payment plans 
and even reparation reductions.   Even after receiving credit from the United States through 
implementation of the Dawes Plan in 1924, while Germany began to recover industrially, 
returning to its pre-war levels of production, Germany nonetheless never achieved a level of 
agricultural production capable of providing for its indigenous population.    
In sum, between the two wars, Germany remained dependent on importing foodstuffs and 
industrial raw resources from outside sources to feed its population and produce finished 
industrial products for export.  Additionally, reparation payments, even after payment reductions, 
gouged a sizeable amount from Germany’s available income.         
1.2  A Choice:  Again, Kanonen statt Butter?  Germany’s Four-Year Plans.   
Germany did not need to reorganize its economy from a peacetime to a wartime status in 
September, 1939, as economic mobilization began with the second Four-Year Plan (1936 – 
1940), or arguably, with the First Four-Year Plan (1933-1936).  The first Four Year Plan, 1933-
1936, focused on job creation, reorganization of the agricultural sector and rearmament.  
Rearmament, however, while putting people to work, recreated the old conundrum.  By focusing 
on rearmament production – taking away raw materials and resources otherwise required for 
exportable products – the country reduced its available exports that in turn reduced the financial 
exchange necessary to import required materials and foodstuffs. 
44 
 
The second Four-Year Plan, announced by Hitler at the Nürnberg Reichsparteitag in 
1936, aimed to make Germany as economically independent as possible from the outside world.  
The basic objective of the second Four-Year Plan focused on establishing a unified and 
centralized economic system that, through a controlled investment program, would produce the 
industrial base necessary to support wartime armaments production.  A secondary objective 
centered on preparing the population to support a war effort through reduction in consumer 
products as necessary, while a tertiary objective aimed at incorporating economic resources from 
states brought under German influence, and later occupied, to support German rearmament and 
agricultural production.   
Even before World War II began, as early as 1936, Germany imported approximately 
4,725,000 metric tons of foodstuffs.  Imports included substantial amounts of grain, meat, dairy 
products, fruits and vegetables – all basic food items.  The Hesse-Württemberg-Bavaria region, 
eventually the U. S. occupation zone, historically less self-sufficient than other regions in 
Germany, fell as much as 25 percent short of meeting its food requirements from its own 
production.  In 1936, for example, the region claimed about one-half of all imports for Germany.   
“Its imports included almost as much grain as the total for Germany, more potatoes than the total 
for Germany, and substantial amounts of meat, fats, sugar, fruits and vegetables and other 
commodities,” concluded a U. S. Army G-5 division study.
47
  “After 1936, rationing and state-
controlled prices played a grueling role, and the consumer had to get used to the rationing of 
scarce foods [already] one year before the war.”
48
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Nazi Germany never achieved economic independence.  Domestic sources could only 
assure approximately 80% of the minimum needs in food supplies.  Germany procured supplies 
of grain for bread, several other foodstuffs, and oil from the resources of the Balkan states.  
Romania, with its grain surplus and its oilfields, ranked especially high in German calculations.  
The German government stockpiled grain and some of the scarce materials to safeguard against 
surprises at least for a few months until the centralized German government agencies attained the 
elusive self-sufficiency Hitler hoped to achieve through forcible expansion of the German 
Lebensraum. 
Likewise, raw industrial material requirements of Hitler’s Germany still largely depended 
on importation: e.g., all oil, most fuels, iron ore and nonferrous metals such as copper, nickel, 
manganese, chrome, wolfram, zinc, as well as fibers, and leather.  As the war began in 1939, 
Germany still imported 70% of the iron ore, 80% of the copper, 65% of petroleum and rubber, 
50% of fibers, 45% of hides and pelts, and nearly 100% of manganese, nickel, wolfram and 
chrome. Germany did embark on a program to develop substitute (Ersatz) material, e.g., the 




The Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, while considering the two Four-Year 
Plans, noted that available data indicated a 25% higher total production in 1938, compared to 
1928, using 1928 as the base year.  Broken down into production goods and consumption goods, 
the percentage increases dropped for both categories until 1936, then rose to a 44% and 16% 
increase respectively.  At the same time, however, the population increased approximately 7% -- 
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from 64.5 million to 68.4 million.
50
  If rearmament represented the majority of production goods, 
unless Germany manufactured rearmament items for export, clearly the increase in consumption 
goods, offset by the population increase, that is, 16% increase domestically for consumption 
goods spread out over a 7% larger population group, could not make up for the historic need to 
import consumer goods, particularly foodstuffs.  Obviously, Hitler and the German Government 
never reached self-sufficiency before the war – nor during the war.       
1.3  Kriegswirtschaft:  Feeding Mars to Fight the War. 
Alan Kramer noted that the strategic bombing campaign incurring the most industrial 
damage between the late 1943 and early 1945 had not permanently reduced productive capacity 
of German industry.  “In fact, gross fixed capital (the value of durable goods used in production 
– mainly machinery, buildings and vehicles) was at least 20 percent higher in May 1945 than it 
had been in 1936.  This astonishing expansion can only be understood it we take a look at the 
development of the German war economy.”
51
  In that process, one must differentiate between 
reaching full economic mobilization and full or near full production capacity, as that appears to 
have been the pattern for the Kriegswirtschaft in Nazi Germany.   
Both Alan Kramer and R. J. Overy
52
 argue strongly that reaching near full economic 
mobilization did occur, but earlier than the popular view, that such mobilization had not occurred 
until 1943-44.  Moreover, economic mobilization came at a cost between 1939 and 1941, but 
again, not the traditional “guns over butter” production, rather, through centralization and 
rationalization of production.  Furthermore, both Kramer and Overy argue convincingly that full 
economic mobilization did not come totally at the expense of consumer goods production.  
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Consumer goods produced remained at about the same level in 1939-1941 as in 1938.  “The 
supply of food to the German civilian population was almost at the prewar level until the last 
year of the war, and was far higher than in any of the countries of occupied Europe or in the 
other Axis countries.”
53
   
 Undeniably, the German government imposed rationing of consumer products to varying 
degrees at different times, but the government chose the taxation tool initially to curb consumer 
spending, while at the same time, increasing funds available for the armaments industry through 
increased consumer savings and government loans.  As Overy noted, the government resorted to 
direct taxation – income, corporation and luxury taxes -- that increased the total tax burden from 
17.7 billion RM (Reichmarks) in 1938 to 32.3 billion RM by 1941.54  Additionally, using 
statistics from the Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,55 Overy extrapolates consumption 
levels for the period 1938-1941, suggesting that levels of per capita food consumption dropped 
22 percent, “with sharp increases in potato and vegetable consumption and sharp falls in the 
consumption of meat, fish, eggs, cheese, milk and fats.” 
56
  Further, while the government 
intentionally monitored food consumption to maintain a basic minimum of food for all citizens 
“to reduce political risks,”
57
 the rationale for strict and universal rationing focused more on a 
lesson learned from World War I – avoid the severe black marketing that transpired during that 
war and the infamous Steckrübenwinter of 1916-1917. 
 Another lesson learned from World War I by the German armed forces:  that the 
economic system needed to prepare for the next war with adequate resources, infrastructure 
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capacity and preferably an armed forces economic administrative organization.  However, in the 
early years of World War II, the appropriate execution of production under armed forces 
management went awry.  Overy notes that even though the economic system reached near full 
economic mobilization by the summer of 1941, and in spite of all the transfers of resources 
towards increasing armaments production, the total production capacity and therefore output did 
not expand accordingly.     
By July 1941, Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler intervened, after receiving a pessimistic 
economic assessment from General Georg Thomas, Chef des Wehrwirtschafts- und 
Rüstungsamtes Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Chief, German Armed Forces Economic Staff), 
“that the economy was completely overloaded with demands from the armed forces.”
58
   The 
myriad of problems, the most serious, lack of civilian industry leadership and management, as 
well as competing interests among the armed forces and the absence of targeted planning 
guidelines for the war economy by the armed forces slowed production gains.  Further, 
bottlenecking within the production process, and transportation and energy shortages, led Hitler, 
after several months of preparation, to decree an economic strategy of efficiency and 
rationalization. The essential concepts of this strategy targeted productivity:  “how to get more 
weapons out of an economy already close to full mobilization.”
59
  Reichskanzler Hitler’s answer, 
in his Führerbefehl, 21 March 1942, “The greatest output is to be achieved with the smallest 
expenditure of resources.”
60
  The most productive effort leaned toward mass production rather 
than the traditional and more time-consuming skilled labor.  Further, Hitler put considerably 
more responsibility for the wartime economy back into the hands of the industrialists and 
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technical officials, at the expense of the armed forces officials.  Hitler appointed to the key 
wartime economy positions, for example, Albert Speer as the Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und 
Munition (Minister of Armaments and War Production), Ernst Friedrich Sauckel as the 
Generalbevollmächtiger für den Arbeitseinsatz (General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment) 
and Erhard Milch as the Generalluftzeugmeister für Luftrüstungsproduktion (Minister for 
Aircraft Production).  Production capacity did improve after 1942, peaking in 1944.  
Streamlining and rationalizing the war economy no doubt played a key role in this achievement, 
however, labor utilization and acquisition of labor and raw materials from occupied Europe quite 
possibly played a bigger role in success of the German war economy.  As Alan Kramer noted, 
without the raw materials, forced labor and the extracted armament production from occupied 
Europe (extracted after 1942 by Hitler’s order), production capacity would not have fulfilled 
military requirements, tilled German agricultural land, nor provided additional foodstuffs for the 
German population; “Germany would have lost the war by summer 1943.”
61
              
U. S. military government sources support Alan Kramer’s supposition.  Nazi Germany 
never achieved self-sufficiency in food production before or during the war.  The regime 
continuously procured primarily from occupied countries approximately 15% of its food 
requirements during the war.  Any U. S. official involved in planning for the occupation of 
Germany and presumably having available basic knowledge of Germany’s circumstances over 
the previous fifty years should have expected huge food shortages in Germany after capitulation 
and for several years after the war.  Indeed, it became a key policy issue for the U. S. military 
government to reestablish German exports to balance import of necessary items in short supply, 
particularly foodstuffs.  Until this occurred, the U. S. Government would continue to ship 
foodstuffs to Germany to provide at least the minimum calorie intake necessary to support life.  
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The U. S. Army, the only U. S. governmental agent capable of such a mission, provided the 
logistics to support this policy. 
2.  Challenge:  Stunde Null?   Facing defeat and destruction, 1945. 
Firestorms, total destruction, unconditional surrender terms provoking vivid scenes of a 
scorched earth-type policy, while emotionally charged, conveyed little of the reality on the 
ground.  Indeed, Allied bombing raids destroyed German infrastructure, and in turn reduced 
productive capability, transportation means and routes, housing, schools, and so forth.  While 
destruction rates from the bombing raids vary and have been somewhat exaggerated, in many 
cases, what was destroyed or damaged is more important than how much damage occurred.  For 
example, all but one of the bridges over the Rhine River were destroyed, and the Rhine, a critical 
European inland waterway was virtually impassable.  The Ruhr coalmines in northwestern 
Germany - its major coal producing region - could still produce coal but because of damaged or 
destroyed transportation means and routes, the coal could not be effectively transported to the 
users.  As far as the agricultural areas in the countryside, most relatively undamaged by air raids, 
available villagers, elders, women and children, planted crops but who would return after the war 
to harvest the crops, as the Nazi forced laborers, the Zwangsarbeiter, were now only voluntarily 
available? 
Agricultural production, characteristic of most production, operates as a system.  Only 
one missing spoke in the wheel can hobble the production process.  By the end of World War II, 
more than one spoke had fallen out of Germany’s agricultural production cycle.  Russel Hill, 
writing for the N. Y. Herald Tribune on 2 July 1945, commented on his impressions while 
driving through a part of the U. S. occupation zone:  “a land of plentiful crops, where nearly 
every acre of soil seems to be exploited to best advantage.  Everybody is engaged in getting out 
51 
 
the hay – old men, women and children, and there are many fields of potatoes, spinach, beets, 
and lettuce ripening under the sun.”
62
  A G-5 Division staff member at U. S. Forces in the 
European Theater (USFET) Headquarters, wrote,  
This impression of plenty is no illusion.  The G-5 section of the 12th Army Group 
Headquarters has estimated that in the U. S. zone between 90 and 100 percent of 
the areas normally sown have been planted this year.  American Military 
Government authorities are doing everything in their power to help the food crop.  
Captured Wehrmacht horses are being turned over for agricultural needs, and 




One week later, the same G-5 Division staff section filed a more complete report of the 
agriculture situation in the three western zones of Germany, giving readers a detailed analysis of 
the food production system in the three western zones, focusing on the U. S. occupation zone.
64
  
Not one, but at least nine spokes fell off this wheel, and perhaps not known by journalist Hill, the 
western region of Germany, and particularly areas to the west and north, historically produced 
approximately 60-70 percent of the required foodstuffs to support the population in the area prior 
to the war.  Even before German capitulation, refugees had flooded the western zones.  
Additionally, USFET G-5 estimated that indigenous population movements during the war 
resulted in approximate 27 and 4 percent increases in population to Bavaria and Württemberg 
respectively, from northern Germany, since 1939,
65
 a 31percent increase in mouths to feed.  
Lastly, Displaced Persons (Zwangsarbeiter), many having left their forced labor locations, 
swarmed the region looking for food and shelter. 
 Concurrently, in cascading sequence, wartime destruction and dislocation wrecked the 
transportation and communication systems, creating critical breaks in not only the traditional 
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food distribution systems from the ground to storage and then on to the market, but also in the 
ability to administer and communicate food production across the region.  Subsequently, 
transporting necessary farm labor -- early-release German POWs, as the Zwangsarbeiter that had 
replaced many German men during the war left the fields, to the needed locations depended on 
transportation assets sadly lacking.  Simultaneously, the destruction and dislocation also resulted 
in interruptions of spring planting in many areas, as well as the inability to procure enough seed 
and fertilizer for planting, and particularly seed for sugar beets that had traditionally come from 
the eastern sections of Germany. 
 Sequentially following the planting, harvesting and transporting foodstuffs requiring 
processing to the refineries, canneries and related production facilities required not only 
transportation assets to move the harvest, but also fuel.  Likewise, the production process 
required fuel, in particular, coal, itself a critically short resource.  U. S. military government 
officials had already calculated a shortage of butter, cheese, livestock and preserved fruits and 
vegetables available for the winter season.    
Finally, continually throughout this cycle, administrative issues constantly required 
attention.  Firstly, the denazification process forced the removal, at least initially, of key German 
administrators and officials, removing the knowledge and experience base of the agriculture 
production process.  Secondly, military government organizational responsibility shifted 
constantly during the summer of 1945, causing confusion as to implementation of policies and 
rendering of logistic support.  The initial and perhaps most critical decision the military 
government had to make involved establishing the ration scale, as it was already clear that 
foodstuffs would not meet requirements for the winter 1945-1946.  One decision came easily:  in 
order to conserve grain supplies, the U. S. military government prohibited the brewing of beer 
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for German civilian consumption.  With so many unknowns in the agriculture production 
process, how does an administration set a ration scale?  
On the one hand, several million people perished during the Allied ground and air 
campaigns.  On the other hand, some areas remained relatively untouched.  In other words, the 
Allies defeated the Nazi regime; brought the German State to its heels, exacting its unconditional 
surrender, but they did not destroy the nation.  While infrastructure destruction pervaded in the 
cities and industrial areas, most of the countryside remained relatively untouched.  The damage 
that really mattered over time befell German institutions, community life and the German 
population.   
The terms of the Potsdam Protocol, signed at the meeting of Marshal Stalin, President 
Harry S. Truman and Prime Ministers Winston S. Churchill and Clement Attlee, confirmed the 
agreement of the wartime allies to put into place a military government on the ground in 
Germany, that proved challenging for the occupying authorities.  In contrast to rosy projections 
about Germany’s rapid recovery, U. S. Forces faced enormous challenges in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II.  The country suffered enormous destruction in many cities and 
industrial areas – exactly the locations where U. S. military and later civilian occupation 
authorities stationed the majority of their forces.  Not only did U. S. Forces have to resupply 
themselves but these forces also faced the daunting task of repairing or, in many cases, 
rebuilding essential infrastructure – bridges, roads, railroad junctions, sewage treatment plants, 
electric, water and gas utilities, inland waterways and critical buildings.  Additionally, U. S. 
Forces supplied fuel and food to Germans in the assigned U. S. occupation zone to prevent total 
collapse of the population immediately following the war.   
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In the immediate aftermath of V-E Day, the U. S Army became not only the logistics 
workhorse providing the mechanisms for deployments from the European to the Pacific theater, 
but also the collectors, inventory-takers, packers, shippers, suppliers and transporters of 
personnel and materiel required by U. S military personnel and family members assigned for 
duty in occupied Germany.  Additionally, U. S. Army personnel formed the initial crews in many 
German villages, towns and cities to repair at least temporarily many ruined factories, broken 
communications systems and utility works, transportation routes and equipment, and provided 
critical repair parts and “work-arounds” for the worn-out machinery, so necessary for daily 
survival.  The following notes from a U. S. Forces, European Theater Weekly Information 
Bulletin could have been Anywhere, Germany in the summer of 1945.  A U. S. Army Civil 
Affairs Detachment (CAD E2C2) coordinated with the Bremen German Civilian Billeting Office 
to take “immediate and aggressive steps to provide increased housing facilities in the city” to 
provide minimally adequate housing for 32,000 city residents and approximately 70,000 
returning Prisoners of War.  CAD E2C2 urged the civil authorities to begin repairs immediately, 
while the Military Government would do “everything it could to provide food, fuel and building 
materials, and that these efforts would be continued.  Additional housing has first priority in the 
rehabilitation program.”
66
  Such early reports across occupied Germany represented the norm. 
2.1  The Nazi Inheritance:  Reality on the Ground at War’s End. 
General Lucius Clay, in Germany prior to the capitulation and the only senior U. S. Army 
leader assigned for the duration of the U. S. military government in Germany, characterized the 
situation in Germany immediately after capitulation. 
We began from scratch, with Germany as close to the bottom as an industrial 
nation could be.  Germany needed everything.  The war had left ruined factories, 
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broken communications, worn-out machinery, demoralized workers.  Cities were 
devastated; living space was scarce, millions of displaced persons wandered over 
the land.  Food, coal, and raw materials were scarce.  The complicated economic 
system under which goods are produced, exchanged, and used had broken down.  
The equally complicated system for administration of a modern nation was non-
existent.  There was no government.  There were no leaders.
67
 
   
All Federal, Länder, Distrikt and Kreis (central, state, county and city) government had 
collapsed and senior-level personnel dismissed.  Public services operated only sporadically, 
hampered by damage, destruction and lack of fuel.  Communications means – phones, mail, 
radio and press – devolved to occupation authorities.  Transportation routes littered with war 
debris and crowded with troops and refugees as well as damaged or destroyed rail lines and 
blocked inland waterways severely restricted movement.  Adding to this chaos, destroyed or 
damaged bridges, sunken barges and mines further thwarted movement – particularly on the 
Rhine and Danube rivers, earlier the capillary system for inland German trade as well as key 
trade routes with its neighbors.  In the U. S. occupation zone alone, initially over 2.5 million 
Displaced Persons required support and eventual repatriation, soon to be joined by refugees from 
the East and expellees from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.  One also must add to the number 
requiring basic needs, approximately five million demilitarized Wehrmacht soldiers.  Further 
complicating this difficult situation was the following circumstance noted by General Clay:  
Hundreds of thousands of tons of German war material had to be guarded and 
destroyed while more than 8,000,000 tons of our own equipment were moved into 
Germany from the liberated areas for disposal or for utilization by our occupation 
forces.   .   .   . Certainly the authorities in Washington who had prepared our 




Obviously, expectations for a short occupation quickly collapsed. 
 General Eisenhower, the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) 
Commander until SHAEF’s dissolution in July 1945, and senior U. S. Army officer in charge of 
                                                   
67
 General Lucius D. Clay, “Germany – Four Years of Occupation,” Army Information Digest (May-June 1949):  3. 
68
 General Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York:  Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950), 15-16. 
56 
 
the initial U. S. occupation in Europe until his departure in late November 1945, fervently hoped 
that the role of the United States would quickly revert from the military to a civilian-led 
occupation.  As it happened, however, the transition from a military-led to a civilian-led 
occupation government would not take place until the summer of 1949.  The U. S. Army 
continued to provide security and logistics support for the duration of either military or civilian-
led occupation.  How herculean this task would become was not immediately apparent to the 
military government or U. S. Army forces.  It took U. S. occupation authorities up to three 
months after capitulation to calculate a good measure of the damage, destruction and therefore 
minimum requirements to put Germany and the Germans back on their feet.  Perhaps statistics 
from the OMGUS September 1945 report provide a better sense of the U. S. Army’s immediate 
logistics mission while postulating a longer-than anticipated occupation.    
 Fuel, construction materials and food represented the most critical resources required 
initially.  Of these, perhaps the most crucial German production line – coal – critical for domestic 
as well as export purposes war praktisch stillgelegt (practically non-existent) at war’s end.  
Displaced Persons no longer provided the labor source while indigenous labor provided 
approximately 50% of 1938 labor levels.
69
  Moreover, destroyed or damaged rail, roadways and 
transportation assets further hampered movement of allowed production to the consumers.  With 
coal mining initially at a standstill at war’s end due to labor shortages, Germany’s steel and other 
industrial production also slowed to a snail’s pace.   
Most importantly, the Potsdam Protocol provisions, although not in effect until August 
1945, severely limited coal production as a major part of the plan to demilitarize Germany.  The 
procedures to control coal production developed in the Ruhr region focused ostensibly on an 
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Allied Control Council-determined Level of Industry to raise coal production to meet reparations 
requirements, leaving little coal for domestic use, particularly coal for the heating of homes in 
the winter.  Concern for serious increases in disease and mortality rates among the elderly and 
young weighed heavily on occupation authorities as early as the summer of 1945.  Even though 
production had increased from month to month after May 1945, regions within the U. S. 
occupation zone had never produced high levels of coal and therefore, this vital fuel had to come 
from the other zones.  By September 1945, German labor produced approximately 70% of hard 
coal and 68% of brown coal at 1938 levels.
70
  At these levels coal production would not sustain 
the indigenous population, the Displaced Persons population, refugees and the U. S. occupation 
forces.  Either the French, British or Soviets supplied coal from their regions to support the U. S. 
zone, or the U. S. Government had to ship coal from the United States.  Until the Allied Control 
Council established a sufficient “Level of Industry” policy for coal production to meet both 
export and domestic use, industries, transportation assets and the population would suffer.  
 The shortage of fuel produced a snowballing effect.  Electric power generation depended 
on four sources:  hydro-generation, brown coal, hard coal, fuel oil and gas.  According to the 
September 1945 OMGUS Military Government Report, by the end of that month, hydro-
generated electricity stood at 63% viable, with brown coal and hard coal at 13% and 1 % 
respectively, fuel oil at 2%, and gas production virtually non-existent due to coal shortages.  
While these levels barely covered minimum requirements through September, cold weather had 
not set in.  These levels would not supply requirements for the population and occupation forces 
during winter months.  Even though hydro-generation provided the highest level of electricity 
through September, this source diminished during winter months because of the propensity for 
water to freeze in cold weather.       
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Furthermore, fuel not only heated homes and moved transport, but also fed industrial 
production, at least that industrial production allowed by the Allied Control Council, e.g., the 
production of plastics, some synthetics and dyestuffs, some pharmaceuticals, fertilizer for 
agriculture, soaps and medical supplies.  Even where a limited level of production could 
continue, the long pole in the tent – replacement of raw resources for production – failed.  
Furthermore, occupation authorities shut down key firms producing essential products for 
agriculture, e.g., fertilizer, as under Allied Control Council directives, either the components or 
the process of producing certain components fit into the category of production of war industry 
materials.  Equally serious was the reality that the broken transportation system could not move 
even the small amount of items produced to the consumers.  Rail, road and inland waterways and 
ports provided the arteries for the German economy, moving products and people within not only 
Germany but also north-south and east-west through Germany to surrounding countries.  
Damaged heavily by Allied air strikes, the German transportation and communications 
infrastructure supported neither the U. S. Army forces’ needs nor subsistence requirements of the 
Germans for the near future without at least temporary repair.  Ports, particularly Bremerhaven, 
Bremen and Marseilles, damaged by sunken ships and barges and laced with mines, topped the 
list of immediate repairs for the U. S. Army Engineers.  Likewise, bridges – both rail and road - 
required at least temporary fixes to allow thoroughfare transportation.  Additionally, rail 
networks could not run without operational communications systems. 
 In another critical area, building materials, U. S. occupation authorities recognized almost 
immediately that available resources fell below both military and civilian requirements, requiring 
imports from the United States to cover minimum needs.  The following chart amplifies the 
shortages.  None of the resources listed reached even half of requirements.  Even with cement 
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and lime at 33.9% and 42.2% respectively, with brick produced at only 2.6%, repair of buildings 
could proceed excruciatingly slowly.  Similarly, repairing roofs proceeded slowly due to the 
shortage of roofing materials.  Only the supply of pit props for the mines seemed adequate.  
Production of Building Materials for Military and Civilian Use
71
   
 
Product Unit Production/Requirement % of Requirement 
Glass Square meters 170,000/1,342,600 12.6 
Lumber Cubic meters 83,600/238,650 35.0 
Pit Props (for mines) Metric tons 63,920/75,000 85.2 
Plywood Square meters 66,500/353,500 18.8 
Cement Metric tons 44,819/132,399 33.9 
Lime Metric tons 3,600/8,517 42.2 
Plaster Metric tons 1,200/24,385   4.9 
Brick Each 1,500,000/57,500,000   2.6 
Roofing tile Each 834,000/25,110,000   3.3 
Roofing paper Square meters 950,000/9,880,000   9.6 
 
 
 Aside from shortage of fuel and construction materials, shortage of food was of most 
concern to the Germans struggling to survive.  U. S. occupation authorities noted that food 
shortages potentially creating malnutrition, if not starvation, as the immediate critical economic 
problem in the U. S. occupation zone.  A 19 June 1945 The Stars & Stripes report observed that 
under strict rationing in the Rhine valley area, at roughly 1150 calories per person per day, food 
sources would supply the indigenous population in the U. S. occupation zone until summer 
harvests.  Predicting harvest results, however, would prove difficult because of several factors:  
drought conditions, shortage of labor and fertilizer, poor transportation and war destruction.
72
    
Indigenous sources could not provide enough food products at the authorized ration level of 1550 
calories daily for the normal consumer.  Grain and potato harvests from 1944 ran out before 
harvesting of the 1945 crops; said crops estimated at only 83% of Germany’s 1939-1944 
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average.  According to OMGUS health surveys, already 60% of the German population
73
 lived 
on a sub-standard diet that only in some cases either home gardens and produce or the black 
market could supplement, if personal funds were available. 
 Food production depended on several factors that, with the exception of late planting 
because of  the ongoing war and the summer drought, related directly to the consequences of 
war:  shortages of seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, machinery, transport assets (primarily rail, trucks 
and horses), and farm labor.  German firms that before the war under the Nazi Four-Year Plans 
altered production lines in favor of war material could not refocus on production of farm 
equipment and chemicals because occupation forces either targeted many of these firms as 
reparations-eligible or shut down the firms pending denazification processing.  Even if a firm 
escaped these procedures, acquiring raw materials for production proved near impossible.  To 
bolster food supplies in Germany, the U. S. Government initially shipped over 690,000 long tons 
of wheat as a reserve for the U. S., British and French occupation zones to supplement known 
shortages.
74
  As the months wore on and foodstuffs ever more scarce to find, the U. S. 
Government shipped considerably more food products to Europe and Germany, and the U. S. 
Army provided the bulk of the transportation and storage resources for shipment and distribution 
in country. 
2.2  Tausch-, Schleichhandel und Fringsen (Bartering, Black Marketing and Scrounging). 
 As a Stars & Stripes journalist noted in a 1 June 1945 article, whatever food civilians had 
in the urban areas came from the surrounding farm lands “in driblets” by whatever means of 
transportation people could find, usually bicycles or on foot.  Further, seeing so many people 
during early morning and evening hours riding on whatever streetcars still ran (referring to 
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Hamburg at this time), heading out to the suburbs or into the surrounding countryside, he 
wondered why.  Most travelled to the countryside in search of food for the next day.  He 
emphasized that, “hunting food is the chief occupation for the citizens of Hamburg [or any urban 
area in Germany at this time].  There is plenty of time for that because there isn’t much other 
productive work that most can do.  What work is done consists mostly in an attempt to clear 
rubble, restore communications and building shelter.”      
Bartering, black market activities and scrounging often replaced normal markets as the 
only possible methods to increase meagre food and fuel supplies during at least the first two 
miserable winter years – 1945-46 and 1946-47.  Of the three activities, bartering, legal or illegal, 
and scrounging received less scrutiny, while black market activities bedeviled the authorities the 
most – and for several reasons.  Most importantly, the desperate demand for food items and the 
shortage of supply in the already severely rationed communities created ever-higher prices 
(either Reichmarks legitimately or “cigarettes” on the black market), leading to dangerous 
inflation, an awful prospect for older Germans who remembered the inflationary spiral after 
World War I.  Moreover, farmers could sell their products on the black market for considerably 
more than they would receive through the compulsory delivery and rationed item systems 
established through military government channels.   
Over and above the German population’s need for scarce resources, a number of U.S. 
soldiers, recipients of rationed items highly desired by the local population, pounced upon the 
opportunity to supplement their government incomes by selling sought after rationed objects 
such as cigarettes, sugar, coffee, butter, even fuel at the black markets.  Some would then 
exchange the Reichmarks at Army finance centers for either official Allied marks or U. S. 
dollars.  Other soldiers and some officers pursued black market activities as a second career, 
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often making more money at black marketeering than in their official capacities.  One U. S. 
Army soldier reminisced about his exposure to black marketing while doing MP duty in Belgium 
in 1945: 
Our first introduction [to black marketing] came in a subtle way, like a civilian 
approaching us and asking if we wanted to sell a pack of cigarettes.  Just to put 
things in perspective, cigarettes were the most desirable commodity in Europe at 
that time.  They had become a medium of exchange and in many cases, people 
would rather be paid in American cigarettes than in money from any country.  
They could be bartered for anything and were more in demand than currencies.   .   
[The individual] buying the cigarettes would pay us in Belgium government 
francs .  .  . we would then convert back into Army scrip or American dollars at 
the camp money center.  It seemed like such a simple way to make some fast 
spending money, but we also knew it was dealing in the black market, which was 
illegal.
75
   
 
Of course, any member of the U. S. occupation force caught in such activities faced legal action, 
at least a delay in redeploying back to the States, and possibly a bad conduct discharge.   
In an effort to curb rampant black market activities, military government set up price 
controls on scarce food items, but this initiative met with little success.  OMGUS also set up a 
semi-official barter exchange system, with centers in at least Berlin, Frankfurt and Stuttgart.  As 
Martin Sommers wrote in his 13 March 1948 Saturday Evening Post article, “Looting with 
Consent,” the rationale for establishing the Tauschzentrale (barter centers) considered the 
shortage of household effects needed in the households of the occupying forces, allowing 
Americans to exchange foodstuffs mailed from the States, but in short supply among the German 
population, for needed household effects.  U. S. military government employees, usually German 
women, working under Military Government officials priced and supervised the exchange 
process.  By setting up the Tauschzentrale, OMGUS hoped to curb black market activities, but 
the effort experienced only limited success.  Black market activity slackened considerably with 
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the currency reform in June 1948.  In the meantime, this so-called “cigarette economy” probably 
kept many a German alive for the first two to three years after the war. 
An oft resorted to measure to supplement resources – Fringsen, or scrounging – often 
proved innovative, usually quite effective, but not without an element of risk.  For example, a 
group of brothers would hop slow-moving trains going through the outskirts of their village to 
toss down coal briquettes or sugar beets to one of the group on the ground who would then pick 
up the pieces.  The coal supplemented fuel for heating while the sugar beets became either sugar 
or Schnapps – the latter manufactured under the cover of darkness as the U. S. military 
government forbade alcohol production for the local populations in the early days after the war.
76
  
Another tactic involved a group of young teachers.  While the most attractive of the females 
would distract any security personnel, the others in the group would appropriate coal or whatever 
needed resource was available.  When the book bags could carry no more, the detractor 
disengaged from flirting and the group headed home with their goods.
77
 
3.  Summary.     
The German economic system came to a standstill in the first months after war’s end.  
Food production reached less than half its 1938 level.  Food rationing varied between roughly 
1,000 and 1,500 calories per person per day.  Industrial output was less than 30% its 1938 level.  
Large numbers of working-age men, either in uniform or dead, could neither help with industrial 
nor agricultural tasks, nor the necessary clearing of rubble and temporary repair and 
reconstruction of transportation systems, utilities, housing and the sundry other facilities and 
services that make up daily life in a community.  Looking at rough statistics, larger industrial and 
urban areas suffered partial to total damage ranging from 42% in Munich to 80% in Mainz.   
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Stuttgart (Württemberg-Baden), for example, the traditional industrial and transportation 
hub of southwest Germany, had contributed mightily to the German war effort.  Companies such 
as Daimler-Benz produced tanks and aircraft engines; Robert Bosch produced electrical 
equipment; Mahle K. G. produced pistons; the Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken produced ball 
bearings; and H. Hirth produced aircraft parts.  Several military kasernes ringed Stuttgart, e.g., 
Kurmärker in Vaihingen and a Luftwaffe airfield at Echterdingen.  Thus, it was not surprising 
that Allied aircraft targeted the area frequently – 53 raids between 1940 and 1945.    
The status of the economic situation within and between the Potsdam Protocol-oriented 
occupation zones in Germany depended on consensual policies developed at the Allied Control 
Council.   Both the French and to some degree the Soviet Union objected to the stipulation that 
Germany be run as an economic unit.  The French vetoed any suggestion of centralization and 
the Soviets refused to comply with the mechanisms decreed relative to food and fuel exchanges.  
All four occupiers disagreed on various aspects of a reparations policy.
78
  By September 1945, U. 
S. military government authorities relaxed economic controls, allowing trade and 
communications within the U. S. zone, placing more responsibility on German authorities, while 
honoring the Potsdam Protocol principles of decartelization, denazification and disarmament.  
Even if public officials in Washington had not yet reckoned with a long occupation in 
Germany, the military authorities in Germany had figured it out.  An early OMGUS report noted:   
It is necessary to emphasize, however, that even though satisfactory economic 
disarmament of Germany does not prevent the future subsistence of her people 
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without external assistance, the destruction and dislocation of her industry by the 
war, accentuated by reparations, will certainly prolong the period of 
reconstruction for several years, during which the German people are unlikely to 




 A military occupation of short or long duration unquestionably requires thoughtful, 
detailed yet flexible planning.  The Americans had a plan but not one universally accepted 
among the planning communities of the State and War departments.  The War Department 
placed responsibility for civil affairs and occupation planning primarily with the Provost Marshal 
Directorate.  No doubt, the first forays into this task of planning for the post-war occupation led 
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Chapter II.  U. S. Strategic Planning for the Occupation of Germany  
Introduction:  the political becomes logistical.  
The level of logistic support by the U. S. Army in its occupation zone depended initially 
on the tenor of the Allied agreements promulgated before the war’s end.  More than that, the 
Army’s logistic support mission mushroomed after the war because of the wartime destruction, 
as well as the changing, global political scene, the dire economic situation in post-war Europe, 
and the humanitarian mission on the ground in Europe.  Underlying these challenges remained 
the traditional Army logistics support mission to its own community – soldiers, civilians and 
eventually family members who joined service members overseas.       
National leaders sign and bind their administration and citizens to treaties and 
international agreements.  As long as the parties to the agreement uphold the tenets of the treaty 
or agreement, or any agreed upon modifications thereto, life goes on under the agreed 
arrangements.  If one or more parties ignore the treaty or agreement requirements, other treaty or 
agreement signers often change direction.  A close reading of the Potsdam Protocol coupled with 
the difficulties the World War II Allies experienced in executing the Protocol with regard to 
Germany certainly warrant this observation.   One example:  In the absence of an Allied Control 
Council agreement on economic unity, the United States and Great Britain set up Bizonia in 
1947 to provide at least a two-zone economic exchange.  France joined a year later. 
The Potsdam Protocol established the procedure of consensus rule; agreeing to consensus 
votes on issues raised at the Allied Control Council allowed any of the four members to exercise 
its veto, effectively blocking action unless members arrived at a compromise provision.  On at 
least two critical points – economic unity and establishment of centralized German 
administration for critical utilities and transportation, the Allies never reached a compromise.  
Failure to come to consensus within both the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Allied 
67 
 
Control Council, authorizing execution of the Protocol as agreed on, contributed considerably to 
increasing the load of the U. S. Army logistics mission in Germany, as well as delaying 
Germany’s economic recovery, at least for the first two years of occupation.  Ultimately, the 
British and American occupation forces adopted alternatives to accomplish their objectives, e.g., 
establishment of Bizonia.  The political agreements, protocols and directives – particularly the 
Potsdam Protocol, in essence, became logistical arrangements. 
Although not yet militarily committed, the United States quietly engaged in secret 
strategy and planning discussions with the British and Canadians during the American British 
Canadian (ABC) discussions between 29 January and 27 March 1941.  The British and 
Americans agreed that the Western Hemisphere for the United States, and the survival of the 
British Commonwealth for the British represented the primary areas of interest for the United 
States and Great Britain respectively.  The British and Americans also agreed that the European 
Theater would be the first fight.  After the U. S. entered World War II in December 1941, the 
U.S. and British governments entered into joint discussions regarding eventual surrender of 
German military forces and occupation of post-war Germany.  The Soviet Union joined official 
discussions at the Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow between 18 October 
and 1 November 1943, as well as at political leader conferences beginning with Tehran in 
December 1943.  However, on-the-ground logistics decisions pertaining to post-hostilities 
Germany, e.g., assigned zone of occupation, populations requiring support and extent of war 
damage, remained elusive throughout most of the war. 
1.  How to Plan and Prepare for the U. S. Occupation in Germany 
U. S. Government planning for the occupation of Germany occurred relatively early in 
the war at four different levels – the national leadership level, Federal agency level, in coalition 
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with Great Britain and at theater level -- often simultaneously.  However, simultaneity in 
planning did not enjoy the high level of technical communications capabilities known today; 
consequently, delays in planning products reaching coordinating bodies often resulted in 
confusion and contradiction.  Moreover, the President avoided designating a sole responsible 
planning agency; rather, multiple agencies failed to coordinate with each other, further 
hampering planning efforts while violating a basic principle, unity of command.  Furthermore, 
agencies within the War Department coordinated independently with State and Treasury 
Department agencies.  Agencies within both the State and War Departments coordinated with 
counterparts in Great Britain, and General Eisenhower’s staff engaged in its own planning for the 
Allied role in post-war Germany, however, failure to identify and concur on the critical Allied 
interests as well as U. S. national interests hampered planning throughout the war. 
1.1  An Occupation Model:  Die Wacht am Rhein 1919 (Occupation on the Rhine). 
Assuming some policy guidance from President Roosevelt and the State Department 
would be forthcoming, in the interim; could any of the nine
80
 historic U. S. military occupations 
serve as a model to U. S. Army planners for the occupation of Germany following World War 
II?  With the exception of the Allied occupation of Germany following World War I, the other 
eight occupations focused on peacekeeping operations, imperialistic actions or spreading-
democracy missions.  The Occupation of the Rhine appeared the best suited as a model.  Its 
geographic location, Germany, and organizational composition, the Rhineland occupation 
followed a multinational-force war and was a coalition effort, closely paralleled the anticipated 
second occupation.  Further, the Rhineland occupation was the most recent military occupation 
engaged in by U. S. troops.  The War Department therefore commissioned the reprinting of 
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Colonel I. L. Hunt’s report on civil affairs in the American occupation zone during the Rhineland 
Occupation.   U. S. planners would eventually see more dissimilarities than similarities between 
the two operations as World War II took back stage to the occupation.     
Whereas ideological issues among the Allied forces and Germany did not drive World 
War I or the subsequent occupation, eradicating Fascism and the vestiges of the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) and its organizations and agencies 
drove World War II in Europe and immediate post-war policy, specifically policies to implement 
democratization, demilitarization, denazification, and decartelization.   Arguably, re-educating 
the German people after World War II took top priority with the U. S. military government.  This 
facet of military government policy became increasingly relevant in the face of perceived 
escalation of Soviet intransigence within the Allied Control Council, and the development of the 
Cold War.   
The terms of surrender also differed greatly between the two wars.  World War I ended as 
an armistice followed by the Treaty of Versailles within a year.  World War II, prosecuted as a 
“defeat and destroy” mission, ended under terms of unconditional surrender.  Towards the end of 
the war, Germany itself became the theater of operation, subject to the full force of the 
destructive power of the U. S, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.  Unfortunately, for both the 
Germans and the Allies, the fighting probably lasted longer entailing more loss of life and 
destruction on the ground had the fighting ended with an armistice.  As Gustav Stolper noted in 
1947, “Except for the losses and dead and wounded and the biological damage incurred in the 
hungry years of the blockade, Germany had withstood the war.   The productive plant and 
transportation system were worn down, but they existed.”
81
  Whereas relatively little 
infrastructure damage occurred within Germany during World War I, major damage to most 
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German cities and industrial centers, with the additional physical and psychological impact on 
the indigenous German population, took its toll after World War II.  Furthermore, after World 
War I, returned German veterans played a significant political role in some regions of Germany, 
such as the Freikorps and its role in prevention of a genuine social revolution in 1918-1919, or 
elements of the Prussian military aiding in the obstruction of parliamentary democracy.  Even 
though military planners feared a similar reaction after the capitulation in 1945, a “stab in the 
back mentality” did not develop a second time around as German forces lost on all fronts.  The 
Allied Powers insisted from the beginning of the occupation that all Germans - soldiers, families 
and civilians—had to share in the discomforts of destruction and hardship following World War 
II.   
Germany had a working Federal government and governmental administration in place 
and functioning throughout the non-occupied areas of Germany after World War I.  Furthermore, 
the Allied occupiers relied on local German officials in every-day transactions throughout the 
occupation period.  The German government after capitulation in May 1945 collapsed.  What 
German officials remained in positions, primarily at the local community levels, reflected a 
minority that at least the American occupiers reduced even further through their denazification 
process.  The Four Powers recreated and later supervised occupation governments in their 
assigned zones in Germany after World War II.  Each occupation government – some faster than 
others - vested governmental authority back into local German government and their supporting 
agencies.  However, a federal German government did not reappear officially until ratification of 
the Basic Law in May 1949 and the subsequent federal elections and swearing in of the new 
government in August and September 1949 -- the last year of the military occupation.  
71 
 
Whereas the military government in the occupied provinces of Germany following World 
War I lasted a relatively short period – for the Americans, from December 1918 until January 
1920, the military government occupation after World War II lasted from 1945 until 1949.
82
  
Further, the Treaty of Versailles accepted in June 1919, officially ended World War I, whereas 
the peace treaty officially ending World War II, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect 
to Germany, went into force in September 1990, forty-five years after capitulation.    
 Relative to its involvement in World War II and the follow-on occupation, the U. S. 
Government supported Allies and forces over a considerably larger geographical area than 
during World War I.  One cannot adequately compare the logistics support in what was truly a 
worldwide war effort during World War II, with the more limited action and support provided 
during World War I.    Furthermore, the destruction on the ground in Germany, the enormity of 
the economic impact in Europe, and the barbarity of the war crimes caused by the Nazi regime 
required more than the passive occupation following World War I.  Unconditional surrender left 
Germany stateless:  
A creature without a head or limbs, lacking its own law courts, administration, 
and Constitution, utterly in the hands of the victors. No such catastrophe had 
faced the nation since the Thirty Years’ War in the 17
th
 century.   .   .   The 
territory, already reduced in 1919, lost another quarter of its area; one tenth of the 
people killed, the population exposed to hunger, millions without shelter or 
belongings, and communications with the outside world broken off.   Railroads, 
mail and telephones were out of commission, no newspaper could be printed; 




Finally, COL Hunt, in his report to Army Headquarters concerning the first partial 
occupation of Germany noted that, “The American army of occupation lacked both training and 
organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war 
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had placed under is temporary sovereignty.”
84
 He suggested that civil affairs operations 
demanded policies, a dedicated organization and civil affairs training.  This recommendation 
interested few Army personnel between the wars.  Nevertheless, the Judge Advocate General’s 
office in the War Department did update the Basic Field Manual, Volume VII, part two (January 
2, 1934), with publication of Field Manual (FM) 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, 1 October 1940.  
Although published a few months earlier, the formative edition of Field Manual 27-5, Manual of 
Military Government and Civil Affairs, 30 July 1940, supplemented Chapter 10 in FM 27-10.  
FM 27-5 paragraph 6, assigned responsibility “for preparation of plans and determination of 
policies with respect to military government” to the Personnel Division, G1.  As Earl Ziemke 
humorously noted, these two field manuals “would eventually be regarded as the Old and New 
Testaments of American military government.”
85  
In 1940, as the U. S. was not engaged in the war, none of the War Department staff 
sections appeared to be too excited about the new Civil Affairs mission – least of all, the always-
understaffed G1 directorate.  By the fall of 1941, the situation had worsened, although the U. S. 
was not yet at war.  The Provost Marshal General post was reactivated, and interestingly, the 
JAG officer responsible for both manuals, Major General Allen W. Gullion, became the Provost 
Marshal General that fall, and shortly thereafter, “father” of the Military Police Corps.  In the 
process of organizing a military police school in November 1941, General Gullion volunteered to 
include military government courses at the school.  G1 was, as Ziemke wrote, “Pleased to have a 
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place to put the training function.”
86
   The story does not end here, as the oft- squabbling federal 
staff agencies delayed a final decision, until a compromise ending in approval by Chief of Staff, 
General Marshall, resulted in the authorization for the Provost Marshal to conduct military 
government training “in a school to be operated for other purposes.”  The University of Virginia 
became the “school operated for other purposes,”
87
 and the first U. S War Department academic 
institution to train civil affairs officers.  The first class began in May, 1942, with a program 
designed to take advantage of the University of Virginia location, faculty and facilities, as well 
as the facilities of both the Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth) and the 
faculty at the Army War College (at that time, in Washington, D. C.).   
The military government training program experienced numerous crises over the next 
eighteen months, especially getting and graduating enough quality personnel to meet the 
demand.  Arguments back and forth among agencies, compromises, and finally necessity led to 
approval and establishment of a second training venue by November 1942.  The Provost Marshal 
staff developed a four-month program to train the newly selected civilian specialists – one month 
in a Military Police boot camp at Fort Custer, Michigan, followed by a three-month crash course 
in a foreign language, and regionally-related history, political science, and economics courses at 
one of six selected universities.
88
 
Concomitantly with the birthing pains of the civil affairs training programs in the spring 
and summer of 1942, the question of which agency would run civil affairs/military government 
activities in liberated or occupied countries surfaced, particularly as the kick-off of Operation 
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TORCH approached.  President Roosevelt delegated policy formulation and execution of civil 
affairs to the State Department and procurement and delivery of relief supplies to the Lend-Lease 
Administration.  Neither agency lived up to the President’s intent, the War Department 
standards, or supply requirements on the ground.  The Army picked up the resupply mission at 
the North African end.
89
  By February 1943, General Eisenhower, recognizing that the invasion 
of Sicily was only a boot jump away, and not excited about repeating the North African debacle, 
raised again the issue of unity of command and clarification of the relationships between civil 
and military authorities and missions.  To establish ownership over civil affairs operations, the 
War Department, with approval from the Chief of Staff, set up the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) 
within the General Staff, effective 1 March 1943, with Major General John H. Hilldring as its 
director.  As the War Department’s civil affairs coordinator, the CAD was responsible for all 
civilian agency activities in theaters of operations as well as insuring that plans involving 
occupation of enemy or enemy controlled territory included detailed civil affairs planning.
90
 
Colonel Hunt’s ghost could now rest easy that his advice, at least on the importance of 
civil affairs training prior to a military occupation, had been implemented.  What he had not 
mentioned, and what still remained to be done, was a Presidential decision on which agency had 
the primary responsibility for military government and civil affairs post-conflict.  During the 
silence from the White House on this issue, the civil affairs boys began work on a handbook. 
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1.2  A Handbook for Military Occupation?    
By the Tehran Conference, December 1943, if not sooner, it was clear that the Allies 
would replace whatever existed of the Nazi regime and government after Germany’s 
unconditional surrender.   The U. S. Army experience during the Rhineland occupation, 1919-
1920, increasingly dissimilar to the situation presenting itself to planners during World War II, 
did provide the basis for the first U. S. Army Basic Field Manual FM 27-5, Military Government 
(1940) that delineated policy and procedures for military government.  Based as the earlier 
manual was on the aftermath of World War I and the establishment of partial occupation of 
Germany, the U. S. War Department updated the manual in December 1943.  This version, FM 
27-5 Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, included the relatively new concept of 
civil affairs and reflected the realities of an unconditional surrender following a total and 
considerably more technical war that wrecked significant physical damage on Germany. 
Finalization of this field manual supported the eventual development during the summer, 
1944, of a draft Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender 
that was suspended through efforts of President Roosevelt’s aides and a cabinet member , who 
felt the tone of the Handbook too soft.  However, SHAEF finally published a harsher handbook 
by December 1944, with an introductory statement that the Supreme Commander, Allied 
Expeditionary Force was “initially responsible for the establishment of Military Government in 
areas of Germany occupied by forces under his command.  At some time following the 
occupation, a successor agency may assume responsibility for the Military Government of 
Germany; until that time the Supreme Commander will be fully responsible for establishing and 
maintaining complete Military Government in his area.”
91
  General Eisenhower and numerous 
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senior leaders in the U. S. Army did not want the military government role in Germany.   
General Eisenhower wrote a number of memorandums on the subject to General Marshall during 
the summer and fall, 1945, recommending a civilian-run military government.  However, 
President Roosevelt had declared that the U. S. Army assume this mission, and his successor, 
President Truman maintained this policy, so, at least for General Eisenhower and SHAEF, the 
debate over exercise of authority was clear – the military had the glove and the ball.
92
   
This handbook was unique at the time, in that it not only provided instructions to its 
users, but also introduced each category with a rather detailed account of the German 
organization in place, the interface among German agencies, and the process military 
government personnel should expect to follow while coordinating with German agencies.  For 
example, Chapter XI, Agriculture, Food and Food Distribution, outlined the structure of the 
agencies, explaining in detail the food rationing system in effect, the calorie allocation, and the 
food chain process from soil through market, inventory, rationing and on to the consumer. 
Further, SHAEF objectives and policy for agriculture and food management and “Action to be 
Taken” in this arena by military government detachment personnel complete the section (see 
Handbook Table of Contents at Appendix II.1.2).   
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By the end of 1944, SHAEF military government detachments had an official handbook, 
the U. S. Army continued to focus on the fight, while War and State department planners in 
Washington continued to develop a post-war occupation policy. 
2.  Planning Organizations for Occupation Policy.  
The rationale for discussing the agencies below involves each group’s responsibilities for 
planning post-war occupation in Germany.  Once President Roosevelt decided that the U. S. 
Army would be responsible not only for security in the U. S. occupation zone but also for 
American military government in Germany, length of occupation to be determined (later),
93
 one 
should expect the occupation package to include policy guidelines, which in turn, would produce 
logistics requirements.  While little of the strategies and few of the policies from the agencies 
discussed below directly cite Army logistics, “armies march on their stomachs.”
94
  What armies 
need to function comes through their logistics chain.  Solid and early policy decisions improve 
logistics support planning, particularly in this situation when the military forces would run 
military operations together with occupation duties.  Too often, policy decisions for post-hostility 
actions in Germany, entangled either in internal U. S. agency wrangling or between U. S. and 
British agencies, were ambiguous or postponed.  Small wonder considering the plethora of 
agencies, committees, lack of authority below presidential and prime ministerial levels, 
organization cultural differences, as well as differences in national interests.   
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The U. S. Government entered into logistics support arrangements with Great Britain, 
already at war with Germany, as early as mid-1940 by supplying Britain with surplus weapons 
and ammunition.  The U. S. Congress subsequently passed the Lend-Lease Act, 11 March1941, 
officially known as “An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States.”  However, 
this narrative begins with the Atlantic Charter, drafted between President Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Churchill in August 1941.  The Charter echoed democratic ideology setting goals for a 
post-war world, although it offered neither wartime nor post-war specific policy or strategy for 
defeating Germany.  As Theodore A. Wilson noted in The First Summit:  Roosevelt and 
Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941,95 the British did offer a strategic plan for the defeat of 
Germany, whereas the U. S. representatives waffled.  Verily, the British proposal was always 
about strategic bombing of Germany, continental blockades and an indirect approach to 
Germany through the Mediterranean Sea or North Africa.  However, the American strategy, 
especially put forth by General Marshall, suggested that the only way to defeat Germany was 
directly, under unity of effort and command, on the ground with an Army.   
Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, at the First 
Washington Conference (ARCADIA), 22 December 1941-14 January 1942, Prime Minister 
Churchill and President Roosevelt agreed to the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
(CCS).
96
  The initial organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff centered on a committee of 
the British heads of the Army, Navy and Air forces and equivalent U. S. representatives - the 
newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff.
97
   Designed as “the supreme body for strategic direction of 
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the Anglo-American war effort,”
98
 CCS members or their representatives met, discussed wartime 
military policy, and advised their respective leaders accordingly.  The CCS together with its 
supportive committees researched and drafted issue and policy papers for the major wartime 
conferences, for example, Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.  However, while affirming 
the goals of the Atlantic Charter, and establishing the objective of destroying Hitler and his 
allies, the CCS products remained ambiguous as far as details on post-war policy for Germany.    
One critical detail relative to occupation planning emerged from the Casablanca 
Conference (SYMBOL), attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their 
senior military advisors, January 14-24, 1943 – that Germany surrender unconditionally.  What 
would unconditional surrender in Germany look like after total war?
99
  More importantly, what 
would unconditional surrender look like for the Anglo-American bloc? 
“Hear, Hear,” a surprised Prime Minister Churchill exclaimed, according to a special 
correspondent for The Times (London),100 upon hearing President Roosevelt drop one of his 
many verbal bombshells at an afternoon press conference on 24 January 1943, following the 
Casablanca Conference, announcing that unconditional surrender was the end state of the war 
with the Axis.  Contrary to popular lore, President Roosevelt did not pull this bunny from his hat 
without prior discussions among members of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff early in January 
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1943.  Nonetheless, Roosevelt’s concept of the relationship between unconditional surrender and 
post-war planning never really surfaced other than an-oft repeated comment, noted by Maurice 
Matloff (and others), that the President “explained with emphasis, he did not mean the 
destruction of the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but the destruction of the evil 
philosophies that had taken hold in those lands.”
101
 
Representatives of the Big Three did not agree on application of the concept, as seen in 
the divergence of each of the draft surrender documents.
102
  Even within the U. S. planning 
community, agreement on a surrender document diverged, ranging from an all-inclusive 
surrender document to a simple surrender statement with detail provided in follow-up directives 
– ad hoc --as required after the initial surrender.  Discussions among and between respective 
military and diplomatic staffs continued within the European Advisory Commission until 
representatives produced three working surrender documents, one from each of the Big Three, 
between January and July 1944, from which the EAC produced one relatively tight surrender 
document approved by each of the three representatives.  In the end, a simple military surrender 
document was what General Eisenhower pulled out of a desk drawer on 7-8 May 1945 -- 
acknowledgement by the vanquished that he quit the fight and surrender his state and nation to 
the victors without conditions.  Although, according to Warren F. Kimball, President Roosevelt 
and perhaps Prime Minister Churchill had more than a simple military victory in mind when 
President Roosevelt announced the unconditional surrender policy at Casablanca.    
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Called a policy by some, principle by others and part of the American grand strategy for 
prosecuting the war by the Roosevelt camp, historians continued to discuss and debate the 
meaning of and circumstances that influenced the development of the concept and 
implementation of unconditional surrender decades after the end of the war.  Perhaps Warren F. 
Kimball, with the advantage of hindsight, got to the root of the matter.   
Unconditional surrender may have been, at one level, a commitment to the Soviet 
Union, but it also should be seen as a major foreign policy statement made by the 
Anglo-Americans without consulting or even advising Stalin.  A decision to 
pursue a non-compromise peace was more than a military decision.  It posited the 
destruction of Germany as a major European power and worked from the premise 
that the Anglo-Americans could run the postwar show.
103
   
   
Further, Kimball suggested three convincing arguments supporting this statement.  First, at least 
for President Roosevelt, unconditional surrender provided the only viable tool to de-Prussianize 
German society, and revamp it, moving the Germans “out of the industrial age into contact with 
their honest, peaceful, Jeffersonian roots.”
104
  Second, the policy of unconditional surrender 
assuaged the Soviets of the Anglo-American intent to stay the course of the war.  Finally, 
unconditional surrender would eschew the Dolchstoβlegende (Stab in the Back Legend) that 
mushroomed after World War I, and initially claimed by the German Imperial Army -- that 
[German] civilian government leaders and a war-weary population were responsible for 
Germany’s defeat.
105
  This time, however, after World War II ended, Germany as a nation and its 
population would be compelled to take responsibility for Hitler and the Nazi regime’s crimes. 
Prior experience with a military occupation in Germany after World War I suggested a 
standing German government in place and relatively little on-the-ground infrastructure damage 
at war’s end.  Asked in many corridors in Washington to include the White House, “Would a 
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central German government remain intact after this surrender,” seems a strange question after 
promoting a policy of unconditional surrender and effectively a total war to the end.   
Nonetheless, this question remained unanswered until at least the onset of Operation 
OVERLORD.  Moreover, each of the political leaders formed a different understanding of 
unconditional surrender.  Furthermore, transcripts from the October 1943 Moscow Foreign 
Ministers’ Conference (attended by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Foreign Minister Anthony 
Eden and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov), the preparatory conference preceding the 
Teheran Conference (EUREKA), indicate either the inability or undesirability of the Foreign 
Ministers to agree on what post-war occupied Germany might look like.  Even though the three 
foreign ministers could not quite agree on particulars, they appeared to advocate a softer-peace 
along the lines proposed by U. S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
106
 unlike their three leaders, 
President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, in discussions at the Tehran 
Conference later that year, all of whom favored a hard peace.
107
          
The European Advisory Commission (EAC) evolved from the Moscow Foreign 
Ministers’ Conference with the realization by the three Foreign Ministers, Cordell Hull, 
Vyacheslav Molotov and Anthony Eden, that treatment of Germany as an occupied country after 
its unconditional surrender required more time and thought than the two-week conference could 
provide.  Further, planning for postwar Germany had to include the Soviet Union, explaining 
why the CCS, the combined British-American committee, could not officially plan for or 
recommend occupation policy.  The EAC, with Sir William Strange representing Great Britain, 
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Feodor T. Gusev representing the Soviet Union, and John G. Winant representing the United 
States, met informally in December 1943 after Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin approved 
formation of the EAC as a working group at the Tehran Conference (28 November – 1 December 
1943).  The Tehran Conference itself focused on strategic issues – particularly agreement on the 
opening of a second front in Western Europe (Operation OVERLORD, in northern France, May 
1944), and postwar partition of Germany into occupation zones, the latter issue given to the 
newly approved EAC to research and advise back to the leaders.  Thus, two years into the war, 
discussion on the terms of unconditional surrender, the control machinery to insure surrender 
compliance, and the establishment of occupation zones at termination of the fighting began.
108
  
Tasked to plan and formulate recommendations on postwar policy for the three 
governments, the EAC finally filled the gap and assumed a role that the CCS could not fill given 
the reality of Soviet non-participation.  The EAC held its first formal meeting in London on 
14 January 1944. U. S. Secretary of State Hull had raised several key issues at the October 1943 
Moscow Conference:  rights of the occupation powers, reparations, status of the German military 
after surrender, the direction of economic and political reorganization of Germany, and quite 
possibly the most important question to be resolved, would Germany be dismembered or 
decentralized?  The Commission tackled three immediate issues and recommended an instrument 
of unconditional surrender (July 1944), the initial division of post-surrender Germany into three 
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occupation zones (September 1944) and formation of tripartite control machinery (the Allied 
Control Commission) to establish common occupation policy (November 1944).    However, the 
EAC could only discuss, negotiate and recommend.  Reaching agreements often required a 
multitude of back-and-forth meetings, conversations and instructions from the respective 
governments, and ultimately a unanimous decision from the three governments.  The key issue of 
a strategic occupation policy dragged behind the operational timetable.
109
     
As of spring, 1944 and the impending D-Day, when boots of soldiers of the Western 
Allies would shortly come ashore on the northwestern coast of France, General Eisenhower still 
had no post-hostilities policy from which to plan for the occupation of Germany.  His combined 
headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) could only plan for 
pre-surrender military occupation and his nominal American Headquarters, European Theater of 
Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) served primarily as an administrative headquarters.  
Because the EAC had not produced an agreed-upon occupation policy, General Eisenhower, 
concerned about tactical forces fighting into Germany with no agreed upon rules of engagement, 
recommended to General Marshall that an organization be formed to work together with British 
and Soviet counterparts along with the EAC on developing a policy.  The U. S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff approved the recommendation and by mid-July, the U. S. Group Control Council 
assembled in London to formulate occupation policy for U. S. military government in Germany. 
Time was running out.  A notable assumption was that occupation of Germany could 
begin after D+90 (5 September 1944).  While OVERLORD planning timetables called for 
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Western forces to be in Paris by D+90,
110
 they actually arrived toward the end of August, and the 
first American troops crossed into Germany, south of Aachen, on 11 September 1944.  The map 
below depicts the line of Western forces in France up to D+90 (around 4 September 1944) .
111
       
     
To this point on the timeline, policy and guidance on what German occupation might 
look like remained sparse.  August-September 1944 proved to be profitable months for the 
generation of policy guidance, however.  Reviewing the state of occupation planning by July 
1944, the British and Americans at Casablanca (1943) agreed on unconditional surrender; and 
the EAC, approved as a tripartite advisory group at Tehran, produced an unconditional surrender 
document by July 1944.  The British and the U. S. governments – separately - established early 
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versions of an occupation control council/commission to oversee occupation government, and 
awaited the Soviet team arrival in London.  The U. S. War Department, under the Provost 
Marshal Directorate developed a draft Handbook for Military Government in Germany.  
Describing progress over the next six months or so proves to be somewhat murky depending on 
sources used.  At this point, a military person might suggest, “Shit hit the fan,” on development 
of occupation policy. 
The Handbook for Military Government in Germany somehow made its way into 
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau’s hands, during a short trip to London in August 
1944.  Although up to this point, Morgenthau’s involvement with occupation planning revolved 
around financial issues, he had prepared his own memorandum on occupation policy.  Upon his 
return to Washington, Morgenthau forwarded the Handbook along with his critique (essentially 
negative; Morgenthau thought the Handbook too soft on the Germans) to President Roosevelt, 
who sent the Handbook to the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, with comments and the order to 
pull back any copies already distributed.  The then-sequestered Handbook floated among several 
agencies in Washington until a revised and approved copy surfaced in December 1944 as a 
SHAEF document, under the title, Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to 
Defeat or Surrender.   
As mentioned above, Morgenthau had prepared his own memorandum on occupation 
policy, “Program to Prevent Germany from starting a World War III,” a program that Roosevelt 
favored enough to approach Prime Minister Churchill about at the Second Quebec Conference 
(OCTAGON), 12-16 September 1944.  Churchill initially accepted Morgenthau’s basic plan to 





  Additionally, Roosevelt finally agreed on the last day of the conference to take 
the southwestern zone, leaving the northwestern zone (the primary industrial zone in western 
Germany) with the British.  Included in the agreement, the U. S. Forces would have access to 
both ports, Bremerhaven and Bremen (in the British Zone), along with transit rights between 
Bremerhaven, Bremen and south to the U. S. occupation zone. 
Further, between September and November 1944, the European Advisory Commission 
approved the “Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of the 
Greater Berlin Area,” 12 September 1944, and the “Agreement on Control Machinery [Allied 
Control Council] in Germany,” 14 November 1944.   Finally, the War Department had enough 
information for work to begin on post-war military plans, the key document, the Directive to the 
Commander in Chief U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of 
Germany (JCS 1067/8), discussed in Section 2, below. 
The last tripartite conference before Germany surrendered – the Yalta Conference 
(ARGONAUT) in the Crimea, 4-11 February 1945, seemed an anticlimax after that last few 
months’ turmoil in Washington and the military operations from France into Germany between 
June 1944 and January 1945.  The Conference Protocol covered numerous topics concerning 
post-war Europe and Japan, but relative to occupied Germany, relatively little new.  The three 
leaders approved the EAC recommendations (September and November 1944) for the 
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dismemberment of Germany into zones of occupation with a fourth occupation zone for France, 
carved from the British and American zones.
113
         
The last Big Three conference, the Potsdam Conference, 18 July-2 August 1945, fell 
between the two surrenders – Germany and Japan.  The primary subject under discussion 
concerned administering Germany under occupation.  According to Earl Ziemke,
114
 the three 
leaders, Truman, Attlee and Stalin, agreed on and tasked the Control Council [Allied Control 
Council] with two missions:  to administer occupied Germany as an economic unit and to 
establish a level of industry for Germany.  Both missions appear in the Potsdam Protocol, 
published on 2 August 1945, discussed in Section 3, below.  Additionally, the Council of Foreign 
Ministers replaced the European Advisory Council.         
The Council of Foreign Ministers, a product of the Potsdam Conference, convened in five 
quadripartite sessions between September 1945 (London)
115
 and November/December 1947 
(Moscow)
116
 with little to no progress on implementing key Potsdam Protocol provisions 
particularly in the areas of reparations, economic unity among the four occupation zones, 
boundaries and a peace treaty with Germany.  As Daniel Yergin noted in his narrative, Shattered 
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Peace, the Origins of the Cold War,117 from beginning to end, that is, from the first council 
meeting in September 1945 to the fifth session in December 1947, neither the British nor the 
Americans could agree with the Soviets that Russian reparations be paid from current German 
production.  Failure to resolve this issue ultimately precluded a German peace settlement, of 
which reparations and unity, particularly economic unity, remained a large part.  Non-
compliance with the economic unity provision of the Potsdam Protocol, a sticking point between 
the British and the U. S. on one side, and the Soviet Union and French on the other, exacerbated 
further resource inequalities in all zones, and thus German economic recovery.  
The Office of Military Government United States in Germany (OMGUS) officially 
replaced the U. S. Group Control Council as the U. S. Government representative at the Allied 
Control Council (ACC), on 1 October 1945.  The Potsdam Protocol acknowledged the ACC as 
the overall governing body for occupied Germany (revalidating the decision made during the 
Yalta Conference), responsible for Germany’s central administration as well as for promulgating 
policy to establish a certain level of uniform governance in the four occupation zones.  Each of 
the occupation forces -- Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and France -- sat at the 
ACC table, with equal representation.  Unfortunately, resolving issues proved difficult under the 
consensus requirement established under the Potsdam Protocol.  Walter Dorn, in his discussion 
of wartime consultations characterized development of occupation policy, as “a policy of drift.”
 
118
  The same could apply to ACC efforts during the four-year military occupation period, as the 
ACC had no enforcement powers. Each occupation power could interpret the Potsdam Protocol 
within the parameters of its own national interests within their zones of occupation. 
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3.  Executing Occupation Government:  Planning Decisions and Documents. 
Three planning products framed U. S. occupation policy in Germany after surrender:  the 
Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference (Potsdam Protocol), August1945 and the 
two Directives to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the 
Military Government of Germany, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 in May 1945, and 
JCS 1779 in July 1947.  More importantly for this study, these planning products represented 
strategic level theater operations plans for U. S. military forces in occupied Germany, products 
from which U. S. military commanders could develop mission statements (see Chapter III).  
Mission statements provide the embryo for logistics planning.  Furthermore, although no specific 
end date for occupation appears in any of these documents, both political and military planners 
make assumptions, one being in this case, at least initially, “Occupation will end when either the 
conditions of the Potsdam Protocol or a Peace Settlement is reached – whichever comes first.”   
The Potsdam Protocol, a diplomatic document signed by Stalin, Truman and Attlee, set 
the overall requirements for administration of occupied Germany.  Only the Directives to 
Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government 
of Germany, JCS 1067 and its successor, JCS 1779, gave official U. S. War Department 
guidance to U. S. Army planners developing occupation policy for U. S. Forces.  JCS 1067 
guided the U. S. occupation government in Germany between 1945 and 1947, when JCS 1779 
replaced it.  In-the-works as early as mid-1944, and quietly
119
 issued to General Eisenhower in 
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April 1945, JCS1067 preceded and, according to historic sources actually heavily influenced the 
content of the Potsdam Protocol.   
Disquieted by the snail-like progress of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) in 
developing a tripartite occupation policy, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Post-
War Committee (JPWC) in June 1944 to work on post-war military plans.  This committee, like 
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) staff did not represent a 
tripartite group (the EAC), but required and could obtain most quickly from General Eisenhower 
recommendations on the best path to take initially, at least for U. S. military forces, in defeated 
Germany.  Hoping to provide a document to the EAC, the JPWC and SHAEF planners selected 
Directive TALISMAN for a starting point.  As Earl Ziemke noted however, TALISMAN, the 
only approved post-surrender guidance for Combined Forces (British and U. S.) assumed a 
Germany politically and economically intact.  By August 1944, General Eisenhower and SHAEF 
planners gravely doubted a German government would survive to surrender.   
While each set of planners – the Americans in Washington and the British in London -- 
jostled to become the key planning agency for post-surrender occupied Germany policy 
development, the U. S. Army Provost Marshal, Civil Affairs Division (CAD) pursued drafting 
the Handbook for Military Government.  CAD forwarded the draft Handbook to SHAEF and 
CAD staff in London for reviews.  In the process, the draft Handbook caught the eye of 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry L. Morgenthau, a close confidant of President Roosevelt.  The 
tone of the Handbook struck Morgenthau as decidedly too soft on the Germans, particularly with 
respect to economic issues and deindustrialization.  Morgenthau, as noted in the Section 1 above, 
provided his critique of the Handbook, based on his study, “Program to Prevent Germany from 
92 
 
Starting a World War III,”
120
 to Roosevelt.  Roosevelt sided with Morgenthau’s critique.  Shortly 
thereafter, Roosevelt directed standing up a Cabinet Committee on Germany with the Secretaries 
of War, State and Treasury to develop a post-surrender policy for Germany – their first product, 
a template for JCS 1067.  Parts of Secretary Morgenthau’s study, particularly his economic 
recommendations, became not only the blueprint for JCS Directive 1067 and later the Potsdam 
Protocol, but also the key point of discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill at the Second 
Quebec Conference, 12-16 September 1944.  Secretary Morgenthau in his study suggested a 
program of fourteen points, four briefly discussed here.
121
 
Demilitarization, partitioning, restitution and reparations, control of the Ruhr and the 
surrounding industrial areas, as portrayed by Secretary Morgenthau, would have resulted in 
pastoralization of Germany – leaving the country reduced to little more than agricultural plots of 
land and cottage industries, unable to sustain the population and dependent on the Allies for 
logistical support.  As noted in the previous chapter, Germany historically depended on its 
exports of steel, coal and manufactured items to import raw resources and food requirements for 
its population.  However, Secretary Morgenthau felt that complete deindustrialization offered the 
only way to prevent Germany from launching another war. 
These political decisions in Washington, advanced by Morgenthau and his supporters, 
and based on a hard peace concept, call to question the bases used by the U. S. Government in 
formulating its post-surrender occupation position.  The Morgenthau course would drastically 
reduce the German industrial capability, certainly checkmating Germany’s ability to re-
militarize, but crush its ability to meet domestic heating, feeding and reconstruction requirements 
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from its own resources.   Further, reducing Germany’s industrial capacity stunted European 
recovery, as European countries relied heavily on German coal, steel and industrially 
manufactured products.  The other course, favored by both Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson 
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull would enable Germany industrially, albeit with severe 
restrictions pointed toward remilitarization.  This option would provide the optimal course for a 
quicker European recovery even though it risked German remilitarization.  Clearly, the decision 
danced between thwarting or enabling Germany industrially and economically.  President 
Roosevelt opted for the first course of action, thwarting German reindustrialization.  The impact 
of this decision laid the groundwork for the build-up of U. S. Army logistics support in Germany 
as the U. S. Government through its agent, the U. S. Army, supplied much of the resource 
shortages – food, building materials and fuel, medical and other technical assistance – for several 
years after the war.   
JCS Directive 1067 acknowledged unconditional surrender after the total defeat of 
Germany as the only possible outcome of the war.  Furthermore, the tone set in the first section 
of the JCS 1067 clearly placed responsibility for the war on the German population as a whole. 
It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and 
the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made 
chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility 
for what they have brought upon themselves. 
 
Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated 
enemy nation.  Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose 
of realizing certain important Allied objectives.  In the conduct of your 
occupation and administration you should be just but firm and aloof.  You will 
strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population.
122
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JCS 1067 ordered the demilitarization, denazification, and deindustrialization of 
Germany – nice political terms, but not well-practiced Army missions.  These measures required 
U. S. Army logistics support on the ground in occupied Germany, but not before basic recovery 
began.  First, Allied strategic air and ground attacks resulted in collapse of virtually every 
segment of German industry and communal life.  Scores of U. S. Army engineer and other 
logistics units engaged in food relief, temporary repair to utilities, transportation resources, 
bridge, road, waterways, and debris removal.   
Second, JCS 1067, Part I, Paragraphs 4 and 5, provide the Basic Objectives of the 
Military Government in Germany, in particular, enforcement of the program of reparations, 
restitution and relief for countries devastated by Nazi aggression, and providing for the welfare 
and eventual repatriation of Displaced Persons.  Additionally, the U. S. Zone Commander had 
the authority to impose controls he deemed necessary as “essential to protect  the safety and meet 
the needs of the occupying forces and assure the production and maintenance of foods and 
services required to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger these 
[occupation] forces.”  Furthermore, the Zone Commander could not put into effect in any way 
measures that would “support living conditions in Germany or in your zone on a higher level 
than that existing in any one of the neighboring United Nations.” 
123
   
JCS 1067, Part II, paragraphs 16-43, Economic: General Objectives and Methods of 
Control, by-and-large the most oppressive section of JCS 1067, take the tone of Morgenthau’s 
recommendations to Roosevelt.  The Potsdam Protocol, Section II B, paragraphs 11-19 
Economic Principles, mirrors this section.  The cornerstone to this segment of JCS 1067, indeed, 
in the Directive, lies in the clause:   
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Economic controls will be imposed only to the extent necessary to accomplish 
these objectives provided that you will impose controls to the full extent 
necessary to achieve the industrial disarmament of Germany.  Except as may be 
necessary to carry out these objectives, you will take no steps (a) looking toward 





However, the paradox:  complying with one mission, i.e., to return Germany to even the 
minimum living conditions of surrounding European countries (excluding Great Britain and the 
USSR) required some measure of economic rehabilitation.  JCS 1067 required occupation forces 
to regulate German resources to the degree that minimal consumption precluded the need to 
import.  Surplus resources would then support the Occupying Forces, Displaced Persons, United 
Nations prisoners of war, and serve as reparations.
125
 What surplus?  The indigenous German 
population could not even support its own food requirements in the first months after the 
surrender, much less the requirements of the Displaced Persons, prisoners of war or occupation 
forces.  The U. S. Government continued to ship to Germany millions of tons of relief supplies, 
debatably a violation of JCS 1067 provisions, for over a year after the end of the war.  U. S. 
Army logistics personnel in France, The Netherlands and Germany picked up the workload of 
transloading the material from ships to train or truck for transport to final destinations, storage, 
inventory control, and issue.  Additionally, JCS 1067, Part II required that occupation forces 
insure that power, transportation and communications facilities supported the overall objectives 
of the Occupying Forces.  Initially, this task required U. S. Army personnel,  fuel, as well as 
repair parts and other types of support.   
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Third, the Allied Control Council failed to enforce critical sections of the Potsdam 
Protocol.  Conjointly, the levels of industry
126
 established under the Potsdam Protocol and 
ensuing Allied Control and Foreign Minister Council meetings acknowledged the uneven 
distribution of resources among the occupation zones – hence the necessity for economic unity.  
The Potsdam Protocol, Section II B, paragraph 14 established the principle of economic unity 
within Germany during the occupation.  The areas specifically noted included:  mining, 
industrial production and its allocation, agriculture, fishing, forestry, wages, prices and rationing, 
import and export programs for Germany as a whole, currency and banking, central taxation and 
customs, reparation and removal of industrial war potential, transportation and communications.  
Further, Potsdam Protocol, Section II B, paragraph 15(c) specified that the Allied Control 
Council establish controls to ensure that “equitable distribution of essential commodities 
between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce 
the need for imports.”
127
  The particular control referred to here, establishment of a level of 
industry for Germany, would set a production capacity the country as a whole needed for 
subsistence.  Excess capacity would go towards reparations.  The U. S. occupation zone, for 
example, had few raw materials.  The region had traditionally relied on exporting finished 
industrial products to provide the raw materials needed for production and food products 
necessary for the region.  The same situation applied to the British occupation zone, only the 
swap was coal and steel for food.  The critical breadbasket of Germany – Silesia, Pommern, and 
East Prussia lay in Soviet and Polish hands, under the Potsdam Protocol, Sections V and VIII 
until the Allies reached a final determination of a peace settlement over these boundaries.  The 
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Soviets refused to comply with Protocol directives on two grounds:  first, the breadbasket region, 
no longer came under the umbrella of occupied Germany; second, the Soviet Zone did not 
produce excess food to redistribute in other parts of occupied Germany.  Members of the Allied 
Control Council could not reach consensus on execution of the economic unity principle in the 
Protocol.  General Clay,
128
 by the late spring, 1946, ordered discontinuance of dismantling 
reparations-marked plants except those already approved for advance delivery, until the Soviets 
complied with Potsdam Protocol Section II B, paragraph 15(c) to exchange foodstuffs from their 
occupation zone to the other three zones. 
Failure to comply with the provisions of the Protocol resulted in unequal distribution of 
resources among the three western occupation zones, forcing the British and the Americans to 
provide relief to both the German population and Displaced Persons within their zones from their 
national accounts.  The establishment of economic unity as foreseen in the Protocol and 
supported in JCS 1067 could have lessened the burden of resources support on U. S. military 
forces and even possibly shortened the period of military occupation.     
Fourth, at least for the first summer, labor, horse and farm equipment shortages affected 
harvesting.  Non-repatriated Displaced Persons, used as labor during the war, refused to continue 
working on the farms after surrender. Manufacturing new equipment often conflicted with ACC 
restrictions; even without restrictions, shortage of raw materials proved enough to preclude full-
scale resumption of manufacturing.  Planting for the next year’s harvest faced shortages of seed 
and fertilizer. 
Fifth, unlike the humanitarian actions with regard to the above efforts, weather bestowed 
the final blow that brought Germany to its knees during the first two years of the occupation.  
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The summers of 1945 and 1946 witnessed droughts that significantly lowered harvest yields.  
Additionally, Germany (as did much of the continent and the British Isles) experienced its two 
longest and coldest winters in decades.  The poor harvests could not support the population 
during the first two years after surrender.  In each of these circumstances in the U. S. occupation 
zone, the U. S. Army intervened, at least temporarily, often together with the German population, 
to stabilize or resolve; maneuver around directives; or actually repair breakdowns in critical 
logistics arenas, e.g., providing U. S. Army transportation to bring in the harvest.   
Obviously, U. S. military forces found themselves and their missions as hampered by the 
wartime destruction as the local population.  The military forces had to live in the midst of the 
destruction, move around and complete their security and supply missions while also engaging in 
repair and rebuilding facilities.  However, U. S. military forces had access to resources:  
transportation, communications, food, POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) products and a supply 
base able to provide more resources.  Thus, despite the restrictions of JCS 1067 and the Potsdam 
Protocol, the U. S. Army in providing for its own resupply, contiguously aided the recovery of 
German infrastructure – in particular, roads, rail, bridges, waterways, utilities and other 
infrastructure.  This subject is discussed extensively in a later chapter.     
As Vladimir Petrov noted, implementation of a Morgenthauian “harsh peace” toward 
occupied Germany, represented in JCS 1067, possibly “delayed by several years the economic 
reconstruction of the war-torn continent, a reconstruction which subsequently cost the United 
States billions of dollars,”
129
 not to mention a longer occupation.  Something had to change. 
U. S. Secretary of State John Byrnes ushered in the change in U. S. policy toward occupied 
Germany by professing in September 1946 that the recovery of Europe depended on the recovery 
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of Germany.  Most importantly for the U. S. military, he committed the U. S. Army to service in 
Germany for as long as it took to ensure full recovery.   
Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period. I want 
no misunderstanding.  We will not shirk our duty.  We are not withdrawing.  We 
are staying here.  As long as there is an occupation army in Germany, American 




This speech, given in Stuttgart, Germany some fifteen months after the war’s end to a 
gathering of American military governor administrators and German officials together, 
repudiated a number of the harsher precepts of JCS Directive 1067.
131
  The most important 
points in the speech appear to have come from a memorandum sent by General Lucius Clay to 
Secretary of State Byrnes as early as May 1946.
132
  General Clay called attention to the problems 
in Germany noting the increased communist propaganda coming out from the Soviet occupation 
zone, suggesting the need for a positive public statement on U. S. policy in Europe in general and 
Germany in particular. In his memorandum, General Clay listed the following issues as critical to 
the successful implementation of the occupation policies called for in the Potsdam Protocol, 
albeit not [yet] implemented at the Allied Control Council level.  Specifically, Clay noted that 
the Potsdam Protocol called for treatment of Germany as an economic unit.  This required the 
establishment of key central administrative agencies in the areas of transportation, 
communications, food, agriculture, and industry; free trade and a common financial policy 
within Germany to curb inflation; and finally, a decision on how to administer the Ruhr and 
                                                   
130
 Velma Hastings Cassidy, compiler, Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents, 7. 
131 According to Robert Murphy, career-diplomat with the U. S. Department of State, and General Clay’s political 
advisor between 1945 and 1949, “This gathering had particular significance because German officials were invited 
to Stuttgart to meet with Americans in a public place for the first time since surrender.”  Diplomat among Warriors, 
(New York:  Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), 303. 
132





  These points formed the core of Secretary of State Byrnes’ 
Stuttgart speech.   
Perhaps due to the logjam in reaching consensus on these critical issues within the Allied 
Control Council, but certainly due to the urging of both General Clay and his political advisor, 
Robert Murphy, Secretary of State Byrnes resolutely confirmed in his speech: 
The time has come when zonal boundaries should be regarded as defining only 
the areas to be occupied for security purposes by the armed forces of the 
occupying powers and not as self-contained economic or political units.  That was 
the course of development envisioned by the Potsdam Agreement, and that is the 
course of development which the American Government intends to follow to the 
full limit of its authority.  It had formally announced that it is its intention to unify 
the economy of its own zone with any or all of the other zones willing to 
participate in the unification.  So far only the British Government has agreed to let 
its zone participate.  . . . Of course, this policy of unification will be open to them 




Even prior to Secretary of State Byrnes’ speech, General Clay and Robert Murphy, 
through their chains of command, urged replacing JCS Directive 1067 with a milder directive.  
However, as the wheels of government move slowly, the U. S. Government officially issued the 
change, Directive to the Commander in Chief of U S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1779), on 
11 July 1947. 
More than two years after Victory-in-Europe Day (V-E Day), the more humanitarian 
policy statement, JCS 1779, announced that while the U. S. occupation government would 
continue to focus on disarming and demilitarizing Germany, and would stay the course in 
Germany as long as even one other occupier was present, its efforts would converge toward 
establishment of a stable and prosperous Europe.  To reach this goal the War Department
135
 
directed the U. S. Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation (Germany) “to lay 
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the economic and educational bases of sound German democracy, of encouraging bona fide 
democratic efforts, prohibiting those activities that would jeopardize genuinely democratic 
developments.”
136
   
Moreover, JCS 1779 charged the Office of Military Government, United States in 
Germany (OMGUS) with promoting “the development in Germany of institutions of popular 
self-government and the assumption of direct responsibility by German governmental agencies, 
assuring them legislative, judicial and executive powers, consistent with military security and the 
purposes of the occupation.”
137
  While the JCS 1779 script still advocated federal German states 
with limited centralized government, it also acknowledged to the Commander-in-Chief that, 
“Your Government believes finally that, within the principles stated above, the ultimate 
constitutional form of German political life should be left to the decision of the German people 
made freely in accordance with democratic processes.”
138
  Within this framework, several 
explicit logistics support missions evolved for the U. S. Army, in addition to assisting with 
demilitarization and disarmament.  Had the U. S. Army ever faced the overwhelming amount of 
logistics support required not only to keep U. S. forces supported in occupied Germany, but also 
to meet the requirements of the Potsdam Protocol and the JCS directives?   
One of the principal missions for the U. S. Army continued under JCS Directive 1779: 
support of the United Nations International Refugee Organization (IRO) until 1952, for the 
maintenance, care, protection, and eventually movement of Displaced Persons and refugees.  At 
least 132 Displaced Persons camps housing anywhere between 4,100,000 in July 1945, and 
333,118 in July 1947, and two IRO vocational training schools existed within the U. S. 
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occupation zone at various times during the military occupation.
139
  A second mission, equally 
monumental, involved assisting German authorities in establishing resettlement programs for the 
German-extraction Expellees forced out of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in accordance 
with the JCS 1067, Part I, Paragraph 4 (d) and Potsdam Protocol, Section XII.  Chapter IV 
discusses the logistics aspects of these missions in more detail.           
   The importance of JCS Directives 1067 and 1779 rests with the impact each had on 
Germany’s economic recovery and particularly on logistics support that the U. S. military 
government provided:  for its own occupation forces; for local populations–indigenous and 
displaced; for reconstruction; and for supplementing the German food supply, particularly in the 
first two years after war’s end.  JSC Directive 1779 took a more tractable approach.  One sees 
this alone in the language.  JCS 1067 immersed itself in language such as, enforce, control, 
destroy, dissolve, bar, fanatical, guilty; whereas JCS 1779 plies its requirements in softer 
language, for example, promote development, encourage political parties, facilitate judgments, 
supervise as necessary, assist, and encourage.  Furthermore, JCS 1779 clearly acknowledges the 
ironies of consensus rule within the Allied Control Council.  Therefore, JCS 1779, in Part I, 
Paragraph 2, under Authority of the Military Government, directs the Commander-in-Chief to 
“exert every effort to achieve economic unity with other zones.”
140
  JCS 1779, in various drafts 
since the summer of 1946, although not officially released until July 1947 after the formation of 
Bizonia, in many ways circumvented numerous actions, and particularly the inability to 
implement the economic unity clause of the Potsdam Protocol, that had been continuously 
blocked by lack of consensus at the Allied Control Council.  The British were hit hard by the 
lack of a common export-import program that, if in operation, could have relieved the British 
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government of much of its occupation expenditures by allowing the Germans to export 
manufactured items and coal at world prices to cover their import requirements, particularly 
food.
141
  For the Americans, occupying a region agriculturally weak but industrially strong, a 
centralized export-import program could have also reduced U. S. government occupation costs.       
 Discussions on a British-American zone merger began during the summer of 1946, with 
the British signing the agreements at the end of July.  Bizonia acted primarily as an economic 
union between the British occupation zone and the U. S. occupation zone, effective 1 January 
1947.  France also had an opportunity to join the union, refused on the principle that they 
opposed any centralization of German administration or organization, but finally joined in April 
1949, a few weeks before formation of the Federal Republic of Germany on 24 May 1949 .    
Historians offer differing interpretations as to the intent and success of establishing 
Bizonia.  On the one hand, Edward Peterson severely criticized the functionality of the union, 
hampered, he noted, by obfuscation of Bizonia’s mission, its decentralized nature, organizational 
structure, and unwieldy membership.
142
  On the other hand, both General Clay and his political 
advisor, Robert Murphy, frustrated by the inability of the Allied Control Council to execute one 
of the key provisions of the Potsdam Protocol, establishment of an economic unit in Germany, 
sought to work around this impasse by inviting the members of the Allied Control Council to 
join in an economic union.  Both the Soviet Union and the French demurred; the Soviets 
considered this union a violation of the Potsdam Protocol as well as Allied Control Council 
procedures (the ACC had not reached consensus on this issue).   
The British and the Americans intended, by establishing Bizonia, to make the two zones 
more nearly self-supporting economically, but not politically, to avoid both French and Soviet 
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protests against establishing a political organization in Western Germany.
143
  However, 
unfortunately, even with Bizonia, authorities in neither the British nor the American occupation 
zones could completely overcome the foodstuff and natural resource shortages, albeit partially 
the result of black market activities and hoarding related to inflationary prices.  Alan Milward
144
 
presents a different picture in which he provocatively argues that by 1947, Europe was rapidly 
recovering economically, and therefore Bizonia was superfluous, a statement I refute based on 
the overwhelming material to the contrary.  As an example, Milward claimed, using UNRRA 
statistics, that daily caloric count between 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 for selected Western 
European countries, including Germany, increased.  Alan Milward’s use of the UNRRA statistics 
are to this author, incorrectly interpreted.  First, the UNRRA numbers are cited by country, in 
this case, Germany,
145
 but calorie intake varied tremendously from region to region and from one 
age group to another.  For example, official statistics from the Ernährungsamt der Stadt 
Stuttgart, Verwaltungsbericht 1947, show a Durchschnitt for the year 1947 of 1318 calories per 
day for the normal person in the age group over 20 years.
146
  The undifferentiated UNRRA 
number for the same period is 1800 calories per day (no specific region or age group).  Further, 
the UNRRA statistics show an increase from 1600 calories per day in 1945-1946, to the 1800 
calories per day in 1946-1947.  The Ernährungsamt report shows an average for 1946 of 1406 
calories per day in comparison to the 1318 calories per day in 1947, a drop in average calories 
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per day between 1946 and 1947.
147
  Nonetheless, Milward’s study presents the very political side 
of American foreign policy during this period.     
While Allied leaders contemplated political and economic solutions to the German 
problem and the stale European economic recovery, people were starving, or close to it.  
Showcasing capitalism and democracy clothed in an American supported European economic 
recovery program counted for little to the people on 1200 or fewer calories per day.   As 
Theodore Wilson so eloquently wrote,  
People were without adequate food, clothing and shelter.  Drought had destroyed 
much of the 1946 wheat crop and severe winter [that year] had greatly reduced the 
prospects for the 1947 crop.  .  .  .  Factories throughout Europe shut down 
because of power shortages, and even if energy had been available, the raw 
materials were lacking.  Since Europe had exhausted its foreign exchange 
reserves, it could not afford to pay for the coal, oil foodstuffs and fiber that it 
needed and which was available only from America.
148
 
   
Clearly, by early 1947, American leaders were deeply frustrated about the political and 
economic situation in Europe.  President Truman at the advice of key Sovietologists, particularly 
George Kennan, opted for a containment policy
149
 predicated on a presumption that even though 
it appeared that the Soviets did not intend or were unwilling to live up to international 
agreements, Soviet proselytization of communism abroad could best be contained through 
economic power.  The situation in Germany focused on how best to reignite the Germany 
economy under the restrictions placed by the Potsdam Protocol, especially since the ruling body 
constituted under the Protocol, the Allied Control Council, failed to agree on execution of the 
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Protocol’s key parameter--the requirement to establish economic unity within Germany.   The 
overall political and economic situation in Europe while slowly recovering fared little better.   
The Greek Civil War had been a British foreign affairs dilemma since British occupation 
of Athens in1944 on the heels of the German military withdrawal.  The Greek government split 
between the British-supported nationalist right and the communist National Liberation Front.  
The civil war ran off-and-on until 1949, with the Greek communist-led leftist forces (ELAS) 
hoping for support from the Soviet Union and the Greek national government forces supported 
by British troops and financial aid.  However, by March 1947, the British government, engaged 
worldwide in its colonial affairs, and in dire financial straits, requested that the U. S. take over 
financial aid to the Greek government.  President Truman, acknowledging the advice of his 
specialists on Soviet Union foreign policy, and the veracity of George Kennan’s monograph on 
containment,
150
 decided that the economic element of power provided the best tools to thwart 
communist expansion.  Most importantly, the U. S. wanted a toehold in the Mediterranean and 
both Turkey and Greece offered that opportunity.
151
   
Addressing a joint session of the U. S. Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman 
requested a $400 million dollar appropriation from the U. S. Congress to stabilize the Greek and 
Turkish governments, and using economic power, hoped to keep both countries in the Western 
camp.
152
  The Truman Doctrine, emerging from this transaction, supported George Kennan’s 
position that countering the Soviet threat, at that time, through economic assistance and peaceful 
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military advice to “Western” supporters would better contain the Soviet Union than riskier and 
costlier military intervention and use of force.   
While President Truman argued his case for financial support to Greece and Turkey in 
front of Congress, the diplomatic element of power at the Council of Foreign Ministers, an 
advisory body constituted under the Potsdam Protocol, continued to unravel, manifesting a 
deadlock similar to that in the Allied Control Council.  General Clay, commenting on results of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, 10 March to 24 April 1947, noted that,  
The Moscow conference had significant if not immediately tangible results.  The 
principal result was to convince the three foreign ministers representing the 
Western powers of the intransigence of the Soviet position.  This led them to 
work more closely together in the future.  I do not believe that our delegation had 
any illusions as to the outcome of the conference.  Our difficulties in preparing 
the report of the Allied Control Council had demonstrated Soviet unwillingness to 
seek a settlement. Also, Soviet expansion in Europe was still gaining ground and 
Soviet representatives were confident that Germany would be included. While we 
had not yet embarked on a positive program of assistance to the free countries of 
Europe, I believe that it was at Moscow that Secretary Marshall recognized the 
necessity of stopping the Communist advance in Europe before the German 




This was, of course, not the first indication of discord over execution of the post-war 
agreements on Germany among the Four Powers at the Allied Control Council.  Nevertheless, 
1947 in retrospect, seems to signify a watershed year for the U. S. Government wherein most 
American leaders, civilian and military alike, decided to stop “nach der russichen Pfeife zu 
tanzen” and to begin pushing back.  The Bizonia merger pact, signed in early December 1946, 
took effect on 1 January 1947, and its Economic Council formed by the end of May 1947.  This, 
according to Soviet representatives, violated the Potsdam Protocol as it initiated establishment of 
centralizing German political agencies.  Was this not an attempt to comply with the Potsdam 
Protocol that had called for economic unity, and because of French and Soviet dissension, the 
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closest that could be worked out by 1947  Secretary of State Marshall, in a radio address to the 
American people on 28 April 1947, summarizing the recent Council of Foreign Ministers in 
Moscow said this: 
Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our view, the Soviet 
Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a 
centralized government, adapted to the seizure of absolute control of the country 
which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive 
population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as 




What the occupation governments could not do to achieve economic improvement in 
Germany, and thus Europe, in the face of a virtual standstill within the Allied Control Council, as 
well as the  inability of the Council of Foreign Ministers to agree,  the U. S. Government under 
President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall did.  Pulling out a loaded economic gun, on 
5 June 1947, Secretary of State Marshall, with President Truman’s support, in his speech at 
Harvard University, advocated that, “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for the 
Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet 
economically.  This is the business of the Europeans.  The initiative, I think, must come from 
Europe.”
155
  And indeed, it did!  Accepting Secretary Marshall’s offer, the British and French 
Foreign Ministers, Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault, invited twenty-two nations to a conference 
in Paris in July to develop a comprehensive economic program, a conference that, in effect, 
birthed the European Recovery Program (ERP), more fondly known as the Marshall Plan.  As 
Secretary Marshall, in his speech, further stated, “The role of this country should consist of 
friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far 
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as it may be practical for us to do so.”  The ERP, as developed over the following months, 
proposed monetary support in the form of grants and loans directed towards economic recovery 
in war-ravaged European countries.  Sixteen of the twenty-two invitees
156
 to the initial Paris 
conference eventually took part in the program that, by April 1948, developed into the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, and later the OECD).  The Soviet 
Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe politely declined to participate, and by January 1949, 
established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), supposedly as a counter 
to the OEEC.
157
   
The European Recovery Program not only fit nicely into Washington’s newly developing 
containment philosophy, but also coupled with American nuclear supremacy, allowed President 
Truman to demobilize drastically U. S. military forces overseas.  As noted in Appendix II.3, the 
U. S. reduced military forces on the European continent from approximately 329,601 in June 
1946, to approximately 134,025 troops by July 1947.  One might also suggest that planning for 
the European Recovery Program brought renewed focus on the necessity for currency reform in 
occupied Germany.  Both General Clay and his political advisor, Ambassador Robert Murphy 
had urged Secretary of State Byrnes to support this course of action as early as the 
spring/summer of 1946, however, to no avail.   
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For the ERP to succeed economically, military governments in Germany needed to coin 
not only a valid currency domestically in inflation-torn Germany, but also an established 
currency for import-export trade.  Economic recovery in Europe converged around German 
recovery.  This action, too, faced resistance from the Soviet military government at the Allied 
Control Council.  The Soviet representative at the Council, Marshal Sokolovsky, insisted on a 
duplicate set of plates, so that currency could be printed in Leipzig.  As General Clay later noted: 
We had suffered badly when we made available to the Soviet Government a set of 
plates to print Allied military marks [in 1945], and we had never been able to find 
out the total value of Soviet notes, large amounts of which we had redeemed in 





Where the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in March and April 1947 
foretold a rocky year ahead politically and economically, the December conference in London, 
25 November to 16 December, ended the year validating that forecast.  Economic unity, common 
utilization of German resources, the future form of German government (federalist or 
centralized), and procedures required to prepare for a German peace treaty remained the key 
issues requiring resolution at year’s end.  Neither Foreign Ministers’ conferences resolved these 
issues.  Secretary of State Marshall understating results in his 19 December 1947 report of the 
conference, noted that the “recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London was 
disappointing.”  The American delegation left London, tired of the meetings long on rhetoric but 
short on action.   
The Communist-led February 1948 Czechoslovakian coup d’état altered the landscape in 
Europe.  Any lingering Congressional opposition to the European Recovery Program melted 
away; Congress approved an initial $5-plus billion for the first year of the program, and 
according to Theodore Wilson, by June 30, 1949, the Economic Cooperation Administration 
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(ECA) “had turned over $5.95 billion to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) nations for procurement of goods and services.”
159
  Moreover, Western Europeans 
quietly advocated for a Western European defense union to provide mutual security that singly 
none could afford.  The Treaty of Brussels (Brussels Pact), signed on 17 March 1948, and 
intended originally as a mutual defense pact against Germany, matured into the Western 
European Union and establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance by 1949.  Perhaps 
events in 1948 convinced the Brussels Pact members that the greater threat lay farther east than 
Germany; perhaps they realized that they required a bigger tiger on their team.  However, 
although the Czech coup rattled senior officials in the U. S. Government, President Truman’s 
focus and emphasis on containment of communism remained in the economic arena.   
Quadripartite relations among the World War II Allies broke down by April 1948, with 
the Soviets withdrawing from all agencies but the Kommandatura in Berlin.  By mid-June 1948, 
the Soviet military government vacated the Kommandatura, declaring Four-Power rule in Berlin 
defunct.  Coincidentally, the U. S.-backed currency reform went into effect in the western three 
occupation zones 20 June 1948, followed shortly thereafter by establishment of the 
Parliamentarische Rat to work out a West German constitution, leading to establishment of a 
West German Government.  Clearly, the Americans, British, and French, weary of Allied 
Control Council impotence, accepted the inevitability, at least for the time being, of a divided 
Germany, and moved ahead with the Potsdam provisions.  This, of course, aggravated the 
Soviets further.  After several months of partial transportation delays and “baby blockades”
160
 by 
Soviet police and troops, by 24 June 1948, the Soviets effectively blocked all land and water 
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routes into Berlin.  Coincidentally, Soviet representatives cut all electricity and communications 
flow originating in the Soviet sector and zone flowing into the West Berlin sectors.  One 
wonders why the Americans and British had not worked out dedicated transit routes to and from 
Berlin when agreements for occupation zones were under consideration.  Earl Ziemke documents 
that SHAEF had studied the issue as early as June 1944, as had the U. S. War Department.  Both 
organizations had apparently decided, “free access across the Soviet zone was preferable to 
corridors or selected routes.”
 161
  Further, that the EAC or the ACC would more closely define 
transportations issues later.  Nonetheless, the Soviets shut off all but the air corridors, forcing the 
British and U. S. to initiate airlift logistics support into Berlin, to support military forces, family 
members, and the German civilian population.
162
  What to do?  The short story follows, however, 
many narratives delve into the subject in extreme detail.
163
 
The War Department pretty much followed General Clay’s recommendations with the 
caveat that extreme consideration be given to avoid any action that might provoke armed 
conflict.  The War Department did reject a suggestion from General Clay to force an armed 
convoy from Helmstedt to Berlin.
164
  On the other hand, the War Department accepted his 
recommendation to allow family members to stay in Berlin during the crisis.  The three 
beleaguered military forces in the West Berlin sectors, along with command support from their 
headquarters in their respective occupation zones, planned and supported the airlift operation for 
nearly eleven months.   
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This logistics feat, code-named Operation VITTLES, resulted in 166,984 flights of C47s 
and C54s carrying approximately 1,402,644 metric tons of food, coal and other essentials (see 
Appendices II.3.1, and 3.2 to support the French, British and American sectors in West Berlin 
until the Soviets ended the Blockade on 12 May 1949.
165
   
Quite possibly the official establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 
April 1949, and particularly the overwhelming success of the Luftbrücke into Berlin eventually 
convinced the Soviets of the futility in continuing the blockade.  More importantly, however, the 
Soviets had bigger fish to fry.  With the announcement of their successful nuclear detonation on 
29 Aug 1949, they joined the United States as the second nation to possess nuclear capability.  
However, during this critical period internationally, 1947-1949, in addition to post-war 
Europe and occupied Germany, the American President had several significant issues to consider 
at home:  retooling American industry, demobilizing military forces, and reining in the wartime 
federal budget.  The above noted series of international events, in retrospect, one following on 
the other, finally convinced American government leaders that leaving a fighting military force 
in Germany might not be a bad idea.  The U. S. Army had already committed to allowing family 
members to join their military spouses in country.  Because the tooth required the tail’s 
support,
166
 combat service support forces represented a portion of the occupation force as well as 
the cost.  The paradox lay in keeping a force overseas:  how could the U. S. Government pay for 
occupation forces during a time when Federal budgets remained constrained and Americans 
wanted jobs at home and peace overseas?   
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Perhaps President Truman and his advisors felt that their atomic card provided some 
measure of assurance to offset the dwindling forces overseas.  Certainly, force strength in Europe 
did not reflect an overriding concern, particularly after the Soviet announcement of a successful 
atomic test in August 1949, as the U. S. contingent in Europe continued to drop, from 91,535 to 
82,492 in 1949, and further the next year, to 79,495.  In his defense, however, President Truman 
faced considerable issues domestically after the war, opting for butter over the guns.   
 For most officials in Washington, D. C., June 1950 – the beginning of the Korean 
Conflict -- substantiated Soviet intentions to dominate the landscape.  Finally, augmentation of 
U. S. troops to Germany increased.  General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, commented to President Truman, “”Unless we rearm Germany soon, we will lose it.”
167
 
4.  Conclusion:  Implications and Unplanned Initiatives. 
 Initially, the terms of the Potsdam Protocol bound occupation forces to duty in Germany 
for an undetermined period.  The occupation objectives dictated an overall strategy that military 
planners and commanders translated into missions.  Mission planning involves logistics 
planning, normally based on how much and what type of resources, delivered where and when.  
The nature of the logistics pipeline determines how logistic support arrives at its destination (in 
this study, detailed in Chapters IV and V).  The oddity of this situation lay with the establishment 
of two key missions, security and military government, and realistically two chains of command 
on the ground in Germany, although the Military Governor officially functioned as the supreme 
commander of all U. S. Forces.  The U. S. Army could conduct security missions, but it had 
never performed the all-encompassing type of military government/occupation mission set forth 
in the Potsdam Protocol.  Nor had the U. S. Army the conducted such an intensive and long-in-
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duration logistics support mission.  The security forces were typical tactical military units with 
support forces, organized by standing, approved Tables of Organization and Equipment for the 
period.  At the beginning of the post-surrender occupation, the fighting force numbered over 
three million.  Redeployment and demobilization reduced this number significantly within 
eighteen months, but both occupation and security missions remained.  As will be discussed 
later, logistics missions actually increased, but not necessarily fulfilled by U.S. military 
personnel.    
As the occupation evolved, so, too, did the international arena, one world colliding with 
the other.  Progress toward curtailing the occupation eluded at least the Americans and the 
British.  As the international arena grew more volatile and the economic distress in Germany and 
Europe continued, the Berlin crisis erupted into the Berlin Blockade, a logistics nightmare, 
lasting almost one year.  While the final straw in the pile would not come until June 1950 on 
another continent, the Berlin Blockade most certainly represented a wake-up call for the U. S. 
Government. 
The next phase in occupation, reestablishing a German government, albeit with 
restrictions, transfer of authority to civilian High Commissioner status, quiet, early discussions 
on German rearmament, establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ostensibly to 
defend Europe against external aggression, and redeployment of U. S. Forces to Europe loomed 
just over the horizon
168
.  The logistics mission remained, and in fact, increased.      
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 The inability of U. S. Government agencies to coordinate, plan and agree on post-war 
occupation issues until a few months before unconditional surrender resulted in lack of a clear 
policy and confusion for the government’s executive agent for occupation, the U. S. Army.  
Furthermore, the roadblocks in combined planning between the British and the American 
agencies exacerbated the situation.  Moreover, national interests often trumped coordination and 
consensus, further complicating planning.     
President Roosevelt ultimately decided that the U. S Army would administer military 
government in Germany.  Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson supported the President’s decision 
even though General Eisenhower wanted the Army out of Germany as early as possible, but no 
other agency and particularly the State Department could handle the logistics mission.  So the 
U. S. Army would unscramble the politics, shoulder the mission and ultimately remain in 
Germany to support the redeployment of forces back to Europe.  Thus, the political again 
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CHAPTER III.  U. S. Army Military Organizations and Missions in Occupied Germany 
 
Introduction. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the United States Group Control Council (USGCC) 
activated in 1944 as the “captain” of the U. S. Military Government ship for occupation duty in 
Germany.  After Germany’s unconditional surrender and the conclusion of the Potsdam 
Conference at Babelsberg, outside of Berlin, the Office of Military Government United Sates in 
Germany (OMGUS) replaced USGCC as the representative of the U. S. Government in the joint 
occupation governing body, the Allied Control Council (ACC).  OMGUS not only conducted 
joint level Allied Control Council business for the U. S. Government, but also piloted all U. S. 
military government activities, and oversaw the operational missions of the U. S. Army forces 
deployed in Germany after the unconditional surrender.  However, OMGUS’ primary mission 
involved establishing directives to implement the Potsdam Protocol.  OMGUS designated a 
major Army headquarters, U. S. Forces European Theater, to execute these directives in its 
occupation zone.  To be sure, an extremely complicated and unusual mission challenged the 
military leaders, civilian leaders and their subordinates on site during the U. S. occupation. 
The U. S. Army deployed to Europe initially to win the war – the job that American 
soldiers had been trained to do.  The missions that followed severely tested the U. S. Army more 
than once over the following four years of military occupation.  Primarily, the difficulties were 
the result of limited resources and financial restrictions.  These missions, over and above the 
primary mission to maintain security and restore order, included redeploying over three million 
U. S. troops plus millions of tons of equipment either to the Pacific Theater or back to the United 





 and resettling several million Expellees.  The critical and often 
spontaneous missions of debris removal, infrastructure rebuilding, transportation resources, rail 
and road repair, and food and medical support to the civilian population expanded the workload 
assumed by most of the Army’s logistical units. 
The overall mission to resuscitate Germany inarguably overwhelmed those charged with 
the responsibility and the tasks.  One need only recall the images in New Orleans after Hurricane 
Katrina (2005) destroyed much of the infrastructure in the city and surrounding areas to conjure 
up a miniscule perspective of the scale of the destruction confronting both conqueror and 
conquered in Germany and the immensity of the mission the U. S. Army took on in 1945.  At 
least New Orleans in Katrina’s aftermath retained its governmental structure, receiving state and 
federal support.  Germany, on the other hand, faced a complete breakdown of its central and 
much of its regional government structures.  Among the knowledgeable personnel that remained, 
occupation forces generally purged suspected Nazi supporters.  During these initial months, tasks 
not covered by policy or manuals often preceded guidance.  As noted earlier, the War 
Department did not release the final directive for U. S. Army in Occupation Germany, JCS 1067, 
officially until October 1945, five months after the surrender.  The mission could not wait.  The 
Army organizational structure required converting rapidly from its wartime fighting mission to 
the new missions under occupation government. 
1.  U. S. Army Military Organizations in Occupied Germany. 
As noted in previous chapters, a policy of drift typified Washington’s attempts between 
1943 and early 1945 to generate a U. S. Government occupation policy for post-war Germany.  
Aside from JCS 1067 that the U. S. War Department officially released in October 1945, little 
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119 
 
definitive guidance as to length of occupation or specific long-term policies appeared before the 
Potsdam Protocol was issued in August 1945.  President Roosevelt had decreed that the U. S. 
Army would occupy and manage the U. S. occupation zone for an indefinite period only after the 
Tehran Conference (December 1943).  The European Advisory Commission, a product of the 
Tehran Conference, comprised of representatives from the Big Three, set up for duty in London 
to provide recommendations on surrender documents as well as policies for follow-on 
occupation.  As noted in the previous chapter, getting to the task proved difficult.  Roosevelt 
finally ordered the Departments of State, War and Navy (SWNCC) to work out occupation 
details in December 1944.     
However, prior to that point, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower 
required a more robust U. S. Army organization in Great Britain to stage the operation that 
would get British and American forces on the shores of France.  The Special Army Observer 
Group (SPOBS) set up in London during May 1941 to work with British counterparts on war 
planning issues should the U. S. enter the war, and by August 1941, to administer Lend-Lease 
and Reverse Lend-Lease programs for Europe, was about to expand.     
1.1 European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA) 
The European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA) saga began with the 
establishment of Services of Supply, European Theater (SOS, ETO) in Great Britain in May 
1942 to support logistically a relatively small group of U. S. Army Forces in the British Isles 
(USAFBI), successor to the Special Army Observer Group in London (SPOBS).  USAFBI 
reinforced the small contingent of U S. Army personnel assigned to the SPOBS in January 1942, 
as the U. S. War Department committed to and initiated planning for its northwest European 
adventure.  With the commitment to a cross-channel operation into continental Europe came also 
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the commitment to establish not only a robust service and supply organization but also a theater 
of operations.   
As it became apparent by spring, 1942 that even the USAFBI could not handle the scale 
of planning tasks and execution for of a full cross-channel operation and follow-on theater 
operations, the War Department established European Theater of Operations United States Army 
(ETOUSA), on 8 June 1942.  Services of Supply (SOS) expanded with the ETOUSA 
organization as a separate command under ETOUSA.  The first Organization Chart below 
reflects the ETOUSA organization as it stood officially on 20 July 1942, roughly two months 
after its inception. 
Chart III.1.1a – European Theater of Operations, USA
170
   
 
                                                   
170
 Roland G. Ruppenthal, U. S. Army in World War II Series, European Theater of Operations, Logistical Support 
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Services of Supply shows as a separate coordinate command in the above chart.  The 
organizations listed under Theater Special Staff (dotted lines), under Control and Direction of the 
Commanding General, SOS (left side of the chart), proffers a glimpse of the magnitude of 
logistics support unleashed in the European Theater.  Further, it also hints at the nature and 
complexity of the logistics organization that supports a military community.  Two special staff 
sections shown – Army Exchange Service and Special Services Officer, however nondescript to 
the layperson, along with the Chaplain, provide the moral and morale boosters for the soldiers.  
The Army Exchange Service is the Army’s Sears, Roebuck & Company while the Special 
Services Officer arranges all manner of entertainment and recreation activities for service 
members, the most notable, the USO (United Service Organization) shows.  The Chart III.1.1b, 





The Chart III.1.1c below, offers a view of the growth of ETOUSA and SOS by August 
1943, a little more than one year after inception. 
 
ETOUSA initially conducted planning for the fight in Europe and exercised administrative and 
operational control of U. S forces in the European theater
171
 until the activation of SHAEF in 
December 1943.  The following organization chart depicts the scaled down, consolidated 
ETOUSA-SOS organization that functioned as the administrative and services headquarters for 
U. S. Army forces in the European Theater until July 1945. 
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(usually referred to as the Communications Zone).  ETOUSA covered the geographical area in Europe north of Italy 
and the Mediterranean, whereas NATOUSA covered military operations in North Africa.  At the completion of 





As Roland Ruppenthal wrote, “The history of the logistics of the war in Europe, so far as U. S. 
participation is concerned, is basically the history of the SOS and its successor on the Continent, 
the Communications Zone.”
172
  ETOUSA reorganized as the United States Forces European 
Theater (USFET) in July 1945.  The Communications Zone transformed into Theater Service 
Forces under USFET on 1 August 1945, continuing the redeployment mission and logistic 
support effort for U. S. Army forces in Germany. 
1.2  Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces. 
The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) activated in December  
1943 as a combined headquarters with the British primarily to complete planning for, and to 
execute Operation OVERLORD and the follow-on operational and tactical missions on the 
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European continent.  Its predecessor, the Chief of Staff for the Supreme Allied Commander 
(COSSAC), had planned much of the initial OVERLORD operation.  The SHAEF staff also 
prepared and coordinated administrative and logistic requirements that would influence the 
European theater throughout the rest of the war and into the occupation phases.  A large 
headquarters with approximately 2,800 members initially, SHAEF figured critically in the 
preparation of the surrender documents for Germany as well as development of military 
occupation policies for U. S. commanders in the U. S. occupation zone. 
 





Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington:  GPO, 1954), 77. 
125 
 
Lt.- Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, in Overture to Overlord,173 reflects that SHAEF’s predecessor, 
COSSAC, worked out its teething problems prior to growing into SHAEF.  However, for 
SHAEF, three crucial organizational concepts presented difficulties for the newly assigned 
SHAEF Commander, General Eisenhower, the first two which concern this study:  how to 
organize combined G4 Logistics and the G5 Civil Affairs branches, and how to organize the 
combined Air Command under his single authority.  Forrest C. Pogue discussed these issues in 
depth in The Supreme Command.174  A shorter version follows.   
First, according to Roland G. Ruppenthal, in Logistical Support of the Armies, COSSAC, 
in the fall of 1943, had finally resolved the logistics issues at the Allied level by, “determining 
inter-service and inter-Allied administrative policy, but leaving the detailed implementation of its 
decisions to its subcommands and national agencies.”
175
  For logisticians, “the Devil is often in 
the details,” and indeed, implementation of COSSAC and later SHAEF administrative and 
logistics policy proved complicated.  General Eisenhower, wearing two hats as SHAEF 
Commander and as the ETOUSA Commander, had command authority over ETOUSA’s 
Headquarters, Services of Supply (SOS).  U. S. and British logistic systems differed significantly 
in structure – a major factor in establishing the SOS in Britain in the first place.  General 
Eisenhower could not restructure the British logistics organization within SHAEF.  He did, 
however, streamline the U. S. logistics system in Europe by consolidating Headquarters, 
ETOUSA with Headquarters, SOS, assigning Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, former 
commander of Headquarters, SOS, as the Deputy Theater Commander for Supply and 
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Administration, and later, commander of Headquarters, Communications Zone.  General 
Eisenhower relied on two ETOUSA staffs - G1 (Personnel and Administration) and G4 
(Logistics) – for direct communications with the U. S. War and Navy departments on U. S. Army 
in Europe administrative and logistic issues.  Further, he directed the ETOUSA-SOS 




 Army Groups on logistics support for the 
upcoming Operation OVERLORD and complete planning for establishment of the 
Communications Zone (COMZ) on the Continent following a successful OVERLORD.         
The second difficult issue for the combined SHAEF staff involved the philosophy and 
organization of the relatively new concept of a G5 Civil Affairs Directorate.  The British, 
engaged in occupation-type governments, both civilian and military, over several centuries had 
considerable experience in this type of operation.  At issue was what model would work best in 
Europe after hostilities ended - military government or civil affairs?  The U. S. concept of 
military government for occupied Germany heralded from the World War I experience in 
Germany after the armistice went into effect (11 November 1918), and recounted in the Hunt 
Report that the U. S. Army reprinted in 1943 as a resource for the fledgling Civil Affairs 
Directorate.
176
  This concept initially followed orders issued under the supreme command of 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, subsequently supplemented and adopted by the American General 
Headquarters as Anordnungen (9 December 1918) for the American occupied zone.  However, 
regarding the American Army relations with the German civilian population, the General 
Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces published General Orders No. 218 on November 
28, 1918, calling for a firm but distant military force on the ground to supervise existing local 
government and insure that local populations followed orders issued by the occupying force. 
                                                   
176
  Hunt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920.  Report of the Officer in Charge of 
Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, 203-218.   
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If the Americans succeeded in maintaining an attitude of dignified aloofness from 
the Germans and did not mingle with them at all on a basis of equality, the 
military authorities would be better able to enforce their orders to the civil 
population and, incidentally to maintain discipline.  It was based on the identical 
theory which prevents an officer from mingling on terms of equality with soldiers, 
-- the fear that familiarity will breed contempt, to the detriment of discipline.  The 
anti-fraternization order was sound in theory and undoubtedly succeeded in 
achieving its purpose as far as the officers of the army were concerned; but its 




Unfortunately, and as Colonel Hunt further explained, American soldiers actually billeted with 
German families.  Maintaining aloofness and distance at the dinner table must have been 
difficult.  One wonders if U. S. Army planners missed this section of the Hunt Report when 
rewriting their non-fraternization script for the post-World War II occupation, although 
American soldiers did not billet with German families during the second occupation period.      
Post-World War II presented a different scenario:  first, there arose the challenge of 
making a distinction between liberated countries and occupied countries, and second, 
determining what type of military government, if any, appeared necessary.  Germany presented a 
different situation, given that the Allies intended to execute an Allied-fed, top-down political, 
economic and cultural revolution.  U. S. military forces lacked the technical personnel to run a 
government, to run an economy, and to reorient a culture.  It is not clear historically when the 
U. S. Government realized – or the British either, for that matter – what political and economic 
structures in Germany would remain at surrender.  According to Maurice Matloff, by the summer 
of 1943, U. S. Army planners projected a German surrender in the fall of 1944.
178
  Further, the 
War Department Special Staff in its 30 June 1944 Report on the Status of Demobilization and 
Postwar Planning based its demobilization planning objectives on 1 October 1944, as “the 




 Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44, 206, 240, 309, 509, 517. 521.   
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earliest probable date that a German collapse may be expected.”
179
  The German breakthrough at 
Ardennes between 16 December and 25 January 1945 altered that assumption.  Regardless of 
timing, considering plans from at least 1943, however, the Allies clearly intended to replace the 
Nazi-led government and economic structures at all levels.  Whereas Germany after World War I 
faced little infrastructure damage from the war and only a partial military occupation, Germany 
after World War II faced massive infrastructure damage in many industrial and urban areas and a 
total military occupation.  Moreover, Displaced Persons within Germany and refugees from 
Eastern Europe, fleeing the Soviets, created not only massive bottlenecks on the road network, 
but also required food and shelter that military forces under international law had to provide even 
during ongoing military operations.   
Recognizing the need for early planning and an organization to deal with these civilian 
issues thus relieving military forces to fight the battle, the U. S. War Department established a 
Military Government Division with the U. S. Army Provost Marshal’s staff on 15 September 
1942.  The Military Government Division designed a civil affairs training program, drafted 
civilian specialists and opened several schools to train these new officers in civil affairs issues.
180
   
Further, the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) under Major General John H. Hilldring was 
established on 1 March 1943, to report directly to the Secretary of War.  As with several other 
attempts to establish combined agencies, the British and American civil affairs agencies could 
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not agree on location of a Combined Civil Affairs Committee – London or Washington, D.C.
181
  
American and British philosophy of civil affairs differed.  The British planned for civil affairs 
and military government together, whereas the U. S. Army looked at the two concepts 
differently.  Civil affairs would deal with liberated countries, and work through existing 
political-civil arrangements offering indirect assistance; whereas military government would deal 
with occupied (enemy) countries, instituting changes in the laws, institutions, and administrators 
as necessary, engaging directly in these  tasks.
182
  In the end, both the British and U. S. 
governments concluded separate accords with German-occupied countries in which civil affairs 
support would assist in liberation and reconstruction activities. 
The difficulties over establishing common ground at the government levels played out in 
establishing civil affairs organizations at the SHAEF level.  Lieutenant General Sir Frederick C. 
Morgan, tasked to set up the civil affairs organization at SHAEF, remarked,  
There were plenty of affairs, but the difficulty was to keep them civil.  Which is 
little to be wondered at when one considers how indifferently the normal course 
of military training is designed to equip the soldier to tackle all the great problems 
of government here involved.  And, paradox of paradoxes, it needed little 
perspicacity to see that the ultimate object of all our operations in so far as we had 
one, was to set up or reestablish some form of government in all the territories we 
were to liberate or capture from the enemy.  We had been given no political object 
for our campaign so we had to assume one, or rather several.  It was just not 
possible to proceed without one for, sooner or later, and we naturally hoped  
sooner, would arise the situation where we should have overrun large areas of 
Europe with the crucial battle still in progress in the heart of the Continent.  These 
overrun areas would contain a hotch-potch of inhabitants of many categories, 
races and states of salvation over whom some form of control must be exercised 
by someone and over whom moreover the Supreme Allied Commander must have 
some species of domination.
183
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Lt.- Gen. Morgan raised the critical question, “Where is the guidance for this mission?”  
Equally important, and an issue that SHAEF’s predecessor, the Supreme Allied Command 
(SAC) had worked through earlier, “Will the civil affairs/military government organization be 
independent from the military structure in place providing security if and as needed?”  The Chief 
of Staff for the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) staff eventually published a handbook 
on civil affairs in December 1943, making the military commanders responsible for civil affairs 
operations handled through the regular channels of their commands.  SHAEF published a slight 
modification of this handbook in May 1944, allowing the Supreme Commander to delegate 
control over civil affairs activities with the commands in the field.  Tactical commanders would 
have responsibility for civil affairs operations within their assigned area in accordance with 
SHAEF policies, at least while the war continued.  
1.3  United States Forces European Theater (USFET) 
SHAEF, created as a combined, fighting headquarters to finish planning for - and to 
execute Operation OVERLORD, was deactivated on 14 July 1945.  ETOUSA reorganized into 
the United States Forces European Theater (USFET).  Replacing SHAEF as the U. S. national 
tactical, operational and military government organization on the ground in Europe from 
1 July 1945 to 15 March 1947, ETOUSA moved the main headquarters from Paris to Frankfurt.  
USFET-Rear remained in Paris.  General Joseph T. McNarney replaced General Eisenhower as 
the USFET commander as well as Military Governor for the U. S. Occupation mission in 
Germany in late November 1945.  Lieutenant General Lucius D. Clay assumed the duties of 
Deputy Military Governor, responsible for the military government mission headquartered in 
Berlin (OMGUS).  
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The USFET as of July 1945 (see chart below), distinctly displayed its inherited logistics 
organization under the Communications Zone:  specifically the base sections, a holdover from 
the SOS organization of Britain days in 1943 when SOS Commander General John C. H. Lee 
crafted these organizations based on regional and mission requirements. 
Chart III.1.3
   
1.4  Communications Zone. 
The Communications Zone in the chart above transformed into the Theater Support 
Forces, effective 1 August 1945.  The regional logistics sections, however, survived as service 
commands primarily to support redeployment efforts:  United Kingdom Base Section, Chanor 
Base Section, Delta Base Section, Oise Intermediate Section, Seine Section, Assembly Area 
Command and the Bremen Port Command.  The Chanor Base Section (combined Channel and 
Accessed 21 Jan 2014, www.usarmygermany.com/Sont.htm , Also, U. S. Army Europe Historians’ Office, Heidelberg, Germany.  
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Normandy base sections) located in northwestern France and Belgium, the United Kingdom 
Base Section, and the Delta Base Section operating out of the Marseilles area -- all primarily 
responsible for port arrival and departures, for received, classified, stored and forwarded supplies 
during combat, and for reversing the process during the redeployment phase after combat.  The 
Oise Intermediate Section, located just east of Paris, northeast of the Delta Base Section to the 
French-German border, served as a major storage area for theater reserves, taking the pressure 
off the ports and reconfiguring logistics packages for forward movement.  The Delta Base 
Section,
184
 adding a redeployment mission to its task list after the war, managed three 
redeployment centers:  Calas Staging Area, about 10 kilometers northeast of Marseilles, St. 
Victoret Staging Area about 20 kilometers northwest of Marseilles, and the Arles Staging Area, 
about 92 kilometers northwest of Marseilles.  The Oise Section also housed the so-called 
“Cigarette Camps” that served as assembly areas for units moving forward into the battle and 
redeployment centers after the war, shipping soldiers to the Pacific Theater or returning service 
members to the United States.  The Seine Section, a relatively small area surrounding Paris, 
provided storage for the military headquarters located in and around Paris.  Bremen Port 
Command becoming the primary port of entry for logistics for the U. S. Occupation Force joined 
the log bases only after U. S. engineer units cleared both Bremerhaven and Bremen ports of the 
debris and mines left by retreating German forces.  The first port began operations in June 1945, 
and the other port in September 1945.  Finally, the Assembly Area Command, headquartered 
near Reims, France, served initially as an assembly area during the war, then a redeployment 
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center after the war.  It sported four sub-areas, with eighteen redeployment camps scattered 
within the sub-areas, southeast of Reims, each named after an American city.
185
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Original planning estimates called for building to a capacity for 270,000 personnel at a time, but 
shortly after capitulation this number climbed to 294,000.  Facilities, winterized tents, and huts 
for support facilities, complete utilities, roads, walks and hardstands for vehicles could not be 
built quickly enough to house the incoming units readying for redeployment.  One example of 
the dimensions of these camps is shown below in an overview of Camp Baltimore.  Following 
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The Communications Zone and its successor, Theater Service Forces (Chart III.1.4a, 
below), discharged two critical missions in support of the U. S. occupation force during the first 
post-war year:  resupply forward to the forces in the U. S. occupation zone and redeployment of 
approximately three million service members out of the theater.  By June 1946, with the 
completion of most of the personnel redeployment, much of the base section-line of 
communications through France could downsize and eventually close its doors – at least for the 
remainder of the occupation period.  Correspondingly, command structures adjusted to the new 
reality of reduced force structure.  However, the assumed reality of reduced logistics missions 
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did not materialize.  Theater Service Forces deactivated on 28 February 1946.  Their missions 
transferred to the Continental Base Section under the USFET organization by June 1946 (Chart 
III.1.4b, below), retaining the Bremen mission under Bremen Sub-Sector.  By this time, the 
Bremen Enclave, with the two ports – Bremerhaven and Bremen – had replaced the French, 
Belgian and Dutch ports as the major ports of embarkation – for both supplies and personnel.  
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1.5  Headquarters, European Command (HQ EUCOM) 
The Headquarters European Command (HQ EUCOM) replaced USFET effective 
15 March 1947, with General Lucius D. Clay dual-hatted as its commander and as the Military 
Governor for the U. S. occupation zone in Germany, replacing General McNarney.  A close 
scrutiny of the Headquarters Command EUCOM organization chart, 1 July 1947 (Chart III.1.5, 
below) offers a view into the nature of the logistics missions, and also into the sprawl of soldier 
and community activities U. S. Army Europe oversaw – suggesting the huge growth in 
organization and support structure in the U. S. occupation zone. 
In addition to the early-established Post Exchange (formerly Army Exchange Service) 
and Special Service staffs, HQ EUCOM also sported staff sections responsible for the 
Dependents School System, a Music Center, the German Youth Program and a Visitors’ Bureau.  
Also in this timeframe, U. S. Army Europe began consolidating military communities and 




vacated by repatriation or relocation of most of the Displaced Persons, creating the first Little 
Americas in the process.  Senior Army leaders had long since stopped talking about a one-year 
military occupation, although many still hoped that a civilian administration would replace the 
military government soonest.  However, as early as 18 May 1945, The Stars and Stripes quoted 
Lieutenant General Lucius Clay, General Eisenhower’s designated Deputy Governor for the 
soon-to-form U. S. military government in Berlin, at a Paris press conference, “The U. S. has 
established a stern, long-term military government in Germany and will keep American forces in 
the Reich for a long time.”189  Although General Eisenhower, in correspondence with President 
Truman later in the year, argued for a one-year limit to military authority over the U. S. 
occupation, and President Truman wrote that such a plan was “desirable,” no such decision was 
forthcoming.
190
  Further, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in his “Stuttgart Address” on 6 
September 1946, told his audience of American service members and a selected group of 
German citizens:  “Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a long period.  I 
want no misunderstanding.  We will not shirk our duty.  We are not withdrawing.  We are 
staying here.  As long as there is an occupation army in Germany, American armed forces will 
be part of that occupation army.”
191
  Moreover, Secretary of State Byrnes’ address hinted at the 
difficulties within the Allied Control Council in agreeing on execution of the Potsdam Protocol, 
suggesting that the desired world peace was not yet in sight.      
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Six months after formation of HQ EUCOM, on 15 September 1947, the United States Air 
Force Europe activated as a separate military organization under the National Military 
Establishment headed by a Secretary of Defense James Forrestal.
192
   The HQ European 
Command reorganized as the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR), on 1 August 1952, 
remaining in Heidelberg as the senior Army command in Europe.  The U. S. European 
Command (USEUCOM) activated as a joint command, subordinating Air, Army and Naval 
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 sess, (July 26, 1947), Chapter 343, the   






1.6  The 1st Infantry Division in Germany. 
During World War II, the 1st Infantry Division (1
st
 ID) entered Germany through Aachen 
in September 1944, one component of the first American fighting force on German soil.  After 
fighting through Germany, division elements eventually reached Ansbach, in Bavaria, Bavaria 
being the predominant location of 1
st
 Infantry Division forces during the occupation.  The typical 
infantry division at this time, with attached medical, chaplain and band, numbered approximately 
14,253 personnel assigned.
194
  Further, these numbers increased with the arrival of family 
members as early as April 1946, on the first boatload of family members to Germany.  Appendix 
III.3 proffers a sense of 1
st
 Infantry Division organization and the scattered locations to which the 
units deployed. 
2.  Missions of U. S. Military Occupation Forces in Germany.   
As one of four occupation forces in Germany, the U. S. Army shared execution of the 
Potsdam Protocol through the Office of Military Government United States in Germany 
(OMGUS).  OMGUS assumed responsibility for the military government mission and its work 
with the Four Power Allied Control Council.  U. S. Army forces executed the directives dictated 
in JCS 1067 and supplementing policies from OMGUS as missions.  Agreements among the 
Allied Control Council members decreed that each force occupy its zone by 1 July 1945.  The 
U. S. Army occupied Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, Greater Hesse, the Bremen Enclave and its 
section in Berlin shortly after this deadline (see Appendix III.2.1).  
USFET divided its southern German area into two military districts:  Bavaria, the Eastern 
District under the Third Army and the rest as the Western District, (see Appendix III.2.2), to 
include the Bremen Enclave (see Appendix III.2.3) in northern Germany under the Seventh 
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Army.  The Berlin Sector remained a separate entity under OMGUS.  Other than a small 
contingent of rotating combat units stationed in Berlin, and the units needed to manage the ports 
in the Enclave (predominantly U. S. Navy units) the majority of U. S. Army Forces remained in 
the Western and Eastern Military Districts.  These units picked up the majority of the logistics 
missions facing the U. S. Army during the occupation.   
The two military districts eventually reorganized into military communities (1947), akin 
to the garrison organizations in the continental United States.  Three key considerations 
prompted this reorganization:  reduction of forces and consolidation of remaining units, 
provision of a family-like community for soldier and dependents, and a push to return 
requisitioned facilities back to the German communities.  The first issue, consolidation of troops, 
eased not only the logistics support mission, but also the ability of units to train.  Moreover, by 
1947, the U. S. Army, in conjunction with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), had repatriated many of the Displaced Persons, freeing up many 
kasernes.  With the infusion of German Deutschmarks for repair of older kasernes and 
construction of new facilities for the Americans after 1949, these kasernes became the hubs for 
most of the American military communities in Germany, saving U. S. taxpayer dollars in the 
process.  Consequently, the U. S. Army returned a number of requisitioned to the German 
communities.  Further, with American families moving into the kasernes, opportunities to mingle 
with the German population dwindled as kasernes became “little Americas,” providing military 
families most of what communities back in the United States offered.      
Aside from the day-to-day mission of logistically supporting U. S. Army Forces in the 
occupation zone, the biggest and most pressing initial mission for the remaining service members 
involved redeploying U. S. Forces to the Pacific Theater as the war with Japan raged on.  As 
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redeployment progressed and more units returned to the States or deployed to the Pacific, only 
two complete tactical organizations remained in Germany:  the 1
st
 Infantry Division (1
st
 ID), and 





Armored Division -- wartime cavalry reconnaissance units.  These two organizations with their 
support elements performed tactical and operational occupation missions, the 1
st
 ID until 1954, 
and the Constabulary until German police forces took over the law and order mission in 1948.  
OMGUS, activated in October 1945, took over the military government mission from USFET 
until relieved of the mission by establishment of the High Commission on 21 September 1949, in 
accordance with the Occupation Statute, the Agreement on Basic Principles for Trizonal Fusion 
and the Declaration Placing Occupation Statute in Force.
195
   
The initial and immediate missions of the U. S. Army occupation force derived from JCS 
1067, engaged the forces for the better part of the first two years of military occupation.  While 
logistics support is inherent in any military mission, redeployment, repatriation of Displaced 
Persons and provision of nutrition, repair, reconstruction and technical assistance to the German 
population – herculean tasks – consumed an inordinate amount of resources and time.  Those 
challenges will be described in Chapter IV.             
2.1  Missions.  Provide security, redeploy forces, repatriate Displaced Persons, logistically 
support the force, and assist the German population with critical infrastructure repair and 
procurement of food as necessary.   
 
Secure.  Until establishment of the High Commission in July 1949, the European Theater 
Commander held two positions:  senior commander for U. S. Forces in the theater and Military 
Governor of the U. S. Occupation Zone.  As senior commander, responsible to the U. S. War 
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Department initially and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army after 1947, the 
Theater Commander ensured the internal security within the zonal borders under a number of 
conditions, depending on the timeframe.  Security concerns ranged from possible internal 
disruptions caused by disaffected pro-Nazi supporters, criminals, Displaced Persons seeking 
revenge against their former German captors, or even hungry people fighting for food.  Initially, 
Occupation Forces restricted indigenous Germans from crossing occupation zones.  Within a few 
months, Occupation Forces in the U. S and British zones relaxed this restriction, requiring only 
application for passes for temporary movements.  External border security concerns focused 
necessarily at first on limiting the numbers of refugees fleeing from Eastern Europe, and 
preventing sought-after Nazi leaders from fleeing capture and eventual prosecution in Germany.   
Redeploy.  When the war in Europe ended, U. S. Army forces, as previously noted, engaged in 
redeployment activities – some forces scheduled for immediate transfer to the Pacific Theater 
while others returned to the States either for mustering out of the military or for further rerouting 
to the Pacific Theater.  Redeployment, however, involved not only transferring personnel, but 
also their equipment, particularly equipment for those forces headed to the Pacific Theater.  
Gladwin Hill noted in a New York Times, 16 May 1945 article, “Year Needed to Shift War Gear 
from Europe to Pacific Theater.”  He observed, “What is probably the biggest repairing and 
shipping project in history faces United States Army authorities in the European theater in 
transferring a large part of their forces and equipment to the Pacific in the next twelve months.”   
Put another way, General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commander, Army Ground Forces, commented in 
The Stars and Stripes, “Army Chiefs Stress Speed in V-E Shift,” on 9 April 1945, “We are 
shifting from a 3,000-mile haul across the Atlantic to a 7,000-mile haul across the Pacific.”  Of 
course, in May 1945, not Gladwin Hill and probably not General Stilwell could have known 
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about the nuclear weapons destined for Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Nonetheless, with or without 
an active Pacific Theater, the U. S. Army in Europe had a tremendous mountain of material to 
return to the States, sell off to appropriate buyers, or destroy.  Further, disposition of German war 
material added to the mission load.  Hill wrote, quoting Brigadier General Morris W. Gilland, 
Assistant Chief of Staff (G-4, Supply), ETOUSA, that the Army in Europe at war’s end, had 
approximately 5 ½ million long tons of supplies both in the United Kingdom and on the 
Continent. Even recognizing as early as the fall of 1944 that the war was winding down, and 
reduction of the supply pipeline began, U. S. Armies received on average 25,000 tons
196
 of 
material daily during the final four months of the war.  Further, in addition to shipping some of 
these items to the Pacific, and returning shiploads to the States, logisticians had to calculate what 
kind and how much supplies the occupation force required.  For example, General Gilland 
suggested that “food, clothing, post exchange supplies, housekeeping equipment, spare parts for 
reconditioning equipment, gasoline and lubricants, recreational and educational supplies and 
medical equipment” would provide the bulk of the 150 ships sent monthly to resupply the Army 
in Europe.  He estimated that food alone for the force would take up approximately 70 of the 150 
shiploads. 
 In addition to preparing and shipping material out of Europe, Army personnel had to set 
up and run the redeployment camps and prepare redeploying and returning soldiers for departure.   
According to The Stars and Stripes, 13 May 1945, American forces leaving the European 
Theater of Operations would ship out of four ports, Le Havre, Cherbourg, Antwerp and 
Marseilles, the first three for troops returning to the U.S., and Marseilles for Pacific-bound troops 
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and equipment. In the same article, Brigadier General E. S. Eyster calculated that 3,000,000 
soldiers would flow through the redeployment centers enroute to the U. S. or Pacific Theater.  
Thus, the “cigarette” and “American cities camps” sprung up. 
 Setting up these camps involved not only the facilities, but also, according to a Stars and 
Stripes 19 May 1945 article, most camps included arrangements for various entertainments to 
include, for example at the Delta Camps outside Marseilles, a 10,000-seat outdoor amphitheater 
equipped with two 35 mm movie projectors, and even a 2,400- seat capacity beer garden.  Shown 
below are two pictures of recreational areas for redeploying service members in the Delta Base 







picture is the enlisted service member beach in Nice.  Both facilities were requisitioned by the 
U. S. Army solely for military forces and their quests.
197
  Further, while the soldiers waited to 
depart, they could engage in every possible sport activity, peruse the library offerings, and even 
take advantage of selected educational opportunities.  Keep the soldiers busy until they depart – 
that was the objective.                      
Repatriate.  At the same time that forces relocated to their assigned occupation zones, 
approximately six million Displaced Persons (DPs) required settlement, either repatriation to 
their home countries or resettlement elsewhere.  This group, comprised of the Displaced Persons 
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(slave laborers), political, racial and war prisoners held by the German Nazi authorities, 
constituted a complex problem requiring urgent action not only temporarily to house and feed 
people from across Europe, but to return them to their home countries or resettle them 
somewhere.  Although the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
198
 officially 
took over the mission of administering the Displaced Persons camps in October 1945, the U. S. 
Army occupation forces remained responsible for supplying and transporting persons in DP 
camps within the U. S. occupation zone.  According to a G-5, USFET Information Bulletin,
199
  
SHAEF (combined British and American forces) repatriated approximately 3.36 million DPs by 
July 1945.  Chapter IV provides a deeper discussion of this mission.   
Support the Force.  JCS 1067 and its successor document, JCS 1779, conferred upon the Office 
of Military Government in Germany, United States (OMGUS) full responsibility for the 
execution and implementation of U. S. policy – civilian and military – within the U. S. 
occupation zone.  However, the U. S. Army was also responsible for law and order within the U. 
S. occupation zone, as well as administrative and disciplinary control of all U. S. civilian and 
military personnel employed by or detailed to the organization.  Administrative control included 
all facets of logistics:  manning, feeding, housing, financing and medical care for the force, 
transporting, maintaining equipment, arming, communicating, building and repairing buildings.  
Chapter IV provides an in-depth discussion of this mission. 
Support local population.  Although JCS 1067 expressed the intent that the Germans fend for 
themselves as best they could, military leaders realized relatively early two quintessential issues:  
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first, convincing a hungry occupied people that democracy works evoked little positive response; 
second, inoperable infrastructure – particularly utilities, transportation, and communications – 
worked no better for the occupation forces than for the local population.  In this case, repudiating 
the political created the logistical.   
Headquarters Detachment E1C3, Company C, 3d European Civilian Affairs (ECA) 
Regiment, detailed to Stuttgart in July 1945, noted in its initial weekly report to the Commanding 
General, Seventh Army, several critical supply issues.  Most notable was a critical shortage of 
coal that would paralyze not only industrial operations but also public utilities and eventually 
heating and related household operations.  Additionally, shortage of labor, transportation assets 
and basic supplies hampered harvesting of crops, creating probable food shortages over the 
upcoming winter.  Moreover, shortages of fuel and oil products would derail the critical “T” – 
transportation itself.  Without a working transportation system, nothing moved.   
The U. S. Army had shipped locomotives and rail cars to the European Theater to support 
military operations.  This foresight allowed the U. S. Army to assist tremendously with the tasks 
of postwar relief and reconstruction.  According to Brigadier General Morris W. Gilland, the 
ETOUSA G-4, quoted by Gladwin Hill in a New York Times article on May 16, 1945, 
approximately “1,900 special-size locomotives and 20,000 freight cars, [were] now being used 
on 11,000 miles of railroads.”  However, before even these rail cars could move damaged 
German engines, cars, rail track and bridges required either repair or rebuilding.  U. S. Army 
logisticians – quartermaster supply, engineers, and transporters – all engaged in this repair, 
restoration and rebuilding effort during the early occupation period.  In most cases, even though 
local communities galvanized German labor to perform the actual work, U. S. forces often 
planned, supervised, and provided equipment and necessary supplies.  In addition to the above 
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primary missions, U. S. Army forces also supported military government missions as discussed 
below.   
2.2  Implement the Four Ds:  Demilitarize, Denazify, Decartelize, Democratize 
 
The U. S. Military Governor represented U. S. interests at the Allied Control Council.  
OMGUS’ responsibilities included oversight of the “4Ds” within the U. S. occupation zone:  
demilitarize, decartelize, denazify, and democratize.  Demilitarization and decartelization 
activities were closely entwined with deindustrialization, decentralization, Levels of Industry and 
reparations.  Likewise, denazification and democratization activities often overlapped.  The 4D 
mission fell primarily to OMGUS for policy direction, and to the scattered civil affairs officers 
and selected Army forces in the field for execution.  Military staffs and many tactical military 
service members in subordinate units carried out little of the day-to-day work, although 
logisticians often supplied transportation assets and drivers while technical specialists, especially 
engineers, provided supervision over the German labor involved in demilitarization projects.  
Nonetheless, a brief discussion follows as these OMGUS missions kept the occupation force in 
Germany until the U. S. Government realized they might have to begin remilitarizing Germany, 
albeit eventually under NATO.     
Demilitarization to eliminate or at least mitigate the threat of German armed forces 
resurgence had not worked in Germany after World War I.  Therefore, the World War II Allied 
Powers structured the demilitarization clauses in the Potsdam Protocol to read, “complete 
disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German 
industry that could be used for military production.”
200
   In this regard, the Potsdam Protocol 
demilitarization clauses were two-pronged.  First, all military and semi-military organizations, 
clubs and associations furthering military traditions would be “completely and finally abolished 
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in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and 
Nazism.”
201
  Further, Allied Control Council Proclamation No. 2, dated 20 September 1945, 
disbanded the German military forces, prohibited any type of military training, and formation of 
any type of organization that might carry on the German military tradition, regardless of whether 
the group professed to be political, educational, religious, recreational, industrial or athletic.  At 
the U. S. occupation forces level, JCS 1067 initially, and JCS 1779 after July 1947, specified 
objectives,
202
 while finally, USFET Military Government Regulations, Title 11, Industry, 
effective 1 March 1946, covered practices and procedures for U. S. Forces in the control and 
supervision of German industry, to include demolition, removal for reparations, or destruction.  
Title 13, Trade and Commerce and Title 16, Finance, provided guidance that aimed to “achieve 
the financial disarmament of Germany.”
203
  Second, occupation forces accepted, inventoried, and 
stored targeted military and industrial equipment, supervised destruction and demilitarization of 
this material, or redirected German military equipment as reparations to liberated countries.
204
 
The Potsdam Protocol mandated decartelization of the German economy, the breaking up 
of associations formed to control marketing arrangements and to regulate prices, “for the purpose 
of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in 
particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.”
205
   The Allies 
were convinced that the German-peculiar economic organizations, many formed in the late 19th 
century, helped set the stage for the growth of Nazism in Germany.  Gustav Stolper, an émigré 
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Austrian economist, in an older narrative, German Realities, Chapter IX, “Socialization and 
Decartellization,” discussed the historical background and implications of German 
decartelization culturally and economically.
206
  David Calleo explained that German industry in 
the late 19th century, especially in the fields of chemicals, for example, I. G. Farbenindustrie, 
electricity and optics, developed large-scale industrial conglomerations, many often with a 
particular big bank in their back pockets, competing particularly against American and British 
economic concerns and interests.  Distinguishing the German arrangements from other nations, 
“each industry was dominated by a few giant firms closely linked with the big banks.  All 
depended heavily upon high technology and foreign trade, the former nurtured through close 




The German government, and particularly Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, during his long 
tenure, aimed to protect German industrial and agricultural production with high tariffs against 
cheaper prices from competitors.  These cartels supported Germany during World War I, 
suffered under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, reemerged in the mid-1920s, and were 
subordinated to the Nazi economic machine after 1933.  Why the Allies would call for 
decentralization of German industry except to limit Germany’s war-making capability and 
                                                   
206
  For the basic “Plan of Allied Control Council for Reparations and the Level of Post-War German Economy, 28 
March 1946 (Appendix D);” and “The President’s Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, 18 March 1947,” by 
former President Herbert Hoover (Appendix E).  Also, see Stolper, German Realities, Chapter VIII, War Potential, 
for a basic but critical commentary of German industrialization and economic future.  Lewis H. Brown, at the 
request of the U. S. Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, visited Germany in 1947 to provide a realistic report 
on the status of   German industry and production.  The results of his research appear as A Report on Germany (New 
York:  Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947).  As with another private citizen-industrial/finance expert, Lewis W. 
Douglas, brought to Germany early in the occupation to analyze the economic situation of Germany and to propose 
recommendations to revive German industrial production, Lewis Brown’s Report fell on closed minds.  Kramer,   
The West German Economy, 1945-1955, Chapter 4 – Economic Recovery 1945-1948, offers a more current report 
on the German economy, and the issue of decartelization.  Additionally, see in Kramer, Document 2.2 for the 
Control Council Plan for Reparations and the Level of Post-War German Economy, 28 March 1946.      
207
 David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered:  Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1978), 63. 
152 
 
potential is unclear.  Targeting cartels, (Potsdam Protocol, paragraph 12), seems a bit like “the 
pot calling the kettle black,” as both the United States and Great Britain allowed democratic 
versions of cartels in monopoly form.  Regardless, execution of decartelization, as with the other 
4D measures, fell to the occupation governments.  Diethelm Prowe, wrote a long-overdue article 
on the “Economic Democracy in Post-War Germany:  Corporate Crisis Response, 1945-
1948,”
208
 in which he questioned the emphasis placed by the Allies on such issues as the 
“undemocratic” German economic systems, e.g., decartelization.  In fact, democratically oriented 
systems existed, e.g., -- Industrie- und Handelskammer since the eighteenth century -- survived 
the Nazi takeover, and supported the military occupation after the war. 
For in contrast to government offices, which had been directly integrated into the 
Nazi state, the chambers had maintained a degree of autonomy even under Hitler 
and were therefore able to reconstitute themselves in their pre-Nazi form 
immediately upon the arrival of the occupying forces.  Because their technical 
personnel had an intimate knowledge of the regional economies and had, in fact, 
in their Nazi incarnation of Gauwirtschaftskammern, handled much of the 
wartime raw materials distribution, they were indispensable to the early 
occupation governments, who were unfamiliar with the details of the German 




The Potsdam Protocol directed denazification – the dissolution of the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) and all of its affiliates and 
organizations.  Additionally, the Protocol called for abolition of Nazi laws and for the arrest, 
internment and prosecution of war criminals, Nazi leaders and high officials, influential 
supporters, as well as party members “who have been more than nominal members in [the Nazi 
Party] activities.”
210
 The Allied Control Council followed suit with Proclamation Number 2, 
primarily Sections I and XI, and a number of laws, orders and directives implementing the 
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Proclamation and the Protocol declaration.  Specifically, ACC Directive Number 38
211
 
established five categories of persons deemed responsible for supporting National Socialism,
212
 
and therefore subject, as a minimum, to rigorous scrutiny (at least on paper).  Although not 
officially effective until 12 October 1946, the basic parameters of the Directive were well 
represented earlier among the occupation powers. 
For the U. S. occupation forces assigned to the denazification boards, JCS 1067, Part I, 
paragraph 6, specified criteria on which to determine a level of individual participation with the 
extensive National Socialist organization.  However, such concepts as “avowed believers in 
Nazism or racial and militaristic creeds,” or “voluntarily given substantial moral or material 
support,” or “more than nominal participants,” proved difficult to establish in many cases.  
Alone, determining who qualified as a nominal Party member proved difficult, too often left to 
the interpretation of American officials and later approved German board members, involved in 
the denazification process in the U. S. occupation zone.   
However defined, the denazification process caused much hardship on German families 
where the breadwinner received a classification barring him (or her) from a profession, position 
or other means of earning a living, and thus supporting a family.  Although an appeals process 
existed, months and even years could follow before a hearing was granted – if a hearing was 
granted.  More importantly, employees and workers, once designated in all but the last category 
of “Groups of Persons Responsible,” (Category 5, Persons Exonerated), and dismissed from their 
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positions, created irreplaceable gaps in the labor force. When one examines the JCS 1067 list, for 
example, those people with more than nominal participation in the Nazi party and involved in 
“industry, commerce, agriculture and finance, education, the press, publishing houses and other 
agencies disseminating news and propaganda,” probably lost their positions, setting back 
reconstruction, the byproduct of which meant lengthening the occupation, according to Frederick 
Taylor.
213
   
Whether the denazification process – at least that process exercised in the U. S. 
occupation zone, lengthened the military occupation remains a debatable issue.  However, one 
particularly critical profession in support of the democratization efforts – teaching - was hit hard 
by these rules with percentages of teachers barred from teaching upwards of 50% in most areas, 
resulting in what teachers remained after denazification, or even during the process, to teach 
often in shifts to a student population of seventy or more students per one teacher.  Furthermore, 
because of U. S. military government closure of higher education institutions, and pending 
proposed changes to the teacher education process, in Württemberg-Baden, for example, the first 
class of new teachers did not graduate until the summer of 1947.   
While the process of capture, indictment, internment and prosecution or dismissal of 
individuals suspected under the ACC and U. S. provisions ensued, U. S. soldiers served as justice 
officials, security forces, prison guards and even executioners for those awaiting or carrying out 
their sentences.  Additionally, on occasion U. S. forces raided communities to confiscate 
forbidden materials – weapons, literature, and other Nazi memorabilia – all part of the 
denazification program. 
Of the 4Ds, the demilitarization (deindustrialization for many observers), decartelization 
and denazification processes ranked among most observers as the punishment phase of 
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occupation government.  Of these three processes, execution of the denazification process rated a 
failure, primarily because of the military governments’ lack of clarity in defining categories, the 
inconsistency in punishment, and once the process transferred to German boards, the 
intimidation factor between defendant and prosecutor often resulted in lesser or no charges (the 
so-called Persilschein, or whitewashing effect).  As one unnamed German noted, many of the 
Big Fish got away, and too many of the Little Folks were punished.  John Gimbel, in A German 
Community under American Occupation:  Marburg, 1945-1952,214 categorizes the 4Ds into two 
groups:  the three mentioned above as “The Punitive Program,” and the fourth, Democratization, 
as the “Constructive Program.”  Gimbel, as part of the U. S. military government contingent in 
Hessen and actively engaged in the “Constructive Program,” certainly had a voice on the issue of 
success of American policies, and many of his observations, for example, on the denazification 
process are applicable for the other Länder in the U. S. occupation zone.  However, perhaps he 
was too close to the issues, particularly the education and school reform issue, to be objective on 
all counts.  Constantine Fitzgibbon, Denazification, Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of 
Germany, and Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler:  the Occupation and Denazification of 
Germany, have written substantive manuscripts that document the denazification process in 
readable fashion.  As with John Gimbel, these three authors graded the denazification process a 
failure.  They have the advantage of distance and time as more material was undoubtedly 
available to them.     
The fourth process, the “Constructive Program” as John Gimbel paradoxically described 
Democratization, changed terms over the tenure of the U. S. military government reconfiguring 
as re-education, reconstruction, reform, and finally reorientation.  The intent of military 
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government policy in this area, however, remained relatively constant.  According to Alonzo 
Grace, “reeducation and reorientation of the German people has been an established policy of the 
United States from December, 1941 to the present.  The long-range goal of this policy has been 
to restore an intellectual, spiritual and cultural life based on the principles of freedom, social 
justice, brotherhood, and individual responsibility for matters of public concern.” 
215
  John 
Gimbel writes a different epitaph: 
Americans, educated and conditioned to believe in the American dream and 
guided by policy statements, worked – crusaded – for an ideal:  a peaceful, 
democratic, free-enterprise Germany.  Reaching to the lowest German 
administrative levels, American detachments ferreted out the people who would 
deny their purpose.  They destroyed institutions and tried to modify or reform 
others that they believed made peace, democracy, and free enterprise unattainable.  
They tried to reorient the German people themselves to accept and espouse 
democratic political and social ideals.  In effect, American policy would have 
transformed Germany.  It would have uprooted people and traditions, shattered 
customs, prejudices, and other non-rationally assumed practices and myths, 





American policymakers in the overseas military government decreed that education, writ-
large, would be the vehicle of choice to drive toward democratization.  This program therefore 
included any medium that served as a potential conduit to the German population:  newspapers, 
radio, theater, music, books, the school system, and eventually people-to-people exchange 
programs.  Each of these issues has been extensively researched, and particularly by German 
specialists in the last quarter century.  For the purposes of this research that focuses on school 
reform, James F. Tent, in Mission on the Rhine:  Reeducation and Denazification in American-
Occupied Germany, provides the most inclusive, English-language version of the four 
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occupation governments’ roles in revamping the German education system, from Grundschule 
through vocational training, professional schools and the university.   
Two U. S. military government agencies shared in the reeducation task:  Information 
Control/Information Services Division and the Education and Religious Affairs Division 
(ERAD; Education and Cultural Affairs Division (ECAD) after 1948).  OMGUS determined 
policy, Civil Affairs officers throughout the U. S. occupation zone carried out the policies, and 
military forces engaged in support of the various stages of implementation, providing basic 
logistics support, e.g., transportation assets. 
3.  Conclusion. 
U. S., British and Canadian forces came ashore on the West European continent at six 
Normandy beaches on 6 June 1944.  At that time, the U.S. Army Services of Supply (SOS) under 
the command of Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee totaled 434,497 of the 1,549,080 U. S. Army 
service members
217
 – close to one-third of the total U. S. force landing at three of the six beaches 
(Omaha, Utah and Pointe du Hoc) involved in the Normandy campaign.  By December 1944, 
Army Service Forces (SOS to the troops) reflected a one-SOS soldier-to-two-combat soldier 
ratio (1:2).  By 30 April 1945, the ratio was again at about one-SOS soldier-to-three-combat 
soldiers (1:3), as the total U. S. Army force on the Continent had jumped to 3,065,505, of which 
979,637 soldiers belonged to the SOS.
218
  Furthermore, by 31 May 1945, these SOS soldiers had 
moved over 47 million long tons
219
 of logistics resources onto the European continent.
220
  This 
was the beginning of the U. S. Army’s long logistics haul into occupied Germany in support of 
its forces and eventually their family members. 
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The personnel strength numbers declined quickly after Germany capitulated and as the 
war in the Pacific continued and soldiers redeployed, based on a predetermined point system, the 
Adjusted Service Rating,
221
 home or to the Pacific Theater.  Nonetheless, the logistics support 
mission, albeit in smaller numbers, shifted from war support to other non-traditional missions 
ranging from infrastructure repair and humanitarian support to Displaced Persons, refugees, 
Expellees and indigenous Germans.  The U.S. Army remained in Germany as part of the 
occupation government, both military (1945-1949) and civilian (1949-1955). 
By 1955, ten years after the Allies achieved their unconditional surrender, the U. S. Army 
had deployed in West Germany approximately 250,000 service members and roughly 200,000 
family members, in at least 263 acquired and rent-free German Kasernen (military installations) 
and facilities.
222
  The infrastructure required to sustain the mission and support these personnel 
included medical facilities, schools, and a host of other logistics facilities.  From the early days 
after World War II, U. S. Army logistics support and infrastructure grew to accommodate the 
military mission in an ever growing and increasingly high technology environment.  Although 
the numbers would expand or contract depending on security incidents, the total U. S. force 
figures remained over the 200,000 range until 1991, when the U. S. Department of Defense 
began drawing down forces stationed in Europe.   
How did the hoped-for short U. S. Army occupation after World War II develop into 
long-range stationing of forces on German soil?  The expansion of U. S. Army logistics support 
and infrastructure commitments supporting the U. S. presence in Germany follows. 
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Chapter IV:  Support the Military Force, the Displaced Persons and Family 
In a tale of war, the reader’s mind is filled with the fighting.  The battle – with its 
vivid scenes, its moving incidents, its plain and tremendous results – excites 
imagination and commands attention.  The eye is fixed on the fighting brigades as 
they move amid the smoke, on the swarming figures of the enemy, on the general 
serene and determined, mounted in the middle of his staff.  The long trailing line 
of communications is unnoticed.  The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant 
bayonets dazzles the observer, nor does he care to look behind to where along a 
thousand miles of rail, road and river, the convoys are crawling to the front in 
uninterrupted succession.  Victory is the beautiful, bright coloured flower.  




PART A.  Support the Force. 
 
Introduction:  Logistics matters.  The birth of Little Americas. 
 
 Once it became apparent that U. S. forces would be deployed for some considerable time, 
the U. S. War Department underwrote and encouraged occupation servicemember participation 
in programs and activities akin to those in hometown America.  This commitment explains many 
of the nuances of American life in occupied Germany:  the athletic programs, movie theaters, 
college and technical courses offered, layout of the local newspapers, household provisions for 
sale in the Post Exchanges, and ice cream parlors providing favorite American flavors.  The U. S. 
Army even corralled German breweries in several areas within its occupation zone to provide 
good German beer to the troops.  Of course, various American beers, e.g., Budweiser in an olive 
drab can, continued to be shipped overseas.  Various considerations buttressed this position, 
ranging from retaining the authorized personnel strength in occupied Germany to providing 
incentives to placate troops waiting to return to the United States or to entice others to volunteer 
for occupation duty.
224
  In fact, to keep occupation strengths current, as part of the Regular Army 
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enlistment program worldwide, the U. S.  Army in Europe, taking advantage of improved 
reenlistment benefits, aggressively recruited to retain enlisted service members in Germany.  
According to the U. S. Army, European Command, 51,140 service members reenlisted between 
October 1945 and July 1946.
225
  Of course, not all elected to remain in the occupation force 
structure and military requirements could always trump individual choice.   
Further, medical issues - the ever-increasing venereal disease rate among soldiers and 
concern for exposure to potential and sometimes real epidemics within the civilian population -  
caused concern.  Additionally an official non-fraternization policy existed until 1 October 1945, 
along with the broad-based mentality at some senior leadership levels that the U. S. troops and 
German civilians should not mix socially.  Providing practically all the comforts of home, thus 
limiting comingling of German and U. S. troop populations and easing the boredom of restless 
servicemembers did not discourage fraternization, but did result in development of embryonic 
Little Americas. 
 However, to conclude that providing for the U. S. servicemember constituted the total 
logistics support effort in the U. S. occupation zone belies the reality of the war’s destruction.  
As Captain Ned A. Holsten argued in an analysis of the first years of the occupation, the military 
government mission of furthering national policies, in this case, the Potsdam Protocol, included 
obligations, imposed by international law and the customs of war, to the surrendered civilian 
population.  Holsten stressed, “War is a duality:  destruction and reconstruction.  It is far less 
costly to rebuild indigenous resources and productive capacity than it is to continue direct 
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  Therefore, in addition to supplying its own forces, the U. S. Army supported the 
civilian population in critical ways.   
Colonel Stanley Andrews, travelling to his new assignment at the U. S. Army Forces, 
European Theater (USFET) in Frankfurt, in late summer 1945, wrote: 
 Next morning I bid my jeep driver “so long” and boarded the old workhorse of 
the Army, C-47, which lumbered off the runway loaded with almost everything 
from beer to truck parts.  I was the lone passenger.  Our winding flight [from 
Salzburg] through the passes into the Bavarian Alps was, as always, breathtaking 
in beauty and when we broke out under the clouds in Southern Germany the 
peaceful fields glowing with ripening wheat, green meadows, the patches of pine 
trees always perched high on the hills and the doll-like picture book villages 
below, seemed as peaceful as a summer in the country which had never seen war.  
The appearance was deceiving as I was later to learn, but even then one could not 
but be impressed with the cleanliness, the carefully laid out villages, and the 




Clarification for the apparent deception of the peaceful fields and scrubbed and prosperous look 
of the villages arrived shortly.  Labor and equipment to harvest the crops that summer failed to 
appear.  Harvesting efforts suffered from lack of men in the fields, shortage of harvesting 
equipment, repair parts, the inability to manufacture replacement equipment, and lack of fuel and 
transportation to move the harvest to production, storage or to the markets. 
War-caused destruction considerably reduced freedom of movement, particularly through 
the larger cities and industrial areas.  Typical of the first few months after German surrender, a   
young U. S. Army servicemember would arrive for duty in Berlin after a two-week trip across 
the Atlantic aboard a Liberty ship that had landed at Antwerp, a rocky train ride across northern 
Germany and finally a truck ride to Berlin.  The port at Antwerp had suffered limited war 
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damage, unlike Bremen or Bremerhaven that were not 100% operational until the fall of 1945.  
The trip to Berlin by British military train across the northern portion of Germany, through the 
heavily damaged areas around Köln, Wuppertal, Dortmund, Bielefeld, Hannover, and finally, 
after a longer stopover in Braunschweig, on to Helmstedt, then by U. S. Army 2 ½ ton truck 
from Helmstedt, through the Soviet occupation zone to Berlin, did not come with a guaranteed 
arrival time or date.  The cities passed through en route, most, heavily damaged from the Allied 
strategic bombing campaign, contrasted sharply with the panoramic view of the countryside in 
between.  However, reaching Berlin seemed almost like home.  The U. S. Army Headquarters 
even published a newspaper, The Berlin Sentinel, (25 Sep 45) that commented on U. S. military 
forces working with the German woodcutters in the Grunewald stocking heating fuel.  
Additionally, the Armed Forces Network radio stations, films showing at theaters around town, 
the weather report for the region, sports stories from back home, and even the favorite ice cream 
flavors at the Post Exchange (PX) ice cream parlor made the news.      
Both vignettes hint at the scope of logistics support required in occupied Germany. From 
supporting summer harvests with personnel and transportation assets to repairing and rebuilding 
bridges, roads, rail tracks and utility infrastructure, the U. S. Army was often called upon, 
providing critical support as needed.  Moreover, the local population, Displaced Persons and 
refugees required aid to maintain a minimum standard of living until the economic recovery 
kicked in or repatriation lessened the burden of supporting Displaced Persons and refugees.  
Compounding the situation as well as increasing over time the logistics support required, U. S. 
occupation authorities had not expected that a large number of Displaced Persons would refuse 
repatriation, thus requiring alternate arrangements not only for their future settlement but also for 
longer-term services within the centers. 
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This chapter discusses both levels of logistics support:  support to military forces broken 
down into organizational categories and support to civilian populations, though to a lesser 
degree.  This chapter also includes a section on Lines of Communications (LOC).  Without a 
LOC logistics does not function.   
1.  What units remained where to support?  Logistics is everything. 





 U. S. Army Groups, elements of the 21
st
 combined British-Canadian 
Army Group (with some attached U. S. units) in central and northern Germany.  The First French 
and Seventh U. S. armies under the 6
th
 U. S. Army Group, having successfully landed at Toulon 
on 15 August 1944 (Operation DRAGOON/ANVIL) and fought their way north through central 
France, crossed the French-German border and were scattered over southwestern Germany.  
Reorganization and redeployment began almost immediately following capitulation, on 12 May 
1945 (R Day), with approximately 90,000 of the over three million U. S. Army forces scattered 
over Germany with a few in Austria and Czechoslovakia, leaving the European Theater of 
Operations (ETO) almost immediately.  Some headed home; others headed to the war in the 
Pacific.  By the end of June 1945, 313,298 service members departed the ETO.  According to 
Major General Charles P. Gross, Chief, U. S. Army Transportation Corps, the U. S. Army would 
redeploy forces from Germany as follows:
228
 
Number of Force Redeployed Timeframe 
845,000, or approximately 285,000 per month June-August 1945 
1,185,000, or approximately 395,000 per month September-November 1945 
870,000, or approximately 269,000 per month December 1945-February 1946 
Redeployment to continue until approximately 400,000 
personnel remained in the U. S. occupation force structure. 
(Actually, the force reached close to a further reduced 
Occupational Troop Basis of 300,000 military personnel.) 
By 1 July 1946 
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These numbers, culled from General Gross’ May 1945 Stars & Stripes article dropped 
significantly lower by the end of 1946 – to approximately 188,000.  Strength figures were 
moving targets in Washington, for the months following the end of the conflict ensured that 
military budgets came under critical review. 
Between May and December 1945, the U. S. First, Sixth, Ninth armies, 12
th
 Army Group, 
and the XVIII Airborne Corps had cased their colors and returned to the United States.  SHAEF, 
its combat mission completed, deactivated on 10 July 1945.  The British-Canadian 21
st
 Army 
Group renamed and restructured as the British Army of the Rhine, assuming occupation duty in 
the British occupation zone effective 25 August 1945.  Of the remaining two U. S. Armies, the 
Seventh inactivated by March 1946, leaving the Third Army in Germany until 1947, when it, too 
returned to the United States.  Most of the Third Army’s combat forces however, returned 
earlier.  The 1
st
 Infantry Division and the newly forming Constabulary (1946), both totaling 
approximately 25,000 soldiers, remained in Germany along with an odd regiment or two and a 
slew of support units.   
Each occupation force moved into its assigned zone in July 1945 (see Appendix III.2.1).  
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the final occupation zones in 
London on 12 September 1944.  Further, modifications on 14 November 1944 and 26 July 
1945
229
 resulted in a French occupation zone carved out of the initially agreed upon British and 
American zones.   The ports of Bremen/Bremerhaven lay in the British occupation zone, but by 
agreements between Great Britain and the U. S., Britain ceded the port area to the U. S., giving 
the U. S. Army access to critical port facilities for resupply efforts.
230
  This Bremen Enclave 
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became the primary debarkation/embarkation not only for U. S. Army resupply, but also for 
personnel and family members, replacing to a large degree, the Belgian port at Antwerp.  
U. S. occupation forces were assigned Württemberg-Baden, the greater part of Hessen, 
Bavaria, the Bremen Enclave and its sector in Berlin.  Two military districts, each with an Army 
command -- the Seventh Army in Hessen and Württemberg-Baden (Western Military District), 
and the Third Army in Bavaria (Eastern Military District), comprised the major organizations 
within the southern U. S. occupation zone.  The Army’s Theater Supply Services rested 
externally with the Communications Zone (COMMZ), in France, and internally in Germany (to 
include Bremerhaven that was a part of the COMMZ), with the G4 logistics staff at USFET in 
Frankfurt.      
2.  Logistics Reality on the Ground. 
 The Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067) 
explicitly stated: 
As a member of the Control Council and as zone commander, you will be guided 
by the principle that controls upon the German economy may be imposed to the 
extent that such controls may be necessary to achieve the objectives enumerated 
in paragraph 4
231
 above and also as they may be essential to protect the safety and 
meet the needs of the occupying forces and assure the production and 
maintenance of goods and services required to prevent starvation or such disease 
and unrest as would endanger these forces.  No action will be taken in execution 
of the reparations program or otherwise which would tend to support basic living 
conditions in Germany or in your zone on a higher level than that existing in any 
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U. S. military forces faced immediate and critical problems on the ground.  Aside from 
food shortages within the German civilian population not immediately apparent, transportation 
posed the most critical issue.  Rail track, rail bridges and roads damaged throughout the country 
from the Allied strategic bombing campaign, as well as destruction of infrastructure by 
Wehrmacht units to delay the Allied advances, severely hampered the movement of Allied 
supplies and personnel.  Moreover, Displaced Persons as well as refugees fleeing Eastern Europe 
clogged the roadways.  The U. S. Army had transportation assets but with bridges down, rails off 
track, and roads cluttered, the vehicles and rail cars stood more or less still.  Additionally, the 
Allied Control Commission dictated that occupation forces move into their assigned zones by 
1 July 1945.  Chaos reigned for about two weeks as national units crossed other national units 
moving from warfighting locations into their respective occupation zones.  American units had 
been fighting with the British in northern Germany and had to relocate to their assigned zone in 
southern Germany.  The French had to move west of the Rhine and south of the Stuttgart  area, 
and so it went. 
As the war ended, many U. S. units found themselves in northern and eastern Germany 
moving to their zone in late June-early July 1945.  Once in their zone, U. S. forces faced not only 
the immediate specter of obvious destruction of structures in and around the larger towns and 
cities, but also major infrastructure damage to critical utilities – electric, water, sanitation 
facilities, and heating systems.  Fortunately, to accomplish their mission, many senior 
commanders interpreted JCS 1067 instructions liberally to “protect the safety, meet the needs of 
the occupying forces, and assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required 
to prevent starvation or such disease and unrest as would endanger these forces.”  Stuttgart, in 
Württemberg, serves as an example of the support U. S. Army forces provided in establishing at 
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least minimum living standards not only for the German population but also for themselves.  As 
it turned out, Stuttgart would house U. S. Army forces for decades following occupation.         
Stuttgart, in the designated U. S. occupation zone, Western Military District, received at 
least fifty-three Allied bombing raids between August 1940 and April 1945, resulting in 
approximately 12,000 explosives and 1,300,000 incendiary bombs.  Stuttgart and its near-
surroundings, historically a regional  industrial center and transportation hub, home to Daimler-
Benz (tank and aircraft engines), Robert Bosch (electronics equipment), Nahle K. G. (pistons), 
Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken (ball bearings),  and H. Hirth (aircraft parts), presented a 
relatively high priority target.  Along with these industrial targets, two international railroad 
routes – west to east and north to south meeting in Stuttgart provided equally high priority 
targets.  Unfortunately, however, precision air raids did not occur often in the 1940s.  According 
to the “United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report, September 30, 1945,”
233
 
depending on the vagaries of weather, and enemy defensive and offensive opposition, the target 
area consisted of “a circle having a radius of 1000 feet around the aiming point of attack.  While 
accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of 
the bombs aimed at precision targets fell with this target area.”   It would no doubt be accurate to 
suggest that even if the bombs missed their intended targets, they hit something.  Subsequently, 
in the process of destroying industrial and rail targets, many of which were in the middle of the 
city, raids damaged or destroyed approximately one third of the dwelling spaces in Stuttgart.
234
  
In addition to Allied air raid damage, in late April 1945, retreating German troops blew up all 
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Neckar River bridges save the one destroyed by an October 1944 air raid, two railroad viaducts, 
seven road bridges and two pedestrian bridges, leaving one pedestrian bridge standing, virtually 
cutting off the city from its historic transportation routes.     
Internally, the city fared little better with debris from damaged and destroyed buildings 
littering the roads and thoroughfares.  Picking up bricks a few at a time made for romantic prose, 
as described in newspaper articles and later novels, but did little for rapid clearance of the debris.  
The U. S. Army would eventually support debris removal with the necessary technical 
equipment and fuel.  The 100
th 
U. S. Infantry Division, if near full strength at over 13,000 
soldiers, moved into the Stuttgart vicinity on 7 July 1945 -- Stuttgart, a city faced with 
approximately 40% infrastructure damage.  In addition to its organic
235
 combat forces, and 
presuming the division arrived more or less with all its assigned assets, a military police platoon, 
an ordnance light maintenance company, a quartermaster company, a signal company, an 
engineer battalion and a medical battalion,  as well as the various pieces of equipment, the 
division arrived, ready to provide critical reconstruction support.   
U. S. Army Civil Affairs units had already arrived while the French Army
236
 occupied the 
area, and had assessed much of the damage.  In a weekly consolidated report (30 June to 6 July 
1945) from a U. S. Army Civil Affairs detachment in Württemberg-Baden, the acting regimental 
deputy commander, Lieutenant Colonel Auffinger writes under the heading, “Public Utilities and 
Works:”   
Continued progress is being made in the repair and restoration of power light and 
water services.  The gas supply has been drastically curtailed, due to the acute 
shortage of coal.  Repairs of sewers and bridges are being retarded by lack of 
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sufficiently high priority to obtain cement from the plants, which are controlled 
by U. S. Army Engineers.  Roads are being repaired under U. S. Army Engineer 
Corps supervision.  The control of the central civilian road maintenance agency, 
however is exercised by this headquarters.    Upon presentation of appropriate 
orders indicating a high degree of priority, the Detachment at Őhringen (WS2867) 
authorized the release of lumber for the reconstruction of a railway bridge on the 
outskirts of the town.  This railway bridge is being constructed by German 
civilian engineers, at the direction of the MRS [U. S. Military Railway Service] 




Lieutenant Colonel Auffinger also noted several critical shortages that required 
addressing before winter set in.  Coal and fuel topped the list of shortages.  Without substantial 
coal deliveries, industry, public utilities and food processing plants could not sustain demand.  
Even if coal production returned immediately to pre-war production, without petroleum, oil and 
lubricants (POL) and functioning transportation assets, delivery to consumers, including the 
U. S. Army forces, could not occur. 
The human factor also entered into play:  Decimated by war losses and prisoners of war 
not yet released, labor for the coalmines, for gathering harvests, for reconstruction and technical 
tasks sank to minimum levels.  Additionally, products imported earlier, e.g., sugar beets and 
garden seeds, historically procured from Halle, but blocked from export from the Soviet 
occupation zone by the Soviet Military Government, or fertilizer produced locally but now 
forbidden from production under the unconditional surrender terms, were either in extremely 
short supply or unavailable.  Wood could (and did to some degree) replace coal and fuel 
shortages but transportation remained the long pole in the tent.
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 Finally, Germany’s capitulation officially released millions of Displaced Persons forced 
to labor for the Nazi regime that had previously provided them with accommodations and food 
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(however minimal).  Now, these people were without a roof over their heads, food, or means to 
return to their homes.  Initially, each occupation force assumed responsibility for the housing, 
care and feeding of Displaced Persons in its zone until the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) officially took over administration of the camps in 
October 1945.  The military occupation forces retained responsibility for transportation, 
repatriation, and the provision of supplies not met by the local German population.
239
        
2.1  U. S. Lines of Communication (LOC) 
 
 The birth of Little Americas in occupied Germany began with the establishment of Lines 
of Communication (LOC).  The German term, logistische Verbindung – logistic connection - 
best defines line of communication.  A line of communication forms a connection - a route - 
between a supply base and a supply user.  These routes include ground, air (ALOC) and sea 
(SLOC) routes.  Critical in military planning, selection of LOCs provide the lifeline to military 
units as few units can sustain themselves organically for long periods.  In the case of the U. S. 
involvement in World War II in Europe, ground, sea and air LOCs played a critical role in 
resupplying not only U. S. forces but also the British and Soviet forces.  The continental United 
States (Zone of Interior, or ZI) represented the principal supply base, with Great Britain often the 
intermediary supply base.  Until the successful Operation OVERLORD, the western Allies could 
not establish a base on the European continent.           
While perhaps not so critical – at least initially after Victory-in-Europe Day (V-E Day), 
resupply remained a top priority for U.S. occupation forces in Germany, particularly important, 
as the U.S. occupation zone was landlocked in south–central Germany.  Air resupply could not 
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even begin to provide the daily requirements of a force located so far away from its supply base 
in the Zone of the Interior.  Both SLOCs and ground LOCs proved necessarily important.  James 
Houston has written:  
In those circumstances [occupation and military government in Germany] the 
setting up of a line of communications was principally a problem of 
administration to be worked out in the way that would be most economical and 
efficient. Little thought, supposedly, had to be given to tactical considerations in 
the disposition of troops and the facilities of the supply line serving them.
240
  
However, Houston further observed that this “problem of administration” became a strategic 
consideration with the realization of “new aggression from the East” and the possibility of 
renewal of war, when it might be necessary to revise thinking on matters of delivering supplies. 
To some degree this argument stands.  However, although the tactical necessities of war 
ended officially on V-E Day, the realities on the ground created by the war begged resolution. 
Such resolution cost resources much of which came from outside Germany, most shipped in and 
transported via the LOCs by ground – truck or rail to the eventual user. Moreover, less than one 
year from V-E Day, following a decision to permit family members to join soldiers serving in the 
zone of occupation, family members of U. S. forces serving in Germany arrived in Bremerhaven, 
traveled the LOC by rail and truck to join their spouses stationed in the U. S. occupation zone. 
Family members’ presence in Germany required additional logistics support and resources.   
While the German LOC eventually served as the primary supply route, three additional 
LOCs deserve notice.  The first, a not so well known LOC, developed by the British to supply 
petroleum from storage tanks in southern England to the Allied forces in France following the 
Normandy landings proved a brilliant solution against the vagaries of both weather and 
unpredictable sea conditions.  Fuel tankers in the English Channel made easy targets for German 
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submarines or aircraft, so the British developed an under-the-channel pipeline.  The second LOC 
across northern and up from southern France, and the third LOC, Antwerp-Maastricht-Wesel 
preceded the German LOC, only shutting down as repairs on Bremerhaven and Bremen ports 
completed and the ports able to take over the preponderance of the shipping load.     
2.1.1  PLUTO, Pipeline under the Ocean.
241
  
PLUTO developed as a fix to the conundrum of fuel resupply on the European Continent 
in anticipation of Operation OVERLORD.  British engineers long wrestled with this problem, 
and finally devised a method to set up a pipeline from England under the English Channel to 
Boulogne-sur-Mer and Cherbourg on the northern coast of France.  After extensive studies and 
trial runs, PLUTO went operational in August 1944 and supplied about 120,000 gallons of 
gasoline per day to the British and American armies until after V-E Day.
242
 
2.1.2  The French LOC:  West to East through France. 
 
The first established LOC for U. S. forces on the continent developed as part of 
OVERLORD (June 1944) in northern France and later DRAGOON (August 1944) operations in 
southern France – the primary effort to support tactical forces moving through northern France 
and into Germany.  The first LOC went from the northwest coast of liberated France through 
France, following the fighting forces into Germany:  Cherbourg once cleared of mines and 
destruction, through St. Lo, and on to Alencon, Chartres, Coubert, just south of Paris, to Chalons, 
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Verdun, Thionville and into Germany to Mainz.
243
  Even after the Normandy landings, resupply 
tested the ingenuity of logisticians until establishment of intermediate supply points into France 
and then Germany.  After the successful Operation DRAGOON landing and fighting near 
Marseilles and northward from southern France, a second French LOC ran from Port de Bouc 
and Marseilles, north through Avignon, Livron, Chalon, Beaune, then northeast through Langres, 
Epinal and into Germany by Zweibrücken and eventually on to Mannheim.   
After V-E Day, the French LOCs functioned primarily as redeployment camps and ports, 
wherein the French regained control of the LOC by mid-1946.  As tensions increased between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly after the Berlin Blockade, military planners, 
very much aware of the susceptibility of the German LOC to possible Soviet threats, revisited 
enhancing a French LOC.  Negotiations for renewing a French LOC – known as the Donges-
Metz LOC, began during 1949-1950.  A French LOC would again provide supply routes for the 
U. S. Forces in Germany after 1950, and indeed would form the primary route for NATO’s 
Central European Pipeline System (CEPS).  Construction began in the late 1950s, and CEPS is 
still in operation today.  This French LOC began on the west coast of France at Donges, 
approximately 19 km east from Saint-Nazaire, and proceeded eastward , north of Orleans, by 
Melun, north of Fontainbleau, Cambrai, St. Baussant, Vilcey-sur-Trey, south of Metz, Arriance, 
Hambach and into Germany to Zweibrücken.  This LOC opened for business in 1951 and 
remained functional until the French President, Charles de Gaulle, ordered U. S. forces out of 
France in 1966. 
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2.1.3  The German LOC:  North to South, Bremerhaven, Bremen to the U. S. Zone of 
Occupation. 
As of V-E Day, U. S. forces shipped supplies and personnel into eight of the twenty-one 
ports used during the war:  Port de Bouc, Marseilles, Rouen, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Dieppe, 
Ghent and Antwerp.
244
  Of the eight ports, Marseilles and Antwerp allowed the largest discharge 
capacity – particularly for POL shipments.
245
  However, none of these ports provided in-country 
shipment.  More importantly, “liberated countries” with sovereignty issues limited U. S. control 
over harbor use and charged port fees, whereas Germany no longer enjoyed the rights of 
sovereignty, nor charged port fees.  The U. S. Army preferred a German port.  
As British Forces pushed east and cleared sections of northern Germany, they captured 
and occupied two German ports:  Bremen and Bremerhaven.  Bremen, situated on both sides of 
the Weser River and approximately 74 kilometers from the North Sea, fulfilled historically 
critical functions to include industrial shipbuilding, ironworks, machine shops, fisheries, textile 
and grain mills and breweries, to name a few.  Bremerhaven (earlier Wesermünde, and 
traditionally center of German emigration in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries), traditionally a port 
city at the mouth of the Weser River, directly accessed the North Sea.  Because of their strategic 
locations and supportive military missions, both German ports ranked high on the Allied target 
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list, and while the city of Bremerhaven suffered heavily from Allied strategic bombing,
246
 the 
port remained relatively unscathed.  Not so the port of Bremen.  At least twenty-eight heavy 
bomber air raids over Bremen took their toll, damaging port facilities, the primary rail station, 
Bremen-Ostlebshausen, as well as essential rail and road bridges in and out of Bremen.     




 at the end of April 
1945.  President Roosevelt had argued for the United States to receive the northwestern portion 
of Germany as its occupation zone primarily because direct access and control of the 
Bremerhaven-Bremen port facilities would ease redeployment of forces in Germany to the 
Pacific theater, but also ease U. S. Army demobilization efforts should the U. S. withdraw (early) 
from the occupation of Germany.  Earl Ziemke, Forrest C. Pogue and Philip E. Mosely 
commented on President Roosevelt’s favored position on assignment of occupation zones.  
Pogue documented that at least as early as late 1943, several memoranda between the President, 
and the War and State departments expressed the President’s thought that, “The United States’ 
postwar occupation would probably consist of one million troops and last for about two 
years.”
248
  Mosely suggested that any number of British planners considered an early withdrawal 
of the United States from its occupation of Germany, leading them to conclude that if the U. S. 
forces were assigned the southwestern zone, and withdrew early, “The American zone could be 
taken over more conveniently by French forces.”
249
  By spring 1944, agreements had been 
reached neither on occupation zones, nor on an even more pressing issue, designated access 
routes across the Soviet Zone into Berlin.  Ziemke wrote, “In any event, at the time the United 
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States was far less interested in access to any place in Germany than in the exit from Europe, 
which the Bremen enclave provided.”
250
  However, the President eventually agreed at the Second 
Quebec Conference in September 1944 to accept the southern portion of Germany, with the 
caveat that U. S forces would have access to Bremen and Bremerhaven.  Negotiations with the 
British resulted in establishment of the Amerikanische Enklave.  Additionally, U.S. and British 
forces worked out an agreement on designated rail and road routes between the ports and the 
U. S. occupation zone (to include its Berlin sector).  The second issue, designated access routes 
through the Soviet Zone into Berlin, was resolved only unofficially through assumptions that 
access was implied after the zone protocols were signed in November 1944 -- a cause for regret 
numerous times during the military occupation, most notably in 1948.  
Agreements notwithstanding, the Bremen port required major transformation from mined 
access routes and rubble into an again-functioning port before the U. S. forces could use it.  
Major repair, if not reconstruction of the harbor, port and supporting infrastructures garnered 
high priority resulting in materiel and workforce dedicated toward completion of the project.  
Additionally, according to James A. Huston, costs associated with repair and use of both ports 
fell into the German marks fund (paid into by the German population through taxes) provided for 
in the Occupation Statutes.
251
   
The British handed the port facilities over to the U. S. 29
th
 Infantry Division on 20 May 
1945.
252
  Initially, the Bremen Port Command, established under General Order No. 50 (11 April 
1945) took command of port operations under the U. S. Communications Zone Command (later, 
Theater Support Forces) in June 1945, followed by the 17
th
 Major Port Command about a year 
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  By 12 June 1945, the Bremerhaven Port opened for shipping.  Bremen, refurbished, 
opened for full-load shipping business in mid-September 1945.
254
  With both German ports 
functioning at capacity by early 1946, U. S. forces could ramp down the Antwerp port operations 
(31 March 1946) that Allied forces had been using to support the forward movement of combat 
forces into Germany after Operation OVERLORD.
255
   The following example of the tonnage 
shipped into and unloaded from Bremerhaven in July 1945, represents approximately 20% of the 




June 1945   22,000 tons 
July 1945 162,000 tons 
April 1946 181,000 tons 
July 1946
257
   58,000 tons 
   
After arriving by ship, cargo travelled primarily by rail and truck from Bremen and 
Bremerhaven south to the U. S. Military Districts, or south and east to Berlin.  Supplies for the 
military districts travelled  along the following routes:  Bremerhaven, Bremen, Hannover,  
Göttingen, Kassel, Hanau (or Fulda), Frankfurt, and then branched out to the southwest to 
Mannheim, Karlsruhe, south to Stuttgart, southeast to Augsburg, Munich and on to Salzburg, 
Austria, or southeast from Hanau to Würzburg, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Regensburg and Vienna.  
Supplies for Berlin travelled from Bremerhaven and Bremen south to Hannover and east through 
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Braunschweig, under agreement with the British occupation authorities, and then on to 
Magdeburg and Berlin, under agreement with the Soviet occupation authorities.
258
  
The fourth LOC, the Northern System, primarily a petroleum pipeline, ran from Antwerp 
to Maastricht and finally to Wesel, serving both the British and the American forces.  The last 
part of the line, from Maastricht to Wesel was completed in March 1945.  Nonetheless, running 
POL through pipelines saved on scarce tanker or rail tanker cars.  The U. S. Army scaled back 
operations in October 1945 as Bremen and Bremerhaven increasingly picked up the supply 
operations.   
2.2  Supporting the Force.  
As Franklin M. Davis and others have noted, “There is little doubt that the overall 
responsibility for coordinating the relationships of political factors to military realities lay with 
the President as Chief Executive and with the State Department as the principal foreign-policy 
agency of the United States Government.”
259
  Despite the strongly voiced opinions of senior 
military leaders, especially General Eisenhower, the U. S. Army and not the U. S. State 
Department, would administer post-World War II occupation government in Germany in the 
U.S. zone of occupation and its sector in Berlin.  An Army general would represent the U. S. 
Government as the U. S. Military Governor.  General Eisenhower attempted on several occasions 
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to convince his seniors, most notably, General Marshall and President Roosevelt, that armies 
should not run democratic governments, but to no avail.  The U. S. Army “dug in for the long 
haul.” 
 The major task of the U. S. Army in the first year following V-E Day revolved around 
redeployment of over 2.5 million service personnel back to the United States and many on to the 
Pacific Theater.  Equally preeminent, keeping service personnel, whether waiting for 
redeployment or assignment to occupational duties, engaged and entertained occupied force 
commanders and military government officials alike.  Single, and in most cases relatively young 
soldiers quickly found diversions in a foreign but nonetheless tantalizing and challenging 
environment away from home.  The U. S. Army went to great lengths to provide a home-away-
from-home for the soldiers. 
More than any other occupying power in history, the Army brought as much of 
the homeland to occupied Germany as it could; no occupation soldier was ever 
very far removed from the same installations and influences that surrounded him 
in the United States.  His daily duty, his recreation, his radio listening, his 
newspaper, even his physical surroundings were all created for the soldier in as 
carefully contrived an American image as the Army could arrange.  Thus the 
soldier might venture forth into the darkness of Germany, but he could always 
hustle back to the brightness offered in an almost total American environment.  In 
short, he could cut in and out of the occupation atmosphere like a tourist, and the 




 By V-E Day U. S. Army forces, numbering approximately 3,069,000 had scattered over 
much of Germany.  One year after the war, the Third U. S. Army with three divisions (1
st
, 3d and 
9
th
 Infantry divisions) and nine infantry regiments along with seven separate infantry regiments, 
as well as three Constabulary brigades with ten regiments and a multitude of non-organic
261
 
logistics units remained in Germany.  Both the 9
th
 and 3d Infantry divisions as well as the seven 
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separate infantry regiments, returned to the States or inactivated, with the last unit inactivated 
effective 14 January 1947.  By January 1947, the troop strength in Germany dropped to 167,772 
military personnel, very different from the original planned occupation strength between 300- 
and 400,000.  However, numbers can be misleading.  By January 1947, the U. S. Army total 
work force numbered approximately 507,000, comprised of 167,772 Army-uniformed personnel, 
11,396 U. S. civilians, 17,136 Allied/Neutral Country citizens, and 310,219 enemy/ex-enemy 
citizens and Displaced Persons, the last group most likely paid out of occupation funds (see 
Appendix II.3 for strength figures between 1 May 1945 and 30 April 1948).  The latter two 
groups – non U. S. employees totaling 327,355 -- engaged in support activities, suggesting that 
while the fighting force declined, logistics support had not.  By 1947, many U. S. family 
members had joined the military communities, increasing support requirements.
 262
    
 By November 1945, the USFET G4-Civil Branch Section assumed responsibility for 
supplying Class I (subsistence items), as well as Class II (clothing and individual equipment) and 
IV (construction materials) resources to U. S. civilian employees, American Red Cross staffs, 
Allied military personnel entitled to U. S. support, Allied and neutral employees, prisoners of 
war held by both the French and U. S. Forces, and UNRRA detachments in the U. S. Zone.  As 
of 1 July 1946, a USFET Statistical Summary noted that the command wholly supported 571,991 
personnel:  32,264 U. S. Military Forces, 201,240 prisoners of war and 28,487 in the other 
categories, combined.     The command partially supported another 385,104 personnel:  1,019 
U. S. Navy ashore (the ports), 1,487 American Red Cross, 848 Allied military personnel, 
287,600 Enemy and ex-enemy civilian personnel and 94,150 other civilian personnel.  Due 
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primarily to extreme cost-cutting measures and budget pressures from Washington, these 
numbers decreased drastically a year later, 1 July 1947.  USFET wholly supported 153,263 
personnel:  134,653 U. S. Military Forces, 2,500 prisoners of war and 16,110 in the remaining 
categories.  USFET partially supported 360,875 personnel:  358 U. S. Navy ashore (the ports), 
1,159 American Red Cross, 925 Allied military personnel, 272,800 Enemy and ex-enemy 
civilian personnel and 85,633 other civilian personnel.
263
   These numbers do not include support 
to Displaced Persons nor to U. S. servicemember dependents.  While most of the U. S. war-
fighting forces had left the European Theater, it appears that the logistic support mission in the 
European Theater had not decreased in proportion to the number of troops redeployed. 
2.2.1  Transportation:  How does  the stuff get there? 
Most supplies in support of the U. S. occupation forces left staging ports in the Zone of 
the Interior (United States) and travelled per ship to either the United Kingdom or a continental 
European port.  On arrival at the port, dockworkers trans-loaded material to either rail cars or 
trucks, and the supplies were then transported via various lines of communication (LOCs) to 
their final destinations.  Under normal conditions, this worked well.  Under wartime conditions, 
especially where strategic air bombing took place, ports, rail track and roads rated high on 
strategic target lists, damaging if not destroying an enemy’s capability to resupply itself, but also 
blunting Allied transportation possibilities until completion of repairs or work-arounds.  One 
expected the abnormal in Germany after years of Allied strategic bombing. 
A brief overview of the situation with regard to various types of transportation systems 
illustrates the problems confronted by the occupying authorities.   
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WATER TRANSPORT.  Both trans-Atlantic shipping and inland German waterways 
played critical roles in resupplying the U. S. occupation force in Germany.  Trans-Atlantic 
shipping relied on ports at both ends.  As discussed above, on the European side of the Atlantic, 
Allied bombing and German mining of harbors took their toll and required in many cases 
massive repair.  On the U. S. side of the Atlantic, shipping strikes and work stoppages threatened 
to tie up shipping, particularly in the fall of 1946. 
The obstruction of inland waterways in Germany really presented the “long pole in the 
tent” relative to moving supplies from port to user in the U. S. occupation zone.  Particularly 
critical, heavy coal moved best on barges in the rivers.  Furthermore, barging the coal saved wear 
and tear on rail and road facilities.  Land-locked in southern Germany, with little local coal 
production available, the U. S. military government called for as much coal as possible 
transferred from the Ruhr in the British occupation zone to the U. S. zone before winter 
restricted, if not closed down whatever inland waterways remained operational.  The 
combination of destroyed bridges in the water, mining by retreating Wehrmacht soldiers, and 
port damage challenged U. S. Army engineers.  However, despite these challenges, varying 
sources place the Rhine River as “completely open to water transportation all the way from 
Rotterdam to Karlsruhe”
264
 by mid-October 1945.  One such repair mission reported by The 
Stars and Stripes on 14 May 1945, was a 2,315-foot long rail bridge spanning the Rhine River at 
Duisburg, completed in six days and 15 hours by the 15
th
 Army Advanced Section Engineer 
Group A.  The Danube River played a less critical role in inland water transportation -- it was not 
directly connected to the Rhine, as it is today by the Rhine-Main-Donau-Kanal.  Trans-loading 
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supplies from barge to rail or truck, while doable, was also labor-intensive.  However, the 
Danube route served a purpose when resupplying U. S. Forces in Austria.      
THE RAIL SYSTEM.  Considering the damage caused to industrial areas, to include rail 
yards, OMGUS statistics indicated that as of 31 July 1945, operational rail trackage in the U. S. 




Region Total Km of Track Km of Track Operated % Track in Operation 
TOTAL            13,193 10,377 78.6 
    
Western Military District 5,555    4,442 79.2 
Kassel RBD    998       907 90.9 
Frankfurt RBD 2,400    1,883 78.4 
Stuttgart RBD 2,157    1,652 76.5 
    
Eastern Military District 7,638    5,935 77.6 
Nürnberg RBD 2,348    1,452 61.8 
Regensburg RBD 2,097    1,598 76.1 
Munich RBD 1,867    1,737 93.0 
Augsburg RBD 1,326    1,148 86.5 
 
Surprising as these numbers are considering the war damage, approximately 46% of the 
total locomotives, to include 143 U. S.-supplied locomotives, and 82% of the freight cars 
remained serviceable in the U. S. zone.  However, the defining figure here is the 46% capability 
of the locomotives, as freight cars do not run without a locomotive pulling them.  U. S. military 
government transportation authorities noted, “There appears to be ample rolling stock (cars and 
locomotives) in the zone to meet requirements for a rail system to maintain our Army of 
Occupation and a minimum civilian economy.”
266
  The prognosis for rail movement deteriorated 
by the end of August, as approximately 32% of total locomotives and 72% of total freight cars 
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remained serviceable.  The decline in operational status most likely occurred due to over-usage, 
shortage of repair parts and technical personnel to make necessary repairs.  Also, unfortunately, 
while operational numbers for freight cars increased by October (from 49,000 to 108,921), 
approximately 47% of these operational freight cars belonged to liberated countries that soon 
after capitulation called for return of their freight cars, and also insisted on holding onto 
whatever Reichbahn equipment remained in their countries as part of the reparations agreements.  
As important as operational equipment was, reestablishment of an operational rail 
organization was critical.  U. S. Army authorities and the rail experts on Army staffs recognized 
this even before war’s end.  Although activating a U. S. Military Railway Service (MRS) to 
serve the needs of U. S. tactical forces, Army officials realized that the MRS could not run the 
German rail system, no matter how many U.S. locomotives and cars the Army shipped over to 
Germany.   First, many of the American rail experts were only temporarily available, needing to 
return to their high-level civilian posts in the U. S. railway system.  Second, a German rail 
organization, albeit under U. S. Army supervision, required immediate reconstitution, and in the 
U. S. occupation zone, this transpired as early as July 1945.  This Oberbetriebsleitung, 
reestablished in Frankfurt, had executive, administrative and operational authority over the 
German railways in the U. S. Zone.  Unfortunately, one of the Potsdam Protocol precepts – that a 
central German transportation agency be reestablished – never came to fruition because the 
French balked at reestablishment of any centralized German agencies.  Because of occupation 
zonal boundaries, reconfiguration of the earlier divisional offices (Reichsbahndirektionen, 
RBDs) resulted in seven RBDs:  Kassel, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Nürnberg, Augsburg, Regensburg 




Even more important and a “deadlining system” factor, dysfunctional communications 
facilities precluded railway traffic from moving.  Trains coming at each other on a single track 
had nowhere to go, no options, other than to stop, if the engineer saw the danger in time.   
Complementary to repairing rails and stations, engineers also had to repair rail communications 
systems.   
THE ROAD SYSTEM.  As with the German railway system, U. S. military government 
established through the local German officials the reopening of necessary German civilian 
governmental agencies to oversee the vagaries of road transportation.  Although U. S. military 
government official inventories of German road transport equipment indicated more motor 
freight transportation available in September 1945, compared to 1932, officials still estimated a 
shortage of 6,654 operational trucks required for essential transport in the U. S. occupation 
zone.
267
  Along with shortage of trucks, military government officials also noted the ongoing 
shortages of road maintenance materials – tar, asphalt, rock, lumber, cement and automotive 
parts, particularly tire chains, tires and tubes, batteries and anti-freeze.  However, even with 
cannibalization of unsalvageable equipment to increase the numbers of operational vehicles, the 
U. S. military government survey calculated shortages over the next six months in fuel: 
approximately 28,801 metric tons (approximately 34,700,000 liters) of gasoline, 66,164 metric 
tons (approximately 74,389,000 liters) of diesel fuel and 10,702 metric tons of kerosene and 
tractor fuels.
268
  Ongoing studies focused on replacing these liquid fuels with solid fuel (wood) 
with the aim to preclude the need to import large quantities of POL. 
 U. S. occupation forces had the ground transportation assets and fuel to move – people, 
supplies, even rubble in the cities and towns.  This ability manifested in numerous ways, aided 
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not only military government authorities, but also local communities.  Characteristic of such 
support, a USFET August Weekly Information noted that even with the 8,000 prisoners of war 
averaging 2,000 cubic meters per day of debris and destruction from bombing raids, clearing 
4,900,000 cubic meters of debris from the streets and sidewalks was far from finished.  The U. S. 
Army committed 140 Army trucks, nine Army cranes and additionally, as available and 
operational, trucks from private German concerns.  At that rate, with no increases in personnel or 
technical assistance, it would have taken close to seven years to complete the task.
269
  
Additionally, most communities formed clean-up committees to sort through the rubble, 
categorizing and separating out useable material for future construction.  Add more time to the 
project.    This vignette was repeated often in Germany after the war, and particularly concerning 
transportation routes.  Whether German civilians volunteered or were drafted, routes needed 
clearing, if only for the transport of food and fuel. 
Rail, road and inland waterway transportation modes received heavy damage primarily 
from bombing raids.  Rail and road routes crisscrossed Germany for close to a century.  The 
inland water canal routes, primarily the north-south Rhine route and the east-west Donau route to 
the East and Austria, preceded rail and proved quicker and cheaper than road transport prior to 
the mid- nineteenth century.  Extensive damage to any of these routes, to include bridges, played 
havoc with armed forces on the move.  In peacetime, Germany’s economy depended and 
depends today on moving produce and products to port and market.  Because of the extensive 
bombing air raids over Germany during the war, U. S. Army engineers received a lot of 
experience in transportation repair, to include rail and rail equipment repair.  Many an American 
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railroad veteran found himself in uniform, assigned to an engineer unit in Germany during and 
following the war.   
2.2.2  Billeting and construction:  tent-city or a roof over one’s head? 
Allied forces had agreed to establish their military forces in assigned occupation zones on 
or before 1 July 1945.  Rationalizing movements into the U. S. assigned zone – essentially 
Hesse, Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria – proved difficult as little German infrastructure 
remained intact and functioning, hardly able to support large concentrations of U. S. Army 
forces.  Naturally, commanders wished to get their forces out of tent-cities.  Imagine finding 
housing facilities for three million U. S. troops, particularly if the traditional barracks facilities 
cannot accommodate these numbers.  Additionally the U. S Army, in accordance with JCS 1067, 
Part I, paragraph 4d acquired the responsibility to “ensure that prisoners of war and displaced 
persons of the United Nations are cared for and repatriated.”
270
  Add to the number of U. S. 
Forces an estimated three million Displaced Persons (see Part B, Section 3.)    
The U. S. occupation zone contained many Wehrmacht kasernes that would have been 
logical choices for billeting troops.  However, many of these kasernes already housed large 
numbers of Displaced Persons.  Many others had suffered extensive damage caused by the 
strategic bombing campaign.  Only toward the end of the military occupation would U. S. Army 
in Europe have access to many of the kasernes in their zone.  Consequently, units remained 
scattered throughout the zone for at least a good two years before reorganization and 
consolidation of units was even possible.   Even as consolidation began, soldier billets remained 
scarce, and funds for construction just as scarce.  Housing for soldiers, and indeed for family 
members, remained problematic throughout the military occupation.  Appendices III.3 and  
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III.3.2.2 convey a notion of the scattered 1
st
 Infantry Division (1
st
 ID) locations in the summer, 
1945, as the units moved into assigned occupation zones.  One perhaps sees better the 
dimensions of the housing problem, although the 1
st
 ID finished the war pretty much within the 
U. S. assigned occupation zone.
271
  Many of 
these locations were small crowded towns with 
few buildings large enough to house even 
platoon-sized elements, but even the larger 
towns and cities often filled rapidly with 
refugees.   
Troops and units often dispersed 
throughout the zone initially after the war.  However, the shortage of mass housing facilities 
blended well with the early attitude that the Germans required constant over-watch, therefore 
scattering tactical troops over the countryside provided the security and supervision felt 
necessary at the time.
272
  Stephen Fritz provided a classic propaganda piece designed to get the 
attention of American service members:
273
  “Every friendly German civilian is a disguised 
soldier of hate.  Armed with the inner conviction that the Germans are still superior . . . that one 




 Infantry Division data is used as it is the only division in Germany from pre-V-E Day until it returned to 
the U. S. in 1954-1955.  The Division, ironically, served with the occupation forces in Germany after World War I.  
One can say that unit moves were necessarily chaotic, particularly in the first year after the war.  As former 
Wehrmacht kasernes emptied out their displaced person /refugee/POW residents, and were rehabilitated as needed, 
U. S. forces moved in in keeping with the division’s organizational/tactical plans.  Data for the organizations and 
locations comes from several sources.  This researcher pulled dates, unit designation and locations together; the 
material represents as close as possible locations, trying to rationalize on occasion conflicting data.  The dates are 
not arbitrary; units down to platoon level moved around as deemed necessary to provide security and/or 
logistical/military government support.  In addition, the above lists represent major subordinate commands of the 1
st
 
Infantry Division during this particular period, 1945-1951.   Sources:  The American Traveler, “1
st
 Infantry Division 
33
rd
 Anniversary, 1917-1950,”  (Munich:  Publishing Operations Branch ISD, OP, HICOG, 1950).  Stationing Lists 
from the Adjutant General’s Office, 1951-1962   
272
 Booby Trap poster located at:  http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/06/10/article-2339094-1A3EC69D000005DC-
863_634x830.jpg 
273
 Stephen G. Fritz, Endkampf:  Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich (Lexington:  University Press 
of Kentucky, 2004), 218-219. 
189 
 
day it will be their destiny to destroy you.  Their hatred and their anger . . . are deeply buried in 
their blood.  A smile is their 
weapon by which to disarm you 
. . .In heart, body and spirit 
every German is Hitler.”   
Initially, U. S. Army 
forces were wary of the security 
situation and the reaction of the 
German population.  After all, 
the troops had been plied with 
extremely explicit propaganda 
on just how dangerous the 
Germans could be, not 
discounting the rumors of small 
gangs of Werwölve274 
supposedly roaming the country, 
underground movements of Nazi sympathizers, youth with time on their hands, or simply 
German hatred toward the victors.  The security surprise for U. S. forces turned out to be raiding 
bands of Displaced Persons, seeking revenge against the Germans or scrounging for food and 
any item worthy of exchange at the black markets.  So much so, that shortly after the end of the 
war, the U. S. Army reconstituted the German police (unarmed) to assist with law and order 
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issues.  Up until December 1945, in addition to DP issues, curfew violations and miscellaneous 
military government violations, particularly illegal immigration and migrant movements across 
occupation zones caused the biggest problems U. S. military police faced.  To assist with 
unauthorized movement problems, the U. S. Army reestablished German border police, effective 
15 February 1946,
275
 to assist with border and zone movements issues.  
Furthermore, billeting for U. S. military forces immediately after V-E Day stood in flux 
as units moved into assigned occupation zones in July 1945.  Tents and requisitioning of German 
facilities set the billeting pattern for U. S. forces as units advanced into Germany after September 
1944.  As U. S. military government units and military headquarters established themselves in 
the assigned occupation zone after July 1945, generally the equivalent G1-Adjutant General  and 
Command Engineer staffs coordinated with U. S. military liaison staffs and local German 
Bürgermeister to requisition facilities required to support the forces.   
 To receive compensation for property requisitioned by the U. S. Army, the property 
owner presented the U. S. Army requisitioning documentation to his local Bürgermeister, who 
then procured funds from the Reichsbank.  In short, the German communities paid German 
property owners for property requisitioned by the U. S. Army, presumably as a category of 
occupation costs.  Unfortunately, and acknowledged by U. S. military government officials, 
requisitioning procedures and financial accounting, at least on the American side, lacked 
accurate documentation.  Designating eligibility for requisitioned quarters, size of quarters, as 
well as requisitioned furnishings, varied from location to location.  The process of acquiring 
quarters varied as well.  The lack of standardization only aggravated relations between Germans 
and the U. S. Army.  Not surprisingly, however, many Germans accepted requisitioning with a 
shoulder shrug and, “After all, we lost the war.  Who wants to argue with the U. S. Army?”   
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USFET published Standing Operating Procedure 37, Procedure for Acquisition of Real 
Estate in Occupied, Liberated and Allied Countries, dated 15 August 1946 – over one year after 
occupation began but problems continued.  USFET’s successor, Headquarters, European 
Command published a memorandum to all subordinate commands, dated 9 April 1947, 
Requisitioning of Real Estate, informing units:  “Effective 1 May 1947, no request for the 
requisitioning of real estate will be placed on the local military government representative by a 
post commander without prior approval of this headquarters.”
276
  The memorandum cites the 
pending European Command reorganization plan as the reason for undertaking readjustments in 
requisitioned property holdings, and notes, “It is considered that very little additional 
requisitioning should be required after 1 May 1947.”  Further, a 26 August 1947 memorandum 
from Headquarters, European Command orders subordinate commands to: 
Take vigorous action to close out and where this is not possible, to consolidate all 
facilities and installations occupied by, controlled by, or under the supervision of 
U. S Forces in the occupied zone of Germany, liberation countries and United 
Kingdom.  Every effort will be made to reduce these holdings to an absolute 




Headquarters, European Command released the official rewritten Standing Operating Procedure 
(SOP) No. 37, reflecting tighter controls over requisitioning, effective 6 October 1947.   
The October 1947 SOP-required requisitioned property report from the Office of Military 
Government, Land and Stadtkreis Heidelberg, dated 6 December 1947, indicated U. S. Army 
requisitioning of German properties as of December 1947.  The second chart depicts 
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Dwelling Status Number/Dwelling Units Number of Rooms 
Occupied, repair necessary 952 3,395 
Occupied, repair unnecessary 26,864 76,293 
          Sub-total 27,816 79,668 
Occupied, U.S. military forces 2,051 10,529 
Occupied, Displaced Persons 600 3,563 
 
 Type of Facility Units/Types 
Private homes and apartments 2,248 units w/22,225 rooms 
Hotels, guesthouses, restaurants 64 units w/1640 rooms 
Office type buildings 64 units w/1034 rooms 
Factories (industrial type buildings) 15 units 
Service stations, motor pools 84 units 
Warehouses 43 units 
Airfields, parking lots, storage depots 12 airfields; 10 parking lots; 6 storage depots 
Hospitals, clinics   7 units 
Recreational properties (tennis courts, athletic 
fields, gymnasiums) 
19 units 
Kasernes and barrack-type installations 34 units 
Theaters   8 units 
 
Additionally, the report notes the following facilities requisitioned to establish a housing and 
 




Type of Facility  Units/Types 
Private homes    6 units w/72 rooms 
Hotels, guesthouses, restaurants 19 units w/864 rooms 
Office type buildings   3 units 
Factories (industrial type buildings)   1 unit 
Service stations, garage-type facilities   1 unit 
Warehouses   4 units 
Parking lot    1  
Hospitals   1 unit 
Theaters   2 units 
 
An analysis of these reports from the U. S. Army real estate officers for Heidelberg and 
Württemberg indicates that U. S. military forces in the U. S. occupation zone in Germany, almost 
two-and-a-half years after V-E Day, still relied on requisitioning to provide the necessary 
housing and facilities for troops and families, even as U. S. forces strength numbers decreased.  





It is necessary to note that German citizens paid through taxes the rents on these requisitioned 
facilities as part of occupation costs. 
Much as the U. S. Army recognized the need to vacate requisitioned German private 
property, it also had to deal with cash flow shortages that precluded building new facilities.  
Actually, requisitioning privately owned German buildings and facilities cost the U. S. 
Government next to nothing as these expenses counted against occupation costs.  Confiscated 
former Nazi facilities, e.g., kasernes, if not already occupied by Displaced Persons, also came to 
the U. S. Army without cost.  Of course, some minimal renovation work ensued, usually through 
German labor and perhaps small caches of building supplies, but in the first years after the war, 
both resources were short on supply and long on demand.  Complicating matters, the open-ended 
budgets of wartime were no more.  U. S. Congressional committees progressively tightened the 
purse strings after V-E Day, reducing considerably finances available for military spending, and 
especially construction, overseas.  Major General Thomas Handy, Chief, Operations Plans 
Division, War Department, notified Major General Harold Bull, Deputy Chief of Staff, USFET, 
in the fall, 1945, that funding was tight – “a bill currently pending before the Senate [would] cut 
Army funds for the fiscal year 1946 by $30.9 billion.”
280
  In fact, the defense spending allocation 
declined continuously from $93.7 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 1945, to $53.3 billion in FY 46 and 
further to $22.8 billion in 1947.
281
  House of Representatives Document No. 657, with a cover 
letter from President Truman, requested reductions in the War Department budget that 
effectively, if approved, cut the budget by almost $38 billion.
282
  Funded projects entailed a 
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myriad of justifications, especially construction of adequate housing and facilities for family 
members, particularly since the occupation was still seen as a temporary affair.  The back-and-
forth memorandums with the War Department (and later Department of Defense) over 
expenditures continued through at least 1948.   
 As noted in The Communications Zone Command Allocation Plan of April 1945 for 
construction projects, and little-changed for most of the military occupation period, the basis of 
allocation for funds and materiel assumed: 
Only the minimum requirements for essential operations will be met . . . 
convenience, appearance, durability, comfort and other desirable features will not 
be considered in determining minimum requirements; existing buildings and 
facilities will be used to the greatest extent with minimum (if any) alterations; 
considerations must  be given to economy of transport; POWs, civilians and 
occupying troops, when available must be used to maximize the work effort; 
Engineer service troops should supervise the work effort and engage in the actual 
work only where their technical expertise is required; finally, construction supply 
needs and materiel within occupied Germany [is to] be met from German industry 




Funding was tight, as were German resources, nonetheless, U. S. Army engineers, supported 
initially by U. S. troops and later by both POWs and DPs, embarked on numerous construction 
programs.  The U. S. Army Communications Zone Command established an allocation plan for 
construction materiel and embarked initially on construction of redeployment camps for the 
projected 3,000,000 U. S. forces to be redeployed either to the Pacific Theater or back to the 
United States, and for rehabilitation of the Bremerhaven-Bremen ports.   Even with the three 
million service member draw down, a May 1945 inventory of ongoing construction projects, 
under the aegis of the U. S. Army Communications Zone, hinted that a post-war infrastructure 
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build-up under austere resource conditions to support U. S. occupation forces in Germany had 
begun. 




Projects New Starts Ongoing 
Completed 
Cancelled 
Depots 15 61 19 
Hospitals 13 36 31 
POL Depots 37 27 2 
Ports 1 6 10 
Railroads 83 107 19 
Roads 10 19 10 
Troop Housing 60 90 48 
Utilities 8 22 22 
Special Projects* 64 144 66 
Waterways 2 1 2 
Totals 293 523 [513] 229 
* Special projects included primarily laundries, refrigeration, installations, chemical impregnating 
plants.   
 
Drawing conclusions from this chart presents obvious difficulties.  First, construction on 
many of the projects began prior to the U. S. Government’s announcement that redeployment of 
approximately three million service members from the Continent over the next twelve months 
would begin on 12 May 1945.  Cancelled projects most likely resulted from redeployment 
decisions.  Second, the chart does not reflect locations of the projects – France, Germany, 
Belgium or Britain, although construction of the first five redeployment camps took place at 
Reims, Marseilles, Le Havre, Antwerp -- all near ports on the Continent, and Southampton  in 
England.  Third, quite possibly a large number of the transportation-related projects resulted 
from combat-related missions to ease crossing of Germany prior to V-E Day, e.g., repair of ports 
(in Belgium and France), railroad bridges, and roads.   However, a large number of project 
completions would support occupation forces after V-E Day.  Further, although under 
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considerable constraints as to both local resources and U. S. War Department funding until at 
least 1948, construction in support of U.S. troops and eventually their dependents continued 
creatively in various forms.   
Nonetheless, leaders in the military government and tactical force structure recognized 
the necessity to turn back facilities to the Germans as quickly as possible to improve not only 
German living conditions, but also the German economy.  Several reasons stand out.  Firstly, 
U. S. forces underwent reorganization during this period, part of which focused on consolidating 
aggregations of troops into near-regimental-size locations.  Former Wehrmacht kasernes, if 
available and functional or easily repaired, offered the best facilities for this.  Secondly, the 
commanders preferred to have family members living within the same community as their 
service members.  This, of course, reduced the scattering of support facilities.  Thirdly, 
consolidation of military units eased training requirements, aided unit cohesion and provided 
closer supervision of troop activities.  Between October 1947 and December 1949, the U. S. 
Army acquired more barracks space, growing from 34 units in 1947 to 156 units by December 
1949.
285
  The transition from non-permanent requisitioned property to former Wehrmacht 
kasernes began the long trek from “occupation status” to “stationed status.”     
 Having a roof over one’s head provides a certain amount of comfort.  Having functional 
public utilities certainly beats looking for bushes or digging holes and reading by candlelight.  
One of the (often overlooked by statisticians) tasks confronting the U. S. Army Engineers, in 
addition to the destroyed or damaged housing and transportation network, was repair of public 
utilities, which dogged the U. S. Army for months.  Although most of the utilities damage 
resulted from air raids to cities and industrial areas these areas housed the largest population 
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bases where epidemics could break out, a situation occupation forces wished to avoid.  
Furthermore, most U. S Army units “set up camp” in and around these areas, and desired the use 
of these facilities themselves.  A Weekly Field Report from G-5, Military Government, USFET 
disclosed the following: 
In Berlin, work is continuing on the Berlinerstrasse Bridge over Telten Canal in 
Templehof
286
 to carry sewage mains transporting sewage to the city for treatment 
and disposal in the installation there.  Similar accommodations will be made 
available when the Emil Schwerz Bridge in the Lichterfelde area is repaired.  
Repair work is now complete on lager and critical sewage mains in Frankfurt.  
The number repaired, 22 (15 percent of the approximately 150 damaged sewers) 
are now open and flowing.  More sewers have been repaired in Bremen, and work 




 Establishing a safe water supply system also created major tasks for the U. S. Army.  
This problem was twofold:  first, sanitizing the water itself by providing chlorine and ammonia; 
second, repairing damaged wells and replacing worn-out wells.  Likewise, in many areas, the 
electrical system required massive repairs – much of the initial work done by U. S. Army 
engineers, with assistance from available technically qualified Germans.
288
 
Related to housing and public utility issues, the coal shortage, particularly critical in the 
U. S. zone, forced the military authorities to authorize mass tree-cutting projects to provide 
lumber and wood products for both military and civilian heating, cooking and construction to 
winterize living quarters for the 1945-1946 winter period.  German authorities established 
necessary rationing programs while the U. S. military district commanders authorized the use of 
U. S Army equipment and supplies not required for essential military operations and the ongoing 
harvesting and food processing support to aid German communities in cutting and transporting 
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lumber to collection points.  Military rail and water transportation provided the first choice of 
transportation possibilities to supplement civilian capabilities.  In addition to German civilians 
available for work, both voluntary Displaced Persons and prisoners of war (provided cut wood 
for U. S. military use) joined the workforce in this effort. 
2.2.2  Supply:  What?  More than 3 million soldiers for dinner? 
 From the beginning of the occupation, the U. S. Army did not “live off the land.”  
Initially, all food products destined for U. S occupation forces arrived in ship-holds from the 
continental United States.  Within a year or so, some fresh products were available on the 
Continent, for example, butter and milk from Denmark.  By February 1946, U. S. troops could 
purchase indigenous fruits and vegetables, as available, in their assigned regions.  The following 
chart depicts the recommended daily food intake for the American soldier at the end of World 
War II.  On average, this diet would provide approximately 3,500+ calories per day (probably 
reduced about 500 calories post-war).  




Food Groups Ounces Food Groups Ounces 
Meat, boneless 12.15 Other vegetables 4.00 
Eggs, dehydrated 0.60 Potatoes 11.00 
Milk products, evaporated milk 8.50 Tomatoes and citrus fruits 5.00 
Butter 1.16 Dried fruits 0.70 
Other fats 0.75 Other fruits 5.00 
Grain products 11.50 Beverages 1.68 
Dried legumes 1.41 Miscellaneous 2.30 
Sugars 5.30 Total, net ounces 77.43 
Vegetables, leafy, green, yellow 6.50 Total, net pounds 4.65 
 
At an average of 4.65 pounds per day of fresh food or 5.25 pounds of the traditional Field C-
ration,
290
 Army logisticians had to provide approximately 13,950,000 pounds of food per day to 
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feed the Victory in Europe U. S. military force members in Europe.  A U. S. Army transporter, 
calculating the transport by truck of a shipment of fresh food arriving at the Antwerp port, 
heading to Frankfurt in the summer of 1945, figuring twenty tons of food per 10-ton reefer with 
trailer, would require at least 300 such truck-trailers for the haul.   The distance would 
approximate 250-275 miles, the trucks travelling between 30-50 mph, the trip probably requiring 
an overnight in Köln (British occupation zone).  Upon arrival in Frankfurt, logisticians 
transferred the load to a refrigerated storage area.  One might draw a parallel between this type of 
“peace-time” movement and the Army’s famous Red Ball Express.   
Even at the reduced force structure of approximately 92,000 in 1948, excluding 
requirements of the Berlin Airlift, logisticians would have provided approximately 427,800 
pounds of fresh food alone for the service members.  By this time, family members had arrived, 
increasing the requirement.  Add to the numbers foodstuffs provided to UNRRA/IRO for 
Displaced Persons, refugees and the indigenous German population – an added mission for U. S. 
Army logisticians. 
 Whereas the Americans shipped in their food supplies, the Germans relied on their own 
agriculture supplemented by American relief shipments and imports as allowed.  At this time in 
late summer 1945, imports to Germany did not exist.  An August 1945 report in the USFET 
Weekly Bulletin addressed this conundrum, noting, “the Germans will eat this winter. [But] under 
present conditions, with normal food movements between regions virtually stopped, and with 
reliance on indigenous resources plus the necessity of feeding displaced persons, refugees, and 
disarmed German soldiers, the answer is no.”
291
  A comparison of the late summer 1945 caloric 
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ration of a German in the U. S. occupation zone, between 1200 and 1500 calories, to the 
theoretical 2,000-calorie minimum ration needed to supply adequate quantities of essential food 
nutrients, indicated the following percentages of an adequate diet:  53% bread/grain products, 
62% potatoes, 61% meat, 27% sugar, and 71% fats.  This report brought up again the importance 
of establishing an economically unified Germany for production and distribution as well as a 
rational level of industry plan to support export and import requirements, the absence of which 
meant sizeable deficits for several regions.
292
   The U. S. taxpayer often paid the bill to reduce 
the food deficits in the three western occupation zones.  
As early as June 1945, the Food, Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Division, SHAEF 
noted that preliminary reports for the 1945 German harvest, while not grim, certainly would most 
likely not provide the recommended calories levels – 1550 - for the “normal consumer” 
recommended by SHAEF in January 1945.  Bread grains, about equal to 1944 results but below 
the six-year average ending in 1944, as well as potato, sugar beet, oil seed, and livestock would 
not exceed the low 1944 production figures.  Estimated lower production figures, increased 
population figures, lack of available manpower, processing facilities, adequate transportation and 
distribution controls aggravated the situation.         
Colonel Andrews, assigned to the Food, Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Division of 
SHAEF at Höchst, near Frankfurt, and later the OMGUS group in Berlin, noted early after his 
arrival in Frankfurt (August 1945) that he had surveyed the grain, potato, sugar and oil seed 
crops not yet harvested.  The crops needed harvesting but that work fell to the women, children 
and the aged left in the rural villages – in insufficient numbers to bring in the harvest.   
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The whole economy of the American zone in West Germany not destroyed by the 
bombing and the fighting had come to a virtual standstill.  Nothing moved or was 
undertaken by Germans themselves except by permission of the military.  The 
military controlled fuel, transportation, food supplies, money – the works.  This, 
plus people struggling back to some sort of existence in their destroyed and 




In an interesting aside, Colonel Andrews sought a meeting with General Eisenhower’s Chief of 
Staff, General Bedell-Smith, to request logistics support – transportation, labor (released 
prisoners of war), and machinery, to reap the harvest.  General Smith’s response, “Don’t get too 




 General Smith’s comment notwithstanding, the Allied occupation governments assumed 
the role of the acting-German government.  In this role, each assumed the responsibility of 
providing for the population.  Moreover, at least in the first months after the war, the U. S. 
occupation forces considered the very real possibility of a hungry people too weak to work and 
too angry to remain passive.  Consequently, U. S. forces administration agencies monitored 
calories, enforced ration control down to local German community levels for rationed food items 
as necessary and imported foodstuffs above the military force requirements – particularly grain - 
to forestall medical crises and dissention within the local populations.  As one author noted,  
We can say they should have thought of that [food shortages] before they started 
the war and let them starve or survive as best they may.  That might be all right if 
we were not trying to maintain law and order in the country and convince the 
people that democracy is the best way to live.  It is difficult to govern, much less 
persuade to your views, a hungry people.
295
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The U. S. Army arranged through the U. S. Government to have approximately a quarter 
of the estimated 1945-46 year’s grain production deficit imported.
296
  According to the OMGUS 
Food and Agriculture specialists, reduced food rations from 1550 calories per normal consumer 
to 1,275 calories on 1 April 1946 exceeded availability of foodstuffs in the U S. occupation zone, 
forcing a further reduction to 1,180 calories per normal consumer on 27 May1946.  Projected 
food sources would not increase until the next harvest several months down the road.  To counter 
the calorie deficit, U. S. Army imported from the United States an initial 45,000 tons of food and 
released 15,700 tons of excess Army food items that included varieties of dry bean product, dried 
and evaporated milk, wheat and other grain products.   The U. S. Army also arranged for 
shipment of an additional 36,000 tons of wheat and flour, 29,000 tons of whole corn, and 35,000 
tons of canned vegetables – all to arrive in June.  At the same time, the Army ordered a second 
quarter (October-December) 1946 allotment of 150,000 tons of bread grains.
297
 
Eventually, by the end of the first year of occupation, food relief packages, prohibited 
until December 1945, began to arrive in Germany.  The Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to 
Operate in Germany (CRALOG), authorized by President Truman in February 1946 to act as the 
umbrella agency for relief efforts to occupied countries, shipped its first packages into Bremen in 
April 1946.  CARE, the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, formed in November 
1945 and operating under CRALOG, shipped its first 20,000 packages that arrived at the Le 
Havre port in May 1946.  Germany received its first packages, 35,700, in July 1946, shipped to 
Bremen on a U. S. Maritime Commission ship, the American Ranger.  The initial packages were 
surplus U. S. Army 10-in-1 rations, designed to provide a soldier ten meals.  The family in the 




 Summary of data from OMGUS Monthly Reports through June 1946. 
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picture below is opening a typical CRALOG/CARE relief package
298
 that contained about 
twenty pounds of meat, cheese canned fruit and vegetables, sugar, coffee, condensed milk, 
cornflakes, chewing gum and often a packet of cigarettes.  Accountability of actual numbers 
shipped and received is difficult to establish.   
 
According to OMGUS monthly reports, as of September 1946, CARE had shipped 
160,445 packages, purchased by Americans initially, at $10 per package.  The above picture 
displaying a typical CARE package received in Germany was taken in 1947.
299
  The following 
picture shows a German girl sitting on a part of a CARE package, provided by the American 
company, Swift & Co.
300
  As one recipient recalled, his mother was too shocked to say anything 
more than, “Danke.”  Although these packages did supplement diets for those who received 
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them, in relation to the total population of over 
17,000,000 in the U. S. occupation zone alone, 
only a small portion of the population experienced 
CARE, and then, rarely more than once.
301
  
U. S. government food shipments 
continued to supplement local production, not 
only in the U. S. occupation zone, but also in the 
British and French zones well into the military 
occupation period.  The exact amount of 
American export of foodstuffs to Germany between 
V-E Day and June 1948, difficult to track, amounted to at least 6,000,000 metric tons, some of 
which also supported both the French and British occupation zones.
302
  This figure does not 
include U. S. Army surplus foods, for example, the initial 630,000 tons of wheat turned over to 
the German agencies in the three western occupation zones in the autumn of 1945.
303
  What the 
total cost in dollars to the U. S. taxpayer was, is probably just as obscure.  However, in addition 
to indirectly funding through taxes these shipments, American citizens were also implored by 
President Truman to “Save Wheat, Save Meat, Save the Peace.”   Established by the President in 
1947, the Citizens Food Committee embarked on a campaign to convince Americans to reduce 
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items from both their and from farm animal diets to provide food items for shipment to 
(primarily) Europe.    
Furthermore, even though the Potsdam Protocol and the Allied Control Council tasked 
the Germans to provide for the feeding and welfare of the Displaced Persons, because the 
Germans could not even feed themselves early after the end of the war that responsibility fell on 
each of the occupation forces, and increasingly on the United States.  Responsibility to move the 
millions of metric tons, from both U. S. government sources and private relief agencies, noted in 
the above paragraphs fell initially to the U. S. Army until German transportation assets could 
support these missions.      
2.2.4  Communications:  Radios, Phones, Newspapers, Magazines. 
Armed Forces Network (radio) serving the U. S. occupation zone remained unchanged, 
with Luxembourg still the center of the network, until units moved first to Frankfurt, then to 
Munich in mid-1945.  The U. S Army relayed programs from the continental U. S.  However, 
after V-E Day, U. S. Military Government Information Control Division gave greater emphasis 
to development of programs locally originated and perceived to be more relevant to service 
members stationed in Germany.  The Stars and Stripes, European edition began printing the AFN 
daily program from the Frankfurt area on Friday, 13 July 1945.  By the end of August 1945, 
AFN transmitted from Frankfurt, Munich, Bremen and Berlin.  The U. S. military government 
contemplated that the German radio stations would be the last medium of information 
dissemination transferred to German control.   As of October 1945, no plans for such a transfer 
were even under consideration;
304
 as of March 1946, the U. S. Information Control Division still 
controlled the six operational German radio stations.  
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Among the news material available to U. S. forces in the U. S. occupation zone, The 
Stars & Stripes, authorized by the War Department and printed in Europe (Britain, France and 
then in Germany, following the troops) beginning in 1942, at a cost of 20 Pfennig per copy after 
capitulation, probably yielded the best sources of information – news as well as entertainment.  
Hardly a day passed when a service member could not keep up with Blondie, Dick Tracy, L’il 
Abner, although until 3 June 1945, Stars and Stripes printed only three or four strips of comics in 
each edition.  Soldiers could also follow their favorite athletic teams back in the States.  With the 
3 June 1945 paper, AFN expanded from a four-page paper to an 8-page paper; comic strips 
expanded to a full page – usually page seven.   Most Stars and Stripes editions ran front-page 
updates on redeployment plans and the war’s progress in the Pacific Theater, perhaps more 
riveting than the comic strips in the early days after the war. 
Overall, as the occupation progressed, telephone service improved, but by mid-1946, 
U.S. Army communications specialists calculated that maximum capacity loomed in the distance 
because of limited equipment and facilities.  By April 1946, the U. S. Army had returned much 
of the communications means to German civilian administration and operation, retaining 
switchboards, circuits, open wire, radio and other military signal installations required by the 
U. S. Army.  Military government reported in April 1946 that 192,000 telephones operated for 
the civilian population; and an additional 18,500 military telephones operated through the 
German civilian agency, Reichspost, the civilian agency responsible for this service.       
2.2.5  The Army Exchange Service, cigarettes, beer, a toothbrush, underwear, a haircut! 
 By the 20
th
 century, the old sutler on his horse peddling bare bones items that he could 
find to sell to the soldiers in the field had long retired.  The concept of the Army Exchange 
207 
 
Service (AES) to provide non-issue items to soldiers dates back to a General Order in1895,
305
 but 
until 1945 the organization had never served so large and widespread a community as it would in 
Europe and particularly Germany over the next fifty or so years.  Its primary mission had always 
been to support the deployed service member, but the growth of military communities overseas 
would tax the organization’s creativity and patience.   
As long as the war continued, the Army Exchange Service provided the basics at 
“minimum expense to servicemembers, merchandise and services of necessity, convenience and 
comfort not provided from appropriated funds for military forces”
306
 -- tobacco, candy, toilet 
articles, coca cola, local beer and occasionally American beer.  Of course, who needed American 
beer when The Stars and Stripes in a May 15, 1945 article reported that, “A beer mission is 
leaving for Germany immediately to get breweries going and provide men in the army of 
occupation with good lager and ale.  The brewers hope to have Heidelberg in operation in a few 
months, bringing in barley from the United States if necessary.”  And yes, Budweiser was 
brought over to Germany from the U. S., still in the wartime OD-green cans.  The soldier needed 
little else as the Army provided clothing, food and shelter.  As the war ended with the specter of 
Germany unable to provide any civilian shopping facilities for the servicemembers, AES 
managers soon recognized that their mission would grow in spades. 
First, AES, caught unprepared at the onset of the military occupation without an 
approved plan for supplying an occupation force in Germany, scrambled to order and receive 
even the minimum comfort items required by the forces.  Transportation posed the most likely 
encumbrance initially as shipping, already overburdened, focused on required military shipments 
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to the Continent and redeployment of soldiers to the Pacific Theater or back to the United States.  
Additionally, AES recognized the importance of supporting the thousands of redeploying 
soldiers waiting in the transient camps to ship out.  Providing the basics along with small 
souvenirs to take home and reading material taxed AES resources.  According to the European 
Command Chief Historian, AES had begun planning for and submitted its first post-war plan to 
support the remaining occupation force, by December 1945, but failed to garner approval from 
either USFET or AES headquarters for various reasons.
307
  One key reason lay with AES 
organization that had previously functioned in a decentralized manner, managed at command 
level, to support an organization on the move.  AES recognized the necessity of centralizing 
management and consolidating requisitioning, shipment and storage of resources in the more 
stabilized post-war environment.  Of course, local commanders balked at losing direct control 
over the AES mission. Nonetheless, between December 1945 and June 1946, AES made several 
notable gains in their service concept – a concept geared to providing community and family-
oriented products.   
Second, AES realized relatively early in the fall of 1945, that family members would 
soon join their spouses in theater, a major event for planners.  An enlarged product list to support 
family life required expanded and more centrally located facilities, a rational ordering system, 
dedicated transportation assets, centrally located storage facilities (Bremerhaven, Aschaffenburg 
and Schierstein, on the Rhine near Wiesbaden), on the main transportation routes, and manpower 
to support the growing mission.  Additionally, the facility concept – different levels of stores to 
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service varying community sizes -- offered a variety of services to support the communities, e.g., 
barber and beauty shops, tailoring and repair services and even on-the-spot eateries.
308
 
Third, AES could not function in occupied Germany on a business-as-usual policy.   
U. S. military government regulations controlled several critical industry and business aspects 
that forced creative planning on the part of AES.   Two commodities sought after by 
servicemembers proved excellent and interesting vehicles to make this point:  production, 
acquisition and sale of beer, and sale and repair of automobiles.   
The U. S. military government announced in their second official monthly report (August 
1945) that the Theater Quartermaster in concert with the Army Exchange Service, would assume 
responsibility for beer procurement to include selection of German breweries to produce beer, 
alcohol content not to exceed 3.2%.  The Theater Quartermaster had the responsibility to procure 
the necessary ingredients.  Initially, the Quartermaster had to order ingredients from the 
continental U. S., as German bread production required every grain from the limited crops of 
barley produced.  Additionally, military government regulations prohibited servicemembers from 
buying products, especially food products directly from Germans, not that the Germans were 
producing or drinking much beer as the U. S. military government prohibited beer production for 
German consumption.
309
   Eventually, AES received permission from the military government to 
employ 14 German breweries to produce beer for U. S. forces.  The product could not, however, 
be exported outside of Germany, nor could the Germans import any of the ingredients as military 
government prohibited most import-export transactions.  Even if import-export were allowed, 
Germany had no viable medium of exchange on the international market. 
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Personal transportation for soldiers was not particularly a problem in 1945, but with the 
arrival of family members, gathered interest, particularly with the AES, that had started planning 
in late 1945 to purchase from General Motors and Ford companies and ship to the Continent 
between 18,000 and 22,000 vehicles between April and August 1946.
310
   The War Department 
agreed with the AES plan by March 1946, as neither GM nor Ford could sell directly in Germany 
because the U. S. military government forbade private companies conducting business in 
Germany.  However, the AES plan overestimated GM and Ford production schedules, shipping 
capability, and the demand for cars in the United States, finally settling for an initial 135 cars and 
a second order of 150 cars.  The first batch arrived in September 1946.  Because the demand 
outstripped the supply, AES used a lottery system to select buyers.  Along with the process for 
selling cars, AES also had to arrange for maintenance facilities and repair parts procurement.  
AES resolved the maintenance issue by arranging with eight German garage owners to provide 
this service.  Because of the stringent business requirements, General Motors arranged with their 
former subsidiary in Rüsselsheim, the Adam Opel Company, to also provide maintenance and 
spare parts on the new vehicles. 
Attacking the snags involved in the GM and Ford production delays, AES went after and 
received permission from the War Department to sell to service members and authorized U. S. 
civilian employees excess Army vehicles received from the Office of the Foreign Liquidation 
Commissioner.  The first jeeps, in “fair” condition, went on the market for $400 in June 1946.  
At about the same time, AES contracted with eight German garage owners for repair work, 
adding to the 17 or so mini-repair facilities at Exchange locations.  AES had already opened a 
maintenance school at Höchst to train German mechanics in the art of performing maintenance 
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on U. S. Army vehicles.  Two additional tasks remained, publishing of a Theater Vehicle and 
Traffic Code and establishment of a gas ration system (initially 104 gallons per family per 
month).   Finally, Americans in Germany had wheels.
311
      
2.2.6  Morale:  sports, movies, live entertainment, clubs, and religious activities. 
 By 1950, one commentary observed, “Foxholes were just memories, and most of the 
occupation troops were living in comfort, sometimes luxuriously in private homes with a 
Displaced Person or German serving them.  Surprisingly superior recreational and educational 
facilities were gradually made available.”
312
  How was this accomplished?   
Many of the sports and recreational facilities were confiscated, particularly the 
Zeppelinfeld at the Reichsparteitagsgelände in Nürnberg.  In the case of the athletic fields, Army 
engineers and soldiers usually prepared the fields to accommodate American sports.  Facilities 
not belonging to the Reich were requisitioned, e.g., community swimming pools, private homes, 
business and community buildings.   
The headlines in The Stars & Stripes sports section on Saturday, 1 September 1945, 
described a common activity encouraged by the U. S. Army command structure.  Baseball, one 
of the most popular sports among Americans, drew not only participants but also large 
audiences.  This particular Stars & Stripes edition predicted a record crowd of approximately 
50,000 spectators at the Nürnberg Soldiers’ Field for the double elimination semifinal games, 
winner of which took the USFET European Theater title.  The “Solders’ Field” mentioned in this 
article is the former Zeppelinfeld, part of the Reichsparteitagsgelände in Nürnberg.  The U. S. 
Army no doubt added the baseball field to the area after war’s end. 
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The sports complex pictured below was taken before World War II, and is today, as 
before 1933, the famous Weser Stadium in Bremen.  After capitulation, U. S. Army forces 
confiscated this complex and renamed it Ike Stadium. 
 
According to Bremen Port Command’s April 1946 Information Brochure: 
With a seating capacity of 20,000, Ike Stadium boasts just about every sports 
facility to be found in any American stadium, including a public address system, 
press and radio box, mechanical scoreboard, large swimming pool, 26 tennis 
courts, a baseball diamond, 8 softball diamonds [baseball fields added by the 
American forces], 2 football fields [probably appropriated the soccer fields], track 




   
Taking time off, or furlough travel, to relax and recuperate became another favorite 
pastime of soldiers in the first year of occupation.    Earl Ziemke chronicled that one of the 
favorite locations, the French Riviera, offered every activity known to a soldier.  The Riviera 
Recreational Area (RRA) open for business before V-E Day to serve Allied service members 
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stationed in southern France after the successful Operation DRAGOON, and soldiers preparing 
for redeployment, advertised 18,000 accommodations for enlisted men in Nice and officers in 
Cannes.
314
  The furlough covered an almost all-expenses paid seven-day vacation.  The Director 
of the RRA provided a pamphlet to its visitors cataloging the enticements.  USRRA established 
three nightclubs, four hotels, and one movie theater for the exclusive use of the soldiers.  One of 
the hotels, Miramar, provided an Officers Club while the Malmaison opened for the enlisted men 
and women.  The American Red Cross operated two clubs in Cannes.  USRRA arranged motor 
tours, boating cruises, fishing trips for the interested.  Swimming areas, tennis, volleyball and 
badminton courts offered the athletically inclined competitive opportunities.  The more mundane 
support facilities were also available:  two post exchanges, a dispensary, laundry and dry 
cleaning, religious services (Protestant, Catholic and Jewish) and “Pro [phylactic] Stations” at 
numerous locations.
315
   
The Stars & Stripes regularly listed religious services in the Friday and Saturday editions, 
and often noted that print space limited listing services locations to major cities in the U. S. 
occupation zone.  Glancing through the list, one reads of a variety of services provided by the 
U. S. Army, e.g., Jewish Sabbath, Latter Day Saints, Seventh Day Adventist, and the more 
traditional faiths – Catholic, and various Protestant denominations, in the cities of Augsburg, 
Bamberg, Bayreuth, Erlangen, Fürth, Munich, Nürnberg, Pilsen, Regensburg, Salzburg, Stuttgart 
and Würzburg.  In some cases, the various community commands used local theaters, churches, 
as well as military government buildings to provide church services. 
The U. S. Information Control Division, by October 1945, provided twenty-three full-
length American feature films, as well as a number of documentaries and short films for showing 
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in German theaters (Kino) to German audiences.  ICD intended that most of these films, 
carefully screened for content, would demonstrate the American way of life – propaganda – as 
part of the initial efforts toward democratization of the Germans.  At this time, the ICD had 
screened and approved the reopening of 94 motion picture theaters in the U. S. occupation zone.  
An additional 194 film exhibitors received approval to reopen, but lacked sufficient films.  By 
February 1946, the ICD had cleared 349 motion picture theaters.  However, German films also 
required screening for appropriateness and censoring under the denazification program prior to 
showing; ICD released those films meeting the established criteria.  Of the 42 theaters registered 
and operating in the Berlin District, eight ran American features.  The remaining theaters were 
showing films supplied by the Russian film exchange.
316
 
2.2.7  Medical Care:  acute and preventive. 
U. S. occupation forces faced several acute medical issues at the onset of the occupation.  
One such issue, the potential onset of epidemics, caused perhaps the greatest concern.  Not only 
did U. S. Army medical personnel have responsibility for the health and welfare of the U. S. 
forces, but these medical personnel also had to take into consideration the public health status of 
German civilians, Displaced Persons and refugees.  Containing an epidemic in even one of these 
groups under the conditions present at the end of the war would prove elusive.  Part of this 
predicament resulted from shortage of German medical and public health personnel removed 
from positions through the denazification program.   U. S. military government statistics indicate 
that “95 percent of the experienced public health officers, 85 percent of hospital staff personnel, 
and in some areas more that 50 percent of doctors engaged in private practice” had been released 
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  The chief cause of the predicament, however, arose from 
war conditions:  shortage of facilities and medical supplies to include various immunizations, 
destruction or damage to sanitation and water systems, overcrowding of residential facilities and 
camps, the widespread population movements to include the repatriation of Displaced Persons, 
as well as the shortages of fuel, food, transportation, and communication facilities. 
Tuberculosis, diphtheria, typhoid fever and gonorrhea topped the list of immediate 
concern.  Diphtheria and typhoid fever impacted the U. S Army population only minimally as 
U. S. service members regularly received immunizations against these diseases; not so the 
German population, Displaced Persons or other categories of refugees.  U. S. Army medical 
personnel supported by the available German medical personnel adopted immediate 
immunization programs and worked toward improvement of sanitary conditions and water 
sources.  The biggest problem occurred from war damage to water lines.  Relative to sanitation, 
as of August 1945, the water supply system at Darmstadt was the only system approved for use 
by U. S. military forces in the U. S. zone.  According to the second monthly report of the military 
government, repairing water distribution systems placed second in priority only to repair of 
power transmission lines.
318
  The third disease, gonorrhea, created a bit more of a problem as 
U. S. servicemembers contracted venereal diseases primarily through contact with local 
populations.  Immediately after V-E Day, military government medical reports focused on the 
rising venereal disease (VD) rates among Germans as being “the most extensive hazard to troops 
over the whole United States Zone.”
319
  U. S. Army medical personnel engaged early in treating 
Germans and U. S. forces against VD through an active information campaign, regular 
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monitoring of infected persons and treatment of VD by the use of penicillin.    Soldiers received 
early briefings on the hazards of VD.  One such short commentary appeared in one of the early 
orientation booklets, Occupation:  “One of the tragic after-effects of the war is the high number 
of European girls driven into prostitution.  There are more of them than ever, and they have a far 
higher rate of venereal disease.  
It’s a direct result of bad 
housing, scarce food, poor 
sanitation, too few doctors and 
destroyed hospitals.  From your 
point of view, it all adds up to a 
greater risk of getting venereal 
disease than ever existed in the 
States.  General Eisenhower 
called these European 
prostitutes ‘booby traps.’  More 
men were knocked out by this variety than by the real article.  Don’t be a VD casualty.”
320
 
Another source of constant reminders to the occupation forces, The Stars & Stripes, 
adopted Veronika as their VD poster girl, and a soldier often found Veronika on page 2 of a Stars 
& Stripes newspaper.321  Petra Goedde suggested that Veronika served two purposes:  to warn off 
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GIs from VD and from Nazi ideology.  “Veronika was not only infected with VD but also with 
Nazi ideology, and that she set out to pass both on to her ignorant American lovers.”
322
    
  A military government monthly report, six months after V-E Day noted that USFET 
directed its logistics command, Theater Service Forces, to order 225,000 vials of penicillin, 
much of it transferred to local German medical facilities for treatment of infected individuals in 
the German population.
323
  Interestingly, Goedde included a chart, Geographical Description of 
Contacts Resulting in Venereal Disease, wherein based on a medical survey of approximately 
123,000 soldiers with VD between 6 July and 21 December 1945, France had the highest number 
of VD origin, at 56,320 cases.  Germany was second with 43,988.
324
  After eighteen months, VD 
continued to present itself actively in the German community.  The OMGUS Monthly Report, 
September and October 1946, reported 14,278 cases in August and 11,871 cases in September, 
for a cumulative to 1 October 1946 of 99,367 cases of gonorrhea among German civilians in the 
U. S. occupation zone
325
 -- 225,000 vials of penicillin would not have lasted long.     
The U.S. Army staffed 307 fixed and mobile hospitals providing 258,150 beds in the 
European Theater on V-E Day.  Planning hospital closures and reductions had already begun 
before V-E Day, with the objective to reduce to eighteen hospitals in Germany to support an 
expected troop reduction to a 370,000-person occupation force.  The initial intent to construct 
new hospitals quickly changed to repair and alteration of existing buildings, preferably buildings 
within Kasernen because of shortage of funds as well as building materials.  According to the 
Headquarters European Command Historian, the Command Surgeon selected twenty sites (two 
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in Austria), thirteen of which were not already hospitals.  “Hospital construction standards for 
the occupation forces were established on a 10 year operational basis although construction 
materials necessary to meet these standards were not readily available.”
326
  Skilled German 
artisans supervised by U. S. Army Engineers completed the alterations and repair on fifteen of 
the sites by 30 September 1945, four more by 10 December 1945, and the last site at Bremen by 
15 January 1946.
327
  By this point, however, the U. S. War Department lowered the Occupation 
Troop Basis downward to 300,000 personnel, triggering a reduction to seventeen hospitals in 
Germany and Austria. 
PART B.  Support the Local Populations 
3.  Logistics:  the local populations – Germans, Displaced Persons, Expellees and Refugees 
 Observers declared Europe following war’s end as “A Continent in Ruins.”  One result of 
the war was the staggering dislocation of population.  According to a The Times (London) news 
article just after VE-Day, Europe was on the move with “exiles heading home.”
328
  About eight 
million Zwangsarbeiter (forced laborers), brought into Germany and exploited by the Nazis to 
increase the labor force, roamed the country looking for food and shelter.  The Allied forces were 
able to repatriate close to seven million of these Displaced Persons, some 4.1 million by U. S. 
forces, by the late summer of 1945.  The U. S. forces supported around 500 camps sheltering 
perhaps 800,000 DPs by 1 August 1945 – exact figures seem to elude record-keepers.   Another 
13.5 million German refugees fled west from Eastern Europe, and within a year, and in 
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accordance with the Potsdam Protocol, expelled people of German-extraction from Hungary, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria (the Reichsdeutsche) entered Germany looking for food and 
shelter.   By January1948, over three million DPs resided in the U. S. occupation zone.
329
   The 
Times (London), 19 May 1945, suggested that millions of “displaced persons” presented only 
“formidable problems of transport and organization.”
330
  That formidable transport/organization 
mission cost the U. S. Government, for the Fiscal Year 1947 (1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947) 
approximately $42 million in Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GAROIA) funds and 
another $100 million U. S. Army funds for supplies for the period.  These figures do not include 
personnel costs for U. S. forces supporting the DP centers.  Of the various groups requiring 
assistance, the Displaced Persons category cost U. S. forces the most in resources to include 
work force.  This mission persisted throughout the military occupation. 
3.1  Who was responsible for the POWs, DPs, Expellees and Refugees? 
 Clearly, terms of the “Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva 
July 27, 1929,” required the U. S. Army to provide appropriate care and feeding to prisoners of 
war (POWs) captured and interred by U. S. forces.  Moreover, the U. S Army, in accordance 
with JCS 1067, Part I, paragraph 4d acquired the responsibility to “ensure that prisoners of war 
and displaced persons of the United Nations are cared for and repatriated.”
331
  In accordance with 
guidance from General Eisenhower, the U. S. Army categorized German military prisoners 
captured or who surrendered prior to Germany’s unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 as 
prisoners of war (POW) and those captured or who surrendered after 8 May 1945 as Disarmed 
Enemy Forces (DEFs).  To a German soldier, the designation, Disarmed Enemy Forces, meant 
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that he would not receive the same level of support as a prisoner of war -- theoretically, support 
would fall to local German populations to provide.  Both groups totaled 1,528,024 of which the 
U. S. Army employed, as of 30 September 1945, 575,214 POWs and DEFs in 2,448 German 
service units.
332
 These service units supplemented U. S. Army logistics units, performing a 
myriad of tasks, e.g., tree-cutting, loading and unloading supplies, and eventually even skilled 
labor in U. S. Army bakeries, transportation maintenance facilities and security units.  So long as 
the POWs and DEFs worked service unit projects fulfilling occupational tasks, they received 
approximately 2,800 calories per day, and often barrack facilities.
333
  
3.2  Population Categories.   
The categories and the movements of non-indigenous people in Germany as well as those 
peoples fleeing to Germany looking for a place to stay and food to eat added to the already 
chaotic scene at war’s end within Germany.  Initially, the care and feeding of Displaced Persons 
(the Zwangsarbeiter) created the most critical problems for Allied forces.  Generally, the term, 
Displaced Persons (DPs), refers to approximately eight million foreign workers forcibly removed 
from their homelands into Germany to supplement the indigenous workforce.  Often referred to 
as “slaves of the Nazi regime,” these people represented roughly 29% of the Germany’s wartime 
industrial force.  A fair number worked as construction crews for submarine bunkers and defense 
walls in the Organisation Todt.  Generally, these Zwangsarbeiter lived and worked separately 
from German workers, and not under the best living conditions.  After the unconditional 
surrender, most Displaced Persons had neither work nor sustenance; many wandered on foot in 
the countryside looking for shelter and food.  Displaced Persons constituted a serious problem 
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for Allied Forces as they moved east through Germany, a problem resolved initially to some 
degree by housing the DPs along with their family members in available camps and abandoned 
military kasernes and feeding them from surplus Army rations. 
3.2.1  Expellees (aka New Citizens). 
 
The looming problem of resettling German populations expelled from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria (the Reichsdeutsche) under the terms of the Potsdam 
Protocol, Section XII, Orderly Transfer of German Populations, also faced occupation 
authorities.  OMGUS officials expected to receive between 2.5 and 3.25 million of the estimated 
12 million expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria, countries where 
German ancestors had migrated to centuries earlier.  This movement began in January 1946.  
Relocation and support of the expellees fell to those German communities so designated by the 
German Länderrat.   The U. S. Army provided transportation from the German borders to the 
appropriate receiving communities as needed.  While expellees did not belong to the category of 
Displaced Persons and responsibility for housing, feeding and clothing this group fell on German 
agencies, the military assumed out of humanitarian reasons much of the support – at least in the 
U. S. and British zones.    
3.2.2  Refugees. 
Refugees created a third category of population fleeing into Germany, primarily from countries 
to the east, and in some cases, from the south of Germany.  German agencies bore responsibility 
for housing, feeding and clothing refugees in the same manner as expellees and Disarmed Enemy 
Forces.  Because the U. S. Army mission under JCS 1067 included support specifically for the 
welfare and care of Displaced Persons, the following sections focus on U. S. Army support to 
this group.  
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3.2.3  Displaced Persons. 
 Until shortly after V-E Day, U. S. Army detachments focused on mass DP repatriation 
efforts.  Daniel Deluce, writing in September 1945 for the Stars & Stripes, commented, “The DP 
is on the way to becoming an extinct species.”
334
  According to his article, as well as a note in the 
TSFET Weekly Bulletin,
335
 between April and July 1945, U. S. military forces repatriated more 
than four million Displaced Persons; between two and 1.6 million Displaced Persons remained in 
centers.  However, neither Daniel Deluce nor U. S occupation authorities expected that a large 
number of those Displaced Persons remaining in the camps would refuse repatriation, thus 
requiring alternate arrangements not only for their future settlement but also for longer-term 
services within the centers. 
 By mid-summer 1945, General Eisenhower acknowledged that his forces did not possess 
the manpower to administer the mass of DPs camps and centers scattered throughout the U. S. 
occupation zone.  He prearranged with the Director General of the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) Herbert H. Lehman that U. S. occupation forces would 
work together with UNRRA under the condition that UNRRA supervised and maintained the 
centers and camps, arranging repatriation and resettlement issues for the Displaced Persons 
within the U. S. occupation zone in Germany.
336
   The U. S. Army forces would provide logistics 
support.  UNRRA assumed responsibility for management and administration of the DP centers 
effective 1 October 1945.  UNRRA actually preceded the formation of the United Nations 
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organization, signing a formal agreement on 9 November 1943.  Forty-four countries met at the 
first meeting, pledging to cooperate financing and administering relief aid in liberated areas 
lacking sufficient resources to provide for themselves.   President Roosevelt, having suggested 
the formation of UNRRA, appointed Herbert Lehman as the first director-general of the 
organization.  UNRRA became part of the United Nations in 1945, functioned until 1947, at 
which time its mission was taken over by the International Refugee Organization, which 
continued to serve refugees until 1952.   Working with the Displaced Persons and other refugees 
constituted the biggest mission of UNRRA and its successor, IRO, in the European arena.
337
   
U.S. occupation authorities countersigned an agreement with UNRRA, 19 February 1946, 
continuing agreements from the summer 1945, that U. S. occupation forces would retain 
responsibility for the care, control, supply and movement of Displaced Persons in the U. S. 
occupation zone.  UNRRA would continue to administer the assembly centers, camps and 
monitor the groups of DPs living outside the centers.  The U. S. occupation forces discharged its 
mission under the supervision of the G-5 Civil Affairs Division, USFET, and after the USFET 
reorganization in March 1947, under the supervision of the Civil Affairs Division, Headquarters 
EUCOM.  According to U. S. Army sources from this period, the Army mission focused on 
execution:  the G5 and Civil Affairs divisions requisitioned food, clothing, shelter, health and 
sanitation items for between 350 and 500 centers and camps within the U. S. occupation zone, 
the number of centers decreasing slowly during the military occupation.  Subordinate 
quartermaster and transportation units provided transportation, warehousing of supplies, 
gasoline, oil and maintenance for UNRRA vehicles.  U. S. Army medical and dental units 
supplemented UNRRA medical care as needed.  U. S. Army Signal units provided telephone 
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communication lines for UNRRA centers.  As the general chaos, infusing the immediate post-
war environment receded, UNRRA and the U. S. Army added services including work, 
recreation, religious and educational opportunities.   Finally yet importantly, even as the U. S. 
Army mission in support of Displaced Persons fluctuated with the exigencies of time and place, 
the U. S. Army retained responsibility for law and order among Displaced Persons centers, 
furnishing guards and security troops as needed to avoid any conflicts resulting from German 
handling of DPs during the war.  As the occupation continued, and with the constant reduction of 
U. S. Army forces in Germany, appropriately screened Displaced Persons assumed law and order 
responsibilities within each center, under supervision of U. S. Army forces.  Although the 
German civilian police forces steadily grew during this period, U. S. occupation policy 
prescribed against substituting German police authority for U. S. military authority.   
Initially, the U. S. Army hoped to requisition most of these food items from German 
stocks; however, hope was not a good plan.  Considering the inability of many German 
communities to provide for their own reduced rations, first the U.S. Army and then the U. S. 
Government recognized the need to supplement shortages either by importing items or through 
relief efforts.  Fortunately, the UNRRA and its successor, the International Refugee 
Organization, managed and supervised the majority of the relief efforts through welfare agencies 
to include the Red Cross, National Catholic Welfare Conference, American Friends Service 
Committee, and the American Joint Distribution Committee.
338
 
3.2.3.1  Billeting.   
Approximately 500 centers and camps, housing roughly 800,000 Displaced Persons 
operated within the U. S. occupation zone in the summer 1945.  By 1 Jan 1947, the numbers of 
both centers and DPs decreased to 443 Displaced Persons centers and approximately 350,000 
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DPs in the U. S. occupation zone, Germany, most concentrated around confiscated 
NSDAP/government buildings and particularly Wehrmacht kasernes and facilities that 
substituted for home and community to this population.  (See Appendix IV.4.3.1 for a partial list 
of DP centers.)
339
   
Many facilities required major repair – both work crews and repair material scarce.  
During the 1½ years following the institution of military government, many facilities, hardly 
Beautiful Homes and Gardens awardees, at least sported repaired roofs, windows, some glass 
and others plastic or whatever workable material scrounged from the rubble, and offered a 
measure of heat and electricity.  In many cases, the residents themselves repaired what they 
could with the scarce supplies provided from the local German communities, the U. S. Army, 
and relief organizations through the UNRRA and International Refugee Organization.  Although 
extremely limited, living space allowed families to remain together.  Most centers, equipped with 
dispensaries, space for schools, workshops and religious services, and offering a variety of social 
activities depending on the ethnic make-up of the groups, served these Displaced Persons 
communities far better than facilities in the German communities for those DPs living outside the 
centers, and certainly better than under the Nazi regime.  Perusing 30 June 1946 data on the 
status of Displaced Persons in the U. S. occupation zone in Germany, 373,758 DPs lived in the 
camps and centers while 117,149 DPs lived outside the centers.  Information on this latter group 
is indeed scanty, though members of this group could move into the centers up until June 1947, 
and certainly qualified for subsistence support.  Nonetheless, repatriation for those wishing to 
return to their homelands or resettlement for those not willing to return remained the objective of 
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both the U. S. military government and the UNRRA/IRO.   Interestingly, as early as December 
1945, U. S. military authorities had already calculated that about 217,395 DPs had opted for non-
repatriation.  Four years later, 272,474 Displaced Persons, apparently opting not to repatriate, 
remained in Germany, 120,841 residing in the 49 remaining DP centers 148,916 living in the 
German economy and 9,707 serving as members of the civilian labor service units.   
The U. S. Army support mission to the Displaced Person project ended on  
1 July 1950, as the mission transferred from the International Refugee Organization to German 
authorities.   
3.2.3.2  Feeding. 
 Feeding any population in devastated Germany after 1945 often exacerbated tensions as 
some groups received a higher level of rations at the expense of other groups, and proved an 
extremely challenging task for U. S. Army forces during much of the military occupation.  The 
official policy toward Displaced Persons in the U. S. occupation zone prescribed that in general 
the German population would not receive as high a ration as the DPs; that the ration for the 
average DP hovered around 2000 calories per day.  The German population lived on an official 
rationed scale of calories that fluctuated often during the occupation period, but rarely reached 
2,000 calories per day depending on the category or condition of the individual e.g., mine 
worker, child, pregnancy, hospitalized.  While some special rates, e.g., the persecutee ration 
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Children to 1 year 1,790 
Children 1 to 5 years 1,650 
Children 6 to 17 years 2,650 
Normal consumers 2,000 
Persons requiring special care but not hospitalized 2,700 




The following chart indicates the categories and source of food rations in net long tons.  The first 
column, Total Issued Stocks, represents the issue from U. S. Army Civil Affairs/military 
government stocks.  The second column, Estimated Issues, represents items from the German 




 Total Issued Stocks Estimated German Issues Total 
Total 77,029.67 134,164.04 211,193.71 
Item    
Cereals, flour 20,546.69 37,342.00 57,888.69 
Meats, fish, fats 10,110.05 5,645.36 15,755.41 
Fruits, vegetables 21,204.69 71,859.08 93,063.77 
Milk, milk 
products 
9697.58 17,956.82 27,654.40 
Sugar, jams 4,760.29 300.00 5,060.29 
Miscellaneous 10,710.37 1,060.78 11,771.15 
 
To provide this level of support in Fiscal Year 1946-1947, the U. S. Army Civil Affairs 
agencies issued and arranged military transportation for a total of 211,193.71 long tons (plus 
packaging) of various food products delivered to the ten supply points – Augsburg, Bayreuth, 
Darmstadt, Heilbronn, Kassel, Lauf an der Pegnitz, Munich, Regensburg, Rosenheim and 
Würzburg.
342
  From these points, U. S. quartermaster and transportation assets fanned out to the 
430+ DP centers on regular weekly trips.  U. S. Army stocks comprised approximately 77,029.67 
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long tons, while the German economy and items, originally intended to supplement the German 




PART C.  Support the Families. 
 
4.  Logistics Really Matters:  Little Americas begin to crawl. 
   
 The nearly imperceptible birth of Little Americas in Germany emerged with the 
appointment at USFET Headquarters of the Special Occupational Planning Board on 19 
September 1945.  Evidence suggests that the issue of family members joining their spouses in 
overseas assignments spawned the convening of this Board.  The Stars and Stripes 12 May 1945 
issue reported that the ban on dependents of Army personnel “joining husbands and relatives 
overseas” would remain in place because of shortages of transportation, food and housing.
344
 
Although the first family members did not arrive in Germany until April 1946, the question of 
joining their spouses in occupied Germany arose as early as 4 June 1945 when General 
Eisenhower, SHAEF Commander, asked General Marshall about “the possibility of enunciating 




By August 1945, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,ETOUSA/USFET Headquarters 
recommended to the USFET Chief of Staff that consideration of facilities expansion to provide 
for family members allowed to join their spouses should begin.  This recommendation did not 
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target the arrival of family members specifically; rather, the recommendation focused on the 
possibility of a long-term occupation and the wisdom of consolidating troop locations into more 
permanent, compact installations “similar to pre-war Army posts in the United States.”
346
  After 
approval by the Chief of Staff, the Special Occupational Planning Board convened with the 
specific task of planning military communities (MILCOMs) in occupied Germany.
347
 
 Arguably, the decision allowing family members to join stationed spouses overseas 
stressed improvement of troop morale as the primary consideration.  However, many of the old-
timers who had not been home for a while redeployed within the first 6-9 months after V-E Day.  
Consequently, the massive redeployment and return to the U. S. by the end of 1945 resolved the 
issue for about 2 ½ million of the slightly over 3 million service members stationed in Europe on 
V-E Day.   The soldiers who had served less than two years had to serve out their terms.  Of this 
group, officers, all ranks, and the most senior non-commissioned officers, E-7 to E-9, wishing to 
bring family members overseas, had to agree initially to a minimum service in occupied 
Germany of one year.   
Several factors combined to convince the War Department of the sagacity in allowing 
family members to join their spouses overseas.  While fraternization phased out officially over 
the early months of the occupation, both a staggering venereal disease rate and the booming 
illegitimate birth rate brought about by fraternization of U. S. soldiers with local women caused 
enough concern to elicit serious monitoring and potential disciplinary action by U. S. occupation 
authorities.  According to Franklin Davis, German authorities estimated that occupation soldiers 
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fathered between twenty to thirty thousand illegitimate children.  The joke in many German 
communities, “In the next war, just send the uniforms, you left the Army here,” rankled.
348
   
Notwithstanding the medical, economic and moral issues surrounding fraternization, two 
less personal but certainly pertinent arguments supported the policy of shipping family members 
to Europe to join their spouses.  Such a move would eliminate the cost to families of managing 
two households; coincidentally, such a move would reduce the War Department’s budget for 
funding two households.  Furthermore, American family life in German communities would 
provide to the “peoples of occupied countries an example of democratic American family and 
home life,”
349
 or, as Donna Alvah contends, the domestic side of the American lifestyle – 
families, wives, children, as well as their service member spouses – “could exert soft-power 
influence that both complemented and tempered the United States’ hard-power martial 
presence.”
350
    
 Perhaps the foremost solid rationale for shipping family members overseas lie in the 
Army’s desperate need to keep, if not the specially trained personnel, at least those with 
experience in Theater operations to complete not only the troop redeployment but also the 
massive equipment redeployment mission of the U. S. Army in Europe.  Additionally, perhaps 
the benefit of bringing family members overseas might stimulate volunteers for overseas duty.  
The assumption had always been that Americans would live overseas as they did in America.   
4.1  U. S. Army planning and logistics preparation for family arrivals.   
The Special Occupational Planning Board convened officially on 5 October 1945 and 
thereafter twice monthly until it dissolved in March 1946 as various Headquarters staff sections 
picked up the Board’s duties.  According to Domestic Economy, the Board assumed for planning 
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purposes an indefinite occupation period of at least five years.  Further, the bulk of the financial 
costs would come from German reparation funds.  Finally, the Board recognized that some 
construction materials and funding would have to come from the United States.  Initially, the 
War Department approved the USFET recommendations, with the caveat that construction and 
rehabilitation costs would be borne by reparation payments from the Germans -- a warning that 
Congress would limit expenditures in Germany and that any expenditures would be under 
scrutiny.  This proved to be the case, especially with funding requests in mid-Spring 1946 when 
USFET requested funds for the overseas school system as well as funding for building material 
not available in Germany.  At this time, Germany was not the only country short on building 
materials – this seemed to be a worldwide problem, therefore, requests for building material 
support met resistance on not only cost bases, but also shortage issues in the Continental U. S. 
(CONUS).
351
   
Established to plan for MILCOMS during the occupation, the Board’s tasks included not 
only facilities for dependents, but also “permanent troop and headquarters locations, barracks, 
utilities, recreational facilities, officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ quarters, clubs, 
expanded commissary and post exchange installations, and children’s schools.”
352
  Not 
mentioned in this source, but equally critical, expansion of medical and transportation 
capabilities joined the list of tasks.  The basic questions required answers:  How many military 
communities would support the troops and family members for how long, beginning when? 
The target date for the first shipload of family members to arrive loomed in the near 
future:  April 1946.  As for number of family members, the planning figure of 90,000, based on 
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two groups of troops authorized to request shipment of family members (officers and non-
commissioned officers, E7-E9), and an Occupational Troop Basis (OTB) of 363,000,
353
 proved 
excessive.  Nonetheless, the scope of planning and execution for the arrival of approximately 
90,000 family members, as huge as it was, especially in the face of considerable budget 
constraints, constant nay-saying, if not occasional outright disapproval from the War 
Department, proceeded on schedule.   
Problems arose as the Board and USFET Headquarters progressed along their timeline.  
First, one of the Board’s planning list of assumptions, sent out to subordinate commands, 
directed these commands to seek out existing German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe installations as 
possible stationing locations, giving critical thought to such factors as access to logistics 
resupply, deployment issues should the force have to deploy, and extent and cost of 
rehabilitation.  However, particularly at this time, many German military installations housed 
Displaced Persons.  According to Domestic Economy, as many as 55 of the 112 selected sites 
housed Displaced Persons.  Even if the Army relocated the DPs in a timely fashion to a desirable 
and workable location, taking over the then-vacated kasernes, clearly USFET could not provide 
accommodations for the planned 90,000 arrivals.   
USFET G-1 then established a priority system for both transportation
354
 and assignment 
of quarters.  Relative to billeting arrangements, the ability of a particular community to receive 
family members depended on available accommodations.  In most cases, available 
accommodations depended on the ability of the German community to fill requisitions and the 
willingness of U. S. commanders to demand requisition fills.  Additional criteria figured into the 
decision-making process, e.g., availability of potable water and sewage disposal systems, 
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commissary facilities, a post exchange stocking essential items, utility maintenance services and 
adequate utilities to include light and heat for cooking, a community security organization, 
medical and evacuation facilities for women and children, and a fire fighting organization.  
Obviously a short suspense for such detail but one way or the other, USFET Headquarters 
directed subordinate commands to have final planning completed in January 1946, provided an 
interim status report to the War Department in December 1945,  and finalized plans for the first 
shipment of family members in April 1946.   
While the War Department prepared paperwork and arranged transportation of family 
members to the ports of debarkation, it more specifically delineated restrictions placed on 
USFET with respect to funding issues not only on construction policy but also on establishment 
of schools for family members’ children.  The Office of the Adjutant General initially refused to 
authorize U. S. War Department appropriated funds or the shipment of materials from the United 
States for construction or rehabilitation of facilities for dependents travelling to join their spouses 
in Germany, allowing that reparations-in-kind and materials available locally would be favorably 
regarded.  Further, Army stocks not excess to the needs of the major commands were excluded 
from the category of locally available materials.  Last, and equally discouraging, no additional 
United States Army personnel were authorized for the accomplishment of the construction and 
rehabilitation efforts.
355
  This back-and-forth on funding between the War Department and 
USFET continued not only into June-July 1946 timeframe, but also for most of the military 
occupation.  Reductions in the Occupational Troop Basis from the September 1945 figure of 
363,000 to 200,000 by 1 January 1947, then to a reduction of 160,000 personnel by 1 July 1947 
further complicated planning projections.  Not only did the Overseas Troop Basis (OTB) 
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reduction decrease the number of family members eligible to join their spouses;
356
 this reduction, 
coupled with impending consolidation and reorganization of military units rendered projections 
of what communities would remain open even more difficult. 
USFET G-4 Plans Division sent its tasking memorandum (see Appendix IV.5.1); to the 
Headquarters staff agencies officially on 15 November 1945.  Of course, some of these tasks had 
been “works in progress” for several months.  It seems from the list that a lot of work remained 
to be completed and the War Department had clearly drawn the lines on availability of 
appropriated funds for construction and rehabilitation.  Eventually, some funding became 
available - USFET developed the argument that the War Department budget would save funds 
from non-payment of stateside rental allowances for those families traveling overseas.  
Additionally, USFET would save on transportation costs by restricting shipment of baggage 
allowances for family members traveling overseas.  The War Department backed down 
somewhat, authorizing the Theater to use existing Engineer funds ($1.6 million) for MILCOM 
development and allowed the USFET Quartermaster to request up to $2.2 million additional 
funds for the fiscal year ending June 1946.
357
  The War Department however reiterated its earlier 
conditions relative to development of military communities – consume supplies and material 
excess to Army needs and procure shortages through reparations (occupation funds) from local 
sources.  Nonetheless, arrival planning for the first boatload of family members still focused on 
April 1946. 
By December 1945, of the original 112 community locations considered, 75 remained as 
feasible projects.  The USFET Engineer published (in December) the upcoming construction 
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program for USFET, Germany (see Appendix IV.4.1).
358
  This chart reflected a mix of purely 
military facilities as well as family member facilities.  However, even if available manpower 
equaled the estimated manpower, projects dragged on because of shortages in funds and 
material. 
 Regardless, USFET moved forward with its April 1946 arrival date, published 
application instructions for transportation and billeting arrangements in February 1946, directed 
subordinate units to submit applications for the April shipment to Theater Headquarters, through 
the chain of command, no later than 1 March 1946.
359
  The first families did indeed arrive in 
April 1946.  Less than a year from V-E Day, the reality of transient fighting troops redeploying 
out of Europe in general and Germany in particular permutated into a military force looking like 
an American community settling in for an indefinite stay. 
4.2  The first families arrive in Germany, April 1946. 
 The United States Army Troopship (USAT) Thomas H. Barry arrived in Bremerhaven, 
Germany with 379 family members on 28 April 1946.
360
  Headquarters USFET prohibited 
occupation force sponsors from meeting their families as Bremen port accommodations could 
not yet support visitors.  Various Bremerhaven port officials shepherded family members from 
the ship onto the appropriate trains, heading in the directions of their occupation force sponsors.  
LTG Clay wrote of his experience-in-waiting at the Berlin Bahnhof for the duty train: 
This proved to be a wait of several hours as locomotive troubles delayed the train.   
In a few months our dependents in Germany aggregated about 30,000 persons, 
scattered in many communities.  Shortly after their arrival one of our press 
correspondents in Berlin remarked that our life in Germany had become a replica 
of American suburban life.
361
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4.2.1  Where to live and how to move around?  
 
 Because of the shortages of funds, building materials and labor, the first family arrivals 
received housing requisitioned from the local German communities.  This could take several 
forms, e.g., apartments and duplexes, hotel rooms converted for families, or single-family 
homes.  U. S. military government regulations prohibited American families from living in the 
same buildings as German families, consequently the American families often found themselves 
either in an enclave of requisitioned living quarters, or isolated from any other Americans.  
Nonetheless, their sponsors and the sponsoring military organization had on many occasions 
already Americanized the living accommodations with the necessary accoutrements to include 
often enough even a maid (who lived in the quarters, space allowing), and a shared 
gardener/maintenance person. 
Headquarters, EUCOM discontinued requisitioning living quarters from the Germans 
in1947.  The Headquarters had to plan and budget for new construction or significant repair of 
existing facilities to house families coming in.  The War Department authorized a measure of 
funding while the occupation funds account provided the bulk of funds for primarily repairs.  By 
1949, the German Government allocated a budget to the occupation forces for new construction 
and repairs.  By December1949, 17,621 U. S. military families lived in Germany.  Family 
members number 38,624, of which 37,188 lived in permanent quarters, 2,360 in temporary 
quarters and 640 in transient quarters.  German Government appropriations for 1949-1950, 
assured construction of an additional 1,948 units.   
4.2.2  Furniture, refrigerators, stoves, washing machines and vacuum cleaners. 
 Many German appliances operated on 220-volt alternating currency.  Doubtless some of 
the better German homes requisitioned by the U. S. Army contained some of this equipment.  
237 
 
However, for those American families living in modified facilities, converted hotels or converted 
barracks, the U. S. Army Quartermaster had to procure and ship from CONUS refrigerators, 
electric stoves, washing machines and the like.  Some families arranged to ship small appliances 
as part of their household goods.  The American families operated any small American-made 
electrical appliances with transformers, as most American equipment ran on 110-volt currency.  
One Army wife wrote of her experience in her Berlin home in 1946. 
I had one especially delightful surprise when I inspected our new home.  Before 
leaving Louisville, I had gone to a lot of trouble arranging for shipment of my 
washing machine, and I was mighty unhappy to learn it would take several 
months.  It still hasn’t arrived, but I no longer worry, for the basement laundry is 
one of the finest and most modern I’ve ever seen.  With its electric dryer and 
ironer, in addition to the almost new washing machine, it certainly makes my 




Mrs. Berry and her family (spouse and two children) lived in a requisitioned nine-room 
furnished house with three servants – one full-time maid, a second part-time woman to do the 
laundry and a part-time gardener.  The Army requisitioned the missing kitchen utensils, dishes, 
crystal and like items for the family.  The house, along with several others in the neighborhood 
requisitioned by the U. S. Army survived somewhat intact the bombing campaigns that destroyed 
much of the Stadtteil Lankwitz.  Lankwitz is located about equally between Dahlem, an elite 
neighborhood where the U. S Army Headquarters was located, and Templehof Airfield, where 
Mrs. Berry’s husband worked.  The family had no car with them, thus relying on Army 
transportation or Berlin’s public transportation system to get to work and shop at either of 
Berlin’s two commissaries.  As Mrs. Berry felt uncomfortable returning home on the streetcar 
with her groceries, she usually resorted to the military-provided taxi service.  “The trip back[on 
German public transportation] is no fun.  Laden with bulky packages of meat, vegetables and 
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clanking bottles of milk that always tower over the tops of the sacks; you are a fine target for 
bitter Germans.  At such times, I have no doubt what they think of us.  They hate us. . . . I keep 
wondering how this sort of occupation can teach them our brand of democracy.”
363
   
Lelah Berry’s story probably reflects the average lifestyle for Army officer families living in 
Berlin in 1946-1947.  
 By 1948-1949, when the U. S. Army Quartermasters could provide repaired or newly 
constructed units for arriving families, temporary shortages of household furniture and 
appliances caused by temporarily housed Berlin Blockade personnel frustrated many a family.  
Army Quartermasters also discovered that local units had little recordkeeping to account for 
previously purchased or built furniture, and the occupation costs fund account could not 
accommodate massive purchases without cutting back on key construction projects.  Army 
records for the period do not discuss solutions; surprising that the narratives even mention poor 
unit bookkeeping, begging the question of higher headquarters oversight, but this problem of 
property accountability – to include accountability for requisitions, plagued the U. S. Army 
headquarters from the beginning of the occupation. Relative to household furnishings, this 
problem no doubt led to the official authorization for command-sponsored families to ship 
controlled amounts of their personal household goods overseas with them.      
4.2.3  Textbooks, teachers and the Dependents School System (DSS).   
 
 Establishing a school system for dependent children, although a necessity once the War 
Department approved family member travel to occupied Germany, surprisingly generated as 
much, if not more ruckus between the War Department and USFET over funding than requests 
for housing construction funds.  USFET had initially requested $4,000,000 to establish and 
support a school system serving 10,120 dependent children.  The War Department initially 
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claimed that it could not legally fund a school system.  Precedents, however, altered that 
argument somewhat.  The War Department had argued back and forth for almost a century as to 
fiscal responsibility of the U. S. Government for military dependent children schooling, 
acknowledging by a Judge Advocate General (JAG) ruling in 1913 that school services for 
military children could not be separated out from military activities.  The Secretary of War then 
decided to use recreation funds and post exchange profits to fund schools, an action supported by 
another JAG ruling in 1925 that validated the inappropriateness, if not illegality of using 
appropriated funds (funds budgeted through Congress to support military operations) for school 
costs.  Finally, by May 1946, the two organizations reached at least a temporary agreement.  
USFET published General Order 132 establishing the Dependent Schools Service (DSS) under 
the command of Major Virgil R. Walker, assigning DSS to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, 
USFET Headquarters, in Frankfurt, Germany.   By 1947, a Dependent Schools Detachment 
organized and by April 1948, reorganized as the Dependent Schools division under the 
supervision of an Army colonel.  Finally, in the mid-1960s, the Air Force and Army dependent 
school systems merged under the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS) system, 
headed by a civilian educator releasing military commanders from the business of education.
364
  
In most cases, military communities continued to provide transportation and other logistics 
support to the school system from military community G-4 assets.  
Families incurred a small monthly fee:  $8 per month per child for officers, $4 per month 
per child for E7, 8 and 9 families and no charge for the lower enlisted grades.  Non-appropriated 
fund sources and Class VI stores, the largest donor at $375,000, contributed to the school budget, 
thus avoiding the expenditure of appropriated funds to cover expenses.   
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The Dependent School System (DSS), accredited through the North Central Association 
of Colleges and Secondary Schools, opened for school in October 1946, the first school year 
running through June 1947.  At that time, approximately 500 students attended one of the five 
high schools -- located in Berlin, Erlangen, Frankfurt, Heidelberg or Munich, or one of the forty-
one elementary schools, that accepted up to 2,500 students; the approximate student-to-teacher 
ratio at 20:1.  In that first year, 80 high schools students claimed graduation from a Germany-
located high school.  One hundred twenty teachers from thirty-four states came to Germany on 
one-year contracts to teach in the schools.  Additionally most schools hired German language 
teachers, paid from occupation costs, and according to Domestic Economy, approximately 90% 
of the students attended German language classes.
365
  By 1949, the Dependent School System 
covered 102 schools: 37 kindergartens, 58 elementary schools and 7 high schools.  The student 
population jumped from 4,844 in January 1949 to 7,622 by the end of December, with 1,209 
students enrolled in kindergarten, 5,525 in elementary schools and 888 in the high schools, 
graduating 130 high school students in June 1949.  At that time, seven high schools, all 
providing dormitory facilities during the week for the 240 or so far-away students existed, 
located in Berlin, Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Nürnberg and München.  
 Also opening its doors in Germany, the University of Maryland offered a two-year 
program and ran its first semester from October to December 1949 with 1,800 enrolled students, 
mostly Army officers, at a student cost of $32 per 4-credit course.  Initially, the University 
operated out of six locations, rotating professors (and their courses) after each semester. 
The U. S. Army also encouraged mental gymnastics for the servicemembers through its 
119 educational centers and the United States Armed Forces Institute, offering a variety of 
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courses, to include high school completion programs as well as technical and vocational training 
classes at no cost to the servicemember.         
4.2.4  The Army Exchange Service and Sears & Roebuck:  perfume, hosiery and diapers. 
The various merchandising and service agencies – Army Exchanges, commissaries, 
bakeries -- in anticipation of the arrival of family members, planned initially to stock items and 
provide services similar to like items and services in stateside department stores and facilities, 
within the limits of space and population served.  The largest of these agencies, the Army 
Exchange, planned for fifty-one stores within the U. S. occupation zone, Germany.  Eight of 
these stores, classified as Type A, would serve larger communities and offer such items as 
furniture, clothing and automobiles.  Type B and C-stores served smaller communities, carrying 
a smaller range of, and fewer items.  The Army Exchange also had responsibility for filling 
stations that provided both gasoline and appropriate oil.  The Army Exchange through the 
military community commanders issued fuel ration cards to qualified individuals.   
Unlike the Army Exchange that dealt primarily with “dry goods,” commissaries provided 
food products, and like the Army Exchange, functioned under a modified ration system, based 
again on the limited supplies the system could ship in and stock.  In both cases, rationing served 
as a tool to restrict black marketing.  Generally, the Army Exchange Service and the commissary 
system rationed the following items:  liquor, cigarettes, coffee, gasoline, candy, and soap.    
 Another type of exchange service flourished in occupied Germany – at least until the 
1948 currency reform.   
The Germans who were best off were those who could still lay their hands on 
jewellery, watches or cameras.  Franz Sayn-Wittgenstein remembered selling a 
badly damaged piece of Meissen porcelain to a black-marketeer for a considerable 
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number of cigarettes.  The piece was restored and sold to an American general’s 




Known by various nicknames as the “cigarette economy,” or “cigarette currency,” the black 
market provided an opportunity for Germans to purchase necessities by bartering their valuables 
for cigarettes that in turn, used as currency, could purchase food items, coal or other necessities 
and for many Americans, military and civilian, to line their pockets.  As Mark Wyman wrote, 
“Efforts to thwart the illegal trading made little headway on a Continent where millions were 
participating in it – most notably the occupying troops.  High ranking Allied officers seeking vast 
riches were involved, as well as displaced persons trying to garner enough food for a satisfactory 
diet.”
367
  A temporary variation on the illegal black-market scene, the short-lived official, 
somewhat regulated and supervised bartering markets (in Berlin and Frankfurt) were sanctioned 
by the military government for about 18 months as a means for Germans to supplement their 
meager rations.  Germans could trade valuables for necessities from Americans who had shipped 
desired items through the postal service for just this purpose.  Selling or otherwise trading 
exchange or commissary items was (and is today) illegal.  Once the currency reform was 
launched in June 1948, black markets faded, although continuing to operate, as products flooded 
the market.  For the average German, even some initially expensive items cost less than risking 
illegal black market activities.
368
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4.2.5  Leisure and Recreation. 
EUCOM’s Special Services Division offered virtually every imaginable leisure-time 
activity in support of EUCOM’s program to improve the morale of service members and family 
members assigned to overseas duty.  Leisure-time activities in the U. S. occupation zone varied 
widely depending on location.  Naturally, the bigger the military community and the nearer to 
larger towns and cities, the more activities and recreational facilities developed.   
Lelah Berry mentioned her family’s ten-day tour of Switzerland arranged through the 
Army’s Special Services Division.  The $140.25 bill included transportation, hotel and meals for 
the family of four.  Martha Gravois mentioned another popular spot – Schloss Kronberg, about 
twenty kilometers outside Frankfurt-am-Main, requisitioned by American military authorities 
and converted into an officers’ club, with an interesting history.  The Occupation Forces in 
Europe Series, Second Year, 1946-1947, published the following table on tour prices offered 
through American Express (American Express contracted with the U. S. Army as early as 1947), 
noting that for the year ending 30 June 1947, 64,500 persons participated. 
 
Country Military Personnel Civilians 
Denmark $40.00 $40.00 
Switzerland 40.50 47.25 
Switzerland-Rome 23.50 23.50 
Holland, First Class rates 80.00 80.00 
Paris 35.00 35.00 
Riviera, First Class rates 58.50 58.50 
United Kingdom 83.50 93.75 
Czechoslovakia 43.00 43.00 
Belgium-Luxembourg 80.50 80.50 
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The Stuttgart Military Post put out a memorandum to all its subordinate units in March 
1947 notifying force members of the impending opening of an operational nine-hole golf course 
by June 1947.  According to the memorandum, the golf course, located near the Stuttgart-
Leonberg boundary, would also provide clubs and balls for golf enthusiasts who left their 
equipment back in the States.
369
  Sadly, this golf course reduced acreage that neighboring 
German residents had used as truck gardens to supplement their grocery bills.  This golf course, 
predecessor of today’s Golf Club Neckar eV., served U. S. military forces and families for more 
than 50 years.  Several other communities, particularly those hosting senior leader commands -- 
Heidelberg, Garmisch -- followed suit, offering golf courses to the military community.   
Activities and services managed through the Special Services Division increased over the 
occupation period for the geographical area supported by the Special Services Division.  
Generally, the Special Services offices throughout the U. S. occupation zone had responsibility 
for athletics to include competitive sports, live entertainment (USO and other organizational 
shows, service clubs), recreation (crafts, maintenance and handcraft shops, libraries and 
operation of the rest and recreation centers), morale and welfare activities (trips and tours), and 
the Army Exchange Service.  Although the USO discontinued its soldiers’ shows in 1947, 
Special Services contracted for fifteen Allied forces-sponsored shows, forty-eight German group 
plays and musical productions and eleven Allied forces bands in Fiscal Year 1946-1947.  
Further, as of July 1946, Special Services organized and maintained forty-nine service clubs with 
lounges, game rooms, music studios and photography darkrooms, ballrooms, snack bars,  as well 
as ten rest centers.  
                                                   
369
 Memorandum from Headquarters, Stuttgart Military Post, Subject:  Community Golf Course, dated 25 March 
1947.  Baden-Württemberg Hauptstaatsarchiv, OMGUS Files, Fiche 12-222-1/5. 
245 
 
Alone, the opportunity to travel inexpensively to most of Europe, supported by U. S. 
Army facilities in many locations, proved a valuable incentive to volunteer for duty in Germany. 
Although the number of rest centers dropped to three by July 1947, reflecting the diminished 
military population, the three remaining centers – Berchtesgaden, Chiemsee and Garmisch – 
rivaled any recreation center in the United States.  Many of the recreational areas provided 
world-class facilities -- each center featured hotels, clubs, snack bars, theaters and motion picture 
halls, as well as locale-specific activities.  Garmisch, the host of the 1936 Winter Olympics, 
hardly touched by the war, offered every kind of imaginable winter activity, particularly 
unparalleled downhill and cross-country skiing and ice skating  and year-round picture-perfect 
scenery.  Berchtesgaden, home of Hitler’s famous retreat, the Eagle’s Nest, drew thousands 
curious for an impression of the man who had brought them to Germany in the first place.  The 
Lake Hotel Resort, right on the shores of the Chiemsee offered a beautiful other-worldly retreat, 
especially for those who loved the outdoors, beautiful water and mountain scenes and old castles.  
The U. S. Army requisitioned many of the facilities, providing equipment to service and family 
members at little to no cost.  From any of these locations, soldiers and their families could jump 
off to other parts of southern Europe.  Austria was only a few kilometers away from Garmisch 
and Berchtesgaden. 
For those families and service members preferring to stay closer to “home,” soldier 
shows and cultural activities, performed or hosted by both Allied forces patronage and German 
companies, offered entertainment most likely not common back home.  Almost every military 
community operated movie theaters, 16 and 35 mm films, and until July 1946, these shows were 
free.  Beginning in July 1946, Special Service initiated paid admission at 15 cents for military 
and family members, and 30 cents for civilians.  By March 1947, admission jumped to 20 cents 
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for the military and family members and 15 cents for minors under 14 years of age.  Further, 
after arrival of family members and by July 1946, military communities boasted fifty-nine 
handcraft shops with average weekly participation of over 30,000 (men, women and children), 
and according to the Second Year annual report, by October 1946, the number of shops had 
doubled.  This program was so popular that the Special Services Division organized training 
schools for craft shop supervisors and teachers.  Craft manuals and training guides soon 
followed.  Initially, craft shops received supplies shipped from the U. S., surplus Army material 
and “captured enemy material.”
370
 
Certainly not the final activity available for service members and families, but an 
important one in the days before television, libraries sprouted up throughout the occupation zone.  
Touting by July 1946, 296 permanent facilities scattered over the zone, in schools, clubs, military 
dayrooms, hotels, hospitals, as well as 36 bookmobiles to get to those families not close enough 
to seek out the libraries on a regular basis.  By July 1946, the library system catalogued over 
546,000 volumes, and expected to increase these resources during the third year of occupation by 
approximately $695,000, adding more magazine, newspaper and book titles.
371
      
As with the recreational activities, athletics appealed to participant and spectator alike.  
The USFET Theater Chief of Support Services for the Fiscal Year 1946-1947, reported USFET 
organized competitions at Theater, inter-Theater and Allied levels in “archery, badminton, 
baseball, basketball, bobsledding, boxing, cross country running, diving, fencing, football, golf, 
handball, horseshoes, ice hockey, skating, skiing, shooting, soccer, softball, swimming, table 
tennis, track and field events, tennis, volleyball, water polo and wrestling.”  Most noteworthy 
according to the reports, the U. S. Army hosted an international track and field meet in 
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September 1946, at the Olympic Stadium in Spandau (British Sector, Berlin), inviting teams 
from Great Britain, Denmark, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia 
and the U. S., garnering over 90,000 spectators.
372
  The variety of athletic opportunities available 
to service-and family members at minimum, if any cost, overmatched most communities “back 
home.”
373
  Moreover, U. S. military forces and their family members more than likely 
appreciated considerably more activities and support than they might have had in an equivalent 
geographical area in the United States.  Many of the recreational services and sports programs 
offered are listed at Appendix VI.4.2.5. 
5.  Summary.  Long-term impact of communities on the logistics support system. 
  
Doubtless, few leaders in Washington or in Germany considered the long-term potential 
of the U. S. Army infrastructure in Germany as the U. S. military government turned over its 
occupation mission to the High Commission for Occupied Germany (HICOG), serving from the 
mid-summer 1949 to 5 May 1955.  “We are in this occupation business for the long haul” had 
long since replaced the euphoria of military victory with the U. S. Army loggies no closer to 
completing their mission.  The short one or two year military occupation stretched to four years; 
General Clay had announced in 1948 that no date had been set to end the occupation; in 
particular, the military-run occupation.  Although the High Commission for Occupied Germany 
(HICOG), serving from mid-summer 1949 to 5 May 1955 took over the occupation mission, 
albeit considerably reduced, the military forces remained, as the U. S. High Commission, a 
civilian organization composed primarily of U. S. State Department employees, possessed no 
organic logistics capability. 
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Amidst the chaos of war destruction in Germany, the overriding concern of the 
Americans and British to finish the war in the Pacific Theater, to redeploy U. S. forces out of 
Europe, to repatriate and settle displaced and refugee populations, and to establish a functional 
military government – each issue brought with it a host of logistics problems.  A military force 
designed to either fight or train to fight became a peacekeeping custodial type of organization.  
Official efforts designed to engage off-duty servicemembers – sports, and other leisure activities, 
education, travel – improved life for the servicemembers, but failed initially to create the 
American setting in the U. S. occupation zone desired by military leaders.   
Venereal disease rates skyrocketed initially, as did crime rates, and service members went 
on strike (January 1946) over their perceived slow return to the States and civilian life.  The 
Command tried harder to improve the morale and the community setting.  Concerned leaders 
suggested that allowing family members to join their spouses assigned for occupation duty in 
Europe, under certain conditions, might alleviate a number of the problems noted above and help 
to create a more American feeling within the military community.  Furthermore, as replacements, 
although considerably fewer in number than during the war, continued to flow into Germany to 
serve as part of the occupation force, adopting such a policy might also enhance overseas 
service, resulting in service members volunteering for occupation duty.  The situation did 
improve gradually.  The Displaced Persons mission faded as repatriation and resettlement actions 
whittled away at the numbers living in the assembly centers, so that by 1950 German authorities 
accepted the Displaced Persons mission.  Military communities consolidated and expanded 
within their boundaries.  Training areas, particularly Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels and Vilseck 
engaged the ingenuity of Army Engineers in upgrading the facilities to accommodate larger than 
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company-size units in complex combined arms exercises, and soldiers went back to training in 





































   
Logistics, the Bridge to Cultural Exchange:  Bratwurst vs. Burger  
 
Introduction.   
In the early days after German capitulation, American military forces’ exposure to 
Germans resulted in more penicillin injected than bratwursts ingested.  Meat and other 
commodities common to the American soldiers were scarce among most Germans at this time.  
Venereal disease was not.  American commodities, however, provided early post-war cultural 
exchange opportunities for both soldiers and Germans.  Food, cigarettes, even a cover over one’s 
head enticed some Germans to barter their possessions – and for some women, even their bodies 
– for these commodities.
374
  One could have argued at the time as to whether warriors or 
prostitutes “own” the oldest profession. However, indisputable to both is the underlying 
requirement for logistics support.  Ironically, even issues of prostitution, often resulting after-
effects of venereal disease, and official occupation policies regarding these matters necessitated 
comprehensive logistics support.  Virtually every effort on the part of the U. S. occupation force 
in Germany after World War II in support of its mission, and even simply its presence in 
Germany required comprehensive logistics support -- from medical, food, housing, to even 
provision of recreational opportunities.   
This chapter focuses on selected German socio-cultural traditions and practices impacted 
by the imposition of an occupation force on a militarily defeated nation.  Furthermore, because 
this narrative argues that logistics underlay the occupation effort, the challenge forces one to 
forge the link between logistics support by the U. S. occupation force and cultural exchange 
between Americans and Germans.  As already noted, social issues such as prostitution and 
venereal disease fit in this discussion, albeit more indirectly.  The policies and efforts directed 
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toward German school reform, the German Youth Activities (GYA) and the establishment of 
Amerikahäuser spotlighted the U. S. military government’s reorientation efforts.  Moreover, this 
intervention in reorienting German culture from its “militant and authoritarian past”
375
 toward a 
democratic system formed perhaps the most important foundation for American cultural policy 
during the occupation years.  The most promising weapons for democratization – school, youth 
sports and activities, and libraries and learning centers -- targeted the younger generations.  
Furthermore, in this arena, U. S. Army logistics initiated and forged a growing German-
American relationship.  What began under the rubric of military orders, control and supervision, 
morphed into engagement, advice, and eventually partnership.  U. S Army logistics in one way 
or another, often transparently, provided the highways and by-ways from occupation to 
partnership.  
Comprised of six sections, the first and second sections introduce key U. S. post-World 
War II democratization and reeducation policies and their application toward the Germans.  The 
third section focuses on U. S. military government attempts to reform the German school system 
in the U. S. Zone of Occupation and sector in Berlin.  The fourth and fifth sections discuss two 
aspects of the cultural activities aimed at reeducation:  Amerikahäuser and the German Youth 
Activities, which U. S. Army personnel engaged in generally in fulfillment of their official duties 
as planners, advisers and supervisors.  The sixth section comments on the impact, particularly 
logistical, of official democratization and reeducation policies on German society, based on 
school reform attempts, Amerikahäuser and the GYA.  The final section summarizes the chapter.  
 
   
                                                   
375
 I have placed this phrase in quotes, not because I accept this interpretation of German history, rather, because 
many of the primary sources use this terminology to define their understanding of German history.  “Militant and 
authoritarian” therefore became the counter-point of their mission to reeducate and democratize the Germans. 
252 
 
1.  U. S. Post-War Democratization and Reeducation/Reorientation Policy. 
The U. S. Government’s initial German occupation policy matured as World War II 
progressed, from Morgenthau’s pastoralization concept to Truman’s reorientation and 
democratization concepts, with “the principal objective that Germany never again will threaten 
her neighbors or the peace of the world.  .  .  . The German people [should] be given the 
opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic 
and peaceful basis, and for eventual peaceful participation in international life by Germany.”
376
  
Initially formed in the framework of the British, Soviet, American wartime alliance, occupation 
policy evolved with the political situation and realities on the ground even as the official military 
government phase ended in 1949.     
The Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference (Yalta), 4-11 February 1945, 
focused on organization of the embryonic United Nations, political-geographic dimensions of 
post-war Europe, reconstruction of the liberated countries, French involvement in occupied 
Germany and in cursory fashion reparation issues.  The Potsdam Protocol,
377
 casually referred to 
as the  demilitarization, denazification, decartelization, and democratization (4 Ds) document,
378
 
refined the political, cultural and economic principles governing the treatment of Germany by the 
occupying powers in the initial occupation period.
379
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The U. S. War Department published the “Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United 
States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany, April 1945 (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067),” issuing guidance to its senior post-war commander in Germany, 
General Eisenhower.  Although not officially published until October 1945, the U. S. War 
Department drafted and fielded versions of JCS 1067 at least a year in advance of the Potsdam 
Conference.  The directive, apparently a model for the U. S. input to the Potsdam Protocol, 
deferred to the Potsdam Protocol where Protocol policy differed, but in the absence of specific 
guidance covered by the Potsdam Protocol, JCS 1067 represented the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
guidance to General Eisenhower in the initial post-war period.   
Specifically for the discussion of cultural impact, both the Potsdam Protocol and JCS 
1067 prescribed the key purpose of the occupation of Germany as “to prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful 
cooperation in international life by Germany.”
380
  Moreover, “German education shall be so 
controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the 
successful development of democratic ideas.”
381
  Further, “The judicial system will be 
reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, or justice under law and of equal 
rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.”
382
  Finally, “Subject to 
the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be 
permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected.  Subject likewise to the maintenance of 
military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.”
383
  In sum, U. S. senior 
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policy makers targeted the German education and justice systems as critical elements to reorient 
and reconstruct post-war Germany into an image of a democratic and peaceful nation. 
Additionally, and pertinent to a discussion of the impact of U. S. Forces on German 
cultural activities, JCS 1067 issued the following guidance to the Commander-in-Chief of United 
States Forces of Occupation in Germany:
384
 
(Part I, 4b)  Strongly discourage fraternization with the German officials and population. 
 
(Part I, 9d) Permit freedom of speech, press and religious worship, consistent with 
military necessity.   
(Part I, 10)  Obtain agreement at the Allied Control Council for uniform or coordinated 
policies for (a) control of public information media in Germany, (b) accreditation of 
foreign correspondents, (c) press censorship, and (d) issuance of official news 
communiqués dealing with Control Council matters. 
(Part I, 14a-d) (a)  Close all educational institutions within the U. S. Zone except those 
previously re-established by Allied authority.  The closure of Nazi educational 
institutions such as Adolf Hitler Schulen, Napolas and Ordensburgen and of Nazi 
organizations within other educational institutions will be permanent.  (b)  Establish a 
coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative program of 
reorientation designed to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the 
development of democratic ideals.  (c)  Permit the reopening of elementary 
(Volksschulen), middle (Mittelschulen) and vocational (Berufsschulen) schools at the 
earliest possible date after Nazi personnel have been eliminated.  Use in the classroom 
only textbooks and curricula free of Nazi and militaristic doctrine.  Under further 
guidance from the Allied Control Council, devise programs looking toward the reopening 
of secondary schools, universities and other institutions of higher learning.  Design and 
implement an interim education program, reopen institutions and departments offering 
training immediately essential or useful in the administration of military government and 
the purposes of the occupation.  (d) The military government should not intervene in 
questions concerning denominational control of German schools, or in religious 
instruction in German schools, except insofar as may be necessary to insure that religious 
instruction and administration of such schools conform to such Allied regulations as are 
or may be established pertaining to purging of personnel and curricula.
385
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The Directive to Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding 
the Military Government of Germany (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1779), 11 July 1947, in contrast to 
JCS 1067 softens the scope of the JCS 1067, which it superseded.  First, the anti-fraternization 
policy, officially rescinded in October 1945, in effect, became a fraternization policy to some 
degree to achieve the results of the restated official policy of JCS 1779.  Specifically, JCS 1779, 
Part VI, addresses the U. S. reorientation program under several headings.
386
   
(Section 22, Cultural Objectives)  Reeducation of the German people is an integral part in 
development of a democratic form of government and restoration of a stable and peaceful 
economy.  Secure coordinated occupying power reconstruction efforts to maintain the cultural 
unity of Germany while recognizing regional traditions and the Germans’ wishes to retain these 
traditions.  Encourage German initiative and responsible participation in Germany’s cultural 
reconstruction.  Expedite establishment of international cultural relations to overcome the 
spiritual isolation of the Nazi era.  
(Section 23, Education)   (a)  As education is the primary means to create a democratic Germany, 
encourage and assist the development of educational methods, institutions, programs and 
materials that further create democratic attitudes and practices.  Require the German Länder 
authorities to develop an education system with educational programs offering equal opportunity 
to all students according to their qualifications.  (b)  Eliminate all National Socialist, militaristic 
and aggressively nationalist teaching, practices and influences from the German educational 
system.  
(Section 26, Public Information)  (a)  Supervise, encourage, and assist the Germans in 
development of media and public information programs that support the political and cultural 
objectives of this Directive.  (b)  Implement free exchange of information and democratic ideas 
by all media in Germany (IAW 23 April 1947 decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers).  (c)  
Develop and maintain media and information programs (both German and military government- 
sponsored) to further the objectives of the U. S. Government.               
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The Office of Military Government for Germany, United States (OMGUS) inserted itself 
into the process of democratization and school reform through official studies, particularly the 
team of professional educators headed by George F. Zook, in August 1946, followed by a decree 
from the U. S. Deputy Military Governor, General Clay, issued to the Länder-level ERADs in 
January 1947.  Publication of the Allied Control Authority Directive No. 54, “Basic Principles 
for Democratization of Education in Germany,” that codified official OMGUS policies on school 
reform, followed in June 1947.     
Relative to reorientation through the Public Information program, OMGUS-
Württemberg-Baden, for example, issued Memorandum Number 13, 10 March 1948,
387
 
“Reorientation Program,” almost three years after German capitulation, establishing a 
Reorientation Committee to guide implementation of reorientation objectives.  One must wonder 
why it took these staffs three years to engage in official guidance for what was considered a 
critical program in democratizing Germans.  These objectives, taking the lighter note of JCS 
1779 (July 1947), that slowly lumbered along after Secretary of State James F. Byrnes’ Stuttgart 
address on 6 September 1946, focused on development of basic democratic rights and procedures 
within the German government and public institutions.
388
   The Information Control, Education 
and Religious Affairs, and the Civil Administration divisions received the majority of taskings 
aimed in various ways at establishment of democratic reform of German institutions.  The 
Reorientation Program detailed in Memorandum Number 13 – the follow-on to the earlier Re-
education Program, traces its military lineage back to the Potsdam Protocol, Military 
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Government Regulations, Titles 1, 8, 21 and 23, and JCS 1779, specifically, Sections 22, 23 and 
26.
389
  Numerous professional educators – some members of the OMGUS Headquarters and 
others at the Länder Civil Affairs detachments, with assistance from visiting educational 
specialists, cobbled together the voluminous Military Government Regulations covering the 
education and religious affairs policies.  General Robert A. McClure, General Eisenhower’s 
SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division Chief, and after the war the Chief of the OMGUS 
Information Control Division, with his staff, oversaw principally the democratization program, 
developing policies, particularly in the media arena, and overseeing German compliance with 
licensing and programming policies established by the military occupation authorities. 
Creating democracy for Germany, even with German assistance, cost both the U. S. 
government and the German people.  Resource-intensive in terms of personnel, funds, time, and 
the more traditional logistics support, the projects and programs planned, coordinated, 
implemented, and subsequently monitored, focused on “reorientation of the German cultural 
pattern.”  The buffet of ideas to reorient the German population, presented by the OMGUS-WB 
in their Memorandum 13, Reorientation Program, dated 10 March 1948, kept staffs in the 
OMGUS, WB-ERAD, ICD/ISD and Civil Administration divisions busy.  Appendix V.2 
displays a sample of projects undertaken. 
Documenting German participation is possible in many cases.  Measuring and evaluating 
German response, however, was not easy, and even surveys such as the Merritts’ analyses of the 
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OMGUS Surveys, represent only a snapshot in time and place.  How palatable were these 
programs to the German public? 
2.  From Policy to Execution of Democratization and Reeducation.  
The authors of the Potsdam Protocol devoted particular attention to democratization and 
denazification.  Although democratize morphed over time to other terms, e.g., re-education, 
reconstruction, reform, and finally reorientation, as noted by Alonzo Grace,
390
 reeducation and 
reorientation of the German people remained an extremely high priority of the U. S. military 
government in Germany.  Policymakers in the U. S. military government decreed that education 
would be the vehicle of choice to drive toward the goal of democratization.  Two agencies shared 
the driver’s seat:  Information Control (ICD)/Information Services Division (ISD) and the 
Education and Religious Affairs Division (ERAD)/Education and Cultural Relations Division 
(ECRD).            
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067 guidance initially underlay the missions of the 
Information Control and the Education and Religious Affairs divisions at the OMGUS 
Headquarters in Berlin, as well as in each of the Länder military government offices in the U. S. 
occupation zone.  These two divisions – ICD/ICS and ERAD/ECRD - would denazify and 
democratize Germany – or, at least attempt to do so – in the U. S. occupation zone until 21 
September 1949. 
2.1  Mission of the Information Control/Information Services Division (ICD/ISD). 
The Information Control/Information Services Division (ICD/ISD) under the U. S. 
military government’s interpretation of the Potsdam Protocol, inserted itself in virtually every 
German activity related to cultural endeavors – literature, newspapers, professional journals and 
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magazines, radio, film and theater – to cite the most prevalent activities.
391
  As stated in Military 
Government Regulations (MGR), Title 21, early during the occupation, ICD’s mission in support 
of U. S. military government objectives, was to further the objectives of the U.S. military 
government.  Indeed, ICD’s mission supported U. S. Government policy!  The ICD objectives 
stated under MGR Title 1, General Provisions, followed the Potsdam Protocol and JCS 1067 
intent:  
Assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the 
world; eliminate German militarism and Nazism; completely disarm and 
demilitarize Germany and eliminating or controlling all German industry that 
could be used for military production; punish and/or remove from office Nazi 
leaders, war criminals, influential supporters and high officials of Nazi 
organizations; convince the Germans that  they have suffered total military defeat, 
are responsible for the results of that defeat (infrastructure destruction, chaos, 
suffering), but will have the opportunity to prepare for eventual reconstruction of 
political life on a democratic and peaceful basis, and eventual participation in 
international life; enforce the programs of reparations, restitution; insure that 




These stated objectives had been modified considerably in preparation for release of JCS 
1779 in July 1947.   U. S. military government acknowledged in Change 3 to MGR Title 21, that 
the German Länder constitutions, approved by the Länder and the U. S military government, 
granted “free access to public information, freedom of expression and free exchange of opinions 
and ideas throughout Germany and between other countries and Germany.”
393
  However, 
“because of quadripartite agreements, shortages of materials, U. S. reorientation policy, and the 
requirements of military security, Military Government must assume responsibility for certain 
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  Whatever restrictions remained at this point would be “gradually relaxed as the 
conditions which now necessitate them can be obviated through quadripartite progress and 
economic revival.”
395
  Karl Bungenstab offered a softer version of ICD’s mission:  “provide the 
Germans with information which will influence them to understand and accept the United States 
program of occupation, and to establish for themselves a stable, peaceful and acceptable 
government.”
396
  Nonetheless, the ICD mission included media censorship, licensing of 
publishers and other media, blacklisting authors cultivating pro-Nazi positions or prone to 
criticize occupation government, monitoring, supervising, and advising on literature, press, film 
and the theater productions during the occupation, and establishment and support of other 
vehicles of communication, e.g., the Amerikahäuser and Radio in the American Sector (RIAS).   
2.2.  Mission of the Education and Religious Affairs Division (ERAD).   
The Education and Religious Affairs Division managed the relationship of U. S. military 
government in the U. S. zone for policies and supervision over “ all types of public and privately 
controlled German schools, youth, sport and physical training activity, libraries, adult education 
and sport activities; all church and religious groups and religious societies in Germany and all 
other formal educational or religious matters which involved the accomplishments of the 
objectives of U. S. Military Government in Germany.”
397
 






 As quoted in Karl-Ernst Bungenstab, “Entstehung, Bedeutungs- und Funktionswandel der Amerika-Häuser.  Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der amerikanischen Auslandsinformation nach dem 2. Weltkrieg,” Jahrbuch für 
Amerikastudien  Band 16 (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1971), 194.  Bungenstab, a Fulbright scholar 
at the University of Kansas, 1965-66, wrote his dissertation, Amerikanische Umerziehungspolitik in Deutschland 
nach 1945, from research during his Fulbright term.  For a detailed study of the influence of American culture 
politics on German culture and particularly literature during the occupation period, see Hansjörg Gehring, 
Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1953, ein Aspekt des Re-education-Programms, (Stuttgart:  
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976).   
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When examined with care, confusion existed within the 1945 Military Regulation Title 8.  
First, paragraph 8-101 allowed, “the reform of German education will be left to the Germans 
themselves, subject to the supervision and approval of the Directors of Regional offices of 
Military Government, through their Education Officers.”
398
  Several paragraphs later, 8-120, the 
same Directors, through their education officers, “will have the responsibility of exercising 
direction and control of German educational institutions.”  This seemingly contradictory section 
erupted into major controversy between the German Kultusministerien and the regional ERAD 
offices, jeopardizing, or so a number of ERAD officers asserted, success of the ERAD re-
education mission.  Amidst the confusion, OMGUS laid out its official policy in January 1947, in 
anticipation of the Allied Control Authority Directive No. 54, released in June 1947.  MGR Title 
8, Change 3 dated 3 March 1947, followed on the heels of the OMGUS decree, and clearly 
designated ERAD as having the “responsibility of exercising direction and control of German 
educational systems and institutions in the U. S. Zone,”
399
 with the caveat that responsibility for 
the operation and functioning of German schools lay with German education officials.
400
  Had 
this clarity been apparent earlier in the occupation, German school structure might appear 
differently today in the Länder of the U. S. occupation zone.                                     
Unlike the Information Control element of military government, the democratization of 
education in Germany warranted its own directive.  Specifically, in the realm of education and 
school reform, Allied Control Authority Directive Number 54
401
 dictated democratization of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Frankfurt, GE:  Headquarters, USFET, 30 Nov 45), para 8-1, spells out in more detail the scope of ERAD’s 
mission.    
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education policies for occupied Germany.  Vaughn R. DeLong summed up these policies in ten 
points: 
1. Equal education opportunities for all. 
2. Tuition-free public schools, school texts and material. 
3. Compulsory full-time attendance between 6 and 15 years of age; part-time 
between 16-18 years of age. 
4. Comprehensive education system for all in which “secondary” education is a 
consecutive level, abolishing the two-track system. 
5. School organization and curriculum to emphasize civic responsibility and a 
democratic way of life. 
6. School curriculums to promote international good will and understanding. 
7. Educational, vocational guidance within the school system. 
8. Health education provided in the schools, to include health supervision. 
9. All teacher education at the university level.  
10. School reform, organization and administration through involvement of the 




Generally, the internal organization of the ERAD included four branches:  Elementary & 
Secondary Schools; Higher Institutions of Learning & Technical Training; Religious Affairs; 
Youth Activities, and a fifth branch added in 1946, Adult Education and Public Libraries.  Under 
the re-designation of ERAD to Education and Cultural Affairs Division (ECAD) in 1948, the 
branches reorganized as Education, Universities, Cultural Exchange, Religious Affairs, Group 
Activities, and in August 1948, added a new branch, Theater and Music Control.  The persistent 
objective holding the division together centered on democratization, education and eventually, 
reorientation of the German people. 
2.3  Logistics Implications for ICD, ERAD and CAD. 
 ICD and ERAD directorates and staff organizations under military government agencies 
at the Länder level, subordinate to OMGUS Headquarters operationally, relied on the combat 
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and related support units for much of their logistic support as staff organizations rarely have 
organic support.  The ERAD offices were generally staffed with between 25-30 personnel, if 
fully manned and funded.  The detachments, whose personnel were responsible for the daily 
contact with local German officials, rarely had more than five or six persons engaged in liaison 
activities.
403
  Staffing and equipment shortages chronically hampered operations, as MAJ 
Richard Banks, Deputy Director, OMGUS-Württemberg-Baden ERAD, noted: 
This division obviously needs more American personnel to carry out the projects.  
We realize that the securing of additional American personnel is difficult; but 
there are many things which could be done here in our own headquarters to 
improve the situation.  Although this division has not been cut in American 
personnel, it received the same 25% cut in indigenous personnel that every other 
division received.  Automobiles assigned to this division have been cut from 10 to 
5.  This serves to reduce the effectiveness of the American personnel of this 
division another 50%.  For example, the Youth Activities Branch has three 
Americans who are normally in the field about 50 hours a week each.  They will 
now have one Volkswagen (available four days a week at most) for the entire 
branch.  Exactly the same situation holds for Schools Branch.  Higher Institutions 
Branch will have no car at all and weekly travel to and from Heidelberg and to 




MAJ Banks’ critique of his division’s personnel cuts, especially the indigenous 
personnel, challenges the validity of the intent of the U. S. Government and its agent, OMGUS, 
to reeducation and [re]create a democratic and peace-loving Germany.  Because of the 
ERAD/ECAD’s constant engagement with German agencies, the German employees were the 
critical connection between the German systems, its agencies, and the U. S. military 
organizations, even aside from the bridge they provided linguistically.  Of all the American 
agencies under military government, it seems odd that the one agency working on a daily basis 
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with German agencies would cut German staff positions.  MAJ Banks made a similar plea, to 
naught, for additional personnel and equipment six months later.  It seems that the budget 
process in Washington drove ideology.  
Ferreting out logistics support involved in these staff operations, missions and supported 
functions often goes unnoticed; likewise the constant contact with German employees as well as 
elements of the German population.  For example, the ERAD staff in Württemberg-Baden set up 
and operated Curriculum and Textbook Revision Centers for German educators, in cooperation 
with ICD, in Karlsruhe and Stuttgart (about 80 kilometers or two hours travel time between the 
two in the late 1940s).  By 1947, the ERAD staff planned to consolidate these operations with 
the ICD-operated Ameikahäuser, to expand their services to the German public.  This expansion 
allowed greater opportunity to host discussion groups between American specialists and various 
professional Germans, or just town-hall type discussions between Americans and German 
residents.   
Other activities established under this ICD-ERAD marriage included:  motion picture 
programs requiring both film projectors and film, orientation of students proceeding to foreign 
countries as part of the newly allowed exchange programs, publication of a monthly News Digest 
for teachers, and establishment of a publishers’ and writers’ reference service.  Additionally, the 
ERAD staff arranged with U. S. Army organizations stateside to have 1,500,000 educational 
manuals shipped to Württemberg-Baden, where ERAD arranged with local Army units to 
distribute these manuals to the German schools.  Through German translators employed by 
ERAD, international news, education manuals and articles were translated and distributed to 
schools, church organizations, businesses and licensed publishers.   
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ERAD, ICD and CAD conducted seminars and discussions, in conjunction with ICD and  
Landrat and local German administrators, focused on a wide range of topics to include 
differences between political organizations and institutions, school reform issues, technological 
and agricultural innovations and also the more mundane subjects such as distribution of food, 
allocation of construction material, or local administration policies.
405
  CAD and ERAD 
catalogued a number of these seminars in the following chart.
406
   
Date Locations of Seminars Attendance 
24 Sep 47 Karlsruhe, Aalen, Ulm 15, 45, 50 
30 Sep 47 Vaihingen/Enz 22 
1 Oct 47 Bad Mergentheim, Künzelsau 40, 30 
2 Oct 47 Backnau, Waiblingen 35, 20 
8 Oct 47 Sinsheim, Pforzheim 35, 40 
9 Oct 47 Leonberg, Böblingen 35, 30 
14 Oct 47 Ludwigsburg 45 
21 Oct 47 Mannheim 50 
27 Oct 47 Heilbronn 45 
28 Oct 47 Bruchsal 60 
19 Nov 47  Sinsheim 30 
12 Jan 48 Mosbach 50 
13 Jan 48 Buchen 80 
26 Jan 48 Pforzheim 50 
28 Jan 48 Sinsheim 75 
1 Mar48 Tauberbischofsheim 150 
 
This is a snapshot of a very small section of military government interaction throughout the 
German population.  In many cases, the social and cultural interaction remained in professional 
channels.  However, each one of these seminars required Army logistical support:  transportation 
assets, fuel, personnel and personnel support.  In some cases, specialists from the United States 
led the program – these individuals were guests of the U. S. Army and required the same level of 
support as a stationed military member.  Furthermore, although the attendance numbers are not 
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overwhelming, each person present represented an exchange of information, points of view and 
perhaps new vistas – a cultural exchange.   
While only three areas of the ERAD mission are discussed in more detail below, many 
other examples of exchange involving U. S. Army logistics support transpired during the military 
occupation ranging from professional and student exchange programs, publication of OMGUS-
sponsored newspapers, relicensing and support to German publishers, to name a few. 
3.  The battle for German School Reform. 
Education, deemed an important venue for democratizing Germans, received a great 
amount of emphasis with educators within OMGUS and the general academic community, both 
in the United States and Germany.  Additionally, the Potsdam Protocol, JCS 1067 and JCS 1779 
specifically addressed education as a critical process toward democratization of the German 
community.
407
  As noted in the Potsdam Protocol, “German education shall be so controlled as 
completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful 
development of democratic ideas.”
408
  Of the panoply of options available educationally, press, 
film, theater, literature, radio, and the military government attacked on all these fronts, school 
reform presented an uphill battle – although one that the U. S. military government never quite 
won.   
However, before engaging the school reform battle, German schools needed to reopen.  
As the American combat forces moved into Germany, they closed down schools in their path.  
Reopening the schools as soon as possible after German capitulation in May 1945, took front-
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stage as the short-term objective, if for no other reason, to get the kids off the streets.  The 
following scene played out throughout much of Germany in 1945.   
A little German boy, almost six years old in April 1945, went off to his first day 
of Grundschule in a town north of the city of Kassel in Hessen, with a 
Schulranzen, carrying his Schiefertafel, Schwamm, Schiefergriffel, and a piece of 
bread for lunch, on his back.  However, the regional U. S. military commander 
cancelled schools barely a month later - 8 May1945.  School in this town would 
not reopen for another year, as the schoolhouse became a hospital.  When the 
school did reopen, trained teachers were scarce, as were the basic materials, 
including textbooks, normally available for both teachers and students.
409
 
   
Imagine reopening a school system in an environment bombed out by war, in which 
double-digit infrastructure damage or destruction – buildings, roads, bridges, heating plants, 
utilities, and transportation systems – represented the norm, particularly in the urban areas.  As 
an example, in the city of Stuttgart, Allied bombing raids completely destroyed eighteen of 
seventy-five elementary (Volksschulen, Mittelschulen, Sonderschulen) schools and damaged 
thirty-nine more.  Only eighteen schools remained undamaged.  Even if the U. S. forces did not 
requisition any of the eighteen undamaged buildings, 75% of the total number of school 
buildings required repair or rebuild – in an area where the student population was about to 
mushroom with the arrival of refugees and expellees.
410
  
Additionally, extremely limited or even nonexistent fuel supplies and especially coal, 
prevented even functional heating plants and utility systems from operating.  German weather 
during a good half of the school year could be a bit uncomfortable without heating, especially as 
many children had little protective clothing or shoes.
411
   Absence of textbooks, most confiscated 
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by the occupation authorities, because of their National Socialist slant, added another burden to 
the school start-ups.  Lecture-style teaching day in and day out, with classes averaging a student-
to-teacher ratio of 60 or 70 to 1, severely challenged the teaching staffs.  Further, at least in the 
first two years, 1945-1947, the denazification processes decimated the teaching ranks barring 
varying percentages of teachers, estimates range from between 40-80% depending on location,
412
 
from the classroom until (if) they eventually received clearances.  As a final point, if the local 
school buildings had survived the bombings in decent condition, problematic, as most schools in 
the cities and towns were located in the central, urban areas largely targeted by the air raids, and 
difficult to assess prior to arrival in the area, U.S. forces most likely requisitioned them for their 
own requirements.  As the schools had been ordered closed by the first occupation 
proclamations, and initially no reopening dates considered, school authorities often scrounged to 
take whatever other facilities were left, to reopen their schools.  These second-hand buildings 
often required repair, sometimes extensive, in an environment short on building materials.  
Ingenuity and creativity often combined with practical solutions, for example, no-longer 
functional cloth, metal, and other textiles often filled holes in the walls or served as windows in 
many buildings.  Army engineers, given time away from the more critical bridge, road and utility 
repairs, lent assistance in major repair.
413
  Knappen, part of the first CA detachment to arrive in 
Germany, Aachen, in September 1944, summed up the situation.  “The essentials for a properly 
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oriented German school system were assumed to be adequate school buildings, suitable 
curriculums and instructional materials, and proper instructional staff . . . [It was hoped] that 
subordinate commanders could be persuaded to evacuate their troops from enough school 
buildings to permit the general resumption of instructional activities.”
414
  Eventually, 
commanders did call for an evacuation of school buildings, however, in the early days of the 
occupation, school leaders scrounged for repair material, and although the card deck was clearly 
stacked against reopening schools, German officials and the U. S. Army forged ahead to repair 
damaged utility systems, and provide some measure of school space to reopen the schools. 
3.1  Development of the OMGUS School Reform Philosophy. 
Other than the Allied Control Council Directive No. 54 (June 47) and MGR Title 8 
(November 45 with changes 2 and 3, May 46 and Mar 47, respectively), no Standing Operating 
Procedures (SOP) existed for OMGUS subordinate ERAD/ECRD offices as to how to reorganize 
German education systems before January 1947.  Nonetheless, the three Länder ERAD offices – 
Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden and Hessen -- supported each other and pursued similar courses of 
action – to restructure the German elementary and secondary schools along the lines of the 
American school system.  In the meantime, Headquarters, OMGUS requested support in 
developing a school reform template.  Retrospective interviews set out the problems associated 
with the U. S. Army’s efforts to reform German education at all levels.  The first noteworthy 
team arrived in Germany during the summer of 1946.   
George F. Zook,
415
 leading a team of professional educators representing a cross-section 
of American educational institutions, after their August 1946 visit with German educators and 
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U. S. military government officials proposed in their “Report of the U. S. Education Mission to 
Germany”
416
 the following template as a methodology toward German education reform.  
Foremost, German Ministries of Education must develop a comprehensive school system, 
wherein children remain together for the duration of the elementary school program (six years), 
not segregated by vocational or professional intentions.  Second, German Ministries of Education 
develop a curriculum imbued with “a significant contribution to democratic experience,”
417
 and 
along these lines, that this experience expand across all academic levels by increasing class time 
in the social studies and cultural subjects areas.  Third, German Ministries of Education establish 
a leadership-training program within the schools and youth groups and committees outside of the 
school environment.  Fourth, send German teachers and students to the United States “for the 
purpose of study and reeducation along democratic lines.”
418
   
Based on these recommendations, the U. S. military government through the Länder 
ERAD offices, directed that each German Minister of Education complete and submit a proposal 
incorporating educational aims, objectives and proposed school structure to the appropriate Land 
ERAD by 1 April 1947.  In the interim, Headquarters, OMGUS, using the Zook template, 
affirmed the following principles for all levels of education in MGR 8, Change 3, and directed 
that each Landesminister of Education strive toward execution of these principles: 
 Provide equal educational opportunity for all;  
 Provide free public schools, free textbooks and materials with school maintenance grants 
for those in need of aid;  
 Establish compulsory school attendance for all students from six to fifteen years and 
compulsory part-time education from fifteen to eighteen years;   
 Establish elementary and secondary levels to mean two consecutive levels, not two 
different types or qualities of instruction; [for example, some children went from 
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Grundschule on to Gymnasium or Realschule, completion of which entitled these 
students to attend university, whereas the majority of students remained in the 
Volksschule system, received some form of vocational training for a trade or skill]   
 School curriculums emphasize education for civic responsibility and a democratic way of 
life;  
 Schools promote international good will and understanding through curricula; 
 Schools provide professional education and vocational guidance;  
 All schools provide health supervision and health education;  
 Conduct teacher education at the university [or equivalent pedagogical] level;  
 Safeguard educational standards;  
 Where the [Land] constitution permits, establish inter-denominational and 
denominational schools side by side;  
 Develop of a democratic school administration sensitive to the wishes of the people.419 
      
When finally published in June 1947, the ACC Directive did not specifically prohibit a dual-
track system as many American educators in the OMGUS system involved in the German school 
reform process proclaimed or argued.  Paragraph 4, Directive No. 54 only states that, “Schools 
for the compulsory periods should form a comprehensive educational system.  The terms, 
elementary and secondary, should mean two consecutive levels of instruction, not two types or 
qualities of instruction which overlap.”
420
  The lack of clarity, particularly in defining 
‘comprehensive educational system’ and ‘consecutive levels,’ paved the way toward multiple 
school reform plans from, and even within each occupation zone, that according to several 
educators, took a decade and more to iron out after the occupation period. OMGUS defined the 
above terms to mean the German historic dual-track system prevalent prior to 1933, in which a 
student’s academic future, and often his career were determined after the fourth school year 
(completion of the Grundschule).  Thus, the official OMGUS policy drifted toward a school 
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reform that would mirror most American schools, or six elementary years – three middle school 
years – and three high school years. 
An official memorandum from the Eastern Military District office in Bavaria, 
“Preliminary Report of the Study of Practical Methods of Teaching Democracy to the Individual 
German,” not only reflected then current U. S. military government attitudes on the prospects of 
democratizing the German people, but also provided recommendations to strengthen the 
democratization program.
421
  This report, prepared within the Bavarian OMGUS Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch, and signed by its Chief, E. G. Bergman, consists of three sections:  (1) 
an outline of the problems encountered in teaching democracy to the individual German; (2) the 
mechanics of teaching democracy [at that time]; and (3) recommendations to improve the formal 
education program.  Bergman and his team considered the problems encountered in teaching 
democracy to Germans formidable, but surmountable.  Bergman asserted:     
There is still no impelling demand felt by the German people as a whole for 
freedom and individualism.  There are today no German outstanding leaders to 
blaze the trail, no spontaneous meetings, no slogans to summarize the ideals of 
liberty, equality and justice for all.  The German people from long training remain 
docile, disciplined and almost anxious to be led.
422
   
Further, Bergman suggested that Germans prefer their hierarchical stratification of 
society, “Germans prefer that those less fortunate remain servants, inferiors, and submissive and 
manageable personalities.”
423
  How Bergman and his staff ascertained and validated these 
characteristics – perhaps from the Merritt team OMGUS Surveys – remains a mystery.  
However, Bergman made one observation that was not lost on many Germans:  “No defeated 
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land under any army of occupation is fertile soil for the seed of democracy.  Occupation by its 
very nature requires authority and submission.”
424
  For Bergman and staff, indeed, for OMGUS 
Headquarters, formal education in the schools system and informal education through the 
information media offered the best approach toward reorienting the German people.  Official 
policy supported this observation – in fact, the Potsdam Protocol targeted education as a key 
component of the occupation reorientation program. 
The Bergman team offered several approaches to reorienting the German school system.  
Foremost for Bergman, but also a stated OMGUS priority, abolish the “two-track” educational 
system that limited attendance to Gymnasium to “less than one tenth of the population,”425 and 
thus also limited access to university and a professional career.  Numerous senior OMGUS 
officials and American educators brought to Germany as consultants argued that in this 
traditional system, aristocracy and economic affluence rather than academic merit determined 
selection for higher education leading to professional careers.  In place of the “two-track” 
system, “elective courses and flexible curricula [at all educational levels] should offer every 
child a chance to choose his way and plan his life according to his interests and abilities.”
426
   
Second, reading very much like a page from then-typical American public school 
manuals, Bergman advocated that the process of establishing school policy should reside within 
the local community, and not exclusively at Länder ministries of education or with church 
officials.  “The parents and citizens of Bavaria should be impressed with the fact that the schools 
belong to them and that, in reality, the school administrator is the servant of the people.  
Expressions of the voice of the people on educational matters should be encouraged through 
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every media of public relations.  There should be an opportunity to organize parent-teacher 
associations and to inform parents on educational matters before the vote on such issues.”
427
 
Third, while ministries of education should establish minimum standards and objectives 
for curriculum and courses of study, decentralization of curriculum development provided a 
more democratic process wherein teachers, together with supervisors and school officials should 
engage in developing curriculum plans and courses of study at the local level. 
 Finally, Bergman offered several mechanics for teaching democracy to the individual 
German through the information media.
428
  His opinion and that of several educators acting as 
consultants for OMGUS during the occupation period suggested that Germans could best teach 
each other democratization.  In this case, “the role of the German editors, publicists, book and 
magazine publishers and personalities in radio, film and theater, becomes indeed an important 
one.”
429
  Realistically, however, these agencies and individuals faced censorship from occupation 
authorities, not only in publishing and broadcasting their own publications and material, but also 
in postal censorship regulations that “prohibit the sending of foreign periodicals or books to 
individual Germans.  Relaxation of this prohibition will greatly aid in widening horizons.”
430
  
Moreover, the scarcity, control and rationing of paper severely constrained publication by even 
the licensed presses.  Bergman noted that, of the approved-for-publication manuscripts accepted 
by Bavarian publishers in the first quarter of 1947, “paper shortages prevented printing more 
than 90 percent of the manuscripts.  At present, there are more than 700 applications for 
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The concluding section of Bergman’s Preliminary Report reiterated the importance that 
German laypersons take part in the development of school policy and curriculum, as well as the 
relaxation of postal censorship.  Further, he called for expediting travel abroad possibilities for 
Germans “who desire and are capable of taking the lead in the democratic reorientation of 
Germany.”
432
  Finally, he lobbied for additional stocks of paper for Bavarian publishers.  The 
essence of Bergman’s report tracked in official military government reports throughout the U. S. 
occupation zone during this period.  How did the ERAD and ICD offices react to Bergman’s 
suggestions? 
ERAD officials continued to pound the hallways of German offices in the 
Kultusministerien encouraging officials to put into practice many of Bergman’s (and others) 
report findings.  American officials and visiting education specialists continued to attend public 
meetings of German teachers, parents and laymen explaining how American public education 
functioned.  One impressive tool to this end procured by the Stuttgart Education Service Center, 
involved the American School Practices exhibit that toured Heidenheim, Heilbronn, Göppingen, 
Heidelberg, Karlsruhe and Mannheim.  The nucleus of the exhibit centered on American public 
school structure and objectives of education, intending to be a jump-off point for discussion 
among officials, education specialists and visitors at the exhibitions.  The exhibition included 
typical schoolbooks, bulletins, charts, photographs, school building plans, and even short motion 
pictures of American schools at work.
433
  An article written by twelve German university 
professors who visited this exhibition in Karlsruhe, noted that the displays were intensive, 
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covering the school life of American children from kindergarten to university, to include display 
and explanations of American educational philosophy and the use of social studies in the 
classroom.
434
  According to an ERAD report, an official formal opening attended by prominent 
German educators inaugurated each exhibit.  Attendance ranged from 500 visitors at Heidenheim 
to over 2,200 in Mannheim.  While no dollar cost for producing the exhibit was given, a similar 
exhibit cost $5,000, according to an ERAD compilation of expenses for 1947-1948.   
ERAD or its subsidiary Educational Service Centers- sponsored workshops covering a 
variety of subjects, to include curriculum preparation and school (all grade levels) textbook 
writing, flourished.  The ERAD annual report shows the cost for these workshops ranged 
between $2,500 in smaller towns and $5,000 in Stuttgart.  Running the Educational Service 
Centers (a total of eight in the U. S. occupation zone) in Württemberg-Baden rounded out at 
$318,226.  This figure included the cost of “Help from Outside.”  Among the visiting 
consultants, Robert E. Keohane, a specialist in social sciences and social science pedagogy, 
George Bush, a specialist in modern school building construction, and Dewitt Boney and Lucile 
Allard, textbook writing consultants, assisted German colleagues engaged in the same 
specialties.   
Robert J. Havighurst, in his reports on German education for the Rockefeller 
Foundation,
435
 and later in a University of Chicago journal article, reiterated that German schools 
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functioned under a grave handicap with few if any texts, severe shortage of teachers and 
inadequate physical plant, even as late as 1947.  He pointed out other detractors hampering 
rebuilding the German education system to include German family life dislocated by wartime 
evacuations and war losses and German responsibility for education of children in the Displaced 
Persons camps as well as the increasing flow of refugees and expellees from Germany’s 
neighbors to the East.  Havighurst also noted the “existence in Germany of a group of conquerors 
who have power and privilege on a level different from that of the German population – the 
possessors of automobiles, the best houses [requisitioned from the German economy], plenty of 




Havighurst’s observations represented those of many American educators observing and 
commenting on the German school system at the time.  Similar to other European schools 
systems, German schools operated under a dual track system.  Selection for the secondary track 
appeared to favor children of middle and upper class parents.  Approximately 10 to 15% of a 
fourth year elementary school (Grundschule) class entered a secondary school (Gymnasium or 
equivalent), that usually charged a tuition not affordable by the lower classes, and which would 
upon graduation and receipt of the Abitur, allow these students access to a university or 
equivalent professional school.  According to critics of the German dual-track system, this 
system not only disadvantaged the lower classes, but also resulted in separating the secondary 
education-bound students from the rest of the children, further stratifying society.  Additionally, 
Havighurst noted the high centralization of authority over education in that the regional 
governments, without the benefit of local school board input, dictated school policy.  
Furthermore, Havighurst remarked on the abysmal situation relative to virtually non-existent 
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school materials, including textbooks and extreme shortage of teachers resulting on average to a 
teacher-to-student ratio of 1:80.
437
  
Havighurst concluded by noting that in the American zone, the three Länder education 
ministers argued that changing the school structure to allow all students eligibility to a university 
or equivalent professional school represented a cost that the German economy could ill afford.  
Moreover, the high standards of the traditional Gymnasium would fall, as lower levels of work in 
these schools would follow if all students attended.
438
   Havighurst, however, failed to mention 
that, while several members of two Länder Kultusministerien, Hessen and Württemberg-Baden, 
voiced these concerns, they at the same time suggested work-arounds to ameliorate these 
particular issues.  Havighurst also incorrectly reported that German educators in three zones 
(Hessen, Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria), “refused to go over to the American system of an 
elementary school that is the same for all children, followed by a secondary school which all 
children are eligible to attend but which offers a choice of courses and leaves the way open to the 
university.”
439
  This most certainly was not the case in Hessen as, according to James F. Tent, 
“Greater Hesse acquired the reputation of being the most progressive” of the Länder in the U. S. 
occupation zone in accepting OMGUS-ERAD policies regarding restructuring the school 
system.
440
   
However, Havighurst did point out that the German educators he interviewed and 
observed enthusiastically supported emphasizing civic responsibility, a democratic way of life, 
and international understanding in social studies courses in the curriculum.  In addition, 
generally, most educators favored improving teacher education by placing that program either 
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within the university or at a university-equivalent pedagogical institution, although some 
disagreement between secondary and elementary-level teachers occurred over the need for 
elementary teachers to receive that level of education.
441
    
According to Havighurst, the Bavarians offered the harshest criticisms of the American 
objectives.  Alois Hundhammer, appointed as Bavaria’s Minister of Culture and Education in 
December 1946, a conservative, traditionalist on education and leading figure in the Christlich 
Soziale Union (CSU), according to James Tent, “was to have a profound impact on the 
development of school reform throughout the U. S. Zone during the remainder of the 
occupation.”
442
   Hundhammer and his staff voiced concerns over societal changes that would 
probably result from implementation of the American model, particularly urbanization and 
secularization brought about by a need to eliminate many rural schools to accommodate the 
structure and afford the expenses associated with implementing American expectations.  More 
importantly, Havighurst noted that the Bavarian Education Ministry felt that the proposed school 
reform “mistakenly identifies an institutional form with true democracy,” and that other 
countries, e.g., England, the Scandinavian countries, France, and Switzerland have dual track 
systems, and all “have managed to obtain a fair measure of democracy.”
443
  
While E. G. Bergman and his staff in the Bavarian OMGUS-ERAD ran the gauntlet with 
Hundhammer and staff in preparing their Preliminary Report (May 1947), German educators in 
the other Länder in the U. S. occupation zone, also wrestled with the recent OMGUS directives 
on reeducation in general and school reform in particular.  However, lack of textbooks, teachers 
and appropriate school facilities, either because many schools were damaged or destroyed during 
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the war, or because U. S. occupation forces had requisitioned school buildings, topped the “to-
fix” list for most German officials.  Reform of school structure seemed to them of secondary 
importance – not so to ERAD officials and the U. S. educators advising Headquarters, OMGUS. 
Vaughn R. DeLong, a school administrator in Pennsylvania and Army Captain with a 
Civil Affairs G-5 team that arrived in Hessen in April 1945, wrote that the Germans “must build 
a school system that will train a German folk both capable and desirous of maintaining a 
democracy, [one] that will be a peaceful, contributing member of the world of nations, . . . [as 
well as one that] domestically lives together in social units capable of cooperating in community 
projects.”
444
  Such an educational philosophy would transform the authoritarian, didactically 
oriented education system into one that would focus on popular democracy with constitutionally 
guaranteed freedoms of speech, press and religion.  How to inculcate this philosophy into 
German politicians and educators plagued OMGUS personnel for the duration of the occupation.  
Ironically, U. S. military government educators in a rather undemocratic fashion mandated 
restructuring and democratizing the German school system as the primary and long-range 
objective of German education reform. 
Franklin J. Keller presciently noted that in the traditional German school system an 
extremely small percentage of children were selected for an academic high school education 
(Gymnasium).  This selection process, in his opinion, based more on the social and economic 
standing of the parents rather than on academic aptitude or intelligence, would make American 
attempts to transform German education “into something preparatory to sound democratic 
citizenship” extremely difficult.
445
  As Keller presumed, American school reform plans, 
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especially recommendations for restructuring grade levels to mirror a typical American school 
system, netted mixed results by the end of the military occupation period.  The Länder 
implemented free public education, and initially free textbooks if and when available.  As 
regards altering the school structure itself, Hessen, Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria approached 
this American objective differently. 
Alonzo Grace assumed the directorship of the OMGUS Education and Cultural Affairs 
Division (formerly the Education and Religious Affairs Division) in 1949.  That summer, in a 
prepared radio-talk presentation, he summarized the basic problem that numerous OMGUS-
employed and contracted American educators had had over the prior four years with the 
traditional German school system.  The following quoted sections, part of the original written 
text, were apparently deleted from the radio-talk presentation.  Nonetheless, the text succinctly 
speaks to reservations often found in written narratives of U. S. OMGUS officials and educators 
involved in the school reform process over the previous four years.   
Alonzo Grace specifically condemned the German dual-track system wherein, “The 
typical German secondary school conceives its purpose to be academic, that is, making a few 
people good scholars rather than making many people good, intelligent, useful citizens,” by 
stressing “the classical languages, mathematics and the physical sciences at the expense of social 
studies, student activities, and vocational guidance.”  Further, Grace argued for more student 
participation in classroom discussions rather than the traditional Frontalunterricht (straight 
lecturing) technique preferred in the Gymnasien:  “Instruction is still largely authoritarian in 
method, with few opportunities afforded students for participation in discussion groups or in 
student government.”  Moreover, as the Gymnasien more often than not charged tuition, the 
children from lower income families often could not attend a Gymnasium and were thus unable 
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to go into university and subsequently into the prestigious professions.  “Thus German education 
has retained its traditional organization, methodology, and objectives, despite long and strenuous 
efforts on the part of progressive German educators [and American military government and 
education specialists] to improve it.”
446
  Inferring from Grace’s comments, some American 
officials connected Germany’s militaristic and authoritarian past, as well as the more recent Nazi 
past to an historical elitist, authoritarian and undemocratic school system.
447
   
The only possible solution toward changing Germany’s militarist and authoritarian 
tendencies then, was to democratize the school system, from the bottom up.  The litany of 
observations and recommendations discussed above coalesced over the course of the occupation 
into OMGUS policy (rather late in the game) to reform the German school system.  
3.2. The OMGUS Plan – School structures and education policy. 
In the beginning, OMGUS improvised on both school structures and reeducation policies 
– the primary motivation - get the kids off the streets.  Security officials and U. S. military police 
conjectured that the majority of petty criminal activity, particularly in the urban areas, stemmed 
from bored youth wandering the streets.  The obvious solution to lowering crime rates – restart 
the schools.  The first Volksschulen, the typical German 8-year elementary schools in the U. S. 
occupation zone prepared to open officially on 1 October 1945 despite shortages of fuel for 
heating, rooms, teachers, and texts.  Before the school doors swung open, the military 
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government required, however, that the Landeskultusministerien (Departments of Culture) 
develop, submit to, and receive approval from U. S. military government authorities for their 
proposals for school curriculum and administrative functions.  One part of a proposal included a 
list of all employees (for the purposes of denazification), as well as a teaching program of 
instruction free from reference to militarism, any aspect of National Socialism, or para-military 
training.
448
  Obviously, both parts of a proposal focused on denazification; and the second part, 
rewriting a program of instruction, could only be roughly accomplished in the short-term.      
A second memorandum announced the possibility of opening Gymnasien, German 
secondary schools, as early as 1 December 1945, following similar instructions for the 
Volksschulen, with the added instruction that schools could only use military government-
approved texts in the classroom.  The task of resolving the textbook shortage, from evaluating 
the texts for worthiness, to producing viable replacements for the thousands of texts confiscated 
fell primarily to the Civil Affairs detachments.  Further, the memo informed the recipients 
vocational and trade schools were to follow these same procedures when they reopened in the 
near future.
449
  At least schools were reopening!  
 The methodology adopted by OMGUS to meet democratization of the school system 
presupposed that the Germans – educators, parents and citizens – acknowledged the need for, 
and supported an American model for school reform.  The first phase toward this objective 
involved the denazification of school administrators, teachers and textbooks.  Official U. S. 
occupation policy required that school administrators submit to the military government, for 
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approval, a list of teachers, texts and other school materials before a school could reopen.  This 
process usually began with the Grundschule, and as with most policies, exceptions occurred, 
especially in urban areas where getting the kids off the streets was paramount.  Nonetheless, this 
process delayed many school openings – alone, the denazification of teachers.  As DeLong 
noted, for the Hesse area, about 55% of the schoolteachers and most of the higher school 
officials faced arduous denazification procedures, keeping this group out of the school system 
until either cleared by the German Denazification Courts or disqualified.
450
  As already 
mentioned, this process reduced the number of available teachers, forcing almost unimaginable 
student-teacher ratios.  Adding to this chaos, lack of adequate facilities forced many schools, 
particularly in urban areas, to run students through in two and sometimes three shifts per day.   
The second phase, running concurrently with denazification, focused on resolving these 
infrastructure shortages.  As German and U. S. forces repaired damaged buildings at least 
provisionally, or the U. S. forces returned requisitioned facilities, the school infrastructure 
shortage improved, but the first two or three years were grim. 
Having addressed the denazification process and infrastructure shortages, the third phase 
kicked in with the OMGUS-ERAD sections marketing their strongly recommended changes – 
the culmination of and compilation from all the American education specialists’ visits to 
Germany - to their German counterparts in the Kultusministerien.  In Hessen, this process 
involved the establishment of committees to study various aspects of school reform.  Committee 
members represented the local population both professionally as educators and as laypersons.  U. 
S. military government officials advised, analyzed and reviewed committee recommendations.  
This process involving as many as thirty theme-oriented committees completed the first reports 
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Perhaps the most critical phase – at least for the U. S. military government contingent – 
involved development of a school structure and curriculum that provided all students a common 
experience, eliminating what the American educators in the military government believed to be 
an elitist system that had not and would not produce a democratic citizenship.  These U. S. 
officials, predominantly in the OMGUS-ERAD divisions at each of the three Länder, Hessen, 
Württemberg-Baden and Bavaria, proposed a single school system, with mandatory attendance 
through the eighth class.  Students would then progress from the first grade through the eighth 
grade, the first six grades considered the elementary level.  The following two or three years, 
depending on a student’s career choice, represented the middle school level.  The tenth through 
thirteenth grades corresponded to the high school level.  For those students not planning to 
complete the high school level, required for university attendance, vocational education along 
with “on-the-job” training followed the eighth class for approximately three years, including 
between 6 to 15 hours of class work, depending on the specialty pursued.    
Common curricula, in addition to German language and mathematics, would, according 
to OMGUS officials, include history, geography, citizenship, government, science art, music, 
physical education and religion, with differentiation allowed for foreign language instruction as 
early as the fifth and sixth grades.  The American rationale backing this recommendation 
developed from the American educator’s opinion that “the German problem” developed 
historically due to a lack of outward-looking international history studies and an inward 
examination and contemplation of civics – the rights and duties of a democratic citizen.  In 
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addition, in accordance with OMGUS directives, local German governments were to enact 
legislation banning tuition at public schools. 
Peripheral to reopening schools, reducing student-to-teacher ratios, and restructuring the 
school system, OMGUS-ERAD officials sought to restructure teacher education programs as 
well as grant programs and funding that would bring German educators into contact with 
educational development in other Western-oriented democracies.  One program, the Rockefeller 
Fellowships, funded several categories of studies to include programs allowing acceptable 
German educators to tour educational institutions in the United States for periods ranging from 
several weeks to almost a year.  Through such programs, U. S. education officials hoped to better 
train teachers at all levels of education, to encourage local citizen participation in the schools as 
well as student participation in student government within the schools, and to develop tactics, 
techniques and procedures to encourage more student participation in the classroom and less 
Frontalunterricht by teachers. 
As riveting, controversial and drawn-out as the school and curriculum structural changes 
proved to be, rewriting textbooks created a similar challenge for both U. S. administrators and 
German educators.  As John Rodden noted, “Books have long been weapons in cultural wars – 
it’s no secret that education is one way of transmitting culture.”
452
  Clearly, NSDAP-sponsored 
textbooks would not meet OMGUS directives or U.S. education standards.  OMGUS officials 
and educators involved in this issue agreed that German educators should write the new 
textbooks.  Resorting to external authoring, i.e., German émigrés, Swiss, Austrian or even 
translated American/English versions, took the responsibility for the work itself, as well as 
acceptance of the work by those teaching, away from the Germans in Germany.  However, how 
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to find “clean” educators, those not under denazification processes and who were forward 
thinking and democracy-oriented?
453
  What textbooks could serve in the interim while educators 
modified or rewrote unacceptable material?  What process would guide the writing effort 
insuring presentation of appropriate material and views? 
Two examples of text-writing outcomes demonstrate initiative and creativity on the part 
of U. S. OMGUS officials:  the Aachen school re-openings in 1945 and the U. S. sector in Berlin 
during 1947-1948.  Nazi-era textbooks did not meet acceptable criteria, and the Nazi machine 
destroyed many of the pre-1933 era textbooks, replacing them with NSDAP-approved texts.  
Educators assigned to the U. S. Army’s Civil Affairs Division grappled with this conundrum as 
early as spring, 1944.  According to Marshall Knappen, an Army Civil Affairs officer with the 
initial American detachment entering Aachen in September 1944,
454
 the early search for 
temporary replacement textbooks ended at the Teachers College, Columbia University.  Knappen 
and his graduate school advisor at Columbia University in the 1920s, Alexander (later the chief 
of HQ, OMGUS-ERAD/ECAD), had collected a number of Weimar-era textbooks for the 
Teachers College library.  “Microfilms of some two hundred and seventy of the most likely 
looking prospects from the New York collection arrived in England.”
455
  Educators edited and 
updated the selected texts in London; fashioned printing plates, and sent the plates to the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Civil Affairs Directorate in early 
1945.  SHAEF managed to scrounge the resources – paper, printing presses and ink – and printed 
approximately 20,000 copies of approved texts for the Aachen Grundschulen in time for a 
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summer 1945 school opening.   Many of these reproduced texts found their way into other school 
systems throughout the U. S. zone, serving until 1947 or so when new, U. S. military 
government-approved, German-written texts appeared on the market. 
Berlin’s situation, in particular, differed markedly, for educational issues required 
presentation before and concurrence from the Four-Power Kommandatura, established under the 
Potsdam Protocol to govern Berlin.  The Four Powers had to reach consensus on an outline of 
history and approve a final text before use in a Berlin school.  Aside from Berlin, the Länder 
approached this task in various ways.  OMGUS education officers had directed that German 
curriculum designers add history and increase social studies in general to school curriculums, but 
OMGUS had not allowed the teaching of history in the German schools in Berlin until after new 
textbooks appeared.
456
  Officials finally backed off this decision and brought Mary G. Kelty to 
Berlin to initiate the textbook writing process for the 1948 school year.  Mary G. Kelty,
457
 an 
educational consultant to the Office of Military Government, Berlin for six months in 1947-48, 
later related Berlin’s textbook tale.    
Acknowledging that, as Kelty observed, “Prejudice-free history is extremely difficult for 
any nation to produce or accept,”
458
 U. S. education officials requested a commission of social 
studies experts from the United States to survey the situation.  In conjunction with OMGUS-
selected German education authorities, they resolved to rewrite history textbooks first.  The 
Berlin schools committee had prepared outlines for all grades, but decided to begin work on 
textbooks for grades 5 thru 12.  This committee, encouraged strongly by the American 
consultants, opted to have actively teaching Germans, selected under specific criteria (to include 
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a favorable denazification check), establish teams of three teachers per grade to rewrite the 
textbooks for that grade.  To entice the best volunteers from their classrooms, OMGUS-
Education and Cultural Affairs Division (the division’s name changed from ERAD to ECAD in 
1948) offered incentives that included the teachers’ regular pay with an additional royalty, one 
meal in the OMGUS Indigenous
459
 Mess, bus passes on the military government’s bus system, 
and a warm room to work in.  Many of these teachers later received a CARE package from 
American teachers stateside.
460
  OMGUS-ECAD arranged all the logistics requirements:  they 
opened a curriculum center, staffed German clerical persons and translators, acquired 
typewriters, ribbons and paper.  As Kelty acknowledged, “Without the help supplied by Army 
education sources – the courses for the Armed Forces, extra copies from the military government 
libraries – the work could not have been done.”
461
  The textbooks, finally written and approved, 
appeared in Berlin schools in the U.S. Sector in 1949.            
3.3  The School Reform Battle in the U. S. Occupation Zone.     
Despite OMGUS’ best efforts, German educators generally resisted American proposals 
for structural school reform.  A brief case study of the Württemberg-Baden struggle 
demonstrates this point. 
3.3.1  Württemberg-Baden.   
The battle lines for German school reform in Württemberg-Baden were drawn in 1947.  
On the German side, the Württemberg-Baden Kultusministerium established a permanent 
commission for school reform, headed initially by the Superintendent of Secondary Education 
for Land Württemberg-Baden, Christian Caselmann.  On the OMGUS side, Major (MAJ) 
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Richard Banks, Acting Director of OMGUS-Education and Religious Affairs Division, 
challenged repeatedly the Caselmann Proposal. 
 As noted earlier, OMGUS-Education and Religious Affairs Division, Berlin 
(ERAD/ECAD) updated and published guidance on German school reform in January 1947, 
notifying subordinate units of the new requirement for German Education Ministers 
(Kultusminister) to prepare comprehensive statements of the aims, objectives and progress of 
their school reform and curriculum development plans on all levels of education.  OMGUS-
ERAD, Berlin expected to see Länder compliance with the policies established by the U.S. 
Military Government Regulation (MGR) 8-201.3, General Principles for Evaluation of Education 
Programs, dated 30 Nov 45, updated 14 Mar 47.  Further, OMGUS-ERAD, Berlin directed that 
the  Länder-level offices receive the plans by July 1947, review them, returning non-compliant 
plans to the German ministries for revision as needed, and finally, submit the plans to OMGUS-
ERAD, Berlin for final approval. 
 The Caselmann Proposal drifted back and forth between the American and German 
agencies for several months -- by July 1947 not yet in conformity with OMGUS directives.  No 
doubt out of frustration, MAJ Banks prepared a 14 Feb 48 response to Caselmann’s chief, 
Minister Baeuerle at the Kultusministerium, noting:   
The Caselmann plan is apparently designed to interfere as little as possible with 
existing administrative and structural arrangements, and to cause as little change 
as possible in the curriculum of the secondary school . . . we are positive that 
there will need to be a sharp reorganization of school structure if Germany’s 




The crux of MAJ Banks’ rejection of the Caselmann Proposal focused on reorganization of 
school structures, restructure of curriculum and to a lesser degree, textbook rewrites.  As MAJ 
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Banks noted in his first point, OMGUS-WB presumed that school reform in Württemberg-Baden 
would include a six-year Grundschule.  Further, MAJ Banks wrote:  
 It is our considered opinion that the six-year Grundschule is the needed vehicle 
for educational reorganization in W-B and elsewhere in Germany.   .   .   You are, 
of course, aware that despite some opposition the six-year Grundschule is planned 
for the other Länder.  Although Württemberg-Baden should not be expected to 
follow slavishly the practices of other Länder, a sharp departure in a fundamental 




MAJ Banks strengthened his argument with a quote from a 1 Dec 47 letter from Richard R. 
Alexander, Chief at OMGUS-ERAD, Berlin:   
Attention is invited to paragraph four of [Allied Control Council] Directive No. 
54.  This paragraph specifically prohibits dual-or triple-track systems.  In the 
American Zone, for the present, the six-year elementary school, Grundschule, will 
be established and no differentiation in curricula will be permitted during the first 
six years.
464
   
 
The primary objection raised by the OMGUS- ERAD office to German proposals for 
school reform hinged on the German desire to retain the traditional German school system 
wherein by the fourth year of school, students, separated by specific academic criteria, proceeded 
to the Oberschule (Gymnasium), referred to in the above quote as a dual-track system.  Further, 
differentiation, another objection of the OMGUS-ERAD, referred to decisions made as to which 
follow-on school a child would go to, e.g., a school leading to university attendance 
(Oberschule), or vocational training schools.  Students not selected for Oberschule remained in 
the Volksschule for the eight-year program, preparing for a trade of some sort after Volksschule 
completion.  OMGUS-ERAD based their objection on the method of selection for Oberschule, 
believing that class and money rather than ability and achievement determined which students 
would attend Oberschule, and thus have access to university-level education.    
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MAJ Banks’ second objection zeroed in on this process of differentiation.  The 
Caselmann Proposal had presented a compromise:  a four-year Mittelstufe (classes five 
through eight) after the first four Grundschule years with differentiation into three 
groups:  intellectual-theoretical, intellectual-practical, and manual-practical.  
Caselmann’s proposal allowed that all students would attend school through the eighth 
class, and that students would have the opportunity to move among the three groups.  
MAJ Banks objected to this proposal, suggesting that crossing over, if it actually 
occurred, would not work if differentiation had taken place between grades five and 
eight, as texts and curriculum focus would differ for each of the above options, rendering 
students who changed options, unprepared for the more strenuous Oberschule work.  
Banks wrote, “It is our opinion that the committee’s plan would continue many of the 
features of the dual – or triple-track system, and would not satisfy the requirement for a 
single-track comprehensive system of consecutive levels.”
465
   
MAJ Banks’ counter-proposed establishing a ninth school year, with the last three 
years functioning as a middle school (seventh, eighth and ninth), attended by all students, 
allowing for some differentiation in courses selected, depending on the career choices of 
the students.  In summary, the essence of the OMGUS-ERAD proposal focused on a 
school system analogous to the American system:  twelve grades, separated into a six-
year elementary, three-year middle school and three-year high school program providing 
comprehensive education for all students with the possibility for students interested in 
technical skills to take technical courses during their twelve-year program.  MAJ Banks’ 
final argument against the Caselmann Proposal on this score read, “In all but your largest 
cities there should be the single comprehensive secondary school, offering several 
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Sections of a later OMGUS-Württemberg-Baden (OMGUS-WB) ERAD report,
467
 in the 
summer, 1948 timeframe, discussed several other points germane to the school reform issue, the 
most important issue, teacher training.  OMGUS-WB promoted the need for the 
Kultusministerium to establish a teacher training institution and curriculums, depending on 
teaching levels.  Additionally OMGUS-WB encouraged the Kultusministerium to continuously 
“re-train and re-orient teachers already in service.”
468
  Generally, the Länder established 
emergency teacher training programs as soon as the military government authorities approved 
such schools to reopen, from July 1946-1947 and July 1947-1948, to increase available teachers 
to replace those under denazification procedures or permanently disqualified from teaching. 
 By the summer of 1948, MAJ John P. Steiner, the original chief of OMGUS-WB 
ERAD/ECAD, returned to the organization, replacing MAJ Banks.  As Tent noted, MAJ Steiner 
inherited several issues facing the Ländeskultusministerium by the summer, 1948.  First, the 
currency reform (June 1948) severely hampered executing any school reform plans, even if 
OMGUS approved the plans.  Second, Kultusminister Bäuerle reminded MAJ Steiner, that 
opting for the American school reform scheme in the face of “the dismemberment of our two 
Länder, Württemberg-Baden, and the differing school policies of the [French and U. S.] 
occupation forces”
469
 could come back to haunt Württemberg-Baden in the near future [1949], as 
quiet discussions among Landtag politicians already indicated the possibility of  a merger of the 
French and U. S. occupation zones.  MAJ Steiner advised the Headquarters OMGUS-
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ECRD/ECAD Director, Alonzo Grace, “that he did not believe it would be wise to force the 
Allied Control Authority Directive 54 on Württemberg-Baden at this time.”
470
  It seems that 
MAJ Steiner’s advice was heeded.      
3.3.2  School Reform in the other Länder in the U. S. Occupation Zone.   
Land Hessen initially favored recommendations proposed by OMGUS to implement the 
6-year elementary program.  However, even in Hessen where the U. S. military government 
education specialists apparently came the closest to convincing German educators and 
Kultusminister, Erwin Stein (from 1947-1951), to restructure the Land Hessen school system 
along the lines of the American recommendations, Hessen never implemented the changes to its 
school structure.  Coincidentally, in Hessen, pushback from German academics and Landtag 
officials began appearing in 1948, once it was clear that at least semi-sovereignty for Germany 
would not be long in coming.  Likewise, Land Bremen, initially favoring changes, never 
implemented school structure reform.  Land Bayern, like Württemberg-Baden, opposed OMGUS 
school restructuring recommendations.
471
  Actually, the Bavarians offered the harshest criticisms 
to the American objectives. 
3.4  Logistics Support to the School Reform Battle. 
 Staffs – OMGUS ERAD/ECAD and the various Kultusministerien, fought the main battle 
over school reform.  However, the logistics effort in support of this battle was not insignificant –
staff and logistics support personnel, technical assistance for exhibition presentations, 
transportation assets, fuel and time.  The larger logistics effort involving personnel, for example, 
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in Fiscal Year 1947 (July 1946 through June 1947), entailed support arrangements (billeting, 
feeding, transportation) for the planned two hundred or so education and technical experts in 
various fields, brought to the Germany by OMGUS for two to four month periods.
472
  Perhaps 
the most significant logistics effort in school reform was the supporting role in the textbook 
production process.  Knappen’s experience with reproducing textbooks for Aachen, while 
extraordinary, was replicated in simpler fashion throughout the U. S. occupation zone.  The 
German teachers collected in Berlin for the textbook rewrite program, received benefits in Army-
provided food, transportation, a warm work environment and professional assistance from 
American and German colleagues during their textbook writing experience.   The U. S. Army 
scrounged and ordered paper, printing presses, and ink to reproduce edited and newly written 
textbooks.  Over a four-month period, OMGUS monthly reports indicated a total of 56,936 
metric tons of wood pulp delivered to German printing facilities.
473
  This pulp was not for the 
exclusive use of textbook printing, but some of the deliveries went in this direction.  
Additionally, the Army provided reams of paper to the German printing facilities during the 
occupation.  Further, the Army shipped from its stateside installations to Germany thousands of 
texts as examples for rewrites, as new texts, or to provide updated information missing from the 
German Nazi experience.  The Army hosted many educational specialists and consultants to 
work with German educators in rewriting textbooks and developing broader curriculums for the 
various levels of education.  
3.5  Conclusions on School Reform. 
According to OMGUS guidance, OMGUS staff agency personnel could only advocate 
for an American school philosophy and persuade German educators to adopt school structures 
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similar to the American system.  While OMGUS never intended to (nor could) underwrite 
construction of a reformed German school system, it seems that several Länder ERAD officials, 
for example, MAJ Banks, interpreted the occupation mandate to require restructuring the 
German school system.  Keller had accurately observed that official policy (from the Potsdam 
Protocol, to JCS 1067 and 1779) contradicted not only itself, but also official practice in the 
field.  Further, OMGUS Länder staffs differed in execution of official policy:  “Top-level policy 
insists that the Germans use their own boot straps to pull themselves out of the mental morass.  
Except in flagrant violations of Military Government orders, reforms are not to be ‘imposed’ lest 
they be labeled ‘undemocratic.”  Yet, Keller also added, “While it is a recognized fact, and 
certainly in the democratic tradition, that you cannot change peoples’ minds and habits by force, 
the very existence of the [military] Occupation, a natural sequel to the war, is a symbol of force 
and unless Military Government wishes to act solely in the role of a family visitor come what 
may, our objectives must be attained through whatever methods prove necessary.”
474
  However, 
this U. S. Foucault-ian exercise of power met an exchange mechanism in the German educators 
and politicians – patience and stalling.  By 1948, it was quietly clear to most German officials 
that the military occupation would soon end – at least in the western German Länder.     
This paradox was not lost on German educators.  Despite almost four years of back-and-
forth communication, advice, recommendations and even threats from the OMGUS education 
officials, U. S. officials did not convince Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, Bavaria or the Bremen 
Enclave to convert to an American-style school system.  Even though the milder JCS 1779 stated  
that because “education is a primary means of creating a democratic and peaceful Germany, you 
will continue to encourage and assist in the development of education methods, institutions, 
programs and materials designed to further the creation of democratic attitudes and practices 
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through education, .  .  .   it directed the U. S. military to “require the German Länder authorities 
to adopt and execute educational programs designed to develop a healthy, democratic 
educational system which will offer equal opportunity to all according to their qualifications.”   
There is a big difference between encourage, assist and require.  It seems that Keller’s 
observations of OMGUS effectively changing at least the German school structure did indeed 
face enormous difficulties.  The Länder ERAD offices did achieve some limited success when 
the Kultusministerien forged laws guaranteeing free public education (no tuition), and rewritten, 
current textbooks appeared in the schools.  Even so, the major objective, structural school 
reform, failed.  
4.  Amerikahäuser. 
 A 1949 OMGUS-sponsored newspaper article offered the following optimistic 
assessment of the cultural initiative known as “America Houses:”  
Amerika Haus has given thousands of Heidelbergers a chance to satisfy their 
curiosity about America in their own quiet, searching way.   Many Germans 
distrust public meetings and like to read up on questions alone, undisturbed by 
crowds and noises.  Heidelberg’s Amerika Haus, located near the university has 
given them this chance to sit down and read.  Amerika Haus has also conducted a 
series of seminars on assorted topics.  The latest seminar, held every Tuesday 
evening, discussed the press, and included American journalists, German 





Not only Heidelbergers enjoyed a “window to the West” through the Amerikahäuser.  
 Two mini-libraries opened in July 1945, one in Marburg as a private initiative and the other, 
sponsored by the Psychological Warfare Branch, SHAEF (shortly after capitulation, renamed 
Information Control Division), in Bad Homburg --  small reading rooms with approximately 700 
“well-worn volumes of educational and reference books, primarily from surplus Army 
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  This embryonic foray into democratization grew to sixteen information centers 
(libraries) by November 1946, and twenty a year later, in the U. S. occupation zone.  By January 
1950, twenty-five information centers, 122 reading rooms and several bookmobiles had sprouted 
up throughout the U. S. occupation zone.  Each information center averaged between 18,000 and 
28,000 books and approximately 500 or more magazine and newspaper subscriptions, while the 
smaller reading rooms generally carried between 2,500 and 4,500 books and a smaller selection 
of periodicals and newspapers.  Over time, German-language material comprised between 20-
25% of the offerings.  A typical American library concept of open shelves and no-fee borrowing 
prevailed throughout the life of these centers.  According to OMGUS monthly reports, book 




What began as a Department of State brainchild in late 1944 under Archibald MacLeish 
and an executable project under the War Department in the first two or so years after German 
capitulation, centered on the libraries -- American books, frequent exhibits, films, concerts, 
lectures and informal discussions.
478
  As Karl-Ernst Bungenstab and others noted
479
 the 
importance of books – of their ability to influence – lay at the heart of the Amerikahäuser 
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libraries and reading rooms.  Further, the ICD, as noted above, controlled all publications – 
printing as well as distribution and marketing --especially of books.  Absent the Amerikahäuser, 
English-language reading material, outside of private collections, was scarce.  Significantly, as 
Bungenstab noted, “Diese Kontrolle, d.h. der Wert, dem[sic] man dem Buch als einem 
Informationsmittel zumaβ, wirft ein bezeichnendes Licht auf die Bedeutung der Amerika-Häuser 
und der Reading Rooms, deren Aufbau in den Jahren der Militärregierung intensiv betrieben 
wurde.”  (The control, the value that books have as an information medium demonstrates the 
particular importance of the Amerikahäuser and the Reading Rooms which the military 
government devoted years in intensely building up.)
480
   
 As with school reform, reeducation/reorientation of the German public became the  
U. S. military government’s penultimate mission after German capitulation in pursuit of the 
democratization process.  However, the direction of this mission changed in mid-stream.  
Initially, accomplishment of this mission involved (among other things) indoctrination in 
democracy directed toward cultural and educational fields through all mass communications 
instruments, censored by the OMGUS-Information Control Division.  Known officially as a 
program in the U. S. military government’s Information Control Division (formerly 
Psychological Warfare Division), under “Military Government Information Services,” the 
Amerikahäuser engaged in democratic reeducation of the German people by disseminating 
information about the western democracies and especially the United States.  Initially, the basis 
of American planning for these information centers was to return Germany to the international 
community of civilized nations.  To reach this lofty goal required more than simple structural 
changes in German government, rather, also a change in German mentality and behavior/conduct 
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(Bungenstab’s terms, Verhalten und Denken481).  One should see the early establishment of 
Amerikahäuser in this light – a tool of the U. S. military government in its pursuit toward 
reeducation.  This early concept altered after 1947.   
Pilgert refers to an ongoing Congressional debate over “misunderstanding and willful 
misrepresentation of the United States which they [U.S. Congressional members visiting Europe 
in 1947] found abroad,”
482
 culminating in passage of the U. S. Information and Education Act of 
1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), that empowered the State Department to broaden the scope of its 
foreign information program.  At the same time, in response to increasing Soviet anti-American 
propaganda particularly in Germany, General Clay, on 25 October 1947, authorized the 
OMGUS-ICD “to attack Communism in every form wherever it existed and to cite each exposed 
example of its day-to-day work.  We still would not attack governments or individuals; we would 
not sling mud, but we would no longer refrain from exposing Communist tactics and 
purposes,”
483
 a policy referred to by some as Operation BACK-TALK.  Neither were isolated 
incidents.   
The year, 1947, might be called the “over-the-hump” year initiating the outwardly 
downward slide in the Soviet-American relationship as regarded Germany, as witnessed at the 
two somewhat acerbic councils of Foreign Ministers (April and December 1947), the entry of the 
U. S. and Britain into Bizonia, as well as a host of other foreign policy decisions and actions.  As 
important as these events were, the publication of JSC 1779 heralded officially a tectonic shift in 
U. S. Government activities and policies toward the U. S. occupation zone in Germany, from 
                                                   
481
 Bungenstab, Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien, Band 16, “Entstehung, Bedeutungs- und Funktionswandel der 
Amerika-Häuser, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der amerikanischen Auslandsinformation nach dem 2. Weltkrieg,”   
190 
482
 Pilgert, The History of the Development of Information Services through Information Centers and Documentary 
Films, 2-3.  
483
 Clay, Decision in Germany, 158.  General Clay did not use the term, Operation BACK-TALK.  
301 
 
control to “guidance and leadership.”  This shift reverberated through the ICD, particularly in 
areas and missions directly relating to the German population – the Amerikahäuser one of 
several prime targets.  Increasingly, the Amerikahäuser offered programs countering Communist 
propaganda, by familiarizing “Germans with the democratic institutions within the United States 
.   .   .  [With] the establishment of ideas and attitudes desired by the United States; and the 




The Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding 
the Military Government of Germany, JCS 1779 and MGR Title 21-800, Change 4, called for 
development of the Amerikahäuser into full-scale Information Centers “for the operation of 
media of information, including those sponsored by Military Government, designed to further the 
objectives of your Government.”
485
  Of note, for the first time, official U. S. Government policy 
for the military government in Germany used the terms, cultural reconstruction and reorientation, 
rather than reeducation in the Directive to the Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces of 
Occupation.  Further, MGR Title 21, Change 4, Section 800, directed Information Control 
personnel to “Plan and carry out overt activities designed to further the democratic reorientation 
of Germany, and to foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful 
nations through the revival of international cultural relations.  Such activities will include 
[among others] creation, operation and maintenance of libraries and information centers.”
486
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By 1947, Amerikahaus stuck as the official name for these libraries that had expanded to 
cultural and information centers providing lectures, concerts, documentary films, language 
classes, presentations and displays.  By the end of the U. S. military occupation in September 
1949, twenty-eight Amerikahäuser, one hundred thirty six Amerikahäuser-sponsored Reading 
Rooms and several Bookmobiles operated within the U. S. occupation zone.
487
   
 Logistics support as well as funding for this program during the military occupation 
rested with the U. S. Army – specifically, with each OMGUS-Land Director and the military 
posts in which the facilities functioned.
488
  As Karl-Ernst Bungenstab wrote, “Die physische 
Erhaltung der Amerika-Häuser – Gebäude, Reparaturen, Heizmaterial, Büromaterial und 
Transport – oblag der nächstliegenden militärischen Einheit der amerikanishen Armee, in deren 
Bereich das jeweilige Amerika-Haus lag.”  (Essentially, logistic support, to include building, 
repair, heating, office materials and transportation, e.g., bookmobiles, for each Amerikahaus 
resided with the closest military unit to that Amerikahaus.)489   How much of these expenses was 
paid through U. S. Government appropriated funds, or through occupation costs billed to each 
German Land is difficult to say.490  However, U. S. Army logistics support definitely provided 
physical support, i.e., book donations from stateside Army libraries, ground transportation to and 
from the European ports for materiel and resupply, as well as administrative assistance to the 
information centers. 
 Measuring the success of the Amerikahäuser as vehicles of cultural transmission is 
difficult.  On the one hand, this project escaped much of the early control aspects witnessed in 
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other reorientation venues that created in many Germans’ minds the paradox noted by many 
researchers:  that a democracy, through undemocratic means was forcing democracy on 
Germans.  Further, as Bungenstab quoted from an OMGUS presentation in 1948, “Keine 
Besatzungsarmee in der Geschichte hat jemals erfolgreich einem anderen Volk ein dauerhaftes 
System von Kultur und Bildung zwangsweise übergestülpt.”  (No occupation army in history has 
successfully forced another People to permanently accept its culture and education system.)
491
 
Quite the opposite, Germans visited the Amerikahäuser voluntarily.  On the other hand, 
according to OMGUS surveys from March 1948, only “one of every 100 adult Germans in the 
American Zone had visited an Amerika Haus  .  .  .  More than nine out of ten in AMZON 
claimed to know nothing about them.”
492
  Another survey in five German cities (West Berlin, 
Bremen, Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Stuttgart), from July and September 1948, suggested that 
apparently through increased newspaper articles and radio reporting and discussions, “52 % in 
West Berlin and 74% in Nuremberg knew that there was an Amerika Haus in their city.”  
Further, “four in ten of the total adult population in each of the five cities could mention specific 
things offered there.”
493
  Significantly, the common thread woven through both surveys 
suggested that the predominant user of Amerikahäuser was not the average German citizen.   
One in three was a high school or university graduate (compared with 4 percent of 
the general population).  The information center visitor was far more likely than 
the general population to be a professional man, well off financially, active 
politically, and young.  Only 18 percent had no knowledge of the English 
language (86 percent nationwide).  Two in five (compared with 17 percent 
nationwide) had contact with someone in the United States, and 7 percent (2 
percent nationally) had been to America.
494
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 Although not mentioned in these surveys or most material written about the success of 
Amerikahäuser as cultural transmitters, one should consider the environmental and social factors 
of the times.  First, the majority of Germans in the U. S. occupation zone lived outside the major 
cities where the majority of the Amerikahäuser were located and most likely had few 
transportation possibilities available to them to visit an Amerikahaus.  Further, the majority of 
Germans focused on food, housing and available work at least until after the currency reform in 
1948.  In addition, lack of English language skills probably discouraged many Germans from 
seeking out the information centers.  Nonetheless, for at least a small group of Germans, the U. 
S. High Commissioner’s Office estimated approximately 3.25 million Germans older than 15 
years of age (in 1954), had visited the Amerikhäuser in their region.  According to the report, 
only three percent of the visitors evaluated the information centers negatively.
495
  If the survey 
results are valid, one could conclude that this aspect of the U. S. occupation’s cultural policy had 
fulfilled its objectives.   
5.  The Army Assistance Program to German Youth Activities (GYA).496  
A U. S. Army publication boasted in 1951 that contact between the U. S. forces, military 
and civilian, their family members, and German youth through the German Youth Activities 
(GYA), “brought hundreds of American soldiers and civilians into direct contact not only with 
German young people but with their German adult youth leaders, [presenting] one of the few 




 The single official source for the German Youth Activities Program is The U. S. Armed Forces German Youth 
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reports.  Throughout the military government phase of the occupation, articles on youth activities programs appeared 
in the OMGUS monthly reports. 
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bright spots in a picture darkened by extensive fraternization for material gain or other selfish 
reasons.”
497
   
Even before the war ended, American soldiers encountered the German children in the 
streets of the villages, towns and cities through which they maneuvered.  The adults kept their 
distance but the children were curious.  A study by two sociologists claimed:   
The small children who frequently clustered about the soldiers during halts in 
towns and villages caught the soldier’s attention and often his sympathy.  Many 
soldiers enjoyed the smiles that came to the faces of the children when they were 
given candy, chewing gum, and bits of food from the military rations.  Broken 
and hesitatingly shy efforts at conversation and games soon followed the handouts 
of candy and food.  From some such spontaneous beginnings developed the first 
concerted actions by which American military personnel befriended German 
youth.  Probably without realizing it, let alone without being trained or prepared 
for it, these men [and later some women, as the WACs and family members also 
joined in the effort] were dealing with one of the many formidable social 




The SHAEF official non-fraternization policy of 12 September 1944 prohibited even 
contact with German children.  However, even as the official history of the GYA program later 
noted, “no amount of reorientation or regimentation could convince the soldier of the soundness 
of this policy, especially as it related to children.  Widespread violation of the non-fraternization 
policy began with the establishment of friendly relations between American soldiers and German 
children.”
499
  Few German children, at least in the American zone, cannot remember the 
Schokolade (most like Hersheys) und Kaugummi, or their first English words, “T (h)ank you.”    
Only a month after capitulation, on 8 June 1945, General Eisenhower, as Commander, U. S. 
Forces in the European Theater (USFET), modified this policy to allow U. S. troops to associate 
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with German children.  Shortly thereafter, USFET extended the modification to allow troops to 
engage with Germans, excepting known Nazi elements, albeit in public locations.  So it went, 




 As U. S. Army units settled, at least temporarily, in towns and villages, contacts with 
Germans – especially the children, increased.  The OMGUS Military Government Monthly 
Report No. 4, 20 November 1945, under Education, Religion and Welfare, applauded the 
voluntary undertaking by numerous service members engaged in German youth activities, 
referring to this undertaking as a “remarkable picture of spontaneous instruction in democracy 
through the media of sports, games and the development of the spirit of sportsmanship and 
tolerance.”  The monthly report cited two activities, at the “Ike” Stadium, within the Bremen 
Enclave, today’s Weser Stadium, a kite contest in which approximately 1,500 children 
participated, and a soccer competition between young Germans from several inactive Bremen 
soccer clubs and a team of Scottish military personnel from Oldenburg that drew about 12,000 
spectators.  The German young adults won the game.   
Dependent on an organization or agency point of view – the military police and 
Constabulary wanted to reduce juvenile delinquency, educators and senior leaders recognized 
that these youth represented the German future and were thus a prime target for reorientation, 
while unit commanders, saw this as a great opportunity to engage bored service members in a 
worthwhile cause.  U. S. Seventh Army decided to formalize soldier-youth associations within its 
Western Military District by issuing instructions, 25 October 1945, on establishment of German 
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youth agencies.  This action apparently caused friction at the U. S. Group Control Council 
(USGCC) in Berlin as early as September 1945, when the Seventh Army informally championed 
the soldier-youth connection in its letter to the Western Military District military units.  The 
USGCC perceived this program to be a violation of at least U. S. official occupation policy – 
“that the Germans themselves [be] responsible for such activity,” as well as a violation of the 
non-fraternization policy.  However, at the time, at least one enthusiastic staff member at USFET 
noted: 
With soldiers as youth leaders, the Germans can learn what American 
sportsmanship is, and why we think and act as we do; that we are not as 
superficial as so many Continentals seem to think, but that our kind of training 
and living has produced something which is called American democracy – a 
commodity which cannot be sold to the Germans in any other way except 
demonstration.   One of the most effective means of achieving international amity 





As the passage of time often clears up disagreements, USFET published Military Government 
Regulation, Title 8, Part 7 – Youth and Recreational Activities, by 30 November 1945, making 
the formation of GYA organizations legitimate and official across the U. S. occupation zone.   
Local Jugendämter and various youth movements in Germany date back to the early 20 th 
century.  The Hitlerjugend organization preempted both the Jugendämter and any youth 
movements or organizations still functioning after 1933.  At the beginning of the military 
occupation, the U. S. military government had forbidden consolidated organization of youth 
groups above the Kreis level to deter reforming a youth group that might have mirrored the 
Hitlerjugend – a highly centralized organization under the Nazi regime.502  Therefore, initially, 
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under the new military regulation, the Jugendamt (Youth Administration) in a German Kreis 
interested in establishing youth groups filed an application with the local U. S. military 
government Civil Affairs detachment.  Jugendämter sprang up in most local cities and Kreise 
relatively soon after the capitulation, and the administrators were no strangers to organizing 
youth activities.  Reorganizing youth committees posed no problem, and according to an 
OMGUS tally,
503
 by December 1946 every Kreis in the three Länder had established a youth 
committee.  Without funds or much equipment, these youth committees, even with local U. S. 
military government approval, required some logistical support to engage actively in establishing 
programs. 
U. S. military government authorities forbade any type of group uniform and emblem 
without prior approval and certain activities such as drilling, marching or para-military training, 
and engagement in political activity.  Change 4, 14 March 1947 to MGR Title 8, Part 7 modified 
the last activity to allow German political parties to sponsor and assist youth groups so long as 
the focus of the youth groups, whose members ranged between the ages of 10 and 25 years, 
remained cultural, religious and and/or recreational.  “Youth activities will have as its purposes 
the constructive use of leisure time, the prevention of delinquency, and, on the positive side, the 
promotion of the political and moral reorientation of German youth toward democracy and 
peace.”
504
     
 Many of the Kreise in the U. S. occupation zone established youth committees staffed by 
a range of German professionals – educators, clergy and city officials, upon receiving approval 
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from the Land U. S. military government detachment.  Seventh Army urged U. S. tactical troops 
and military government detachments located near organizing Kreis youth groups to coordinate 
with the local Kreis in sponsoring these youth groups.  Although activities initially focused on 
sports, motion picture showings and youth festivals joined the menu of activities.  According to 
the OMGUS Monthly Report, No. 5, 20 December 1945, membership numbers soared, e.g., 
Pforzheim reported 1,000 members, Stuttgart, 11,000, Esslingen, 1,000, Heilbronn, 6,000.  
Frankly, these numbers seem high and they do not necessarily reflect regular participation, nor 
motive for participating.  The locations, however, represent a pattern – these youth groups 
flourished most often in urban areas.   
Of all the activities under the ERAD/ECAD directorate, group activities and specifically, 
the German Youth Activities organization, required the most U. S. Army logistics-intensive 
support until the U. S. High Commission turned over operational management to the 
Jugendämter by 1954-1955.  During the second occupation year, 1946-1947, 250 officers and 
600 enlisted men devoted full time duty to German Youth Activities that included operation of 
activities at youth community centers, sponsoring discussion groups on topics of interest, 
organization of social events, motion picture programs, athletic contests, dramatic productions, 
handcraft activities, outdoor activities and a sundry of other activities.  At the height of the U. S. 
military government program, 800 military personnel, along with over 9,000 American and 
2,400 German volunteers supported GYA activities.
505
  The Army units provided facilities, to 
include the craft and maintenance shops, for the GYA at no cost, allowing for year-round 
activities for the groups.   
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While Army Headquarters directed personnel to work with the GYA program, it had not 
allocated funding for material and equipment.  Offsetting program costs against the Occupation 
Fund created antagonism with German residents who were already paying taxes to support the 
Kreis youth groups.  Regardless, the Army found ways to support the program:  first, the Army 
turned over confiscated Wehrmacht equipment to the Kreis groups.  Second, the Army assigned 
much of the excess equipment stocked by USFET Special Service to support the pre-
redeployment Army to the GYA program, e.g., thousands of basketballs, table tennis balls and 
decks of cards.  In the early months of 1947, the Army delivered an additional 1200 tons of 
excess Army materials valued at over $2 million that included camping supplies such as cots, 
blankets, tents, mess kits and athletic equipment, to the various youth groups.
506
  With the 
confiscated and excess material sources exhausted, Army units loaned equipment to the GYA 
groups they sponsored. Slowly, with the arrival of American families, Army wives, noticing the 
absence of girls’ groups, volunteered to work with the WAC personnel assigned to develop this 
facet of the GYA program. 
Paradoxically, according to Anna and Richard Merritt, who examined membership and 
awareness of the GYA program in February and April 1947, between 11 and 13 percent of the 
youth participated in GYA activities, and up to 55 percent of the adults were aware of the 
program.  While the GYA program received positive marks from participants and parents alike, 
only a small percentage of youth actually participated.  Further, when queried about the 
objectives of the program, 41% of the participants’ parents “responded that the programs kept 
the children off the streets,” while 19% commented that the programs “provided free-time 
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  In March 1947,
508
 surveyors asked 1,021 boys and girls between 10 and 18 years, 
living in Frankfurt, Kassel, Heidelberg and Munich, why they participated in GYA activities.  
The Merritt survey results follow below. 
Reasons for Participation in GYA Activities     
 Get candy and food      40% 
 Chance for sports and games     26 
 Show our former enemies what Germans really are like 23 
 Learn English       17 
 Get to know some Americans     10 
 Learn about America from some soldiers     9 
 Learn about democracy       6 
 Have a change         6 
 Occupy leisure time        5 
 Learn how democratic organizations are run     3 
 Other reasons         2 
 Program has no value for me     11 
TOTAL (multiple responses permitted)             158% 
No doubt, the irony of a military organization sponsoring German youth organizations 
and activities forbidden from having any link to military or para-military training or activities 
was not lost on German youth groups, civilian administrators and many German parents.  
However, as small as participation by German youth might have been, surely a few benefited 
from the GYA program.  Further, working with the German youth probably topped the list of 
rewarding activities for those service members privileged to be involved with the GYA. 
 Ironically, although an inspired and instinctive idea at its onset, reorienting the German 
mentality through the youth via sports and related activities, with Americans as role models, the 
German Youth Activities program was perhaps doomed from the start.  Firstly, military 
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personnel worked with the program voluntarily initially, and later on assignment.  However, 
authorized funding required authorized slots and the War Department never authorized the slots.  
Second, without official funding, the organizations ultimately had to rely on donations, 
non-appropriated fund allocations and non-occupational budget funds (also known after 1948 as 
Deutsche Mark funds).  This last item caused no end of grief with many Germans as 
fundamentally, this meant obligatory German taxes paying for a U. S. Army organization – the 
GYA, especially when the local Kreise had their own youth program organizations.   
Third, the GYA concept also had its opponents within the U. S. military government – 
the principal opponent being Alonzo Grace, OMGUS ECAD Director.  According to the author 
of The U. S. Armed Forces German Youth Activities Program 1945-1955 (p. 43), Grace 
“regarded GYA as just a program to give Coca-Cola and candy to German children.”   Further, 
according to the same source (44), in an effort to close down the GYA program, Grace noted that 
under The Hague and Geneva Conventions, using non-occupation funds for the GYA program 
might be illegal.  That line of argument eventually fell apart under a EUCOM barrage arguing 
that the program “fulfilled a need of the Army of Occupation . . . as the program had been 
initiated primarily as a practical method of assuring greater security for the occupying forces by 
reducing juvenile delinquency among the local population.”
509
   However, shortly, the newly 
semi-sovereign German government established a baseline occupation fund that was not robust 
enough to finance all the U. S. HICOM desired programs.  GYA fell under the ax, particularly 
because the local German youth organizations had always perceived GYA as a duplication of 
effort, but mostly because the U. S. could not, or would not fund the program. 
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6.  U. S. Army Logistics in support of OMGUS Educational and Cultural Programs. 
 The U. S. Army had a cartel-like monopoly over many aspects of logistic support in 
occupied Germany – at least in its zone and Berlin sector, if not in some specific logistic aspects, 
e.g., transportation and food provisions, throughout occupied Western Germany.  In almost all 
cases of reeducation/reorientation, the U.S. Army provided much of the logistics to support 
cultural programs, particularly early in the occupation while German administration and logistics 
systems recovered from the war destruction, and American occupation controls were still the 
strictest.  Several examples of support follow, but hardly account for the day-by-day support 
rendered for the duration of the occupation, military and civilian. 
In May 1946, forty-one (41) U. S. Army 2 ½-ton trucks delivered from the Bremerhaven 
ports to Württemberg-Baden, 3,500 wooden crates containing over 320,000 books.  In the 
following October, the U. S. Army transported from Bremerhaven to Württemberg-Baden 
thirteen (13) rail boxcars carrying 3,900 wooden crates loaded with approximately 400,000 
books and 63 tons of pulped paper.  In November 1946, the U. S. Army transported in eighteen 
(18) rail boxcars 5,400 wooden crates containing approximately 520,000 books.  Partial 
distribution of these texts follows:
510 
Type of Institution Number in Württemberg-Baden Number of Copies 
Universities & colleges 11 18,000 
Teacher Training colleges 11 36,000 
Secondary schools 125 103,000 
Vocational schools 125 35,000 
German Educational offices 31 19,000 
Miscellaneous agencies 27 10,500 
Civil Censorship Division  1,000 
American Library  500 
Internment Camp 74  300 
Pulping Program  550,000 
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The Smithsonian Institution, the Friends Service Committee, the Charlotte city and 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina Book Aid Committee, and various women’s clubs of 
Colorado, Michigan and Illinois organized several magazine and book donation drives, shipping  
18 ½ tons of educational materials for distribution to Württemberg-Baden.  During the quarter, 
July through September 1948, approximately 7,741-crated books and 3,995-crated magazines 
arrived, moved through the U. S. Army supply chain to Württemberg-Baden, wherein U. S. 
Army personnel distributed the material to various schools, as requested by the Land 
Kultusministerium.511 
The continuous import of paper and bookbinding material from the United States, 
through Bremerhaven by the U. S. Army greatly improved textbook and educational materials 
production.  This materiel remained in short supply until the currency reform in 1948.  
According to OMGUS-WB, ERAD/EDAD, because of these deliveries, publishers in 
Württemberg produced the following textbooks and related school materials, representing 37 
percent of textbook production in the U. S. occupation zone from the summer 1945 through 
September 1948.
512
   





Copies Total Titles 
printed between 
Summer 1945 and 
September 1948 
Total Copies 
Elementary   4 199,000 58 2,957,750 
Secondary 15 101,800 83    672,250 
Vocational   6   31,000 41    315,200 
For teachers   2   11,000   6      26,000 
Totals for 1948 27 342,000   8      29,000 
Totals for period   196 4,000,200 
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A little known logistics mission of the U. S. Army involved not only producing films, 
particularly documentary films, but also running film centers for U. S. produced film as part of 
the official reorientation program.  The ICD/ICS Division’s Motion Picture Branch, responsible 
not only for determining which films could be played in German cinemas in the U. S. occupation 
zone and sector, but also, early in the occupation, in producing appropriate films for German 
consumption.  Both missions were logistics intensive as U. S. occupation personnel provided not 
only film production personnel but also often technical assistance, film supplies and film 
projectors.     
U. S. Army engineer support early in the occupation rehabilitated two production 
facilities critical for this work at Berlin-Tempehof and in Munich.  U. S. civilian film experts, 
some in uniform, working with cleared German film production specialists, were able by 
February 1947 to provide dubbing of German language tracks on fifty feature films annually.  
The Motion Picture Branch produced a number of documentaries to “explain U. S. occupation 
policies as well as to persuade Germans to adopt for themselves the principles of democratic 
life,”
514
 for example, Storm and It Looks Like Rain.  By 1949, the branch had produced 18 
documentary films, fourteen adapted for German cinemas, with eighty-nine documentary films 
projected for use at the U. S. Information Centers, and fifty-nine films to German schools and 
universities.  Seventeen of these films represented American educational and cultures issues and 
programs, thirteen, agriculture and related issues, and sixteen in general categories displaying 
American democratic institutions and contributions to the war recovery efforts.
515
  In addition to 
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synchronizing language on U. S. films, the production teams also synchronized French and 
British films for German audiences.   
Not only were documentary films synchronized and presented to the German public.  
Noted in the OMGUS Report of Military Government, October 1948, these joint American-
German teams had produced five popular fairy tales, presumably for children:  Frau Holle, 
Rotkäppchen, Glüchwein, Das verzauberte Tüchlein and Ein Faβ voll Spaβ.516  Further, the 
report noted that among the favorite films received by adult German audiences, Flame of New 
Orleans, Together Again, To Each his Own, The Two-faced Woman, The Lodger, and the Song 
of Bernadette, the last film set attendance records in German movie theaters on all showings in 
the U. S. occupation zone.
517
  Interestingly, the Song of Bernadette was based on the 1941 novel 
by Franz Werfel, an Austrian-Bohemian émigré, who fled Austria in 1938, eventually settling in 
Los Angeles.  Noteworthy, by October 1948, 1,510 German cinemas operated in the U. S. 
occupied zone and sector.     
Procuring, repairing and running projectors, transformers, and cycling films around the 
movie theaters within the U. S. occupation zone also kept the Army crews busy.  During the 
three-month period, June to August 1948, in Württemberg-Baden, 1,667 film showings, using 
two copies each of twenty-eight (28) films, were shown to 147,581 German civilians in twenty 
(20) Kreise.  Of the eighty-three (83) projectors on hand, only forty-three (43) functioned due to 
the shortage of both functional transformers and projectionists.  This mission required intensive 
commitment of personnel, equipment and financial support.
518
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During the final quarter of Fiscal Year 1948 (March-June), the American Friends Service 
Committee announced that they would sponsor fifteen secondary schools in Württemberg-Baden 
to assist with provision of educational and cultural materials.
519
  Additionally, during the same 
period, U. S. National Education Association sent 190 CARE packages for needy teachers in 
Württemberg-Baden.  U. S. Army personnel transported the packages from the Bremerhaven 
ports and arranged for distribution to designated German recipients. 
What most Americans probably remember about occupation Germany and American 
largesse to the German communities, aside from CARE packages, are the Christmas parties 
arranged throughout the U. S. occupation zone and the U. S Berlin sector for the German 
children.  General Clay commented on both the unit-level and GYA sponsored Christmas parties 
and particularly Operation SANTA CLAUS during Christmas, 1948, in Berlin, in which Berlin 
Airlift pilots dropped thousands of Christmas packages for the children in Berlin.
520
  
German Youth Activities, through clubs, discussion groups, and the development 
of a cooperative attitude between Americans and Germans – have had a 
particularly active career in Heidelberg.  Last Christmas, for instance, aided 
considerably by GYA contribution of toys and candy, became the best that many 




Staff members of the OMGUS Länder ERAD offices, as part of their mission to manage 
the official reorientation program, travelled throughout the region making many appearances at 
public meetings of German teachers, parents and laypersons.  In connection with the opening of 
the American School Practices exhibit, prepared by OMGUS-ERAD/ECAD, staff members 
informed the German public about the American school system functions and structure, as part 
of the OMGUS-ERAD/ECAD bid to convince Germans to reform their own school structures in 
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the American image.  This represented another personnel and equipment-intensive mission for 
the U. S. Army.   
The OMGUS Land ERAD/ECAD expanded its service to the German teaching 
community through establishment of Educational Service Centers (ESC), one in Stuttgart, 
another in Karlsruhe and a third center planned for Heidelberg.  While the concept revolved 
around the teaching community and other professionals, the ESCs did not restrict use to these 
groups; however, the majority of their material targeted these groups.  The Stuttgart ESC 
reported an inventory of close to 5,000 professional books, 350 professional journals donated 
from sources in the United States, Switzerland, Great Britain, France and the Scandinavian 
countries, many books and journals in German and French.   Additionally, the ESC reported 
regular use by approximately 400 readers weekly in Stuttgart and about half that many at the 
ESC in Karlsruhe. In addition to providing reading rooms and material, the ESCs provided the 
facilities for professional meetings (teacher, student, parent, and laypersons).
522
  ERAD/ECAD 
staffed the centers and U. S. Army logisticians kept the centers supplied with reading material as 
it arrived in country – again, through the ports. 
In support of the GYA program, the U. S. Army provided transportation, fuel, surplus 
Army athletic stocks, particularly the equipment left behind by redeploying troops, facilities and 
even assigned Army personnel to work directly, full-time with the Kreis youth committees and 
the GYA program.  One example follows: 
The youth center in Garmisch received a large quantity of ping-pong balls through 
a distribution of surplus Army supplies, but failed to get any paddles or tables.  
The non-commissioned officer in charge of German youth activities promptly 
borrowed two paddles from the Army Special Services Club turned the paddles 
over to the carpenter fathers of several of the young participants in the youth 
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center program, and within a week sufficient paddles and tables were produced to 
promote a ping-pong competition at the center.
523
 
       
Franklin J. Keller, (Chief of the Vocational & Technical Section, OMGUS-Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch, 1946-47), in an article, “Germany – A Clinical Case,”
524
 provocatively 
suggests that the root to learning lies in the absence of hunger for many German children – it is 
hard to motivate them to learn while their stomachs are growling from hunger.       
 He argues (correctly) that particularly the children were not getting anywhere near enough 
calories, even with the supplements.  “Food imported into the bi-zonal area [and transported by 
U. S. Army logisticians] in 1947 amounted to 4,334,352 metric tons, valued at $516,412,500, 
providing  [on average] 1000 calories per day, or 60% of the official ration.  Deliveries shrank 
about 10% from Bremerhaven to the consumer presumably through black market activity.”
525
  In 
addition to the general food imports mentioned above by Keller, and perhaps more memorable, 
particularly to a generation of Germans, the Hoover child-feeding program initiated in April 
1947, after on-the-ground research by President Hoover and Tracy Voorhees, provided 
approximately 3.5 million school lunches, approximating 350 calories per lunch, to German 
youth in the bizonal region.
526
  The young German boys heading to school, mentioned in an 
earlier section of this narrative, remember even today the school lunches and the cacao milk that 
inevitably came with the meal.   
By this timeframe, 1947-1948, German trucks and drivers supported U. S. Army 
logisticians, many Germans and Displaced Persons employed in the labor (civilian) support 
organizations.  Nonetheless, without logistics support – enablers – little moved except by foot. 
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7.  Summary:  Impact of Official Policies and U. S. Army Logistics on German Society  
From warfighting to lifesaving:  U. S. Army logistics support saved the lives of many 
Germans who would probably have died in the first years following capitulation.  From 
starvation to survival:  U. S. Army logistics efforts guaranteed a food supply for a largely 
starving German population.  From rubble to reconstruction:  one gas line, one water line, one 
electric plant, one brick, one bridge, one road, one railcar -- step-by-step, U. S. Army Engineers 
and Transporters assisted the Germans with reconstruction of infrastructure.  From National 
Socialism to Democracy:  the U. S. Army strove to reorient the Germans, restructure their 
schools, and redirect their leisure activities through modeling the American lifestyle.   
Forging a connection between U. S. Army logistics support and cultural exchange with 
the recipients of this support – the German population – might be a bridge too far.  This does not 
imply that the beneficiaries, or for that matter the U. S. service members, did not experience each 
other’s culture.  However, language differences hindered close contact.  Second, most American 
servicemembers remained in Germany only a short time – one year, maybe two.  Third, at least 
in the first two years, military units moved around frequently.  Even when an American 
community developed with the arrival of families, because Kaserne space was limited by war 
damage or already occupied by DPs and prisoners of war, and even if available, had not been 
configured for family life, cultural connections between Germans and Americans was minimal.  
The U. S. military organization in their assigned area requisitioned housing usually by the block.  
This situation allowed American families to stick together, isolating them from their German 
neighbors.  Further, much of the contact that took place involved specific, elite groups of people.  
Considering the three examples of cultural exchange in this study, the contacts between 
Americans and Germans on the school reform issue occurred primarily between American and 
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German staff officials and academics, whereas with the German Youth Activities program, 
contact occurred directly between American servicemembers and German youth.  On the 
German side, an element many writers fail to consider, at least in depth, was the mindset of many 
Germans immediately after the war – food, shelter and work were the top priorities – survival, 
not cultural exchange with the occupiers.  Furthermore, relatively few Germans had direct 
contact with U. S. Army troops.  This, of course, changed as the U. S. Army employed more 
Germans.   
Attraction to Americans more often resulted from immediate curiosity created by the 
contrast of apparent wealth of the Americans to the destruction in Germany, or access, at least 
initially, to the necessities and even commodities, short or non-existent on the German market.  
Survival and revival instincts overpowered cultural curiosity, at least initially.  Frankly, the 
constant barrage from occupation officials of America’s superior society irritated many 
Germans, especially in light of the often authoritarian and anti-democratic policies and 
America’s own history of slavery, and treatment of minorities, to wit the American Indian 
reservations, Japanese concentration camps, and especially the highly visible segregation of 
white and Negro troops in Germany.  Further, the impact of confiscation and requisitioning of 
German resources on a German society already doing without rankled. 
Nonetheless, if one created a balance sheet to measure success or failure of U. S. Army 
logistics as a mechanism imposing cultural transfer or promoting cultural exchange between 
Americans and Germans during the military occupation, 1945-1949, the score would weigh in 
favor of measured cultural transfer from the U. S. military government to the Germans and 
limited cultural exchange on both sides.  That is, some Americanisms were imposed through the 
denazification and democratization programs, and some Americans as well as some Germans 
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learned or renewed interests in cultures other than their own.  Whether the changes in 
governmental operation or newly found information or rekindled interest brought about lifestyle 
or organizational changes for either group is doubtful.  However, perhaps a better understanding 
is enough.  Notwithstanding the difficulties in measuring cultural exchange, I stand by the score 
– Americans learned about bratwursts and Germans about hamburgers.  Regardless, this game 




















Conclusions:  We are in Country for the Long Haul. 
 Whatever post-war policies and plans leaders developed prior to war’s end, neither 
planner nor plan could have been prepared for the destruction in Europe at the end of the war.  
The physical destruction was obvious – the human and cultural devastation initially not so 
obvious.  Likewise, neither planner nor plan could have visualized a reconstructed and rearmed 
Germany, or, for that matter, a recreated Western Europe within a short timeframe.  Looking 
back, one can easily argue that the end of World War II was also the beginning of a complicated, 
interconnected, U. S. dominated, globalized world. 
After three-and-a half years of combat, many American forces in Germany woke up on 
the morning of 9 May 1945, to a different mission.  For the tactical forces, the fighting in 
Germany was officially finished.  For the service forces, the logistics mission, support the forces, 
continued.  However, for both groups, the occupation mission no longer loomed on the horizon 
as some amorphous concept waiting for the leaders to solidify into an operation plan.  The need 
was too great, the destruction too obvious to ignore.  Amidst the carnage, the survivors needed 
help – they stood in the doorways of blown-out buildings, they lined the streets, they clogged the 
highways in all directions.  American soldiers had already seen these scenes as they crossed into 
Germany, particularly as they crossed through areas bombed out or fought through.  Nonetheless, 
the war was over, at least in Germany and most soldiers wanted to go home.   
Turning around a war-fighting campaign however, took time, particularly when leaders 
back home were not sure exactly how much longer the fighting in the Pacific Theater would go 
on.  In the meantime, preparations for redeployment of approximately 2 ½ million soldiers and 
the set-up of temporary living quarters within Germany for the remaining occupation forces 
topped the “things-to-do-immediately” list for American units.  The clean-up took on gargantuan 
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proportions – not just setting up tent-cities – that was old-hat for the soldiers, rather, basic repairs 
to German civilian utility and transportation systems damaged during the war that often taxed the 
ingenuity of many an Army engineer.  Amidst the physical carnage, it quickly became apparent 
that the specter of starvation and “disease and unrest” danced in the shadows of the destruction.  
The U. S. Army Civil Affairs detachments had trained and prepared well for the initial 
tasks awaiting them, particularly the care and feeding of millions of Displaced Persons and 
refugees clogging the roadways.  However, the lessons learned from Colonel Hunt’s Report 
following World War I, regarding severe food shortages within the indigenous German 
population following Germany’s defeat in World War I, and the historic requirement for 
Germany to import food to support its population, must have been overlooked.  As noted in the 
first chapter, the total German economic system came to a standstill by war’s end.  Food 
production was less than half its 1938 level, while the population to be fed had risen 
substantially.  Additionally, large numbers of working-age Germans, victims of combat, interned 
as prisoners of war, or camp-interned proven or suspected Nazi leaders and sympathizers, could 
not assist with industrial or agricultural tasks, nor, immediately, with even necessary repair or 
reconstruction of infrastructure.  It fell to the U. S. Army Civil Affairs soldiers to catalog the 
current infrastructure damage and future requirements of the local populations.  These were 
perhaps the first witnesses to the absence of functioning local governments in many of the 
villages and towns they passed through.   
The fledgling Military Police Corps soldiers had their hands full keeping roadways 
somewhat clear and practicing law enforcement in a society gone lawless in many cases for lack 
of food and shelter – particularly the many homeless DPs and refugees.  The Army engineers 
surveyed the damage to public utility systems, shook their heads at the extent of the damage, and 
325 
 
all too often had to improvise for temporary fixes while repair parts could be located or 
manufactured.  Signal Corps soldiers set up temporary communications system.  Medical Corps 
treated the sick and injured.   The tactical soldiers fit in where their skills could best be used – 
and so it went, like any other community – each member contributed.  Logistics laid the 
cornerstone to support German revival and reconstruction.   
It is doubtful in the initial post-war months whether too many of these military forces 
mulled over future foreign policy issues of their or another government, much less, where the 
Army might be stationed fifty years down the road.  Few considered a long-term occupation, at 
least one managed and executed by the Army.  Rather, they worked to clean up some of the mess 
and wait out their return home.   
 As contended in the second chapter, the Army leadership had not counted on a long 
occupation, nor had they planned for one, at least not one under Army management, and 
certainly, no one ever dreamed of American forces in Germany for the decades that followed the 
official ten-year occupation.  The decision to tag the U. S. Army with occupation duty was long 
in coming and resisted by President Roosevelt.  The President ultimately, by 1944, decided that 
the U. S. Army would administer the U. S. military government in Germany.  Secretary of War 
Harry L. Simson supported the decision.  Although General Eisenhower had recommended 
against the U. S. Army assuming the occupation mission, it really was the only choice available 
at that time.  No government or civilian organization other than the U. S. Army possessed the 
resources and logistics support capabilities to carry off the mission, and the U. S. Army had the 
advantage of place and time as well. 
 Late in preparation and final approval, the U. S. occupation operation plan, the Directive 
to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067), completed prior to the 
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Potsdam Protocol, virtually guaranteed U. S. Army presence in Germany until the 
overwhelmingly logistics-in-nature mission was accomplished.  Both documents, JCS 1067 and 
the Potsdam Protocol, recognizing the necessity and validity of such a military occupation, 
nonetheless heralded a hazy, virtually unmeasurable end state with no end date.  Events two 
years into the military occupation, in 1947 and 1948, culminating in the Berlin Blockade, itself a 
huge logistics mission involving as a minimum 50 air flights per day, weather permitting,  
carrying over 5,900,000 pounds per month of supplies into Berlin, changed the playing field and 
altered perceptions of occupation.
527
  Indeed, security issues and politics intruded into the 
everyday.  Logistic support became again the arbiter.   
U. S. Army forces remained in Germany, altering command formations during the 
military occupation to reflect the ongoing changes in doctrine as well as to meet strategic and 
operational ends.   The occupation continued under the Allied High Commission, albeit a limited 
“supervisory” occupation, in the summer of 1949, the intent of which really was to convince the 
French to accept Germany as a partner, and to prepare Germany for inclusion in some sort of 
European defense organization.  Under the High Commissioner occupation period, 1949-1955, 
U. S. military forces continued to manage the Lines of Communications (LOCs), providing 
logistics support for U. S. military and civilian personnel.    
After 1955, although in varying numbers, altered formations and a reopened French 
LOC, at least until 1966, U. S. military forces continued to deploy to Europe.   These LOCs, 
having supported the U. S. occupation forces, and after 1949, the redeploying forces back to 
Germany deemed necessary to counter any Soviet threat to Europe in the face of the Korean 
Conflict in 1950, were well situated for future deployments to Europe.   Of course, as this force 
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 U. S. European Command, Historical Division, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, The Berlin Airlift, 21 June – 
31 December 1948 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1949):  80-82. 
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grew, so did the logistic requirements – more family members, more living accommodations, and 
more support facilities. 
By 1955, ten years after Germany’s unconditional surrender, approximately 250,000 
U. S. service members and 200,000 family members had deployed to West Germany, occupying 
at least 263 acquired and rent-free German Kasernen and facilities.  A mostly sovereign 
Germany actually budgeted, as early as 1950, a fair amount of German taxpayer funds to offset, 
if not cover the costs of repair and/or construction of new facilities under the premise that when 
U. S. forces returned to the United States (the next time), such facilities would revert to German 
use, which they eventually did.  Few expected then, that that day might be a long time in coming.  
The German financial support certainly reduced U. S. Congressional angst over mushrooming 
military expenses, and, of course, reduced American taxpayer expenses.  German-funded 
occupation costs had already contributed expansively to the military occupation. 
The troop numbers would remain over the 200,000 range, depending on security issues in 
the region, until 1991, when the latest drawdown of U. S. forces on the European continent 
began.  A few units, in comparison to the heydays in the 1980s, remain, rent-free in German-
funded facilities.  Although scaled down considerably today, logistics remains the support 
backbone to an Army that must still be made to feel like they are “back home.”  
 The fourth chapter explored how U. S. Army logistics in the U. S. occupation zone 
between 1945 and 1949, laid the foundation for the long-term presence of the U. S. Army in 
Germany.  The voluminous logistics information introduced in this chapter represents the tip of 
the iceberg.  Nonetheless, one can extrapolate from the overview presented just how voluminous 
and intertwining logistics writ large can be.   
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First, if there has been one logistics lesson learned over time, it would be the necessity to 
plan logistics support in advance of an operation.  Fortunately, for the U. S. Army, logisticians 
relied on the warfighting logistics support process with modifications, to provide support into the 
occupation period.  However, the long wait times for political decisions, some created out of the 
necessity for coalition planning, negatively impacted long-term logistics planning.  Even the 
U. S. Army did not have an infinite number of trains, ships, vehicles and reserve food stocks to 
support its forces, the millions of DPs, refugees, and the German population not only in its 
occupation zone, but also in the French and British zones.  As one Army general liked to remind 
his staff, “Hope is not a plan.”  In the final analysis, though, the U. S. Army, knowingly or not, 
laid the foundation for a longer-term presence, and a rather sophisticated one at that.  Support 
agreements were in place for LOCs, transportation routes laid out, facilities renovated or built, to 
include living quarters, shopping, and medical facilities for soldiers and their families, schools 
established and accredited, and later in the stationing period, even contracts established with 
McDonalds, Burger King, T. G. I. Friday’s, Baskin Robbins, and American Express banking and 
tour services.   
Second, initially the rationale for U. S. Army presence was legal and ordered:  the laws of 
war demanded that the occupation force provide at least a minimum level of care to avoid 
“disease and unrest” in the occupied population.  Further, JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Protocol 
expanded the occupation requirements carried out by the occupation forces.  These extensive 
missions occurred simultaneously with the redeployment of soldiers, initially to finish the war in 
the Pacific Theater, and then to demobilize and return the soldiers home.  Nonetheless, the 
repatriation of DPs, redeployment of U. S. soldiers, and ongoing assistance with German 
reconstruction moved along quite well.  By 1948 at the latest, the intrusion of political issues 
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changed the rationale for the presence of military forces from occupation duty to their historic 
mission – to defend, and if need be, to engage in offensive operations.  President Truman, his 
advisors and most sane leaders had little interest in engaging in another conflict, and particularly 
not one with the Soviets.  I think we can presume that at that time, the Soviets likewise had little 
interest in another conflagration.  Fortunately, the first battle and the only serious battle during 
the military occupation, and I would call it an offensive battle, was a logistics one, resulting in a 
logistics support mission probably not rivaled to this day – the Berlin Airlift.  Again, the political 
became logistical.  
The final chapter, addressing the third objective of this study, interpreting the cultural 
impact of the U. S. military logistics support on the German population, presented a number of 
challenges.  First, U. S. Army logistics support did positively affect nearly every German, DP 
and refugee initially, albeit often indirectly through food, fuel support, clothing and the like, 
through repair of critical infrastructure, and in some cases, even employment.  Additionally, 
although probably meant primarily as a propaganda tool, the establishment of the Information 
Centers and their successors, the Amerikahäuser, did provide mountains of carefully selected 
reading material in several languages to include information about the outside world to a people 
starved for such material for twelve years.  However, one should consider that relatively few 
Germans had the time or ability to use Amerikahäuser and like facilities.  Either providing the 
basics of living consumed their waking hours, or they had no transportation assets available to 
get to the Information Centers.   
Second, in venues other than the three selected in this study, school reform, 
Amerikahäuser and the German Youth Activities, the cultural impact might have been quite 
positive, unlike the reception given to the battle for school reform.  American officials, often 
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perceived as arrogant, and perhaps naively so, with a missionary-like zeal, masked by the 
authority vested in them through the military occupation statutes, insisted to the bitter end (and 
the end was bitter in many cases) that the German school system should mirror that of the United 
States.  The Americans lost this battle – the German educators in the three Länder pushed back 
and outlasted the military occupation.   Patience can be a valuable tactic.  While reform was no 
doubt necessary, and many German educators had worked toward various reform measures even 
before the onslaught of National Socialism, might the American proponents of school reform 
have perhaps had more success had they focused on content of the education presented rather  
than on the structure of the school system?  However, in at least one educational endeavor, the 
Americans proved quite helpful, that of assisting with the rewriting and publishing of new 
textbooks.   This endeavor, too, depended on the U. S Army’s logistical support for paper, print, 
typewriters, and even printing machines. 
Third, noting from the fifth chapter, forging a connection between U. S. Army logistics 
support and cultural exchange with the recipients of this support, the German population, might 
be a bridge too far.  This does not imply that the beneficiaries, or for that matter the U. S. service 
members, did not experience each other’s culture.  However, language barriers hindered close 
contact.  Further, most American service members remained in Germany only a short time – one 
year, maybe two.  Moreover, at least in the first two years, military units moved around 
frequently.  Even when an American community developed with the arrival of families, cultural 
connections between Germans and Americans was minimal.  As Kaserne space was limited by 
war damage or already occupied by DPs and prisoners of war, and even if available, had not 
been configured for family life.  Individual Americans did not make their own housing and 
related logistics arrangements.  The U. S. military organization in their assigned area 
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requisitioned housing usually by the block, and set up the necessary accoutrements to support the 
families, to include household help, if available and authorized.  In this instance, some personal 
relationships could blossom.  However, these housing procedures and arrangements allowed 
American families to stick together, generally isolating them from their German neighbors.   
This study began on perhaps a naïve assumption:  that the U. S. Government through its 
agent, the U. S. Army, performed its obligatory mission as a participant in the Potsdam process.  
However, this mission all too soon turned humanitarian and logistics-oriented in character in 
post-war Germany, and only after the Soviet Union blocked access to Berlin in 1948, did that 
mission become political and long-term – containment of the Soviet Union.  Actually, time has 
validated both the initial missions :  obligatory and humanitarian.     
Although problems arose and missteps were taken during the planning, preparation and 
execution of the occupation, I think Earl Ziemke got it right when he wrote: 
Of course, an occupation also differs from a combat operation in various respects 
and in one in particular:  the outcome of a battle will usually – that of an 
occupation, perhaps seldom – be clear.  In a strict sense, maintenance of law and 
order sufficient to prevent interference with combat missions during hostilities 
and unrest or to prevent resistance later on are enough to qualify an occupation as 





.   .   . with logistics, 
 
for, logistics developed not only into the strategy to win the Cold War in Europe, where little or 
no fighting took place, but logistics also stabilized German society immediately after the war, 
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Logistics Matters:  the Growth of Little Americas in Occupied Germany 
Interview Questionnaire 
Where were you in June 1945? 
What were you doing professionally or academically at the War’s end? 
 
Were you required to go through the denazification process?  If so, did U. S. Occupation Forces’ 
requirements and/or restrictions hamper your personal and/or professional goals?  Did this 
denazification process impact on your family or friends?  If so, how?  Your thoughts on this 
aspect of the occupation? 
 
Considering access to news media (for example, radio, newspapers, literature, other 
publications), and family and friends’ discussions, how did you keep yourself informed of and 
react to available information on the presence of the U. S. Occupation Forces? 
 
Were you, family members and/or friends employed by the U. S. Forces?  If so, what prompted 
you to accept employment? 
 




Did you and/or your family members participate in U. S. Forces-sponsored activities or use any 
of the U. S. Forces-sponsored resources (e.g., Haus Amerika)? 
 
What was your reaction to the U. S. Occupation Forces’ “reeducation” program? 
 
Looking back on those days after the war, how would you consider the role of the U.S. Forces 
occupation policies in molding reconstruction of Germany? 
 
How did your experiences with U. S. Force occupation affect/impact on the following generation 
(e.g., your children, nieces, nephews, et al)?  
 
Based on your experiences with Americans during this period (1945-1952), what aspects of 
American culture impressed you (positively or negatively) to the degree that you would 
incorporate these traits into your own cultural experience and lifestyle?  What aspects of German 








Appendix I. 1 
Chart 1   Gainfully Employed, Selected Years, 1882-1964
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  1882 1907 1925 1939 1950 1964 
Total gainfully employed (in millions) 
 
17.0 25.4 32.3 35.7 20.4 27.0 
Distribution by sectors (as percent of 
total): 
      
Agriculture and forestry 42.2 33.9 30.3 25.0 24.6 11.4 
Industry and crafts 35.6 39.9 42.3 40.8 42.7 48.3 
Commerce, communications and other 
services 





             Production Comparison 
 1871-1875 1913 
Coal production Annual average, 34.5 million 
tons 
191.5 million tons 
Lignite production 9.7 million 87.5 million 
Iron production 5.3 million 28.7 million 
Merchant marine 147 units/81,994 gross 
register tons (total internal 
volume) 
2098 units/4,380,348 
 1871 1910 
Pig iron 
Exceeded the British at: 
1.6 million 13.1 million 
10.2 
Crude steel 
Exceeded the British at: 
 13.0 million 
7.6 
 1870 1912 
R/R mileage 18,887 km 60,521 km 
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 Ibid., Chapter I, Chart 2, 24. 
335 
 
Chart 3   Composition of Investment (1913 prices, in percent)
531
    
 1851-55 (%) *1856-60 (%) 1906-10 (%) 
Agriculture    
Buildings 23.2 19.8   6.2 
Machinery   5.1   5.6   2.1 
Livestock   0.3   8.3   1.3 
Inventories   6.9   9.9   0.2 
TOTAL 21.2 43.7   9.8 
    
Industry    
Buildings   5.6   5.8 11.4 
Machinery/inventories 10.5 11.3 30.2 
TOTAL 16.1 17.1 41.7 
*International economic crisis triggered by over-speculation of railway stocks in the 
United States. 
 
Chart 4  German Foreign Trade, Selected Years, 1872-1913
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                (Billions of Marks) 





Imports:   
Other  
1872 2.5 3.5    
1880 3.0 2.8    
1890 3.4 4.3 1.4 1.8 1.1 
1900 4.8 6.0    
1910 7.5 8.9    
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 Toni Pierenkemper and Richard Tilly, The German Economy During the Nineteenth Century, 21. 
532
 Gustav Stolper, Karl Häuser and Knut Borchardt, The German Economy 1870 to the Present, 30.  I have 
combined two charts, in which Gustav Stolper cited his source as the Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 
1880-1915, pages 82, 181.  
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Appendix II.1.2, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, “Table of Contents,” 





















 U. S. Army 
Enemy/ex-enemy 
Citizens & DPs 
Employed by U. S. 
Army 
TOTALS 
8 May 45 3,069,310     
31 Aug 45 2,084,213     
30 Sep 45 1,693,621     
15 Oct 45 1,498,137     
15 Nov 45 1,166,883     
30 Nov 45 943,603   150,479  
15 Dec 45 767,121     
31 Dec 45 667,072     
31 Jan 46 560,101   169,000  
28 Feb 46 498,828   200,000  
31 Mar 46 412,223 6,662  229,508  
30 Apr 46 394,230 8,130 43,474 282,070  
31 May 46 357,917 8,744 46,076 294,711  
30 Jun 46 329,601 8,747 43,958 307,867  
31 Jul 46 302,427 9,434 42,842 323,190  
31 Aug 46 291,664 9,734 41,348 312,144  
30 Sep 46 281,121 10,184 35,532 327,666  
31 Oct 46 246,545 10,776 32,062 315,634  
30 Nov 46 218,581 11,199 29,939 317,070  
31 Dec 46 187,618 11,397 23,732 318,229  
31 Jan 47 167,772 11,396 17,136 310,219  
28 Feb 47 157,246 11,382 13,976 311,463  
31 Mar 47 149,824 11,283 10,727 303,167  
30 Apr 47 144,565 10,943 9,109 276,248  
31 May 47 136,184 10,703 8,067 281,124  
30 Jun 47 134,025 10,187 7,709 262,127  
31 Jul 47 130,654 9,910 6,673 243,662  
31 Aug 47 126,258 9,313 6,758 233,034  
30 Sep 47 123,741 9,161 7,001 225,196  
31 Oct 47 122,982 9,190 7,132 217,917  
30 Nov 47 123,330 9,005 6,855 216,046  
31 Dec 47 124,273 8,826 6,474 215,708  
31 Jan 48 122,777 8,712 5,249 214,779  
29 Feb 48 120,856 8,736 6,258 216,390  
31 Mar 48 118,327 8,825 6,009 215,474  
30 Apr 48 113,910 8,911 6,693   
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 Historical Division European Command, The Evolution of the Occupation Forces in Europe.  Data in the 
monograph is from Machine Records Branch, Adjutant General Division, Headquarters, EUCOM, Civilian 
Requirements Section, Requirements, Organization, Equipment and Movements Branch, Operations, Plans, 
Organization, and Training Division, Headquarters, EUCOM (Frankfurt-am-Main, GE:  European Command, 1948), 
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 United States Army European Command, Office of the Chief Historian, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 
The Berlin Airlift, 21 June – 31 December 1948 (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1949):  97. 
TOTALS                   1,611.49       41,174.86       66,080.79       95,208.65    109,098.20   85,623.50   116,249.50 
 
Sources noted above for notes 1, 3, 4 and 5:  HQ, EUCOM Deputy Commander-in-Chief’s Weekly Staff 
Conference, No. 37, 14 Sep 48, p. 7; No. 46, 16 Nov 48, p.8; No. 50, 14 Dec 48, p. 8; and No. 12, 22 Mar 49, pp. 
10-11, respectively.  Note 2 is from the HQTRS G-4 Monthly Report, “Airlift Cargo,” September 1948. 
 
CA represents Civil Affairs:  resources flown in for civilian population. 
Note:  these two charts, II.3.1 and the following III.3.2 represent only U. S. aircraft. 
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(Did this unit redeploy shortly after war’s end?)  
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June – July 1945: 
                        Headquarters, 1
st
 Infantry Division:  Ansbach 
16
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Bamberg, with subordinate units in Höchstadt an der 
Aisch   
18
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Windsheim with units in Uffenheim, Scheinfeld, 
Neustadt an der Aisch, and Rothenburg ob der Tauber   
26
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Nürnberg with units in Fürth, Erlangen, Forchheim  
Division Artillery:  Dinkelsbühl with units in Triesdorf, Heidenheim, 
Feuchtwangen and Gunzenhausen   
1
st
 Engineer Combat Bn:  Frant Lazne, Czechoslovakia    
701
st
 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company:  Bad Aibling (47) 
Reception Station:  Schonbach 
 
By November 1945, as the Headquarters disbursed across the Zone: 
16
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Mellrichstadt, Kissingen, Gerolzhofen, Königshofen in 
Grabenfeld, Hofheim in Mainfranken, Hassfurt, and Ebern    
18
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Höchstadt an der Aisch, Karlstadt, Würzburg, 
Ochsenfurt, Kitzingen, Neustadt an der Saale 
26
th
 Infantry Regiment:  no change 
 Division Artillery:  Lohr, Alzenau in Mainfranken, Aschaffenburg, Obernburg, 
Mitenberg, Gemünden, Marktheidenfeld, Brückenau, Hammelburg 
 
By July 1951, most of the 1
st
 ID units occupied former Wehrmacht kasernes.   
Headquarters, 1
st
 Infantry Division, 1
st
 Counter Intelligence Corps 
Detachment, 1
st
 Quartermaster Company (Prinz Heinrich Kaserne), 1
st
 Signal 
Company (Flint Kaserne), Military Police Company, 1
st
 Replacement 
Company:  Flint Kaserne, Bad Tölz (1950), Darmstadt 
16
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Fürth (Monteith Barracks)   
18
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Aschaffenburg (Pioneer Kaserne)   
26
th
 Infantry Regiment:  Bamberg (Panzer and La Garde kasernes)   
Division Artillery:  Erlangen (Ferris Barracks), with major subordinate units in 
Kitzingen (Dolan Barracks), Schwabach (O’Brien Barracks), Aschaffenburg and 
Erlangen   
1
st
 Engineer Combat Bn:  Darmstadt (Leib-Garde Kaserne)    
701
st
 Ordnance Light Maintenance Company:  Bamberg 
Reception Station:  Schonbach 
1
st
 Reconnaissance Troop and Division Band: Erlangen (Ferris Barracks) 
1
st
 Medical Battalion:  Kitzingen 
48
th
 AAA AW Battalion (SP):  Knielingen (Gerszewski Barracks) 
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Appendix III.2.1, Zones of Occupation
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Appendix IV.2.2.2a, Disposal of Military Installations, August-September 1946
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Appendix IV.2.2.2b, Dwelling Units Inhabited by Indigenous Population and Displaced                       


























Army Exchange Service Retail Installations, 1946-1947
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Post Exchanges and Post Exchange Offices 260 283 
Breweries (contract with German breweries) 14 17 
Ice Cream Plants 52 55 
Laundry and Dry Cleaning 47 44 
Photo Finishing Labs/Plants 8 15 
Shoe Repair Centers/Plants 16 18 
Snack Bars 257 279 
Soda Fountains 192 290 
Watch, Radio, Fountain Pen Repair /Merchandise   Repair 52 47 
Photography/Portrait Studios 16 21 
Beer Halls/Beer Bars 19 7 
Auto Sales Stores 3  
Garages 49 53 
Service Stations 60 69 
Barber Shops 203 269 
Beauty Shops 55 67 
Bowling Alleys 2 9 
Tailor Shops 173 171 
Bulk Stores 43  
Bakeries and/or Donut Plants  24 
Soft Drink Bottling Plants  12 
Juke Boxes  69 
Shoe Shine Stands  107 
Valet Service Pick-Up Points  95 
Flower Shop  1 
Taxi Services  3 
*News Stands  159 
*Magazine Circulation Points  11 
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Displaced Persons, Expellees in the U. S. Occupation Zone
546
  
Date Total DPs Repatriated 
by Month 
Number of DPs 
Remaining in Germany 




September 45 2,555,109 534,829  
October 45 2,667,764 474,506  
November 45 2,708,549 439,841  
December 45  511,000  
January 46548  406,000 150,000 
February 46  327,000 35,000 Sudetens 
10,000 Swabians 
March 46   245,000 Sudetens 
22,000 Swabians 
April 46  532,000 342,000 Sudetens 
46,000 Swabians 
92,000 mixed 
May 46  approx. 500,000 646,338 combined 
Sudeten and Swabians 
June 46    
July 46  500,000 in centers 
50,000 outside  
 
August 46  400,000 410,000 refugees 




October 46 2,950,000 395,000 1,465,000549  
November 46 2,970,050 600,904550  
 
January 47 2,999,000 369,000 in centers 
224,500 outside 
TOTAL of 1,626,672 
Sudetens 1,838,526 
mix of refugees from 
eastern Europe, HU 
and CZ 
Apr 47  366,000 in centers 
166,000 outside 
Apr 47 numbers from 
USAREUR Second 
Year Report 
                                                   
 
546
 Data from Monthly Reports of the Military Government between Sep1945-Sep1946, Report Nos.3 through 15.  
USGCC claimed 4.1 million DPs repatriated by 31 Jul 1945, in Monthly Report of the Military Government, No. 1, 
Aug 1945.    
547
 Although responsibility for housing, food, et al., rested with German agencies, Expellees competed with local 
areas for food, housing, and other support, resources already in short supply. 
548
 Expellees from Czechoslovakia and Hungary officially started arriving in the U. S. Occupation Zone in Jan 46.   
549
 At this time, the category designation changed from Expellee to New Citizens, and numbers were often mixed 
with non-Sudeten, non-Swabian refugees from Eastern Europe. 
550
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United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Teams in the 
 U. S. Occupation Zone, 1945 
U. S. Western Military 
District 
3  Giessen  
(Verdun Kaserne) 
9  Darmstadt 












53 Wolfsanger (Kassel) 
67 Heidenheim 
68 Göppingen 






93 Schwäbisch Gmünd 
94 Ettlingen 
95 Ludwigsburg 






























717 Bettenhausen (Kassel) 
722 Dieburg 



























133 Amberg (Kaiser Wilhelm 
Kaserne)  approx.. 12K DPs 
136 Metten 
137 Lauf a.d. Pegnitz 
143 Passau 
144 Markt Redwitz 
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% Completed a/o 
Dec 1946 
Military Communities 69,175,000 434,800 52.7 
Headquarters 1,845,000 22,885  
Command Schools 1845,000 22,885  
Hospitals 4,600,000 17,200 47.0 
Depots 3,600,000 52,096 59.9 
Shops 332,000 6,250  
Special Installations554 350,000 4,860 51.9 
Bridges:  Highway 






Railways 2,560,000 45.400  
Highways 1,572,000 31,900  
Utilities 2,760,000 38,200  
Ports 432,000 1,210  
Inland Waterways 400,000 25  
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 Office of the Chief Historian European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, The Physical 
Plant – Its Procurement, Construction and Maintenance, 49. 
553
 “Man hours” became the unit of measure for work as assigning a monetary value had at this time little meaning 
and most of the labor included POWs, DPs and U.S. military – all receiving room and board.
 
   
554
 Includes laundries, radio stations, beverage plants, receiver (wireless) sites, cold storage warehouses, map 







Headquarters, EUCOM Special Services Division Activities, 1949
555
     
ACTIVITY Participation in 1949 
Recreation Centers:  Garmisch and Berchtesgaden, Chiemsee 327,500 
Organized Travel Tours primarily to Switzerland, BENELUX, and 
France 
Approx. 6,500 
Arts & Crafts:  82 craft shops and 89 darkrooms Approx. 350,000 
Service Clubs:  94 with approximately 400 hostesses Between 1 and 2 million per 
month 
Libraries:  360 libraries or book collections with 22 permanent 
totaling more than 600,000 books and numerous journals and 
magazines                                          
In March 1949:  377,000 
In September, 1949:  304,500   
Theatrical activities at every major installation  
Motion Pictures:  105 - 35 mm theaters Average per month 700,000 
                             140 – 16 mm theaters Average per month 150,000 
Religious Activities:   
   - Between 125 and 143 chaplains within the U.S. zone 
   - Approx. 126 chapels with 1/3 in space shared in German churches  
   - New chapel/church construction at Garmisch, Wiesbaden,  
     Heidelberg, and Rhein-Main Air Base; 
   -Included regular daily vesper services and Sunday religious 
     services on AFN 
Marriages:  1,053 
Baptisms:  1,033 
Funerals:  341 
Patient visits:  135,926 
Prisoner visits:  10,082 
Pre-marriage counseling:  8,693 
Individual counseling:  125,760 
 
Headquarters, EUCOM Special Service Division Sports Programs, 1949 
   
Type of Sport Contestants Spectators Teams 
Football 2,125 268,000 46 
Touch Football 4,100 164,000 325 
Basketball 10,800 2,044.00 540 
Boxing 809 120,000  
Bowling 1,695 105,000 1,099 
Track 2,070 28,000 33 
Swimming 285 8,000 15 
Skiing 450 8,700  
Volleyball 3,360 68,600 285 
Table Tennis  3,250   
Fencing 106   
Ice Hockey 120 60,200 8 
Golf 855   
Tennis 1,148 1,500  
Softball 11,700 350,000 585 
Baseball 2,420 1,261,600 121 
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 Historical Division, European Command, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1949, Annual Narrative Report, 







PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARYCOMMUNITIES
556
 
USFET AGENCY TASKS 
Quartermaster Establishment of commissaries, including home delivery service 
Bakeries 
Laundry, dry cleaning, shoe repair services 
Supply of household furnishings 
Army Exchange 
Service 
Post exchanges, with branches in each community furnishing clothing sales, 
fountain services, sale of locally procured foods and dairy products (as 
authorized), gifts, sundry items, automobiles (and more) 
Barber shops, beauty parlors 
Auto repair, gasoline services 
Tailor shops 
Photo shops  
Special Services Athletic facilities to include riding stables, ball parks, football fields, swimming 
pools, gymnasiums 
Theaters (both movie and play) 
Service  clubs 
Libraries 
Guest houses 
Playgrounds for children 
Other entertainment as requested and available 
Red Cross activities 
Information and 
Education 
Schools, K through 12, procurement of teachers 
Adult educational projects 
Newspapers, magazines  
Chaplain Facilities for religious services (denominations as required) 
Surgeon Hospitals & clinics for medical care of military personnel and dependents 
Signal Communications facilities, including home telephone service 
Bremen Port 
Command 
Staging (facilities) for incoming and outgoing dependents to include Guest House 
accommodations, handling of baggage, et al 
Transportation Movement of dependents, baggage and household goods between military 
communities and the port 
Plan for the flow of dependents into the Theater 
Engineer Establish construction standards based on requirements specified by other services 
&on availability of construction materials  
Determination of requirements for  materials and labor  
Adjutant General Postal service for troops and their families 
Commanding 
Generals of major 
tactical commands 
Responsible for the development, organization and efficient functioning of the 
MILCOMS assigned to them557 
Appoint community commanders for each community              
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Appendix Chapter IV.5. 













Snapshot of the OMGUS-WB-ERAD, ICD/ISD and CAD Reorientation Program 
Creating democracy for Germany, even with German assistance, cost both the U. S. government 
and the German people.  Resource-intensive in terms of personnel, funds, time, and the more 
traditional logistics support, the projects and programs planned, coordinated, implemented, and 
subsequently monitored, focused on “reorientation of the German cultural pattern.”  The buffet 
of ideas to reorient the German population, presented by the OMGUS-WB-ERAD in their 
Memorandum 13, Reorientation Program, dated 10 March 1948, kept staffs in the ERAD, 
ICD/ISD and CAD busy, especially as the divisions argued increasingly that they were 
understaffed.  Documenting German participation is difficult in many cases, as attendance 
statistics could not be found in most cases.  However, even with attendance statistics, measuring 
and evaluating German response, was not easy, and even surveys such as the Merritts’ analysis 
of the OMGUS surveys represented only a snapshot in time and place.  How palatable were these 
programs to the German public? 
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Information Control Division 
Public forums 
Extension of overt radio programs 
Political information programs 
Establishment of U. S. Information Centers and American reading rooms (Amerikahäuser) 
Surveying German public opinion 
Promoting exchange of publishers, editors, radio personnel, writers between Germany and 
democratic nations 
Education and Religious Affairs Division 
German school reform, to include bringing local community and parents into the equation 
  
Supervision & operation of curriculum & textbook revision centers, to include development 
of social studies (civic duties and responsibilities) in the curriculum at all school levels  
Importation & distribution of relief cultural supplies from foreign nations. 
Establishing radio programs in the schools, to include assisting with procurement of the 
radio sets 
Procuring & distributing foreign educational materials to the German schools; establishing 
direct relations between German and American schools  
Encouraging & coordinating correspondence and conferences between American expert 
consultants and German officials 
Coordinating activities of voluntary agencies working in Germany 
Expediting student/teacher exchange between Germany and the U. S. 
Supervision of Kreis and Land youth activities (GYA) 
Conducting seminars with German groups concerned with educational, religious, and youth 
activities 
Civil Administration Division 
Conducting seminars explaining military government policies and coordination with German 
officials; orientation of Germans on democratization aims and  principles;  
Between Sep 47 and Mar 48: seminars in 22 locations in Württemberg-Baden, with a total 
attendance of 1,032 German residents  
Conducting public forums on protection of civic liberties and other political/civic actions 
possible for Germans; Heidelberg (1/48), 1,200 attending; Esslingen (3/48), 200 attending; 
Sinsheim (4/48), 100 attending. 
Purchase and translation of material on public administration for German government 
officials and educators 
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Appendix:  Glossary 
ACC    Allied Control Commission 
ACC/AMG    Allied Control Commission/Allied Military Government 
ADSEC    Advance Section 
Adv    Advance 
AEF    American Expeditionary Forces 
AG    Adjutant General 
ARGONAUT    International Conference held at Malta and Yalta, January-February 1945 
ASCZ    Advance Section, Communications Zone 
Bn    Battalion 
CA  Civil Affairs 
CAD    Civil Affairs Division 
CAHQ    Civil Affairs Headquarters 
CA/MG    Civil Affairs/Military Government 
CATS    Civil Affairs Training School 
CCAC    Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
CCAC/L    Subcommittee of Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London 
CCAC/S    Supply subcommittee of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee 
CCS    Combined Chiefs of Staff 
CG    Commanding General 
CinC    Commander in Chief 
Class I Supply Subsistence items, generally food and water 
Class II Supply Military clothing, individual equipment and administrative supplies 
Class III Supply Petroleum, oils and lubricants 
Class IV Supply Construction and barrier materials 
Class V Supply Ammunition 
Class VI 
Supplies 
Personal demand items such as soap, toothbrushes, etc.  
Class VII 
Supply 




Class IX Supply Repair parts 
Class X Supply 
Items for non-military programs, e.g., civil affairs operations; this class of 






CO    Commanding Officer 
COMMS Communications 
CofS    Chief of Staff 
ComZ or 
COMMZ   
 Communications Zone 
CONUS Continental United States 
COSSAC   
 Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command; Chief of Staff to the Supreme 
Allied Commander (Designate) Coy Company 
CRICKET    Malta portion of ARCONAUT Conference 
D.B.S.    Delta Base Section 
DCOSSAC    Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command 
Dept    Department 
Det    Detachment 
Div    Division 
DJAG    Deputy Judge Advocate General 
DODDS 
Department of Defense Dependent Schools (replaced the Dependent 
School System 
DP    Displaced Person 
DPMG    Deputy Provost Marshal General 
DPRSC    Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-commission 
DPR&W    Displaced Persons Relief and Welfare 
DRAGOON   
 Final code for Allied invasion of southern coast of France, 15 August 
1944 
DSS Dependent School System 
EAC    European Advisory Commission 
ECAD    European Civil Affairs Division 
ECLIPSE   
 Name given in November 1944 to post-hostilities plan for the initial phase 
of military occupation of Germany  
EM    Enlisted Men 
ERAD, ECAD 
Education and Religious Affairs Division, succeeded by Education and 
Cultural Affairs Division – branch of military government organization 
ET; ETO    European Theater; European Theater of Operations 
HQTRS, 
EUCOM 
Headquarters, European Command 
FEComZ    Forward Echelon, Communications Zone 






FUSA    First U.S. Army 
FUSAG    First U.S. Army Group 
Fwd    Forward 
G-1    Personnel Division, General Staff 
G-2    (Military) Intelligence Division, General Staff 
G-3    Operations Division, General Staff 
G-4    Supply Division, General Staff 
G-5    Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF, AFHQ, Army divisions 
Gen    General 
GHQ    General Headquarters 
GO    General Order 
Gp    Group 
GS    General Staff 
HICOG High Commissioner for Germany 
HQ; Hq    Headquarters 
HUSKY    Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943 
HUSKYLAND    Code name for Sicily 
I&C    Information and Censorship 
Inf    Infantry 
Intel    Intelligence 
ICD, ICS 
Information Control Division, succeeded by Information Control Service, 
branch of military government organization 
IRO 
International Relief Organization, UN organization succeeding UNRRA in 
administration and maintenance of the DP mission  
JAG    Judge Advocate General 
JAGD    Judge Advocate General's Department 
JCAC    Joint Civil Affairs Committee 
JCS    Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LOC    Line of Communications 
LST    Landing Ship (Tank) 
MFA&A    Sub-commission for Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives 
MG  Military Government 
MGR Military Government Regulation 
Mil    Military 






MP    Military Police 
MRS    Military Railway Service 
Msg    Message 
MT    Military Transport 
MTO    Mediterranean Theater of Operations 
MTOUSA    Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 
NATO USA    North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army 
NEPTUNE   
 Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. This code name was used 
for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning 
papers which referred to the target area and date. 
OCMH    Office, Chief of Military History 
OCS    Office, Chief of Staff 
OMGUS Office of Military Government Unites States in Germany 
OSS    Office of Strategic Services 
OTB Occupational Troop Basis 
OVERLORD   
 Plan for the Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 
1944 
OWI    Office of War Information 
PAD    Public Affairs Division 
PBS    Peninsular Base Section 
PMG    Provost Marshal General 
PMGO    The Provost Marshal General's Office 
POL    Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
POW    Prisoner of War 
PWD    Psychological Warfare Division 
QM    Quartermaster 
QMG    Quartermaster General 
QUADRANT    U.S.-British Conference at Quebec, August 1943 
RANKIN   
 Plan for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the 
German position 
Regt    Regiment 
SAC    Supreme Allied Commander 
SACMED    Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater 
SCAEF    Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces 






SGS    Secretary, General Staff 
SHAEF    Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force 
SMG    School of Military Government 
SOP    Standing Operating Procedure 
SOS    Services of Supply 
Sup  Supply 
SW    Secretary of War 
SWNCC    State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee  
TAG    The Adjutant General 
TOE    Table of Organization and Equipment 
Telecon    Telephone conversation 
Tng    Training 
TORCH    Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942 
TRIDENT    U.S.-British conference held at Washington, May 1943 
TSFET    Theater Service Forces, European Theater 
TUSA    Third U.S. Army 
UNRRA    United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
USFET    United States Forces European Theater 
WD    War Department 
WDCSA    War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 
WDGS    War Department General Staff 
WDP    War Department Pamphlet 
WPB    War Production Board 
WPD    War Plans Division 
WSA    War Shipping Administration 
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